Potter v. Ehrich

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

PHILLIP TERRY POTTER, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CHRISTINE EHRICH, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0764

FILED 09-10-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2021-013210
The Honorable Jay Adleman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Phillip Potter, Scottsdale
Plaintiff/Appellant

Mark J. DePasquale, P.C., Phoenix
By Mark J. DePasquale
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding
Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
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M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Phillip Potter appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his
complaint against Christine Ehrich and challenges “all claims from all
judgments, rulings, decisions, and orders entered” in the case. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In April 2021, Potter filed a complaint in the superior court
asserting claims against his ex-wife, Tasneem Doctor, and several other
defendants for a claim for wrongful institution of civil proceedings and
aiding and abetting.1 Ehrich was among the defendants alleged to have
aided and abetted Doctor.

¶3 In August 2021, Potter filed another complaint, the cause at
issue in this appeal. Potter accused several defendants of participating in a
criminal enterprise. Potter sued Ehrich and other defendants for
defamation per se, negligence per se, conversion, unjust enrichment,
tortious interference with business relationships, conspiracy to commit
each tort, conspiracy to commit wrongful institution of civil proceedings,
and racketeering. Potter alleged that Ehrich worked with Doctor to bring
the false civil charges, send the defamatory letter, and convert Potter’s
business interest to Doctor and Ehrich’s ownership.

¶4 Potter moved to consolidate the wrongful institution case and
this case, which the court denied because the second case “extend[ed] far
beyond the allegations in [the wrongful institution case] and [did] not
involve common questions of law or fact.” Potter also moved to amend his
complaint in this case, which the court denied.

¶5 The superior court dismissed the complaint here as to several
defendants and entered judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 54(b). This court affirmed the superior court’s rulings in Potter v.
Meza, 1 CA-CV 22-0441, 2023 WL 6845510 (Ariz. App. Oct. 17, 2023) (mem.
decision).

¶6 For the remaining defendants, Potter again moved to amend
his complaint. The superior court found the amendment request moot as it
related to the dismissed defendants. For the non-dismissed defendants, the

1 The “wrongful institution case” is discussed in Potter v. Ehrich, 1 CA-
CV 23-0760.

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superior court found that Potter had failed to “set forth any legal or factual
basis to justify yet another amended complaint” and denied the motion.

¶7 Ehrich moved to dismiss the claims against her for failure to
state a claim. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). She argued that the
aiding-and-abetting claim against her in the wrongful institution case
abated Potter’s claim here for conspiracy to commit wrongful institution of
civil proceedings. Potter agreed that the doctrine of abatement applied. He
argued abatement divested the superior court of jurisdiction to review any
of his claims.

¶8 The court granted Ehrich’s motion. The court dismissed the
count against Ehrich for conspiracy to commit wrongful institution of civil
proceedings based on abatement. For the other allegations against Ehrich,
the court found that Potter failed to state a claim for relief.

¶9 Ehrich moved for a Rule 54(b) judgment, which the court
entered.

DISCUSSION

A. We Have Appellate Jurisdiction.

¶10 This court has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments.
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). Potter argues the superior court erred by entering
the Rule 54(b) judgment, so this court lacks appellate jurisdiction. We
review the superior court’s final judgment determination de novo. Madrid v.
Avalon Care Ctr.-Chandler, L.L.C., 236 Ariz. 221, 223, ¶ 3 (App. 2014).

¶11 If an action has multiple claims or parties, the court may enter
“a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties
only if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay and
recites that the judgment is entered under Rule 54(b).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Here, the superior court entered judgment under Rule 54(b) because it
dismissed all claims alleged against Ehrich in the case, and there was “no
just reason for delay.”

¶12 Potter argues the superior court’s judgment was not final
because common law preclusions would not bar his pending claims in the
wrongful institution case. Potter asserts that “proceedings do not
legitimately end unless the judgments preclude future litigation.” But
Potter conflates a final judgment with an adjudication on the merits. The
case on which he relies, 4501 Northpoint LP v. Maricopa Cnty., explains that
a judgment “on the merits . . . precludes later relitigation.” 212 Ariz. 98, 101,

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¶16 (2006). “For claim preclusion or issue preclusion to apply, there must
be a final judgment on the merits.” Banner Univ. Med. Ctr. Tucson Campus,
LLC v. Gordon, 252 Ariz. 264, 266, ¶ 10 (2022). This does not mean a
judgment must preclude other claims to be final and appealable. See, e.g.,
Laurence v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 255 Ariz. 95,
107, ¶ 50 (2023). Even if Potter were correct that preclusion would not bar
his claims, it would not affect the finality of the judgment.

