Flores v. La Paz

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

LEIF FLORES, Appellant,

v.

LA PAZ COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE LOCAL RETIREMENT BOARD,
Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0653
FILED 05-28-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in La Paz County
S1500CV202200104
The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Smith & Green, Attorneys at Law, P.L.L.C., Phoenix
By James M. Green, Quacy L. Smith
Co-Counsel for Appellant

Vederman Law Office, PLLC, Lake Havasu City
By Samuel E. Vederman
Counsel for Appellee
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Leif Flores appeals from the superior court’s judgment
affirming the denial, by the La Paz County Sheriff’s Office Local Retirement
Board (the “Board”), of his application for accidental disability retirement
benefits. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Flores worked as a deputy sheriff for the La Paz County
Sheriff’s Office for 15 years and was, at all relevant times, a member of the
Public Safety Personnel Retirement System (“PSPRS”). See generally A.R.S.
§§ 38-841 to -863.02.

¶3 Flores and his close friend and immediate supervisor,
Sergeant Michael Rudd, swapped work assignments on October 11, 2021.
While on duty that evening, Sergeant Rudd was struck by a car and killed.
Although Flores was also on duty at the time, he was not present when the
accident happened.

¶4 After the accident, Flores found it difficult to return to work,
struggling, among other things, with “anxiety,” “sleep disturbance,” and a
“fear of dying on duty.” Feeling “no motivation,” he “often stayed in an
isolated area attempting to avoid work.” After taking “a few days off,” he
told his lieutenant that he “felt incapable” of performing his job duties
“safely and effectively.”

¶5 Flores was placed on administrative leave. He began seeing a
psychologist, Dr. Robbie Adler-Tapia, who determined that Flores suffered
from “traumatic grief issues” and “on-going concerns for his future safety”
and diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). After
several months of treatment, Flores and Dr. Adler-Tapia jointly concluded
that Flores should apply for PSPRS retirement.

¶6 In April 2022, Flores applied for accidental disability
retirement and was referred for an independent medical examination

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(“IME”). See A.R.S. §§ 38-847(D)(9), -859(A)(2). Dr. Nathan Thompson
conducted the IME. See A.R.S. § 38-859(B).

¶7 After completing the IME, Dr. Thompson determined that
Flores “experienced a significant change in his mental health and ability to
work following the on-duty death of Sergeant Rudd.” Dr. Thompson found
that due to a variety of factors, including “his close relationship with
Sergeant Rudd” and the fact that they had switched work assignments on
the night of the fatal accident, Flores was suffering from “survivor’s guilt,”
anxiety, depression, and PTSD. Dr. Thompson opined that “Flores is
psychological[ly] unable to continue working as a deputy with La Paz
County” and that his inability to continue working was “directly related to
the on-duty death of Sergeant Rudd.” Addressing the statutory
requirements for accidental disability, see A.R.S. § 38-842(1), Dr. Thompson
concluded that Flores’s condition “totally” and “permanently” prevented
him from performing “a reasonable range of duties within [his] job
classification” and was the “result of an event incurred during the
performance of [his] duty.”

¶8 At a meeting on August 8, 2022, the Board voted to approve
Flores’s application for one year, subject to an annual review. At a later
meeting, however, the Board met in an executive session with its counsel to
discuss Flores’s application, after which it unanimously voted to deny the
application.

¶9 At Flores’s request, the Board held a rehearing, after which it
affirmed its denial of his application, finding that his condition did not meet
the statutory definition of “accidental disability” because it was not a “total
and permanent” disability “incurred during the employee’s duties.”

¶10 Flores appealed the decision to the superior court. Upon
review, the court affirmed, finding that “the evidence supports [the
Board’s] determination that [Flores’s] condition was not incurred in the
performance of [his] duty” as required by A.R.S. § 38-842(1). In so holding,
the court determined that “[s]ubstantial evidence supports a finding that
[Flores’s] condition resulted from his colleague’s death and not from his
own work duties.” Although Flores experienced “guilt” over “having
switched shifts with Sergeant Rudd,” the court noted, Flores “did not have
to be working at the time Sergeant Rudd was killed to feel that kind of
guilt.” Accordingly, the requisite “causal connection between [Flores’s]
work duties and his condition is lacking.”

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¶11 Flores timely appealed the court’s decision, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), 12-913,1 and 38-847(J).

DICUSSION

¶12 Flores challenges the superior court’s decision affirming the
Board’s denial of his application for accidental disability benefits, asserting
that their decisions were contrary to “the expert medical opinions” and
therefore “arbitrary and capricious.”

¶13 When reviewing the decision of an administrative board, the
superior court will affirm the decision unless it is “contrary to law, is not
supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse
of discretion.” A.R.S. § 12-910(F). The superior court reviews questions of
law de novo, Batty v. Ariz. Med. Bd., 253 Ariz. 151, 154, ¶ 11 (App. 2022), but
will defer to the board’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial
evidence, Gaveck v. Ariz. State Bd. of Podiatry Exam’rs, 222 Ariz. 433, 436, ¶ 11
(App. 2009).

