Polich v. Polich

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

NICHOLAS POLICH, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

MICHELLE POLICH, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0098 FC
FILED 01-07-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2018-090462
The Honorable Quintin H. Cushner, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Harmon Law Office, Tempe
By Emile J. Harmon
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Ryan Rapp Pacheco Sorenson PLC, Phoenix
By Lesli M. H. Sorenson, Christopher T. Rapp, Teri D. McCall
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Nicholas Polich (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s Order
for Legal Decision Making, Parenting Time and Child Support (the
“Order”) modifying Michelle Stevens’ (“Mother”) and Father’s parenting
obligations and its judgment awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Mother.
Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Mother and Father Divorce.

¶2 Mother and Father have two minor children, O.P., born in
2015, and Q.P., born in 2016. In April 2018, Mother and Father entered into
a Consent Decree of Dissolution, in which they agreed to joint custody,
equal parenting time, and joint legal decision-making (“the 2018 Decree”).
Since the decree, however, the matter has turned into a high-conflict
proceeding, resulting in more than 550 separate entries in the superior court
file.

¶3 In 2019, both Mother and Father filed competing petitions.
Mother sought to enforce the 2018 Decree regarding educational decisions
for O.P., while Father sought to modify the same. The parties then reached
a Rule 69 Agreement, which changed their equal parenting time schedule.
The court entered a stipulated order in October 2020, under which O.P. and
Q.P. would remain at their current preschool until they could enroll in
kindergarten at a specified school (“Specified School”), where they would
remain until the sixth grade.

B. Mother and Father Disagree on the Children’s Education
and Father Obtains an Order of Protection.

¶4 In January 2021, Mother and Father discussed Q.P.’s
enrollment in kindergarten. Father wanted him to enter kindergarten early,
but Mother did not. Q.P. took an entrance exam that qualified him for
kindergarten, though not at the Specified School. In March 2021, Father

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filed a Request for Post-Decree Mediation, seeking sole legal decision-
making or final say. Father alleged O.P. was being bullied at school.
Mother and Father disagreed on how to handle the situation and failed to
reach an agreement.

¶5 Also in March, Father obtained an Order of Protection against
Mother because she placed a tracking device on his vehicle. Mother was
served with the order in April 2021. Mother was also arrested for tracking
Father. After Mother pled guilty to misdemeanor harassment and
completed a diversion program, the charges were dismissed.

C. Father and Mother File Competing Petitions Concerning
Legal Decision-Making and Parenting Time and Agree to a
Comprehensive Family Evaluation.

¶6 In July 2021, Father petitioned the court to request sole legal
decision-making and that he receive all parenting time. He also then filed
an emergency motion seeking sole legal decision-making as a result of
Mother’s tracking, which the court denied. In November 2021, Father again
moved for sole legal decision-making, then alleging that Mother and her
father were sexually abusing the children. The court granted that motion
and, after an evidentiary hearing, in which a Department of Child Safety
Agent testified, awarded Father temporary sole legal decision-making and
Mother supervised parenting time (“Temporary Orders”). The superior
court acknowledged DCS was investigating the allegations. In December
2021, Mother responded to Father’s petition, denying his allegations and
counter-petitioning to seek sole legal decision-making.

¶7 Meanwhile, the parties agreed to a Comprehensive Family
Evaluation (“CFE”) by Dr. David Weinstock. In February 2022, the court
appointed Dr. David Weinstock to conduct the CFE, ordering that costs be
shared equally subject to reallocation. The same month, Father filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the appointment of Dr. Weinstock, which
was denied. Dr. Weinstock sought to speak with the prosecutor and
victim’s advocate in Mother’s criminal case related to her tracking of Father.
Over the course of the next few months, Dr. Weinstock requested status
conferences given Father’s unwillingness to participate in the CFE. Father
ultimately moved to terminate the CFE process. Mother opposed that
motion, and the court denied it, continuing the CFE.

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D. Father Enrolls O.P. in a Different School and Mother and
Father File Additional Petitions.

