Knight v. Ludwig

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

NANCY KNIGHT, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

GLEN LUDWIG and PEARL LUDWIG, Trustees of THE LUDWIG
FAMILY TRUST; FAIRWAY CONSTRUCTORS, INC.; MEHDI AZARMI;
JAMES B. ROBERTS and DONNA M. ROBERTS, husband and wife,
Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0075
FILED 10-10-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. B8015CV201804003
The Honorable Dale P. Nielson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Nancy Knight, Fort Mohave
Plaintiff/Appellant

Law Offices of Daniel J. Oehler, Bullhead City
By Daniel J. Oehler
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
 KNIGHT v. LUDWIG, et al,
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Nancy Knight appeals from orders dismissing her complaint
with prejudice and awarding attorneys’ fees to Glen and Pearl Ludwig, as
Trustees of The Ludwig Family Trust; Fairway Constructors, Inc.
(“Fairway”); Mehdi Azarmi; and James and Donna Roberts (collectively,
“Defendants”). Knight also appeals several other interlocutory orders.
Finding no legal error or abuse of discretion, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Desert Lakes Golf Course & Estates (“Desert Lakes”) consists
of multiple tracts owned and developed by different developers at different
times. At the time Knight filed this action, Desert Lakes included Tracts
4076-A, 4076-B, 4076-C, 4076-D, 4132, 4159, and 4163. Knight owns a home
in Tract 4163. The Roberts own a home in Tract 4076-A. The Ludwigs and
Azarmi are officers in Fairway, which has bought, sold, and developed lots
in Tract 4076-A.

¶3 There are separate covenants, conditions, and restrictions
(“CC&Rs”) for the different tracts in Desert Lakes. The CC&Rs include
setback requirements and ban advertising signs on undeveloped lots.
There were originally no CC&Rs for Tract 4163, but all lots in Tract 4163 are
subject to the setback requirements in Mohave County Board of Supervisors
(“Board of Supervisors”) Resolution No. 98-348. None of the tracts have a
homeowners’ association.

¶4 In May 2016, the Mohave County Board of Adjustment
granted a request from Azarmi and the Roberts for a variance to reduce the
setback requirements on the Roberts’ lot in Tract 4076-A. In October 2016,
the Board of Supervisors denied a request by the Mohave County Planning
and Zoning Commission to reduce the setback requirements for all 4076
tracts by amending Resolution No. 93-122.

¶5 In 2018, Knight filed a two-count complaint. Count one
alleged that Defendants violated the CC&Rs by obtaining a variance for the

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Roberts’ lot and that Fairway, Ludwig, and Azarmi continued to build
homes in violation of the setback requirement in the CC&Rs for Tract 4076-
A. Knight also alleged that Fairway, Ludwig, and Azarmi attempted to
violate the CC&Rs when they sought to amend Resolution No. 93-122 to
reduce the setback requirements in all 4076 tracts. Count two sought
injunctive relief for alleged violations of advertising sign and setback
restrictions. Knight alleged that Fairway’s display of “build to suit” signs
on vacant lots violated the CC&Rs’ ban on advertising signs.

¶6 Defendants moved to dismiss count one with prejudice
because Knight did not own property in Tract 4076-A and, therefore, could
not enforce the CC&Rs in Tract 4076-A. The superior court granted the
motion to dismiss count one with prejudice. Because this was the only
claim against the Roberts, they were dismissed from the action. The court,
however, ruled that Knight could enforce any alleged CC&R violations in
Tract 4163, where she owed property, and in Tract 4076-B because Tract
4163 used to be part of Tract 4076-B.

¶7 Defendants later moved for summary judgment on the
alleged CC&R violations in count two. They argued that the CC&Rs had
been abandoned due to nonenforcement. Although the superior court
denied the summary judgment motion, the parties agreed that all Desert
Lakes property owners were necessary parties because there was a dispute
over the validity of the CC&Rs. After additional briefing and oral
argument, the court held that Knight, not Defendants, must join the
necessary parties.1 The court ordered the parties to prepare the notices to
serve the necessary parties.

¶8 Knight filed numerous pleadings challenging the order
requiring her to serve the necessary parties and the language in the notice
of service. The superior court heard argument on several of these motions.
Both parties submitted amended notices of service. One year later, after
much litigation, the court ordered Knight to serve the necessary parties
with a specific notice packet provided by the court (“the service order”).
Knight was ordered to take “substantial steps” toward serving the
necessary parties within 150 days or the court would dismiss the complaint.

