Beaumont v. Beaumont

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

NADINE BEAUMONT, Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

DAVID BEAUMONT, Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0555 FC

FILED 10-24-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. L8015DO201907142
The Honorable Kenneth Gregory, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Silk Law Office, Lake Havasu City
By Melinda Silk
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Law Offices of Heather C. Wellborn PC, Lake Havasu City
By Heather C. Wellborn
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding
Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 In this second appeal, both parties challenge orders made on
remand. Nadine Beaumont (“Wife”) appeals the denial of her requests for
spousal maintenance and expert witness fees. David Beaumont
(“Husband”) cross-appeals the finding that stock in a joint trust account is
Wife’s separate property. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 The parties divorced in 2021. As relevant to this appeal, the
community property included real property in Pennsylvania that generated
monthly oil and gas lease royalties in varying amounts. Around the time of
the original trial, the royalty payments averaged $5,000 monthly. Beaumont
v. Beaumont, 1 CA-CV 21-0426 FC/1 CA-CV 21-0642 FC (consolidated), 2023
WL 164063, at *1, ¶ 3 (Ariz. App. Jan. 12, 2023) (mem. decision). The divorce
decree awarded the Pennsylvania property to the parties as tenants in
common and ordered them to share the royalties equally.

¶3 Wife inherited stock during the marriage. In the decree, the
superior court found it “more likely than not” that Wife gifted a portion of
the stock to the community by transferring it into a joint trust account. As a
result, Wife was ordered to pay Husband $151,585 for his share of the stock
in the joint trust account. In the first appeal, we vacated this ruling because
the superior court applied an incorrect legal standard when determining
whether the stock was community property. Id. at *2, ¶ 13. We also vacated
the award of expert witness fees to Wife because the superior court applied
an incorrect prevailing party standard. Id. at *7, ¶¶ 42-43.

1 Because the record in this appeal does not include the complete
transcript, we take judicial notice of the trial transcripts filed in the first
appeal. In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 4 (App. 2000) (“It is proper for
a court to take judicial notice of its own records or those of another action
tried in the same court.”); Ariz. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

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¶4 Under the decree, Wife received $1,000 monthly in spousal
maintenance until she turned 65. In the first appeal, we affirmed the
conclusion that Wife is eligible for spousal maintenance under Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 25-319(A)(4). Id. at *6, ¶ 40. But we remanded
for reconsideration of the amount and duration of the award because Wife’s
financial circumstances may change depending on how the superior court
characterized the stock in the joint trust account. Id. at *6, ¶ 41.

¶5 Indeed, on remand, the superior court determined there was
no clear and convincing evidence that Wife intended to gift the stock to the
community. Thus, the stock, worth $303,170, remained Wife’s separate
property. The court declined to award spousal maintenance based on the
increase in Wife’s financial resources, the corresponding decrease in
Husband’s resources, and a reevaluation of the marital standard of living.
The court did not reinstate the expert fee award to Wife, finding that
Husband’s position was not unreasonable. The court declined to award
either party attorney’s fees and costs for the first appeal and remand
proceedings.

¶6 Both parties appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. The Record Supports the Stocks’ Separate Property
Characterization.

¶7 When Wife inherited the stock, it was her separate property.
A.R.S. § 25-213(A). Even so, Husband argues that Wife gifted the stock to
the community by placing it in a joint trust account. See In re Marriage of
Cupp, 152 Ariz. 161, 164 (App. 1986) (“Separate property can be transmuted
into community property by agreement, gift or commingling.”). Wife
maintains that she did not intend a gift to the community but deposited
some of the inherited stocks in a joint trust account because Husband
threatened to abandon the family if she did not put his name on the stocks.

¶8 The law does not presume a gift to the community when one
spouse deposits separate funds, or stocks in this case, into a joint account.
Stevenson v. Stevenson, 132 Ariz. 44, 46 (1982); Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz.
592, 595, ¶ 10 (App. 2017); see also O’Hair v. O’Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 239-40
(1973). “The burden is on the party claiming the action was a gift to establish
the claim by clear and convincing proof.” Bobrow, 241 Ariz. at 595, ¶ 10
(citing O’Hair, 109 Ariz. at 239); see also Stevenson, 132 Ariz. at 46.

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¶9 Husband’s reliance on the inference of a gift language in Grant
v. Grant, 119 Ariz. 470, 472 (App. 1978), is misplaced. The supreme court
later clarified in Stevenson, 132 Ariz. at 46, that the legislature rejected the
gift presumption when it adopted § 14-6103(A), now § 14-6211. Wife’s
transfer to a joint account may be viewed as some evidence of a gift, but it
is not conclusive. Thus, the superior court had to determine whether
Husband’s evidence showed Wife’s donative intent by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. This determination is “a question of fact, which we review
under a clearly erroneous standard.” Bobrow, 241 Ariz. at 595, ¶ 11.