¶8 In April 2022, Father enrolled O.P. in a gifted school, relying
on his temporary sole legal decision-making authority under the
Temporary Orders. He then moved to change O.P.’s school from the
Specified School to the gifted school. The court denied Father’s motion.
Father then notified Mother he was going to homeschool the children and
not send them to the Specified School. The court then ordered Father to
enroll them at the Specified School.

¶9 When Father sent the children on a trip during Mother’s
supervised parenting time, Mother filed a petition to enforce her parenting
time, also seeking contempt and sanctions (“Mother’s Petition to Enforce”).
The court then modified the Temporary Orders to award Mother and
Father joint legal decision-making on a temporary basis and to award
Mother final decision-making authority regarding schooling and Father
final decision-making in all other matters.

E. The Parties Have Discovery Disputes, Resulting in
Requests for Sanctions.

¶10 In July 2022, Mother moved to compel Father’s deposition
and responses to requests for the production of documents and sought
attorneys’ fees and other sanctions alleging Father refused to cooperate in
discovery. The court granted Mother’s motion but deferred the fee and
sanction issues to trial. In December 2022, Father sought contempt
sanctions over Mother’s alleged failure to pay the uninsured portions of
certain medical bills. The court also deferred this issue until trial. In
February 2023, Mother moved to modify the November 2021 Temporary
Orders to give her temporary final legal decision-making authority and sole
unsupervised custody. After an evidentiary hearing, the court issued a
temporary order affirming legal decision-making as joint and awarding
Mother unsupervised visitation. The court again deferred ruling on the
request for attorneys’ fees to trial.

F. The Trial

¶11 The court held a trial on July 10-12, 2023. The court heard
testimony from the parties, Dr. Weinstock, and Kristyn Alcott, a manager
of a parenting time supervision agency. Father testified about the children
and Mother. Father testified the children accused Mother and her father of
inappropriately touching O.P. Father also testified that Mother had been
Googling Father’s and his wife’s names and found their wedding website.

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Father discussed Mother’s arrest for surveillance and harassment.
Additionally, Father testified O.P. had behavioral problems at school and
at home including inappropriately touching other children. He also
testified O.P. had been bullied at school and he wanted to enroll O.P. in a
school for gifted children.

¶12 Mother testified DCS found Father’s reports of abuse
unsubstantiated. DCS’s report was admitted into evidence. She testified
the criminal investigation into the allegations of sexual abuse against her
and her father was closed for lack of probable cause. Mother testified that
she believed the children had been coached by Father to make these
allegations. Mother acknowledged her plea and diversion agreement from
tracking Father’s car.

¶13 Dr. Weinstock testified about his report and his conclusions.
Dr. Weinstock testified Mother was not unfit to parent the children. Dr.
Weinstock concluded that substantial and consistent contact with Mother
was in the children’s best interests. He testified that his primary hypothesis
regarding the sexual abuse allegations was that Father had coached or
influenced the children. Dr. Weinstock testified Father was uncooperative
during his evaluation and had walked out of his final session.

¶14 Kristyn Alcott testified Mother complied with the Temporary
Orders during supervised visitation. Alcott further testified that she was
not present at each visit, but that her staff documented the supervised visits
electronically, as her final report reflected.

G. The Superior Court Issues Its Order and Judgment Granting
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs to Mother.

¶15 In September 2023, the court issued the Order, which resolved
all pending petitions. The court awarded joint legal decision-making and
equal parenting time and gave Mother presumptive decision-making
authority. The court made best-interest findings, including that there was
no credible evidence Mother sexually abused the children or posed a
danger to them. Within its best-interest analysis, the court found Mother
had committed domestic violence against Father under A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(A). However, the court declined to apply the prohibition on joint
custody in A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A) because Mother’s domestic violence was
not significant. The court also found Mother rebutted the presumption
under A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D) that Father should be awarded legal sole
decision-making for reason of her domestic violence. Mother did so by (1)
showing joint legal decision-making and equal parenting time are in the

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children’s best interests, (2) completing a domestic non-violence program,
and (3) showing there was no domestic violence during the marriage.

