Hirschi v. Hirschi

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

BETTIJO BOUSHLEY HIRSCHI, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

HEATH TRAVIS HIRSCHI, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0625 FC
FILED 08-01-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2020-053255
The Honorable Paula A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Davis Miles, PLLC, Mesa
By Melissa F. Benson
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Wife

Schiefer Law Firm, PLC, Mesa
By Spencer T. Schiefer
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant Husband
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 In 2020, Heath Hirschi (“Husband”) and Bettijo Hirschi
(“Wife”) entered into a decree (the “Consent Decree”) dissolving their
marriage. The Consent Decree incorporated the terms of a stipulated
Property Settlement Agreement (the “PSA”) that, among other things,
awarded the former marital residence (the “Residence”) to Wife and
provided that each party would remain responsible for one-half of the
mortgage. Husband later sought relief from that provision of the PSA,
asking the superior court to order that Wife alone was responsible for the
mortgage. The court denied Husband’s request. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The parties were married in 1999. They lived in the Residence
with their four minor children until 2020.

¶3 According to Husband, the Residence was subject to a
mortgage on which the parties owed “the approximate amount of
$405,000.00 as of August 4, 2020.” In mid-2020, the parties refinanced the
mortgage. Both parties signed the refinancing documents. The prior
mortgage loan had an account number ending in -8730, while the new loan
had an account number ending in -1240. (The significance of these details
will become apparent shortly.)

¶4 The parties separated sometime in 2020. Wife and the parties’
children continued to live in the Residence.

¶5 Wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage in October 2020. By
the end of the year, the parties had executed agreements resolving all issues
in the case. The parties agreed, among other things, that Husband would
pay Wife no child support, but would instead pay non-modifiable spousal
maintenance of $2,700 per month for a fixed term of years. The parties also
executed the PSA in December 2020, allocating marital property and
assigning responsibility for marital debts. The PSA provided, for example,
that Husband was awarded the community’s 2010 GMC Sierra and was

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solely responsible for any liens thereon, and Wife was awarded certain
other vehicles while being solely responsible for any liens thereon.

¶6 The PSA awarded the Residence to Wife. Schedule C and
Schedule D to the PSA, which set forth the debts assigned to Wife and
Husband, respectively, contain virtually identical provisions in Paragraph
7 assigning each party responsibility for “[o]ne-half” of the debt secured by
the Residence “as of August 4, 2020.” The only difference between Schedule
C’s Paragraph 7 and Schedule D’s Paragraph 7 is the mortgage loan account
number. Paragraph 7 to Schedule C states that Wife is responsible for

One half of Debt owed to Mortgage on [the Residence] as of
August 4, 2020, account [number ending in -1240] with an
approximate balance of $406,500.

¶7 Paragraph 7 to Schedule D, by contrast, states that Husband
is responsible for

One half of Debt owed to Mortgage on [the Residence] as of
August 4, 2020, account [number ending -8730] with an
approximate balance of $406,500.

¶8 Paragraph 7 to Schedule D contains a handwritten
modification, however; the account number ending in -8730 was crossed
out and the account number ending in -1240 was handwritten in its place.
It is undisputed that Wife made this handwritten modification to Schedule
D, although the parties dispute whether Wife made the modification before
or after Husband signed the PSA.

¶9 Both parties signed the PSA and initialed each of its
schedules, including Schedules C and D, on December 1, 2020. That same
day, they signed the Consent Decree, which expressly incorporated the PSA
but also provided that the PSA “shall remain a separately enforceable
contractual agreement” of the parties. The parties’ signatures on the
Consent Decree appear directly below the line affirming that the parties’
“agreement about division of property and debts is fair and equitable.” The
superior court entered the Consent Decree in January 2021.

¶10 More than a year and a half later, Husband petitioned to
modify the Consent Decree and the PSA in several respects, including the
spousal maintenance provision and the provision “stating that [Husband]
is assigned one-half of the debt owed on the mortgage” to the Residence.
His spousal maintenance obligation should be terminated or reduced,
Husband argued, because he “simply cannot afford to continue to pay”

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Wife $2,700.00 per month “while trying to meet his current living
expenses.” Husband further asserted that, despite language to the contrary
in the PSA, the parties’ intent was that Husband would pay half of the
Residence’s mortgage only for an unspecified “transitionary period,” after
which Wife was to assume sole responsibility for the mortgage.
Accordingly, Husband asked the court to order Wife to either sell the
Residence or “refinance [it] into her name only.” Husband also requested
modifications to the legal decision-making and parenting time provisions
of the Consent Decree.