1 Knight appealed this order, but this court dismissed the appeal because

the Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certification was improper.

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The court also ordered Knight to have no contact with the necessary parties
except to attempt service (“no contact order”).2

¶9 Knight did not attempt service by the deadline and informed
Defendants she would not be doing so. As a result, Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint with prejudice as a contempt sanction for Knight’s
disregard of the service order. Defendants also sought an award of
attorneys’ fees “for the defense of this matter.” The superior court found
Knight in contempt and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court
also awarded Defendants over $200,000 in attorneys’ fees. Knight timely
appealed after entry of an appealable judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 54(b).

DISCUSSION

I. The court did not err in dismissing count one for alleged
violations of the CC&Rs in Tract 4076-A.

¶10 Defendants moved to dismiss count one of the complaint for
failing to state a claim, arguing, among other things, that Knight lacked
standing to enforce the CC&Rs in Tract 4076-A. Knight responded that the
different tracts are part of one master-planned community, so she was
entitled to enforce the CC&Rs in all Desert Lakes tracts. Knight reasserts
this argument on appeal.

¶11 The superior court found that Tracts 4076-A and 4076-B are
two subdivisions with separately recorded CC&Rs, and that because
Knight did not own property in Tract 4076-A, she could not enforce any
CC&R violations. The court also found that Tract 4163, where Knight owns
property, was originally a parcel within Tract 4076-B, so Knight had
standing to enforce the CC&Rs for Tract 4076-B as asserted in count two.3

¶12 Because the superior court considered matters outside the
pleadings, the motion to dismiss converted to a summary judgment motion.
Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 356, ¶ 9 (2012); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

2 Knight refers to the no contact order as the “Gag Order.”

3 Tract 4163 was created from a portion of Tract 4076-B. For this reason, the

superior court ruled that the CC&Rs from 4076-B carried over to Tract 4163,
and Knight could enforce the CC&Rs in Tract 4076-B. We do not address
this ruling because Defendants did not cross appeal from it.

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Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 305
(1990). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and construe
the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
opposing party. Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12 (2003).

¶13 This case requires us to interpret CC&Rs. “CC&Rs constitute
a contract between the subdivision’s property owners as a whole and
individual lot owners.” Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n Inc. v.
Turner, 196 Ariz. 631, 634, ¶ 5 (App. 2000). Contract interpretation is
generally a matter of law, which we review de novo. Id.

¶14 Arizona courts interpret CC&Rs so as “to give effect to the
intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the
instrument, or the circumstances surrounding the creation of the servitude,
and to carry out the purpose for which it was created.” Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 557, ¶ 13 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.1(1) (2000)); accord Ariz.
Biltmore Estates Ass’n v. Tezak, 177 Ariz. 447, 449 (App. 1993).

¶15 The plain language in the CC&Rs for Tract 4076-A (where the
Roberts own property) states that property owners “within the
subdivision” can enforce the CC&Rs. Knight argues, as she did below, that
all of Desert Lakes is one “subdivision” with one common scheme (the 1988
Preliminary Plat) created by one developer (Desert Lakes Development
L.P.). Therefore, she contends that she owns property “within the
subdivision.”

¶16 Knight places undue weight on the word “subdivision.” She
contends that Desert Lakes is one subdivision because originally, in 1988,
there was a preliminary plat for one “Tract 4076” with one set of CC&Rs.
As Knight acknowledges, however, Desert Lakes was developed in
multiple phases with separate tracts. This resulted in separate CC&Rs for
the different tracts. There were also multiple owners and developers of the
various tracts and the plats for each tract were approved and developed at
different times.

¶17 None of the CC&Rs refer to a master set of CC&Rs that apply
to the greater Desert Lakes community. The CC&Rs for Tract 4076-A state
that they apply to “said tract” multiple times and lists specific lots in Tract
4076-A. The fact that the CC&Rs governing the other tracts contain mostly
identical language does not mean that the Desert Lakes community is one

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subdivision. Each set of CC&Rs makes it clear that it only applies to the
“said tract” identified in the CC&Rs. If Desert Lakes was one subdivision,
as Knight claims, then the individual CC&Rs would not be limited to a
specific tract, and the individual tracts would not have their own CC&Rs.
Thus, using the term “subdivision” in the enforcement paragraphs of the
CC&Rs does not imply that all property owners in the greater Desert Lakes
community can enforce CC&Rs in tracts where they do not own property.