¶16 The court ordered Mother to pay child support. The court,
using the Arizona Child Support Guidelines, A.R.S. § 25-302 app.
(“Guidelines”), ordered Mother to pay Father $62.00 per month. The court
also granted judgment for Father and against Mother for past child support
of $30,965.00. Although Mother sought more than $325,000 in attorneys’
fees, the court awarded her fees and costs totaling $12,750.00. The court
found that there was no substantial disparity of financial resources between
the parties and that Father acted unreasonably during discovery.

¶17 The court denied Father’s Petition for Contempt for lack of
credible evidence. The court granted Mother’s Petition to Enforce, finding
Father interfered with her parenting time under the Temporary Orders. The
court also ordered Father to pay $18,215.29 for Dr. Weinstock’s work “to
offset the difference between the amounts Father and Mother have paid to
date.”

¶18 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const.,
art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶19 Father challenges the Order’s provisions concerning legal
decision-making, parenting time, child support, and its award of attorneys’
fees and costs to Mother.

¶20 We will affirm a superior court’s decision regarding legal
decision-making, parenting time, child support, and attorneys’ fees absent
an abuse of discretion. See Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273 ¶ 11 (App. 2013).
There is an abuse of discretion where the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to upholding the superior court’s decision is “devoid of
competent evidence to support the decision or when the court commits an
error of law in the process of reaching a discretionary conclusion.” Engstrom
v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471 ¶ 4 (App. 2018) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). We will not reweigh the evidence or determine credibility
on appeal. See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347 ¶ 13 (App. 1998);
Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009). And we defer to the superior
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Engstrom, 243
Ariz. at 471 ¶ 4.

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I. Father’s Opening Brief Fails to Comply with ARCAP 13.

¶21 Mother argues that Father’s Opening Brief fails to comply
with ARCAP 13(a) and (d) because his brief failed to include adequate
citations to the record or legal authorities. ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring legal
authority); ARCAP 13(d) (requiring citations to the record). Mother
requests we find any unsupported contention or argument waived. See In
re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64-65 ¶ 6 (2013). While we agree with Mother
that portions of Father’s brief do not comply with ARCAP 13, we exercise
our discretion to address the merits of his arguments, as our resolution of
these issues affects the best interests of minor children. See State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75, 79 ¶ 12 (2002) (exercising discretion to address waived
arguments); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85 (1966) (declining to find
arguments waived where interests of minor children were involved); accord
Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102 ¶ 18 (2003) (“We have repeatedly stressed
that the child’s best interest is paramount in custody determinations.”)
(collecting cases). We address each argument in turn.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding
Joint Legal Decision-Making and Equal Parenting Time.

A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Finding Mother’s Domestic Violence Was Not Significant.

¶22 Father contends the superior court abused its discretion by
finding Mother’s domestic violence was not significant under A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(A) because it incorrectly considered Mother’s stalking as a single
incident. We disagree.

¶23 Joint legal decision-making is precluded by statute “if the
court makes a finding of the existence of significant domestic violence
pursuant to [A.R.S.] § 13-3601 or if the court finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that there has been a significant history of domestic violence.”
A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A). The superior court received and weighed the
evidence of the entire course of Mother’s stalking and surveilling Father
and the children. The superior court expressly considered three factors we
have approved in determining whether domestic violence is significant
under A.R.S. § 25-403.03(C). They are: “(1) [t]he seriousness of the
particular incident of domestic violence, (2) the frequency or pervasiveness
of the domestic violence, (3) and the passage of time and its impact.” See
DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 424 ¶ 15 n.6 (App. 2019) (noting these non-
statutory “factors seem reasonable”). Weighing the evidence, the court
stated that Mother’s “acts in the spectrum of domestic violence do not

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constitute significant [domestic violence] as contemplated by statute.” The
court’s finding is supported by reasonable evidence and applies a correct
legal standard. Accordingly, Father has shown no abuse of discretion.