¶11 Wife moved for summary judgment on Husband’s request for
relief from his financial obligations under the PSA, arguing that the parties
agreed that Husband’s spousal maintenance obligation would be non-
modifiable and so the court lacked “jurisdiction to modify or terminate” it.
Likewise, she argued, the parties “agreed to split the mortgage” on the
Residence, and Husband’s belated request for relief from that agreement
amounted to an improper “attempt[] to appeal the Consent Decree.”

¶12 In his response to Wife’s motion for summary judgment,
Husband argued that he “was hit hard by the COVID recession” and that
his ongoing obligation to pay spousal maintenance and half of the
Residence’s mortgage imposed “a financial hardship” on him “due to
circumstances that were out of his control.” Husband also changed his
position regarding his obligation for the loan secured by the Residence.
Although Husband had asserted, in his petition to modify, that he had
agreed to pay half of the mortgage loan for a “transitionary period,” he now
denied that he ever agreed to pay any part of that debt. He explained that
when he initialed and signed the PSA and its schedules, Paragraph 7 to
Schedule D “listed the loan number for the original [mortgage] loan,” i.e.,
the mortgage loan with an account number ending in -8730. Before
submitting the proposed Consent Decree and accompanying documents to
the court for entry of judgment, he alleged, Wife surreptitiously “alter[ed]
the loan number for the mortgage debt” by crossing out the account number
ending in -8730 and writing the account number ending in -1240 by hand
in its place.

¶13 After briefing, the superior court granted summary judgment
in Wife’s favor, finding no “genuine dispute as to any material fact
concerning the issues of spousal maintenance and [Husband’s] assumption
of half of the mortgage pursuant to the [PSA].” The court found, first, that
the Consent Decree expressly provides that Husband’s spousal
maintenance obligation is non-modifiable, reflecting the parties’ agreement
that, notwithstanding any future change in either party’s “financial

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situation,” “neither the amount nor duration of spousal maintenance would
change.” The court further determined that, “when reading all of [the
PSA’s] provisions together, there is no genuine dispute that [Husband]
assumed one-half of the mortgage debt owed on” the Residence.

¶14 Husband then filed a motion to set aside the judgment under
Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 85(d) (the “Rule 85 motion”) in
which he again alleged that Wife fraudulently altered the PSA after he
signed it but before it was submitted to the court. After he signed the PSA,
Husband maintained, Wife “unilaterally altered” Paragraph 7 of Schedule
D by crossing out account number ending in -8730 and writing, in its place,
the account number ending in -1240. By surreptitiously changing the
mortgage account number, he argued, Wife “changed” the mortgage debt
he “was supposedly agreeing to be responsible for.”

¶15 In her response to Husband’s Rule 85 motion, Wife denied
“conceal[ing] any material facts” or “intend[ing] to mislead the Court in
any way.” Rather, Wife asserted, the PSA accurately reflected the parties’
agreement that Husband would be “responsible for one half of the debt on
the mortgage encumbering the marital residence.” (Emphasis omitted).
Wife explained that, at the time the parties began preparing the Consent
Decree in mid-2020, “the loan encumbering the [Residence] was the
mortgage loan ending in 8730,” with “an approximate balance of $406,500.”
The account number ending in -1240 was not typed onto Schedules C and
D of the PSA, she explained, because “the parties had not yet refinanced the
mortgage loan ending in [-8730], and thus the mortgage loan ending in
[-1240] did not yet exist.” But whether the debt secured by the Residence
was identified by the current account number or the old one is “irrelevant,”
she argued, because “the bottom line is that” Husband agreed to be
“responsible for half of the [$406,500] debt” owed on the Residence “at the
time the Consent Decree was signed.”