¶18 Knight’s interpretation also contradicts the Restatement
(Third) of Property (Servitudes), which addresses restrictive covenants.
Absent statutes or case law to the contrary, we generally follow the
Restatement. Barnes v. Outlaw, 192 Ariz. 283, 285, ¶ 6 (1998). As the
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.14, comment g (2000),
states:

When a tract is developed in phases, with separate units or
subdivisions, the imposition of servitudes in one phase
should not give rise to the implication of reciprocal servitudes
burdening the remaining units or subdivisions, unless the
developer clearly represented to purchasers that the remaining units
would be subject to the same restrictions as the earlier ones under
circumstances that would justify enforcement of an express
oral promise to impose restrictions on the remaining land
under § 2.9.

(Emphasis added).

¶19 This rule has been applied in other jurisdictions. See Lillard v.
Jet Homes, Inc., 129 So. 2d 109, 112-13 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (holding that absent
a manifest intention to the contrary, “purchasers of lots in a subdivision
containing restrictive covenants pursuant to a general building plan cannot,
because they are such purchasers, enforce restrictive covenants relating to
lots in other subdivisions subsequently platted by the same owner.”)
(citation omitted). Accord Marengo Hills, Inc. v. Watson, 368 So. 2d 856, 857-
58 (Ala. 1979); Craven Cnty. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., Inc., 75 S.E. 2d
620, 628-29 (N.C. 1953); Rooney v. Peoples Bank of Arapahoe Cnty., 513 P. 2d
1077, 1080 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Nelson v. Flache, 487 S.W. 2d 843, 845-46
(Tex. Ct. App. 1972); Reid v. Standard Oil Co. of Ky., 130 S.E. 2d 777, 781 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1963).

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¶20 Tract 4076-A is a separate subdivision, and Knight cannot
enforce its CC&Rs because she does not own property in Tract 4076-A.4

II. The superior court did not err by dismissing count two with
prejudice as a sanction for Knight’s contempt.

¶21 As previously mentioned, the superior court held that Knight
could enforce the alleged violations of CC&Rs in Tracts 4163 and 4076-B.
Knight alleged CC&R violations based on Defendants’ (1) advertising signs
on unimproved lots, (2) unsuccessful attempt to amend Resolution No. 93-
122 to change the setbacks in all tracts of 4076, and (3) continued
construction of homes in violation of the setback requirements.

¶22 Defendants moved for summary judgment on count two,
arguing that the CC&Rs in Tract 4076-B had been abandoned. In response
to this argument, the parties stipulated that all property owners in Tract
4076-B were necessary parties under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 19
(“Rule 19”) (requiring joinder of a person if “that person claims an interest
relating to the subject matter of the action and is so situated that disposing
of the action in the person’s absence may [] as a practical matter impair or
impede the person’s ability to protect the interest”). Over the next two
years, the parties litigated whether Knight or Defendants must serve the
necessary parties and debated the substance of the language in the notice
of service. See supra ¶¶ 7-8.

¶23 Ultimately, the superior court ordered Knight to “take
substantial steps” to serve the necessary parties with court-approved notice
of service within 150 days or the “matter shall be dismissed.” The court
also ordered Knight to have no contact with the necessary parties other than
to accomplish service. Knight did not serve any other property owners, and
the court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the action with prejudice
as a sanction for Knight’s contempt.

A. We have appellate jurisdiction.

¶24 Defendants argue that contempt rulings are not appealable,
and because Knight failed to file a special action petition, we lack
jurisdiction to consider the dismissal order and corresponding award of

4 Knight’s brief claims to raise an issue related to the enforcement rights of

the owners of Lot 81 on Lipan Boulevard and the lots in Tract 4076-D.
Knight does not own Lot 81, nor does she own property in Tract 4076-D.
Therefore, she cannot raise these arguments.

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attorneys’ fees. Contempt orders are not generally appealable, Stoddard v.
Donahoe, 224 Ariz. 152, 154, ¶ 7 (App. 2010), but because the contempt ruling
resulted in a final order of dismissal, it is appealable as a final order under
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-2101. Green v. Lisa Frank,
Inc., 221 Ariz. 138, 146-48, ¶¶ 14-17, 22-23 (App. 2009) (holding that an order
of dismissal with prejudice as a sanction for violating court orders was
appealable under Section 12-2101 because it decided and disposed of the
case on its merits). Thus, we have jurisdiction to consider the contempt
ruling that dismissed the action with prejudice.