¶14 This Court “engage[s] in the same process as the superior
court when we review its ruling affirming an administrative decision.”
Batty, 253 Ariz. at 154, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). We review questions of law
de novo, id., and “independently examine[] the record to determine whether
the evidence supports the judgment,” Defs. of Wildlife v. Ariz. Navigable
Stream Adjudication Comm’n, 254 Ariz. 547, 565-66, ¶ 75 (App. 2023) (citation
omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding
the administrative decision and will affirm if any reasonable interpretation
of the record supports it. Id. at 566, ¶ 75.

¶15 Under the PSPRS, “[a] member is eligible for an accidental
disability pension if the member’s employment is terminated by reason of
accidental disability.” A.R.S. § 38-844(B). “Accidental disability” is defined
as:

a physical or mental condition that the [Board] finds totally
and permanently prevents an employee from performing a
reasonable range of duties within the employee’s job

1 Section 12-913 allows a party to appeal to the “supreme court,” which we

have construed to allow an appeal to this Court, as this Court was created
after the statute’s enactment. See Svendsen v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 234 Ariz.
528, 533, ¶ 13 (App. 2014).

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classification and that was incurred in the performance of the
employee’s duty.

A.R.S. § 38-842(1) (emphasis added). A finding of an accidental disability
must be based on medical evidence by a “designated physician or a
physician working in a clinic that is appointed by the [Board].” A.R.S.
§ 38-859(A)(1)-(2), (B), (C).

¶16 Dr. Thompson determined that Flores’s disability was the
“result of an event incurred during the performance of [his] duty.” Flores
asserts that the Board and the superior court erred in rejecting this finding
because, he contends, they “were legally bound to accept the professional
medical opinion of the medical expert.”

¶17 The parties do not dispute that Flores is permanently
disabled, nor do they dispute that his disability resulted from the trauma
he experienced as a result of Sergeant Rudd’s death. The question here is
whether that trauma was “incurred in the performance of” Flores’s duties
as a deputy sheriff within the meaning of A.R.S. § 38-842(1). Dr.
Thompson’s opinion that Flores’s disability resulted from an event that
occurred “during” the performance of his duty is insufficient to satisfy
A.R.S. § 38-842(1). By its terms, the statute requires more than a temporal
overlap between the disabling event and the employee’s work hours.
Instead, the term “incurred in the performance of [the officer’s] duty”
requires a showing of “a causal relationship between [the employee’s]
disability and his duties.” Wills v. Pima Cnty. Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Bd., 154
Ariz. 435, 436 (App. 1987).

¶18 Flores argues that the requisite causal connection exists here
because he “had swapped shifts with a colleague that was tragically killed
in the line of duty” and was “on duty” when he learned of “the traumatic
triggering event.” He acknowledges that he did not witness the fatal
collision but insists that he attempted to “respond[] to the scene of the
deadly accident in his patrol vehicle” but was denied “access to the scene.”

¶19 But the cause of Flores’s disabling condition—i.e., his grief,
emotional distress, and guilt over Sergeant Rudd’s death—did not result
from Flores’s performance of his own duties. As the superior court correctly
observed, there is no indication that Flores’s psychological disturbance was
related to the fact that he was on duty rather than at home on October 11,
2021. We therefore agree with the superior court that the fact that Flores
traded shifts with Sergeant Rudd and was on duty when he learned of his
friend’s tragic death does not establish that Flores’s emotional condition

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was incurred in the performance of his job duties. In the absence of a causal
connection between Flores’s performance of his duties and the disability he
suffered as a result of Sergeant Rudd’s death, the superior court properly
affirmed the Board’s denial of Flores’s application for accidental disability
retirement benefits.

CONCLUSION

¶20 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s decision affirming the
Board’s denial of Flores’s application for accidental disability retirement
benefits.

¶21 Both parties request attorney fees and costs under A.R.S.
§ 12-348. Because Flores is not the prevailing party, we deny his request.
The Board’s request is barred by Subsection H of the statute, which
provides that “[t]his section does not . . . [a]pply to an action arising from a
proceeding before this state or a city, town or county . . . to determine the
eligibility or entitlement of an individual to a monetary benefit or its
equivalent.” A.R.S. § 12-348(H)(1); see also Cortaro Water Users’ Ass’n v.
Steiner, 148 Ariz. 314, 319 (1986) (noting that “[a]n example” of a case in
which A.R.S. § 12-348(H)(1)’s predecessor bars an award of fees is “where
an applicant is seeking . . . a disability pension payment”).

¶22 The Board also requests an award of “legal costs” under
A.R.S. § 12-912. By its terms, A.R.S. § 12-912 applies only to costs incurred
in preparing the administrative record for the superior court’s review, and
so does not authorize an award of costs here.

¶23 Finally, the Board requests an award of attorney fees and
costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline
to award attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. As the prevailing party, the
Board may recover costs on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341 upon compliance
with ARCAP 21.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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