¶16 The court denied Husband’s Rule 85 motion in August 2023
“[f]or the reasons stated in [Wife’s] Response.” Husband now appeals. We
have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶17 Husband argues that the superior court abused its discretion
by granting Wife’s motion for summary judgment and then denying his
Rule 85 motion. He does not challenge the court’s denial of his request to
modify his spousal maintenance obligation but argues that the court erred
by denying his request for relief from his obligation to pay half of the loan

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secured by the Residence. Requiring him to “pay off half of the remaining
mortgage on” the Residence, he insists, is “contrary to the parties’ intent.”

¶18 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. See
Weitz Co. v. Heth, 235 Ariz. 405, 409, ¶ 11 (2014). Although a ruling on a
motion for relief from judgment is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of
discretion, such a ruling is reviewed de novo if it turns on a question of law
or presents a mixed question of fact and law. See Ruffino v. Lokosky, 245 Ariz.
165, 168, ¶ 9 (App. 2018); see also Robson Ranch Mountains, L.L.C. v. Pinal
Cnty., 203 Ariz. 120, 125, ¶ 13 (App. 2002) (reviewing rulings de novo
because they “hinge on mixed questions of law and fact and pure questions
of law”).

¶19 The interpretation of a dissolution decree is a question of law
reviewed de novo. Caswell v. Caswell, 255 Ariz. 356, 358, ¶ 9 (App. 2023). And
a property settlement agreement incorporated into a dissolution decree is
governed by contract law. Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 126, 129, ¶ 10
(App. 2019). A court therefore interprets such agreements like a contract: de
novo, reading “[e]ach section . . . in relation to each other to bring harmony,
if possible, between all parts of the writing.” Gesina v. Gen. Elec. Co., 162
Ariz. 39, 45 (App. 1988).

¶20 The PSA provides that “[t]he parties have agreed that [Wife]
will retain the [Residence]” and that Husband “will cooperate with filling
out any required paperwork for this transfer of the Residence.” Paragraphs
7 of Schedules C and D to the PSA provide in relevant part that each party
is responsible for “[o]ne half” of the loan against the Residence which, “as
of August 4, 2020,” had “an approximate balance of $406,500.” Read
together, these provisions unambiguously award the Residence to Wife
while assigning to each party responsibility for paying one-half of the debt
then owed on the mortgage.

¶21 Husband acknowledges that Paragraph 7 of Schedule D to the
PSA assigns him responsibility for one-half of the mortgage loan with the
account number ending in -8730. He insists, however, that that mortgage
loan—which he refers to as “the Old Mortgage”—was satisfied when the
parties refinanced the loan in mid-2020. Because the parties refinanced the
loan before they signed the PSA, Husband maintains, Paragraph 7 of
Schedule D did nothing more than assign him responsibility for half of “the
Old Mortgage,” i.e., a debt that was “already . . . [paid] off.” By “alter[ing]
the PSA after [he] signed” it, Husband argues, Wife “caus[ed] [him] to be
responsible for” one-half of a different mortgage loan, i.e., the new loan
with the account ending in -1240. At a minimum, he argues, the court

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should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to resolve the parties’
dispute about whether Wife “altered the PSA without his knowledge or
consent to make him responsible for one-half of” the debt owed on the
Residence at the time the parties signed the PSA.

¶22 In insisting that Paragraph 7 to Schedule D was intended to
apply only to the mortgage loan with the account number ending in -8730,
Husband essentially argues that this provision assigned him responsibility
for paying one half of a loan that was already extinguished through a
refinancing before he signed the PSA. To construe Paragraph 7 to Schedule
D to assign Husband responsibility for one-half of a non-existent debt
would be to interpret the words of Paragraph 7 of Schedule D as having no
effect. We will not interpret the PSA or its schedules in a manner that
renders any of their provisions meaningless. See Terrell v. Torres, 248 Ariz.
47, 49-50, ¶ 14 (2020) (attempting to “give effect to all terms of the contract
to avoid any term being rendered superfluous”).

¶23 Further, Husband’s suggestion that the parties contemplated
that Wife would be solely responsible for the debt secured by the Residence,
i.e., the loan with the account number ending in -1240, is refuted by the fact
that Paragraph 7 of Schedule C of the PSA expressly provides that Wife
would be responsible for

[o]ne half of Debt owed to Mortgage on [the Residence] as of
August 4, 2020, account # [number ending -1240] with an
approximate balance of $406,500.