B. All property owners in Tracts 4076-B and 4163 are necessary
parties.

¶25 Knight argues there was no basis for the court to order that
she “sue over 100 parties who have no [CC&R] violations whatsoever.” We
review questions involving interpretation and application of court rules de
novo. Vega v. Sullivan, 199 Ariz. 504, 507, ¶ 8 (App. 2001).

¶26 Knight misunderstands the nature of the order and the
reasons why joining all property owners was necessary. The superior court
did not require the joinder of the other property owners because they might
have violated CC&Rs. Rather, the court said the property owners in Tract
4076-B must be joined because a ruling that the CC&Rs have been
abandoned and are no longer enforceable would affect their property
rights. See Raimey v. Ditsworth, 227 Ariz. 552, 556-57, ¶¶ 11-12 (App. 2011)
(holding that courts may not find CC&Rs invalid as to only some lots in a
subdivision); Karner v. Roy White Flowers, Inc., 527 S.E. 2d 40, 43-44 (N.C.
2000) (holding that all subdivision property owners are necessary parties
because an action to void CC&Rs must apply to all lots). Thus, because all
Tract 4076-B property owners would be affected by any such ruling, they
were necessary parties under Rule 19.

¶27 Further, Knight’s former attorney stipulated that all property
owners in Tract 4076-B must be joined, and Knight is bound by that
stipulation absent a court order. See Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 147 Ariz.
534, 549 (App. 1985) (holding that parties are bound by their attorneys’
stipulations in a judicial proceeding unless relieved of them by the court).

C. Knight was obligated to serve the necessary parties.

¶28 Knight argues that Defendants had the burden of serving the
necessary parties because they asserted an abandonment defense. See
College Book Ctrs., Inc. v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Ass’n, 225 Ariz. 533,
537, ¶ 12 (App. 2010) (holding that the party asserting a waiver of CC&Rs

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bears the burden of proof). Defendants argue that Knight, as the plaintiff,
must serve the necessary parties.

¶29 Both parties cite Sheets v. Dillon, 20 S.E. 2d 344, 345 (N.C. 1942),
in which the plaintiff argued the CC&Rs were invalid. There, the court held
that the plaintiff must join the necessary parties. Although Sheets
established that all interested property owners must be joined, there was no
dispute about which party had to serve the additional parties. Id. at 348. In
a later North Carolina case, Karner, 527 S.E. 2d at 44, the plaintiffs sought to
join nonparty property owners in a dispute over the validity of CC&Rs. The
lower court denied the motion to join nonparties which was affirmed on
appeal. Id. at 41-42. The supreme court reversed, holding that nonparty
property owners in the subdivision were, in fact, “necessary parties to th[e]
action because the voiding of the [CC&Rs] would extinguish their property
rights.” Id. at 44. Again, the issue of which party had to join the necessary
parties was not in dispute.

¶30 Rule 19 does not specify which party must serve the necessary
parties. But Arizona and other state courts generally hold that it is the
plaintiff’s duty to join an indispensable party to the proceeding. See
generally Siler v. Superior Court, 83 Ariz. 49, 54 (1957) (holding that the
plaintiff, who was the party appealing the denial of a liquor license transfer
to the superior court, was required to serve the registered owner of the
license as a necessary party); see also Hubert v. Bd. of Pub. Util. of Kansas City,
174 P. 2d 1017, 1020 (Kan. 1946) (holding that the plaintiff bore the burden
of “procuring the presence of all [] indispensable parties[]”).5 This is
consistent with the nature of the action here.

¶31 Knight’s complaint brought Defendants into court. See Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court.”). Although Defendants raised the abandonment defense and must
prove it, see College Book Ctrs., 225 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 12, Knight initiated the
action that potentially impacted all the property owners’ interests in the
CC&Rs. Defendants raised only an affirmative defense; they did not assert
a counterclaim or third-party claim against the other property owners. See
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 13 (counter and cross claims); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 14 (third-party

5 Although Hubert, 174 P. 2d at 1020, cited 39 Am. Jur. 884 § 25, in support

of this holding, the more recent 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 112 (2024), adopted
after the superior court’s ruling in this case, now states, less helpfully, that
“[n]ormally, it is the duty of the litigants or the court to join an
indispensable party.”