¶24 Father contends the court failed to “comprehensively”
evaluate his allegations against Mother, apparently because the court did
not recite the facts of record more fully in its ruling. We assume the court
properly assessed the facts necessary to support its judgment, including
finding one party’s testimony more credible than the other’s, as the court
did here by implication. See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55-56 ¶ 18 (App.
2004); Elliot v. Elliot, 165 Ariz. 128, 135 (App. 1990). Because there is no
indication the superior court failed to review any of this evidence rather
than assign it minimal weight or find Mother more credible, Father has
shown no abuse of discretion.

B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Its
Consideration of the Children’s Alleged Behavior.

¶25 Father argues the superior court disregarded therapy records,
medical records, and testimony demonstrating the children engaged in
inappropriate behavior with another child during Mother’s parenting time.
Father argues the court should have explained why it found such evidence
not credible. Again, the superior court made clear that it considered all
evidence in the record and found it did not have credible testimony and
evidence that Mother caused the behaviors by sexually abusing her
children. Dr. Weinstock’s report, which the court cites in the Order, found
a lack of data to support a finding Mother inappropriately touched her
children. Again, Father has shown no abuse of discretion, and it is not for
us to reweigh the evidence. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Making Its Best-Interests Findings.

¶26 Father argues the court abused its discretion because it did
not order O.P. enrolled in the gifted school. Father contends this
improperly disregarded O.P.’s best interests.

¶27 First, Father argues the Order did not clearly explain why the
court declined his request to enroll O.P. in the gifted school. Not
considering O.P.’s gifted status, Father argues, “contraven[es] established
legal standards that prioritize a child’s best interests in educational
decisions.” Father’s argument fails for several reasons. It improperly relies
on A.R.S. § 15-779.02, which does not bear on the court’s legal decision-
making analysis. Compare A.R.S. § 15-779.02 (describing the obligations of

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a governing board for identifying gifted pupils) with A.R.S. § 25-403(A)
(enumerating the factors for legal decision-making). In addition, the court
received conflicting evidence about whether O.P. needed to be enrolled in
a gifted program. It heard Father had placed O.P. in a gifted program, and
that O.P. was tested and recommended for a gifted program, but also Dr.
Weinstock’s contrasting analysis that an evaluator merely provided a gifted
program as one option for O.P. Because the court had discretion to weigh
this evidence as it determined, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
determination as to whether O.P.’s best interests required his enrollment at
the gifted school. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

¶28 Second, Father argues the superior court abused its discretion
by failing to “critically weigh evidence” that O.P. was being bullied at
school and by ignoring the claimed “unreasonableness” of Mother’s
response to the asserted bullying. This argument again asks this Court to
reweigh evidence, which we will not do. Id.

III. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Considering
Dr. Weinstock’s Report and Testimony, or Kristyn Alcott’s.

¶29 Father challenges the superior court’s consideration of Dr.
Weinstock’s report and testimony. First, Father argues the superior court
erred because it admitted Mother’s polygraph test through Dr. Weinstock’s
report without stipulation. Second, Father argues the superior court erred
by “solely” relying on Dr. Weinstock’s report. Neither argument is
supported by the record. He has shown no abuse of discretion.

A. The Superior Court Did Not Admit Mother’s Polygraph into
Evidence and Did Not Rely on It.

¶30 While Dr. Weinstock’s report referred to Mother’s polygraph
test, the court never admitted the test into the record. The superior court
did not rely on the polygraph, as it is not referenced in the Order. And
while the court considered Dr. Weinstock’s report, Dr. Weinstock only gave
the polygraph “minimal weight[,]”and Father never objected to the
admission of Dr. Weinstock’s Report. The court did not abuse its discretion
by omitting to reference a polygraph not received into evidence, and which
was minimally relied upon in a report that was admitted into evidence
without objection. See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 13.