(Emphasis added.) Husband does not deny that he read, understood, and
initialed Schedule C, nor does he claim that Wife surreptitiously altered it
after he read it. Husband is, therefore, bound by Schedule C’s terms. See
Valley Nat’l Bank v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, 153 Ariz. 374, 378
n. 2 (App. 1987) (noting that under Arizona law “one who signs an
instrument may not avoid the impact of its terms on the ground that he
failed to read the instrument before signing it.”). If, as Husband now
contends, the parties contemplated that Wife would be solely responsible
for the debt secured by the Residence, why would the parties agree to
Paragraph 7 of Schedule C, which expressly assigns Wife responsibility for
only one-half of that debt? And who would possibly be responsible for the
other half, if not Husband?

¶24 To adopt Husband’s proposed construction of Schedules C
and D of the PSA would require us to interpret the documents as requiring
Wife to pay one-half of the Residence’s mortgage, with no one being

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assigned responsibility for the other half, while Husband is responsible for
paying one-half of a non-existent debt. We will not interpret the schedules
to the PSA in such a nonsensical manner. See Roe v. Austin, 246 Ariz. 21, 27,
¶ 17 (App. 2018) (“[C]ourts must avoid an interpretation of a contract that
leads to an absurd result.”). Instead, we agree with the superior court that,
when read together, Paragraph 7 of Schedule C and Paragraph 7 of
Schedule D can only be reasonably interpreted as imposing on each party
responsibility for one-half of the debt secured by the Residence at the time
the parties signed the PSA.

¶25 Husband argues that whether Wife altered the loan account
number listed on Schedule D before or after he signed the PSA was “a
contested issue,” and therefore the court “erred by denying [his] Rule 85
motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.” But a court is not required
to hold an evidentiary hearing simply because a party asks for one. On the
contrary, a court need not hold an evidentiary hearing unless material facts
are in dispute that must be resolved to determine the issue presented. Cf.
Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 235, ¶ 26 (App. 2012) (discussing when
hearings are and are not needed on applications to set aside a judgment);
Atreus Cmtys. Grp. of Ariz. v. Stardust Dev., Inc., 229 Ariz. 503, 507, ¶ 15 (App.
2012) (holding that “the trial court did not have to hold an evidentiary
hearing” to determine scope of arbitrator’s authority under terms of
arbitration agreement, in part because “the documents submitted to the
court did not present a genuine issue of material fact as to” that issue).

¶26 Here, the terms of Schedules C and D, viewed as a whole,
make plain that the parties agreed that each would be responsible for one-
half of the debt secured by the Residence. Whether, when Husband signed
the PSA, Paragraph 7 of Schedule D listed the refinanced loan account
number, the prior loan account number, or no loan account number at all is
irrelevant, and so no evidentiary hearing was necessary to answer that
question.

¶27 In support of his position, Husband cites Paragraph 30(a)(i) of
the PSA, which, Husband maintains, establishes that “Wife is [solely]
responsible” for the mortgage secured by the Residence “despite whatever
Schedule C might say.”

¶28 Paragraph 30 of the PSA reads in relevant part:

30. Debts

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a. Wife’s Assumption of Debts. Except as otherwise provided
herein, Wife shall assume, pay, indemnify, and hold Husband
harmless from the following obligations:

i. Any obligation[] . . . that relates to, arises out of, is secured
by, or was created to purchase any of the property awarded
to Wife in this Agreement[.]

***

b. Husband’s Assumption of Debts. Except as otherwise
provided herein, Husband shall assume, pay, indemnify, and
hold Wife harmless from the following obligations:

i. Any obligation[] . . . that relates to, arises out of, is secured
by, or was created to purchase any of the property awarded
to Husband in this Agreement.

¶29 According to Husband, the disputed mortgage “is an
obligation that arises out of and is secured by the [Residence]” within the
meaning of Paragraph 30(a)(i), and so that provision of the PSA makes Wife
“responsible for the entirety of” the mortgage on the Residence.