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claims). The burden of service is on Knight because the court would not be
able to provide her complete relief without joining the other property
owners. We affirm the court’s order that Knight was required to serve the
other property owners.6

D. It was within the superior court’s discretion to dismiss the
case as a contempt sanction.

¶32 The superior court can dismiss an action when a party fails to
comply with its orders. Green, 221 Ariz. at 149-50, ¶ 29. See also Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 41(b) (“If the plaintiff fails to prosecute the case or to comply with
these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the
action[.]”). We review the court’s imposition of sanctions for an abuse of
discretion, giving greater scrutiny to the ultimate sanction of dismissal.
Estate of Lewis v. Lewis, 229 Ariz. 316, 324, ¶ 20 (App. 2012).

¶33 Knight argues she was denied due process because the
superior court did not issue an order to show cause or schedule a hearing
where she could appear and show why she should not be held in contempt.
But a hearing is not required “[w]here willfulness or bad faith or fault of
the party is clear from the record[.]” Robinson v. Higuera, 157 Ariz. 622, 624
(App. 1988) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962)). The
adequacy of the notice and hearing requirements depend “to a considerable
extent, on the knowledge which the circumstances show such party may be
taken to have of the consequences of his own conduct.” Link, 370 U.S. at
632.

¶34 Before dismissing a case as a sanction, courts should consider
several factors, including: (1) prejudice to the other party caused by the
disobedient party’s conduct; (2) whether the conduct was that of the party
or counsel; (3) whether the conduct was willful or in bad faith and if it was
repeated or continuous; (4) the public interest in the integrity of the judicial
system and compliance with court orders; (5) prejudice to the judicial
system, including delays and burdens on the court; (6) efficacy of lesser

6 In a related argument, Knight contends the superior court erred in
denying her motion to dismiss the abandonment claim for failure to join
Rule 19 parties. Knight’s motion to dismiss raised the same argument she
asserts on appeal. As stated above, joinder was necessary and was Knight’s
responsibility. Therefore, the court properly denied the motion to dismiss.

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sanctions; (7) prior warnings of potential sanctions; and (8) the policy of
resolving cases on the merits. Green, 221 Ariz. at 154, ¶ 45.

¶35 Several of these factors are present here. Knight represented
herself and personally committed these violations. Cf. Lewis, 229 Ariz. at
324-25, ¶¶ 21-22. Over the course of two years, the superior court
considered Knight’s repeated challenges to the service order seeking relief
from or modification of this order. All were denied. Knight’s continuous
challenges raised the same arguments multiple times and the court and
opposing parties spent considerable resources to address Knight’s
repetitive pleadings. The issue was ultimately resolved in the second
service order which again informed Knight that failure to take substantial
steps to serve the necessary parties by the deadline would result in
dismissal. Thus, Knight knew the consequences of her actions. See Link,
370 U.S. at 632. Further, Knight failed to respond to Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the case with prejudice. Although the court did not state that it
considered lesser sanctions, it considered the delay and Knight’s continued
failure to comply with the service order. See Green, 221 Ariz. at 154-55, ¶¶
46-47 (holding that the superior court’s failure to state whether it
considered prejudice to opposing party did not require reversal where most
other factors were present).

¶36 Based on this record, the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the case as a contempt sanction. Because we find
the court properly dismissed the case, it is not necessary to address the
merits of Defendants’ abandonment defense.

III. The superior court did not err by awarding attorneys’ fees
as a sanction.

¶37 The dismissal order also awarded attorneys’ fees to
Defendants. Defendants submitted a fee application and affidavit. After
Knight failed to respond, the superior court awarded Defendants
$217,254.50 in fees and costs. The superior court has authority to award
attorneys’ fees as a sanction for a party’s “complete and repeated disregard
of a court order” without reasonable justification. Taylor v. So. Pac. Transp.
Co., 130 Ariz. 516, 523 (1981). We review sanction orders for an abuse of
discretion. Lewis, 229 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 20.