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B. The Superior Court Committed No Legal Error by
Considering Dr. Weinstock’s Report.

¶31 Father argues the superior court erred by “citing or adopting”
Dr. Weinstock’s report, which supported the court’s findings as to domestic
violence, the lack of substantiation of sexual abuse by Mother of the
children, Mother’s fitness as a parent, and granting Mother final say. Each
of these arguments fail in turn.

¶32 Father argues that the superior court failed to consider
whether there was domestic violence as required by A.R.S. § 25-403.03(C)
by “relying on Dr. Weinstock’s assertion of no credible school records” and
supposedly failing to consider evidence from the children’s schools, DCS,
and witnesses. Father is wrong. The superior court said it considered all
evidence presented by the parties and even referenced some of the evidence
Father contends it did not consider including reports that the children
exhibited inappropriate behavior at school. Again, we assume the court
properly assessed the facts necessary to support its judgment. See Fuentes,
209 Ariz. 51, 55-56 ¶ 18; Elliot, 165 Ariz. at 135. And we do not reweigh the
evidence. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

¶33 Father next argues the superior court abused its discretion by
failing to give evidence proper consideration, which he contends violates
A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(1) and § 25-403.03(C), by rejecting Father’s claims that
Mother sexually abused the children. This argument fails because
substantial evidence supports the superior court’s decision that the
allegations of sexual abuse against Mother are unsubstantiated. Father
disagrees with Dr. Weinstock’s report and testimony, but the court did not
abuse its discretion by finding it credible and making findings consistent
with it. The superior court is in the best position to weigh conflicting
evidence, which we will not reweigh. See id.; Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250
Ariz. 339, 346 ¶ 27 (App. 2020).

¶34 Father contends the superior court abused its discretion
under A.R.S. § 25-403(A) and violated A.R.S. § 25-403.01 by finding Mother
a fit parent and granting her final say in reliance on Dr. Weinstock’s report
and testimony. Father argues the court weighed Dr. Weinstock’s diagnosis
of him too heavily and Mother’s diagnosis insufficiently. Father’s
arguments again incorrectly ask us to reweigh the evidence. See Backstrand,
250 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 27. Father has shown no abuse of discretion.

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C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Relying on Kristyn Alcott’s Testimony.

¶35 Father argues the court abused its discretion by relying on
Kristyn Alcott’s and unknown supervisors as their reports are devoid in
weight and credibility. Father also contends Kristyn Alcott’s testimony was
not credible because it was contradictory. Father again asks us to reassess
the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence, which we will not do.
See id. Any reliance by the superior court on Kristyn Alcott’s testimony as
reliable and helpful as concerns Mother’s compliance with orders was
within the superior court’s sound discretion.

IV. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding
Mother Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Reallocating Dr.
Weinstock’s Fees.

A. The Victims’ Bill of Rights Does Not Bar the Sanctions.

¶36 Father argues the superior court’s orders sanctioning him for
noncooperation in discovery violated the Arizona Victims’ Bill of Rights,
Arizona Constitution Article 2, Section 2.1, as codified at A.R.S. § 13-4433.
Father contends his status as a victim of stalking should have shielded him
from discovery in this case, thus keeping the court from awarding fees to
Mother for his non-cooperation.

¶37 Though Father was a victim, he failed to argue in response to
Mother’s motion to compel that he was protected by the Victims’ Bill of
Rights, nor did he argue his rights were violated when the court allowed
Dr. Weinstock to complete his report. By failing to raise this position before
judgment, Father waived it on appeal. See Roebuck v. Mayo Clinic, 256 Ariz.
161 ¶ 16 (App. 2023). Moreover, it is true that Father’s rights as a victim of
stalking could shield him from unnecessary contact with Mother
concerning that offense. See State v. Lee, 226 Ariz. 234, 239 ¶ 13 (App. 2011)
(“The purpose underlying a victim’s right to refuse a pretrial interview is
to protect the victim’s privacy and minimize contact with the defendant
prior to trial.”). But his rights as a victim of stalking cannot shield him from
discovery about his unsubstantiated charges that Mother committed a
different offense. See Ariz. Const., art. 2, § 2.1(C) (granting victims’ rights
to “a person against whom the criminal offense has been committed”). The
superior court granted Mother attorneys’ fees for Father’s “unreasonable
conduct during this litigation, including during discovery[]” and that
award does not offend the Victims’ Bill of Rights. Father has shown no
abuse of discretion.