¶13 For similar reasons, Potter’s argument that Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-2341.04(K) precludes entry of a final judgment fails.
Under A.R.S. § 13-2314.04(K), a civil action for racketeering “is not limited
by any other previous or subsequent civil or criminal action.” Potter argues
there was no final judgment because the wrongful institution case must
proceed “unfettered” by this case. Still, Potter does not dispute that the
superior court in CV2021-013210, this case, dismissed all claims that Potter
brought against Ehrich. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

¶14 Potter also argues that the Rule 54(b) judgment was improper
because Ehrich did not allege, nor did the court find hardship or injustice.
But when Ehrich moved for judgment under Rule 54(b), she emphasized
that the case had not been scheduled for trial, and the Rule 54(b) judgment
would prevent “possible injustice or delay” from the need for her to
continue to participate in the litigation unnecessarily. And the court found
there was “no just reason for delay,” as required by Rule 54(b). See Pulaski
v. Perkins, 127 Ariz. 216, 218 (App. 1980) (“The phrase ‘no just reason for
delay’ in Rule 54(b) means that ‘there must be some danger of hardship or
injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.’”)
(quoting Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir.
1968)). The superior court did not err.

¶15 Finally, Potter argues that the judgment against Ehrich was
not final because related litigation remained pending in the wrongful
institution case. Even so, the superior court disposed of all claims against
Ehrich that Potter brought in this case, and thus Rule 54(b) certification was
correct.

¶16 Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).

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B. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Dismissing the Complaint for
Failure to State a Claim.

1. Potter Was Not Prejudiced by the Superior Court’s Ruling
on the Merits.

¶17 Potter argues the court’s dismissal is void because the
superior court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of Ehrich’s motion to
dismiss. Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review
de novo. In re Marriage of Crawford, 180 Ariz. 324, 326 (App. 1994).

¶18 Potter claims the court did not go far enough when it abated
the claim for conspiracy to commit wrongful institution of civil proceedings
because the pending action in the wrongful institution case abated every
claim in this case. “[T]he pendency of a prior action between the same
parties for the same cause in a state court of competent jurisdiction gives
grounds for the abatement of a subsequent action.” Allen v. Superior Court, 86 Ariz. 205, 209 (1959). To determine “whether parties and causes of action
are the same” for abatement purposes, we consider “whether the two
actions present a substantial identity as to parties, subject matter, issues
involved, and relief demanded.” Id.

¶19 First, we address Potter’s argument that the court’s dismissal
is void. A finding that abatement applies does not void an order. See Reed
v. Frey, 10 Ariz. App. 292, 295 (1969) (“The fact that there is a previously
pending action between the same parties as to the same cause of action is
usually not regarded as a ‘jurisdictional’ defect and, unless raised by an
appropriate motion for abatement, such a defect is waived.”). The purpose
of applying abatement is to prevent duplicative litigation and promote
judicial economy. See Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 973 A.2d 1229, 1240 (Conn.
2009). “[T]he doctrine does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.” See id.
at 1244 (citations omitted).

¶20 For these reasons, we reject Potter’s argument that the court
erred by applying abatement “prospectively” and not “retroactively” and
that before the court abated the claim for conspiracy to commit wrongful
institution of civil proceedings, it “decided controversies on the eventually
abated subject matter.” An action does not automatically abate; a litigant
must raise the issue, and if not, the issue is waived. See Reed, 10 Ariz. App.
at 295. The superior court considered abatement once the parties raised the
issue in this case, so we discern no error.

¶21 Potter argues that the protective order facts alleged in the
wrongful institution case were predicate offenses for his racketeering claim

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in this case, so the court should have decided all his claims raised in both
complaints in the wrongful institution case. See A.R.S.
§§ 13-2314.04, -2301(D)(4). Potter asserts the defendants involved in the
wrongful civil action participated in a criminal conspiracy, tying his
racketeering claim to the wrongful-institution-of-civil-proceedings claims.

¶22 Potter’s point is well-taken. He pled that each of his claims,
including the claim against Ehrich for conspiracy to commit wrongful
institution of civil proceedings, “constitute[d] a pattern of unlawful activity
related to each other and to a common external organizing principle.” To
assess the racketeering claim, the court needed to assess each alleged
predicate offense, including Potter’s allegation that Ehrich conspired to
bring false claims against him. See A.R.S. § 13-2301(D)(4) (Racketeering
includes “any preparatory or completed offense.”). The superior court
should have decided all the claims in the wrongful institution case. See
Allen, 86 Ariz. at 209.

¶23 But Potter was not prejudiced because he failed to state a
claim for relief. As we explain below, had the court abated the claims and
had Potter amended his complaint in the wrongful institution case to
include the claims, the complaint would have still failed.