¶30 Husband’s argument ignores the fact that Paragraph 30(a) of
the PSA begins with the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided herein.”
Undoubtedly, Paragraph 30(a)(i) of the PSA imposes on Wife sole
responsibility for any loan against real or personal property awarded to her
that is not otherwise accounted for in the PSA, just as Paragraph 30(b)(i) of
the PSA makes Husband solely responsible for any loan against real or
personal property awarded to him that is not otherwise accounted for. But
because Paragraphs 7 of Schedules C and D expressly govern responsibility
for the Residence’s mortgage debt, responsibility for that debt comes within
the “except as otherwise provided herein” language of Paragraph 30(a) of
the PSA. Nothing in Paragraph 30(a) of the PSA overrides or nullifies the
provisions of Schedules C and D that require the parties to share equal
responsibility for the Residence’s mortgage debt. See Cohen v. Frey, 215 Ariz.
62, 66, ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (‘[W]hen interpreting a decree, we may not assign
meaning to one provision which would render other provisions
meaningless.”).

¶31 In support of his position, Husband asserts that he has
contributed nothing toward the mortgage loan’s monthly payments since
the Consent Decree was entered. The fact that Wife has made the mortgage
payments with no help from him, Husband contends, “demonstrat[es] the

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parties’ original intent and understanding that Husband was not . . .
responsible for the mortgage under the PSA.”

¶32 We disagree. The fact that Wife has consistently made the
mortgage payments with no help from Husband cannot reasonably be
construed as an admission by Wife that Husband has no obligation to pay
it. A debtor’s failure to make required payments does not prove that no
debt is owed, and Wife’s efforts to keep the mortgage from falling into
arrears cannot reasonably be interpreted as an admission that she alone is
responsible for the debt.

¶33 Husband also argues that requiring him to be responsible for
one-half of the debt owed on the Residence even though it was awarded to
Wife would be “a windfall for Wife” and “a highly inequitable division of
assets” that is “contrary to A.R.S. § 25-318.”

¶34 Section 25-318 provides in part that, with certain exceptions
inapplicable here, “the court shall . . . divide the community, joint tenancy
and other property held in common equitably, though not necessarily in
kind.” A.R.S. § 25-318(A). The statute only applies, however, when the court
divides the marital assets. See Meek v. Meek, 539 P.3d 920, 926, ¶ 25 (App.
2023). When, as here, the parties allocate the community’s assets between
themselves by contractual agreement, Section 25-318(A) does not apply. See
id.

¶35 Section 25-317(B) provides in part that “the terms of [a]
separation agreement” are “binding on the court unless it finds . . . that the
separation agreement is unfair.” Whether a separation agreement is
“unfair” is determined by reference to “the circumstances that existed
around the time of the separation agreement’s formation.” Meek, 539 P.3d
at 928, ¶ 41. Although Husband argued to the superior court that “the
COVID recession” caused him “financial hardship,” nothing in the record
supports a finding that the PSA was unfair at the time it was entered. The
Consent Decree includes each party’s signed affirmation that the “division
of property and debts is fair and equitable.” Moreover, although the
Consent Decree awards the Residence and certain other assets to Wife, the
Consent Decree and the PSA allocate numerous financial accounts and
items of personal property of unspecified value to Husband, too. Further,
the Consent Decree and the PSA assign Wife, as well as Husband,
responsibility for paying one-half of certain credit card debts. And although
the Consent Decree requires Husband to pay spousal maintenance for a
fixed term of years, it relieves Husband of any obligation to pay child

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support. Nothing in the record supports a finding that the parties’ agreed-
upon allocation of marital assets and debts was so one-sided as to be unfair.

¶36 Husband next asserts that the superior court should have
considered the terms of a post-nuptial agreement that the parties signed in
March 2019 in anticipation of a possible divorce. According to Husband,
the post-nuptial agreement sets forth the parties’ “rights and obligations in
the event of divorce,” and the parties were “operating off” the post-nuptial
agreement when they drafted the PSA. Noting that he attached the post-
nuptial agreement as an exhibit to his Rule 85 motion, Husband argues that
the court erred in interpreting the PSA without considering the terms of the
post-nuptial agreement.

