Bellapianta v. Az Veterinary Board

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

MAYA BELLAPIANTA, Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA STATE VETERINARY MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD,
Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0109
FILED 01-09-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. LC2023-000405-001
The Honorable Joseph P. Mikitish, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Mitchell |Stein |Carey |Chapman, PC, Phoenix
By Flynn P. Carey, Molly Brizgys
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Marc H. Harris, Casey Hutchinson
Counsel for Appellee
 BELLAPIANTA v. AZ VETERINARY BOARD
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Dr. Maya Bellapianta (“Bellapianta”) appeals from the
superior court’s judgment dismissing her appeal of an Arizona State
Veterinary Medical Examining Board (“Board”) interim order. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In August 2023, a veterinary practice in Missouri, that
Bellapianta had applied to work for, inquired into her licensure status due
to concerns regarding her behavior. Bellapianta had exchanged text
messages with the hiring veterinarian over plans to visit the practice. When
asked if she had booked her flight yet, Bellapianta responded “On a flea.”
Then Bellapianta switched the conversation to motorcycles. The hiring
veterinarian said “[My motorcycle] is not running at present. I need to
replace the start switch.” Bellapianta responded, “Probably best,” “Why
didn’t you do that,” “Too much pussy.”

¶3 When the Board received information about the
correspondence with the Missouri veterinary practice, it opened the case at
issue in this appeal against Bellapianta. The Board issued an interim order
requiring Bellapianta “undergo and successfully complete an updated
comprehensive psychological and substance abuse evaluation.” At the
time, Bellapianta had additional pending cases with the Board stemming
from other complaints involving arriving at a client’s home allegedly
intoxicated, being hospitalized for an overdose on controlled substances
she obtained from her mobile vet unit, and driving under the influence of
an intoxicating substance. The interim order resulting from the most recent
allegations also required Bellapianta to provide a copy of the interim
consent agreement for those other cases to the healthcare professional
completing the evaluation in the instant matter.

¶4 Bellapianta challenged the Board’s interim order by filing a
petition for rehearing or review, which the Board denied. Bellapianta then

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sought to appeal the interim order to the superior court. In response, the
Board filed a motion to dismiss and the superior court granted the same.

¶5 Bellapianta timely appeals from the entry of a final judgment
under Rule 54(c). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 “We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.” Mills
v. Ariz. Bd. of Tech. Registration, 253 Ariz. 415, 420, ¶ 10 (2022). “Subject
matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a
controversy.” Buehler v. Indus. Comm’n, 227 Ariz. 520, 521, ¶ 4 (App. 2011).
We review whether the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction de
novo. Id. Likewise, “[w]e review constitutional issues, including an alleged
violation of due process, de novo.” Wassef v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs,
242 Ariz. 90, 93, ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

I. Interim Order

¶7 Bellapianta argues the superior court erred in dismissing her
putative appeal to that court for lack of jurisdiction because the interim
order should be considered a final decision by the Board. Bellapianta
reasons the interim order is a final decision because the interim order was
a “proceeding within a proceeding. . .that terminated once the Board denied
Dr. Bellapianta’s Motion for Rehearing or Review.”

¶8 Any party aggrieved by the Board’s final order or decision
may appeal to the superior court under the Judicial Review of
Administrative Decisions Act (“JRADA”). A.R.S. § 32-2234(I). As
applicable here, JRADA governs “every action to judicially review a final
decision of” the Board. A.R.S. § 12-902(1) (emphasis added). An
“administrative decision” is defined as “any decision, order or
determination of an administrative agency that is rendered in a case, that
affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of persons and that terminates
the proceeding before the administrative agency.” A.R.S. § 12-901(2).
JRADA allows for judicial challenge to “a final administrative decision.”
A.R.S. § 12-904(A).

¶9 The Board issued the interim order, requiring Bellapianta to
“undergo and successfully complete an updated comprehensive
psychological and substance abuse evaluation,” pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-
2234(B), (C). Section 32-2234(B) allows the Board to require a licensee who
is under investigation to undergo any combination of medical, physical, or

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mental examinations that the board finds necessary to determine the
licensee’s condition at the licensee’s expense. Likewise, A.R.S. § 32-2234(C)
allows the Board, upon receipt of an allegation of drug or alcohol abuse, to
require a licensee who is under investigation to undergo testing or
examination to detect the presence of alcohol or other drugs at the licensee’s
expense.

¶10 The interim order issued by the Board here requires the
examination reports to “opine on Respondent’s ability to safely and
competently practice veterinary medicine, and include results of drug
testing ordered by the evaluator. . .” The interim order also states “[t]his is
an Interim Order and not a final decision by the Board regarding any
pending investigation. As such, it is subject to modification and further
consideration by the Board.”

¶11 The interim order did not terminate the proceedings before
the Board as is required to be a final administrative decision subject to
judicial review. See A.R.S. §§ 12-901(2); -904(A). The interim order dictates
a request to comply with an investigatory tool to further the proceeding
before the Board not terminate the proceeding. See A.R.S. § 32-2234(B), (C).
The interim order is not a final administrative decision and therefore is not
appealable. See A.R.S. § 32-2234(I). The superior court did not err when it
granted the Board’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.1

II. Due Process

¶12 Bellapianta argues that due process requires she be able to
appeal the Board’s interim order. “[S]ome form of hearing is required
before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.” Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “The State is authorized to protect the
public health and welfare by regulating those who practice a profession.”
Dahnad v. Buttrick, 201 Ariz. 394, 398, ¶ 14 (App. 2001). “[A] licensee has a
property interest in his or her license, and the State must afford due process
before it can curtail that right.” Wassef, 242 Ariz. at 93, ¶ 12 (App. 2017).

1 The Board argues the superior court also properly dismissed
Bellapianta’s appeal pursuant to the exhaustion of administrative remedies
doctrine. Because Bellapianta has not completed the Board’s statutorily
authorized process resulting in a final administrative decision, Bellapianta
has not exhausted her administrative remedies. See Mills 253 Ariz. at 420,
¶ 11 (“A litigant must exhaust a statutorily prescribed administrative
remedy before seeking judicial relief from actual or threatened injuries.”).

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¶13 Bellapianta relies on Mathews v. Eldridge to argue that a
consideration of the private interest affected by the Board’s action, the
government’s interest, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, show she has a due process right to
appeal the interim order. See 424 U.S. at 335. But Mathews neither supports
nor addresses the argument that a due process right to appeal exists where
no statutory right to appeal exists. 424 U.S. at 348-49. In Mathews, the
United States Supreme Court considered whether the administrative
procedures to terminate a recipient’s Social Security disability benefits
fulfilled due process requirements. 424 U.S. at 333. The Court concluded
the administrative procedures, which allowed the benefits recipient to seek
reconsideration and an evidentiary hearing after the termination of benefits
as well as allowed for the appeal of an adverse decision, fully comported
with due process requirements. 424 U.S. at 335-339, 349.

¶14 In this case, the property interest at risk of being curtailed,
and that requires due process protections prior to termination, is
Bellapianta’s veterinary license. As previously stated, the interim order
requesting Bellapianta undergo a psychological and substance abuse
evaluation is an investigatory tool to aid the Board in determining her
condition. A.R.S. § 32-2234(B), (C). If the Board determines, based on the
investigation, that disciplinary action be taken, Bellapianta would be
afforded an adjudicative hearing with due process protections. A.R.S. § 32-
2234(A). Further, Bellapianta could have sought special action relief if she
thought there was a due process violation prior to a final administrative
decision. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1. Therefore, Bellapianta was not
deprived of due process rights when the superior court dismissed her
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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