¶38 Knight argues that (1) the fee award was premature because
the superior court did not resolve all counts, (2) the fee award will
discourage others from litigating these types of issues, and (3) the economic
disparity weighs against the award. The order dismissing count two with

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prejudice resolved all issues on the merits. Thus, the fee award was not
premature. The record supports the finding that Knight “willfully and
deliberately refused and refuses to comply with this Court’s specific and
definitive orders.” See supra ¶ 35. Knight’s repeated challenges to the
service orders were unreasonable and caused Defendants to incur
additional and unnecessary attorneys’ fees. Knight also failed to cite to
anything in the record to support her claim of economic disparity.
Accordingly, we affirm the award.

IV. Knight waived her argument that the no contact order
violated her due process and free speech rights.

¶39 Knight argues, without supporting authority, that the no
contact order lacked a legal basis and violated her constitutional rights to
due process and free speech. “Arguments that are unsupported by legal
authority and adequate citation to the record are waived.” J.W. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 184, 188, ¶ 11 (App. 2021). Accordingly, we do not
address this issue.

V. Knight waived her argument that the superior court erred in
denying her motion for leave to amend the complaint.

¶40 Throughout these proceedings, Knight filed seven motions
for leave to amend the complaint. The court denied these requests, finding
the amendments would be futile, would unreasonably delay or expand the
proceedings, or that the request was made for an improper purpose.

¶41 Knight argues that denying her leave to amend the complaint
was not in the interests of judicial economy. We review the denial of a
motion for leave to amend a complaint under an abuse of discretion
standard. MacCollum v. Perkinson, 185 Ariz. 179, 185 (App. 1996). Leave to
amend is usually granted “unless the court finds undue delay in the
request, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility in the amendment.” Id.

¶42 On appeal, Knight cites Arizona Civil Procedure Rule
15(a)(2), which states that leave to amend must be freely given when justice
requires, but she fails to explain how the superior court abused its
discretion. Knight has waived this argument because she cites no relevant
legal authority and does not properly develop her argument. See J.W., 252
Ariz. at 188, ¶ 11. For example, on appeal Knight argues that she stated a
claim for fraud against opposing counsel. The original complaint did not
include any fraud claims. Thus, this issue is not properly before us on
appeal. To the extent Knight’s argument is that she should have been
allowed to amend the complaint to add a fraud claim, it is waived because

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she failed to properly develop this argument or plead the fraud claim with
the required particularity. See J.W., 252 Ariz. at 188, ¶ 11 (waiver); Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 9(b); Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 234 Ariz. 125, 142,
¶ 75 (App. 2014) (recognizing the “more stringent [pleading] requirements
of Rule 9(b)”).

VI. The award of attorneys’ fees for Knight’s motions filed
between March and June 2023 was proper.

¶43 Knight challenges the order awarding $6,230.25 in attorneys’
fees to Defendants for responding to three motions Knight filed between
March and June 2023.7 In denying her motions, the superior court found
the motions were (1) not authorized by any rule, (2) not supported by any
factual basis, and (3) unnecessary.

¶44 The superior court cited Section 12-349(A)(3), which
authorizes an award of fees if a party “[u]nreasonably expands or delays
the proceeding.” We review the superior court’s application of this statute
de novo but view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
award. Takieh v. O’Meara, 252 Ariz. 51, 61-62, ¶ 39 (App. 2021). Knight cites
no facts in the record supporting her challenge to this order. As a result,
this argument is waived. See J.W., 252 Ariz. at 188, ¶ 11. Waiver aside, after
reviewing these three motions, we agree with the superior court’s
assessment. Therefore, we affirm the award.

VII. Knight’s libel allegations and request for punitive damages
are waived.

¶45 Knight argues that defense counsel should be subject to
punitive damages because he libeled and extorted her. Knight does not cite
legal authority or a factual basis for this claim. Accordingly, it is waived.
See J.W., 252 Ariz. at 188, ¶ 11. Moreover, the complaint did not include a
libel claim, so this argument is not properly before us on appeal.

7 These motions are: (1) a motion to strike Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, (2) a motion for gag order on Defendants and their attorney, and
(3) a motion for Defendants’ attorney to state a Rule 12 claim.

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VIII. Defendants are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs on appeal.

¶46 Knight requests an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal under Section 12-1840. This is not a declaratory judgment action, so
Section 12-1840 does not apply.

¶47 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs
under Section 12-341.01. As the successful party, Defendants are entitled to
an award of attorneys’ fees under Section 12-341.01 upon compliance with
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. We also award Defendants’
reasonable costs on appeal under Section 12-342(B).

CONCLUSION

¶48 We affirm the dismissal orders and all other interim orders.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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