2. Potter Failed to State a Claim for Relief.

¶24 We review an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state
a claim de novo. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 211 Ariz. 386, 391, ¶ 18 (App. 2005).
We will affirm the dismissal if the plaintiff “would not be entitled to relief
under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Id. (quoting Fid.
Sec. Life Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 224, ¶ 4 (1998)). “[W]e review
the . . . facts alleged in the complaint as true.” Id. at 389, ¶ 4. But “mere
conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7 (2008).

¶25 To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint
should “give the opponent fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim
and indicate generally the type of litigation involved.” See Cullen, 218 Ariz.
at 419, ¶ 6 (quoting Mackey v. Spangler, 81 Ariz. 113, 115 (1956)). But a
complaint that contains only legal conclusions does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. at
¶ 7.

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i. Conspiracy to Commit Wrongful Institution of
Civil Proceedings.

¶26 Potter argues he pled sufficient facts to support his claim
against Ehrich for conspiracy to commit wrongful institution of civil
proceedings. The superior court dismissed the claim against Ehrich because
the court in the wrongful institution case had an aiding-and-abetting claim
against Ehrich for the same alleged conduct. See Allen, 86 Ariz. at 209. Potter
agreed that abatement applied to the claim. Thus, we need not consider
whether the claim was well-pled.

¶27 Relatedly, Potter also argues that his
wrongful-institution-of-civil-proceedings claim was well-pled. But Potter
did not bring the claim against Ehrich in this case. Thus, the claim’s validity
is not before us here, and we decline to review it.

ii. Conversion.

¶28 Potter argues he sufficiently pled a conversion claim.
“Conversion is ‘[a]n intentional exercise of dominion or control over a
chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it
that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the
chattel.’” Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen, 220 Ariz. 401, 406, ¶ 11 (App. 2008)
(citations omitted). “An action for conversion ordinarily lies only for
personal property that is tangible, or to intangible property that is merged
in, or identified with, some document.” Miller v. Hehlen, 209 Ariz. 462, 472,
¶ 35 (App. 2005) (citation omitted).

¶29 The complaint does not support the claim that Ehrich’s
actions rose to the level of a conversion. The complaint alleged that Doctor
and Ehrich created a corporation that was a “clone” of Potter’s corporation
and was “built on the busines[s] concepts, know-how, labor, and property
rights” of Potter’s corporation. Potter claimed that Doctor and Ehrich
conspired to convert Potter’s business assets into a new corporation under
different ownership. Potter identified no chattel with which Ehrich
interfered. See Miller, 209 Ariz. at 472, ¶ 35.

¶30 Potter argues he sufficiently pled a conversion claim because
the property includes trade secrets. Even assuming Potter could bring a
conversion claim for trade secrets, he failed to allege in the complaint that
Doctor and Ehrich converted any trade secrets, much less in a tangible form.
See A.R.S. § 44-401(4) (A trade secret is information that “[d]erives
independent economic value . . . from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can

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obtain economic value from its disclosure or use” and “[i]s the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.”). Because Potter failed to plead a viable conversion claim, the
superior court did not err by dismissing the claim and the related
conspiracy claim about Ehrich. See Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v.
Stewart Title & Tr. of Phoenix, Inc., 197 Ariz. 535, 545, ¶ 42 (App. 2000) (“A
civil conspiracy requires an underlying tort which the alleged conspirators
agreed to commit.”).

iii. Defamation.

¶31 Potter argues that the defamation-per-se claim was well-pled,
and he could have cured a claim defect by supplementing the record with
the defamatory letter. But in response to Ehrich’s motion to dismiss, Potter
conceded that he erred by naming Ehrich as a defendant for the
defamation-per-se claim.

¶32 The superior court also found that Potter identified no
conduct attributable to Ehrich for either defamation per se or the related
conspiracy claim. Potter does not contest these findings on appeal. We
agree with the superior court that, other than broad conclusions that Ehrich
and others “assisted” Doctor in sending a defamatory letter, Potter
identified no specific conduct attributable to Ehrich. See Dube v. Likins, 216
Ariz. 406, 417, ¶ 35 (App. 2007) (citations omitted) (“One who publishes a
false and defamatory communication concerning a private person . . . is
subject to liability, if, but only if, he (a) knows that the statement is false and
it defames the other, (b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or (c)
acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.”); see also Wells Fargo Bank v.
Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters and Cement Masons Loc. No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund,
201 Ariz. 474, 498, ¶ 99 (2002) (citations omitted) (“For a civil conspiracy to
occur[,] two or more people must agree to accomplish an unlawful purpose
or to accomplish a lawful object by unlawful means, causing damages.”).
The superior court did not err by dismissing the claims.

iv. Negligence Per Se.