¶10 Husband argued that if Wife acted under duress as she
claimed, she would have transferred all the stock to the joint account. The
superior court found this argument had some merit but was speculative
and did not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence. As more
evidence of Wife’s donative intent, Husband argued that Wife gifted the
stocks to the community to convert all property to community property,
including Husband’s transfer of his separate Pennsylvania property and
royalty payments. The superior court found this was not clear and
convincing evidence of a gift because Husband’s transfer occurred many
years earlier, and no corroborating evidence, such as communication
between the parties or by Wife, supported this theory.

¶11 The superior court found that placing the funds in a joint
account met the preponderance of evidence standard. Still, no other
evidence showed that Wife intended to gift the stock to the community.
Thus, Husband did not meet his burden of showing clear and convincing
evidence of a donative intent. The court’s decision required it to weigh the
parties’ conflicting testimony and judge credibility. We defer to the superior
court’s determination and do not reevaluate the evidence. Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347-48, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). Given the lack of objective
evidence of Wife’s intent, we cannot say the court’s decision was clearly
erroneous.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying
Spousal Maintenance to Wife.

¶12 Wife challenges the superior court’s denial of spousal
maintenance on remand. We review a spousal maintenance ruling for an
abuse of discretion. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 348, ¶ 14.

¶13 In the decree, the superior court found the parties had a high
standard of living. The court also found that Wife was in poor health and
had not worked outside the home in over eleven years, and reentering the

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workforce at her age and with her health conditions would be difficult and
unlikely. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(1), (3), (10). As for the parties’ financial
circumstances, the court found they had relatively equal, significant
financial assets. Still, Wife would likely have to spend her assets to maintain
the marital standard of living. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(5), (9). By contrast,
Husband can keep working and need not rely on the other assets for his
living expenses. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(4), (5). The court also found the
17-year marriage to be of medium duration and that Wife did not contribute
to Husband’s earning ability. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(2), (6). The court noted
that Husband’s financial position was “a moving target” because of his
accounting methods. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(4), (5). Finally, Wife’s cost of
health insurance was high. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(12).

¶14 After considering the parties’ supplemental briefs on remand,
the superior court accepted Husband’s argument that the record did not
show a high marital standard of living, citing the parties’ modest vehicles,
need for home repairs, and the lack of extravagances in daily life or regular
vacations. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(1). The court also found that the parties’
financial resources changed because Wife had another $150,000 worth of
stocks, and Husband’s resources decreased correspondingly. See A.R.S.
§ 25-319(B)(4), (5), (9). The court held that “this case was already a close call
in terms of awarding maintenance to [Wife].” Finally, the court considered
Husband’s argument that applying the new Spousal Maintenance
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) would lead to a $79 award. See Ariz. Sup. Ct.,
Arizona Spousal Maintenance Guidelines (2023),
https://azcourts.gov/familylaw/Child-Support-Family-Law-
Information/Spousal-Maintenance-Guidelines.

¶15 Wife argues that the superior court abused its discretion by
finding that the parties had comparable resources. First, she argues that if
Husband’s finances were “a moving target,” an accurate comparison was
impossible. Wife also disputes her royalty income. Essentially, Wife asks
this court to reweigh these competing factors. We decline to do so.

¶16 Wife contends that receiving 100% of the stocks did not
improve her financial position relative to Husband. She argues that
Husband can continue to work, but she must dip into her assets to meet her
needs. Wife’s contention is based on a faulty premise. Although the stocks
are not now income-producing, Wife can transform them into
income-producing assets. See Deatherage v. Deatherage, 140 Ariz. 317, 320
(App. 1984) (Property for spousal maintenance purposes includes
“property presently producing income as well as property capable of
producing income or otherwise transformed in order to provide for the

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reasonable needs of the spouse.”). Wife presented no evidence showing that
she cannot sell the stocks and place the proceeds in an interest-bearing
account. The spousal maintenance ruling does not require Wife to use the
stocks to support herself. Id. at 320-21. The court correctly considered the
income-producing potential of this sizeable asset. Id. Moreover, the amount
of separate property restored to Wife far exceeded the total spousal
maintenance previously awarded. Thus, the record supports the finding
that Wife’s financial position significantly improved and no longer
supported the spousal maintenance award.