¶37 “[T]he parol evidence rule bars admission of extrinsic
evidence” to interpret a written contract if such evidence “varies or
contradicts the terms of [the] written contract.” Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins., 223 Ariz. 463, 478, ¶ 52 (App. 2010). Further, parol evidence is not
admissible “if the meaning of a contract can be determined from the four
corners of the document and cannot reasonably be construed in more than
one sense.” United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 258
(App. 1983). Because the terms of the PSA unambiguously impose on
Husband responsibility for one-half of the debt secured by the Residence,
the superior court properly declined to consider Husband’s proffered
extrinsic evidence as a basis for varying the PSA’s terms. See id.

¶38 Noting that his Rule 85 motion included a request for
declaratory relief, Husband argues that the court “erred by failing to
provide” the requested declaratory judgment. “[T]here are many rights and
obligations not addressed in the PSA,” he argues, “such as how and when
mortgage payments are to be made” and “whether Husband’s
responsibility is extinguished if and when the current mortgage is paid off.”
A declaration of his obligations for the mortgage is “needed,” he argues,
“due to the lack of specificity and gaps in the PSA.”

¶39 Declaratory relief is available to contracting parties to resolve
a dispute over their rights and obligations under their agreement. See A.R.S.
§ 12-1832; see also State v. Mabery Ranch Co., 216 Ariz. 233, 242-43, ¶ 37 (App.
2007) (“The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to obtain a judicial
determination of parties’ rights and obligations in a controversy prior to
one party’s breach of those rights.”). A court cannot, however, add new
provisions to a contract in the guise of a declaratory judgment. See Isaak v.
Massachusetts Indem. Life Ins. Co., 127 Ariz. 581, 584 (1981) (“It is not within

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the power of this court to revise, modify, alter, extend, or remake a contract
to include terms not agreed upon by the parties.”) (cleaned up).

¶40 Although the refinancing documents that Husband and Wife
signed in mid-2020 are not part of the record in this case, we presume that
the terms of those documents set forth the specifics of Husband’s payment
obligations, including the term of the loan and how often payments are due.
If Husband believes that his rights under those documents are unsettled or
unclear, he is, of course, free to file an action for declaratory relief that
includes the lender as an interested party. See Connolly v. Great Basin Ins.
Co., 6 Ariz. App. 280, 284 (App. 1967) (noting that a court cannot grant
declaratory relief “unless the action includes all persons who have or claim
an interest affected by the declaration”) (citation omitted).

¶41 The specific payment terms of the refinancing documents do
not appear in the PSA, however, and so the court had no authority to
“declare” them. Instead, the court’s authority was limited to declaring the
respective rights and obligations of Husband and Wife under the PSA. The
court’s ruling on Husband’s Rule 85 motion rejected his claim that he is not
responsible for half of the mortgage on the Residence, thereby resolving the
controversy between the parties on that issue. See Connolly, 5 Ariz. App. at
120 (recognizing that a declaratory judgment need not be in any particular
form “so long as the court actually determines the issues raised by the
pleadings”) (citation omitted). The court’s ruling had the effect of a
declaratory judgment, see id., and Husband was entitled to no further
declaratory relief in this case.

¶42 Wife requests an award of attorney fees and costs under
Paragraph 39 of the PSA, which provides in part as follows:

If any party commences any legal or equitable action . . . to
enforce any of the provisions of this Agreement, the
prevailing party shall recover its [sic] reasonable attorneys’
fees and litigation expenses in doing so. This paragraph applies,
among other things, to any action for declaratory relief or for any
other form of relief to enforce, interpret, rescind or in any other
manner effect [sic] the provisions of this Agreement, as well as an
action for the breach of this Agreement. This paragraph further
applies to any appellate proceedings that may be brought in
connection with such action. (Emphasis added.)

¶43 Paragraph 39 of the PSA thus entitles Wife to her requested
award. See Geller v. Lusk, 230 Ariz. 624, 627-28, ¶ 10 (App. 2012) (noting that

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a contractual fee-shifting provision will be enforced according to its terms,
as long as amount of fees awarded is “reasonable”). We award Wife
reasonable attorney fees and costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶44 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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