¶33 Potter does not challenge the court’s finding that his
negligence per se claim was “facially deficient.” Potter alleged that Ehrich
violated A.R.S. § 13-1202(A), a statute “enacted for the safety and protection
of the public,” when she threatened and intimidated him. To prevail on a
claim for negligence per se, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
breached a statute enacted for public safety and the plaintiff is within the
“class of persons” the statute intends to protect. See Steinberger v. McVey,

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234 Ariz. 125, 139, ¶¶ 56-57 (App. 2014). The statute “must proscribe certain
or specific acts” and not only define “a general standard of care.” Ibarra v.
Gastelum, 249 Ariz. 493, 495-96, ¶ 9 (App. 2020).

¶34 Under A.R.S. § 13-1202(A), a person cannot threaten or
intimidate to cause physical injury, serious property damage, or serious
public inconvenience to another. The statute is not a “safety statute”
because it does not identify a particular class of persons protected and does
not set forth a specific standard of care. See id.; see also Steinberger, 234 Ariz.
at 138, ¶¶ 57, 59; Ibarra, 249 Ariz. at 495-96, ¶ 9. Thus, the superior court did
not err by dismissing the negligence per se claim and the related conspiracy
claim against Ehrich. See Baker, 197 Ariz. at 545, ¶ 42; see also Meza, 1CA-CV
22-0441, at *4, ¶¶ 23-25 (We affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the
negligence per se claims against the other defendants for the same reason).

v. Unjust Enrichment.

¶35 A claim for unjust enrichment requires a showing of these
elements: “(1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection
between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) the absence of
justification for the enrichment and the impoverishment; and (5) the
absence of a legal remedy.” Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Bank One, Ariz., NA, 202
Ariz. 535, 541, ¶ 31 (App. 2002). Potter alleged that the defendants were
“unjustly enriched” through conversion of his business, fraudulent transfer
of his assets, and attorney’s fees. He also alleged that the defendants’ acts
impoverished him, there was a connection between the impoverishment
and the enrichment, and he suffered damages.

¶36 Potter failed to state a claim for relief against Ehrich because
his allegations were merely conclusory. See Cullen, 218 Ariz. at 419, ¶ 7 (“[A]
complaint that states only legal conclusions, without any supporting factual
allegations, does not satisfy Arizona’s notice pleading standard under Rule
8.”). The complaint contained no facts showing that Ehrich received a
benefit from Potter’s impoverishment, nor were there facts showing that
Ehrich conspired with the other defendants to benefit from Potter’s
detriment. See Trustmark, 202 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 31. The superior court did not
err by dismissing the unjust enrichment and related conspiracy claims. See
Trustmark, 202 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 31; see also Baker, 197 Ariz. at 545, ¶ 42.

vi. Tortious Interference with Business
Relationships.

¶37 To state a claim for tortious interference with business
relationships, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of a valid contractual

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relationship; (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the
interfer[e]r; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach;
(4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship has been disrupted;
and (5) that the defendant acted improperly.” Tortolita Veterinary Servs., PC
v. Rodden, 252 Ariz. 96, 104, ¶ 24 (App. 2021) (citations omitted). Relief is
available only if the plaintiff identifies “the specific relationship with which
the defendant interfered.” Dube, 216 Ariz. at 414, ¶ 19.

¶38 Potter pled that he had launched a business, and Ehrich and
Doctor conspired to convert the value of his business into their new
business that was a “clone” of Potter’s business. Potter alleged that Ehrich
interfered with Potter’s “business relationships, agreements, and
reasonable expectancy of future business” by creating a “business clone,”
and Potter “suffered damages to his business, income, and property” from
Ehrich’s conduct.

¶39 Potter failed to state a claim. Potter failed to identify which
business relationships Ehrich interfered with or how Ehrich committed
improper conduct. See Tortolita, 252 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 24; Dube, 216 Ariz. at 414,
¶ 19. At most, the complaint shows that Ehrich launched a competing
business. Such facts are insufficient to state a claim for relief. See Tortolita,
252 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 24. Nor did Potter explain how Ehrich agreed to commit
the tort with others. Wells Fargo, 201 Ariz. at 498, ¶ 99. The superior court
did not err by dismissing the claim and the related conspiracy claim.

vii. Racketeering.