¶17 Finally, Wife argues the superior court’s reference to the
Guidelines was legal error. The court based its decision on reallocating the
stock and reconsidering the couple’s standard of living. After making this
finding, the court also noted that applying the Guidelines would lead to a
minimal award, which further supported its decision. The court did not
apply the Guidelines, and referring to them for comparison was not error.

¶18 The superior court reconsidered all evidence bearing on the
spousal maintenance factors on remand. We find no abuse of discretion and
affirm the denial of spousal maintenance.

III. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying an
Award of Expert Fees to Wife.

¶19 In the first appeal, this court vacated the award of expert
witness fees to Wife because the superior court relied on an erroneous
prevailing party standard. Beaumont, 1 CA-CV 21-0426 FC/1 CA-CV
21-0642 FC, at *7, ¶¶ 42-43. We stated, “[o]n remand, the superior court may
reinstate the fee award if it determines that Husband’s position was
unreasonable independent of [his] decision not to obtain an independent
and certified business appraisal.” Id. at *7, ¶ 43. On remand, the superior
court did not find Husband’s position unreasonable and declined to
reinstate the award. We review this ruling for an abuse of discretion.
Breitbart-Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74, 83, ¶ 35 (App. 2007).

¶20 Wife argues the superior court abused its discretion in two
ways. First, she contends that Husband should be sanctioned for
misleading the court about his expert’s valuation, which was essentially a
critique of Wife’s expert’s valuation. But the mandate required the superior
court to consider Husband’s reasonableness independent of this issue.
Beaumont, 1 CA-CV 21-0426 FC/1 CA-CV 21-0642 FC, at *7, ¶ 43. According
to Wife, the decree stated that Husband’s position on the business valuation
was unreasonable. But the entire finding stated that “[Husband’s] position

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on the business valuation was unreasonable and not supported by an
independent and certified business appraisal.” On remand, the court,
which heard the arguments at trial, reviewed the basis for its finding and
concluded that Husband’s unreasonableness related to the lack of an
independent business valuation and that Husband’s position was not
otherwise unreasonable. Viewing this finding in the light most favorable to
upholding the judgment, we cannot say it is clearly erroneous. See
McMurray v. Dream Catcher USA, Inc., 220 Ariz. 71, 74, ¶ 6 (App. 2009) (“In
reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny attorney fees, we view the record
in the light most favorable to sustaining that decision and will uphold the
court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”).

¶21 Second, Wife argues the superior court disregarded that
Husband acted unreasonably when he used community funds to pay his
expert because Wife paid her expert between $8,000 and $9,000 from her
separate funds. Husband did not respond to this argument on appeal. Still,
we find no abuse of discretion because the decree awarded Wife a $10,000
equalization payment to offset the “personal bank accounts” and
Husband’s “post-service spending.” Viewing the record in the light most
favorable to affirming the ruling, id., we find the equalization payment
could account for Husband’s use of community funds for his expert
witness. See also Beaumont, 1 CA-CV 21-0426 FC/1 CA-CV 21-0642 FC, at *6,
¶ 36 (affirming the $10,000 equalization payment). As a result, on this
record, we cannot say the court ignored the sources of the funds used to
pay the expert witnesses.

IV. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying
Attorney’s Fees on Remand and the First Appeal.

¶22 Both parties appeal the denial of attorney’s fees for the
remand proceedings and the first appeal. We review the ruling for an abuse
of discretion. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 286, ¶ 29 (App. 2019).

¶23 Wife contends there is a disparity in the parties’ financial
resources because Husband continues to work and earn an income while
she must rely on the assets awarded to her. Wife also contends that
Husband has taken unreasonable positions. On the other hand, Husband
argues that Wife has been unreasonable, selfish, and failed to cite the record
in her filings.

¶24 We agree with the superior court that neither party’s
positions were unreasonable, nor was a fee award warranted. Zealous
litigation does not necessarily equate with unreasonableness. Neither party

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has directed us to anything specific in the record showing the court abused
its discretion by denying attorney’s fees on remand and the first appeal.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

¶25 In exercising our discretion, after considering the
reasonableness of the parties’ positions and financial resources, we decline
to award attorney’s fees on appeal. See A.R.S. § 25-324. Neither party can be
viewed as prevailing, and we decline to award costs. See Murphy Farrell
Dev., LLLP v. Sourant, 229 Ariz. 124, 134-35, ¶ 38 (App. 2012) (as amended)
(“Applying the ‘totality of the litigation test,’ we conclude neither party is
the ‘successful party’ on appeal entitled to taxable costs as both were
successful and unsuccessful in equal measure.”); A.R.S. § 12–342.

CONCLUSION

¶26 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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