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B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Award of Fees.

¶38 The superior court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
fees for Father’s unreasonable conduct during discovery. Substantial
evidence supports the finding that Father acted unreasonably, including
seeking to remove Dr. Weinstock after agreeing to have him conduct a CFE
and removing the children from their schools in violation of a court order.
See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16. And the superior court only awarded
$12,750.00 of Mother’s more than $325,000.00 in requested fees, which
shows restraint and careful judgment.

¶39 Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering
Father to pay half of Dr. Weinstock’s $18,215.29 fee. Father argues that the
court failed to consider the resources of the parties when allocating the costs
in violation of A.R.S. § 25-406(B). But Father agreed to split the cost of the
CFE equally with Mother, and the superior court found the record showed
no significant disparity in the parties’ resources.

¶40 Father also argues the superior court abused its discretion
because it failed to make specific findings of fact about the parties’ income
and resources, despite Mother’s general request for specific factual findings
in the matter. But the superior court was not required to make specific
findings about financial resources under A.R.S. § 25-324. MacMillan v.
Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 592 ¶ 39 (App. 2011). And notwithstanding
Mother’s request, to avoid waiver, Father was required “to object to
inadequate findings at the trial court level so that the court [would] have
[had] an opportunity to correct them.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). He
did not object. Father has shown no abuse of discretion in the fee award.

V. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Its Child
Support Award.

¶41 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion in its
child support award. Each of his arguments fail in turn.

¶42 First, Father claims the court failed to consider the cost of
Mother’s home as well as her in-laws’ contributions to her finances as a gift.
It appears Mother moved into the home after trial, but there is no evidence
of its cost. As to the money received from her in-laws, Father contends that
the money was a gift and should be counted towards Mother’s income. But
the correct inquiry is not whether the money received is a gift or a loan but
rather, whether “the parent acquired a source of funds for living and
personal expenses, from which the children would have benefitted had
their parents not divorced.” Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 114 ¶ 15

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(App. 2016). Here, evidence was presented that the money Mother received
from her in-laws went straight toward paying her attorneys’ fees and that
she did not use them for personal living expenses. Father has not shown
the court erred in finding that “credible evidence and testimony do not
support a finding that any financial support from Mother’s family should
be attributed to her income.”

¶43 Second, Father argues the court erred by including his
employer-provided tuition assistance in his income. A court may consider
non-cash employment-based benefits as income if they are “significant and
reduce personal living expenses.” Guidelines § II.A.1.f. Father received
thousands of dollars annually as tuition reimbursement, and he has not
shown that the court abused its discretion by including these benefits in his
income calculation. See Patterson v. Patterson, 226 Ariz. 356, 360 ¶ 11 (App.
2011).

¶44 Third, Father argues the court abused its discretion by not
including childcare costs in its child support determination. But it is within
the superior court’s discretion to add childcare costs to the child support
obligation. See Guidelines § III.B.4.a.

¶45 Fourth, Father argues the court abused its discretion by not
taking account of his debts and liabilities. But Father never provided the
court with evidence of his debts and liabilities and only mentioned his debt
in response to Mother’s application for attorneys’ fees.

CONCLUSION

¶46 We affirm. In our discretion, we also grant Mother’s request
for her reasonable attorneys’ fees under ARCAP 25 for Father’s failure to
comply with ARCAP 13, subject to Mother’s compliance with ARCAP 21.
Mother also is awarded her taxable costs incurred on appeal, subject to her
compliance with ARCAP 21.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: TM

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