¶40 Finally, we address Potter’s racketeering claim. A private
citizen may bring a civil cause of action for a “reasonably foreseeable injury
to his [or her] person, business or property by a pattern of racketeering.”
A.R.S. § 13-2314.04(A). To establish a “pattern of racketeering,” the claimant
must show that the defendant committed two or more “related and
continuous” racketeering acts that resulted in injury. A.R.S.
§§ 13-2301(D)(4), -2314.04(T)(3); see also Hannosh v. Segal, 235 Ariz. 108,
111-12, ¶¶ 7-8 (App. 2014).

¶41 Potter alleged that all the defendants, including Ehrich,
“knowingly participated in and are engaged in a continuous pattern of
unlawful activity for financial gain.” He alleged that the defendants
“violate[d] various felony state statutes,” that each of the torts he alleged
“constitute[d] a pattern of unlawful activity,” and he suffered injuries.

¶42 Potter asserts that he sufficiently alleged violations of A.R.S.
§ 13-1003 (conspiracy), A.R.S. § 13-2409 (obstructing criminal

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investigations), and A.R.S. § 13-2310 (fraudulent schemes and artifices). We
disagree. Disregarding Potter’s conclusory allegations, the complaint
shows that Ehrich checked in as a witness for a hearing on a protective order
petition against Potter, paid Robert Meza for consulting services, and
formed a business like Potter’s. None of these facts adequately allege
culpability under A.R.S. §§ 13-1003, -2409, -2310, or any other predicate
offense under A.R.S. § 13-2301(D)(4).

¶43 Potter failed to allege sufficiently that Ehrich committed any
predicate offenses required for the racketeering claim. The superior court
did not err by dismissing the racketeering claim against Ehrich.

C. We Will Not Review the Superior Court’s Rulings in the Wrongful
Institution Case.

¶44 Potter argues that although he did not specifically bring an
abuse-of-process claim against Ehrich, he pled sufficient facts to support
the claim. But Potter specifically argued that the claim was well-pled in his
complaint in the wrongful institution case. The court’s rulings in the
wrongful institution case are not before us in this appeal.

¶45 Potter did not state a claim for abuse of process in this case.
Other than broad conclusions that Ehrich helped Doctor bring false claims
against Potter “to perpetuate and conceal their patterns of unlawful
activity,” Potter only alleged that Ehrich appeared at a hearing to testify.
See Goldman v. Sahl, 248 Ariz. 512, 522, ¶ 27 (App. 2020) (quoting Nienstedt
v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1982)) (“The elements of abuse of process
are ‘(1) a willful act in the use of [a] judicial process; (2) for an ulterior
purpose not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.’”).

¶46 Potter also argues that the superior court erred by denying
leave to amend his complaint in the wrongful institution case. Again, the
rulings, in that matter, are not before us, so we decline to review them. And
Potter failed to argue why the superior court abused its discretion by
denying leave to amend his complaint for the claims against Ehrich in this
case. See Schabel v. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97, 186 Ariz. 161, 167
(App. 1996) (“Issues not clearly raised and argued in a party’s appellate
brief are waived.”). In any event, the proposed amended complaint added
no viable claims against Ehrich. See In re Torstenson’s Est., 125 Ariz. 373, 377
(App. 1980) (The court should not grant leave to amend if the proposed
amended pleading is “legally insufficient” on its face.) (citation omitted).

¶47 Potter also claims the superior court erred by declining to
consolidate the two cases. We will not review the court’s order from the

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wrongful institution case that is not before us, and we have already
affirmed the superior court’s denial of the motion to consolidate in this case.
See Meza, 1 CA-CV 22-0441, at *2, ¶¶ 11-12.

¶48 Finally, Potter asks this court for leave to file a supplemental
complaint in the wrongful institution case. Potter must make this request
before the proper court handling that case.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶49 Potter requests appellate costs under “A.R.S. § 12-341 and the
private attorney general doctrine.” Because Potter is not the prevailing
party, we deny his request under A.R.S. § 12-341. Nor is Potter entitled to
costs under the private attorney general doctrine. See Ansley v. Banner Health
Network, 248 Ariz. 143, 153, ¶ 39 (2020) (“Fees are permissible under the
private attorney general doctrine for a party who has vindicated a right that
(1) benefits a large number of people, (2) requires private enforcement, and
(3) is of societal importance.”).

¶50 Ehrich requests attorney’s fees on appeal under A.R.S.
§§ 12-349, 13-2314.04(A), (N). Per our discretion, we deny the request.
A.R.S. § 12-349(A); see also Ariz. Republican Party v. Richer, 121 Ariz. Cases
Dig. 42, 48, ¶ 15 (2024). Ehrich is entitled to costs upon compliance with
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21 as the prevailing party. See
A.R.S. § 12-341.

CONCLUSION

¶51 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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