Luque v. Ocampo
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Stock v. Stock 479 P.3d 859
- Sommerfield v. Sommerfield 592 P.2d 771
- Marriage of MacMillan v. Schwartz 250 P.3d 1213
- In Re the Marriage of Foster 376 P.3d 702
- Goats v. A. J. Bayless Markets, Inc. 481 P.2d 536
- Marriage of Gutierrez v. Gutierrez 972 P.2d 676
- MCDOWELL MOUNTAIN RANCH COMMUNITY ASS'N v. Simons 165 P.3d 667
- Clemens v. Clark 420 P.2d 284
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
In re the Marriage of:
MARIA E. MONTOYA LUQUE,
Petitioner/Appellee,
v.
RAMIRO ALVAREZ OCAMPO,
Respondent/Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CV 24-0173 FC
FILED 10-24-2024
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2023-050740
The Honorable James R. Knapp, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Michael L. Gertell LLC, Phoenix
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
LUQUE v. OCAMPO
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.
T H U M M A, Judge:
¶1 Ramiro A. Ocampo (Husband) appeals from a decree of
dissolution of his marriage to Maria E. Montoya Luque (Wife). As
applicable here, the decree found that a house in Washington state was
community property and required that it be sold, and the proceeds be split
equally. Because Husband has shown no error, the decree is affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Husband and Wife married in 2015 and have no children
together. In 2023, Wife filed a petition for the dissolution of marriage. The
petition inconsistently stated that Husband and Wife “did not acquire any
community property during the marriage,” but then listed a house in
Washington as community property, asking that it be divided between
Husband and Wife. The petition added that Husband and Wife “did incur
community debts during the marriage,” consisting of a mortgage loan.
¶3 Husband’s response was similarly inconsistent. It stated both
(1) that Husband and Wife “did not acquire any community property
during the marriage” and (2) that they had community property real estate
consisting of a house located in Washington. Husband asked that the
Washington house be awarded to him, and that a Phoenix house (also listed
as community property) be awarded to Wife. Husband’s response listed no
separate property, later stating that, during the marriage, Husband and
Wife “bought a property in Mexico and [Wife] kept it.” The response also
stated that “[d]uring the marriage, [Wife] left the marital home and
verbal[ly] agreed [she] had no interest in the Washington property and
[she] signed a [quitclaim] deed.”
¶4 Both parties were self-represented during the superior court
proceedings and made various pretrial filings tracking these inconsistent
positions. The parties did not file a joint pretrial statement; Husband filed
no pretrial statement and Wife filed a separate pretrial statement,
reiterating the relief she had requested.
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LUQUE v. OCAMPO
Decision of the Court
¶5 Wife attended trial held in January 2024, but Husband did not
and provided no good cause for that failure. At trial, Wife testified the
Washington house was purchased in August 2017, during the marriage. At
that time, Wife was living in Mexico, so Husband sent the paperwork for
the property through the American Consulate in Tijuana for Wife to sign.
¶6 Wife testified she was unaware of any quitclaim deed until
Husband mentioned it during a phone call the month before trial. She
recalled that, when purchasing the house in August 2017, Husband sent her
documents to sign, telling her they were the deed to the Washington house.
Because she did not speak English, she took Husband’s word and signed
the documents, despite not understanding what the documents said.
¶7 The day after trial, the court issued a decree of dissolution.
After concluding an equal division of community property was
appropriate, and after considering the evidence, witness demeanor and
arguments, the court divided the equity in the Washington house equally.
In doing so, the court noted the presumption that “any property acquired
by either spouse during marriage is community property, unless
demonstrated otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.” See Sommerfield
v. Sommerfield, 121 Ariz. 575, 577 (1979). Husband, by failing to attend trial,
had not presented controverting evidence and the trial record includes no
quitclaim deed. The court found the Washington house, which was
purchased during the marriage, “is community property.” The court then
directed the house be listed for sale within 45 days, “with the proceeds
divided equally after the payment of all debts.”
¶8 Husband timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona
Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1)(2024).1
DISCUSSION
¶9 Wife failed to submit an answering brief, which this court
may consider as a confession of error. See McDowell Mountain Ranch Cmty.
Ass’n v. Simons, 216 Ariz. 266, 269 ¶ 13 (App. 2007) (citing cases). Given a
general preference to consider the merits of appeals, the court will address
the merits of Husband’s appeal. See Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414
(1966). Husband argues the superior court erred in classifying the
1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited
refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
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LUQUE v. OCAMPO
Decision of the Court
Washington house as community property because (1) the house was
purchased before the parties were married and (2) Wife waived her rights
to the Washington house by signing the quitclaim deed. Husband also
seems to argue the superior court erred in dividing the equity of the house
equally. The court addresses those arguments in turn.2
¶10 Husband argues the Washington house was purchased before
the marriage and, therefore, was not community property. This court
reviews the characterization of community property de novo. In re Marriage
of Foster, 240 Ariz. 99, 101 ¶ 5 (App. 2016) (citing cases).
¶11 Stated simply, property acquired during a marriage is
community property, while property acquired before marriage is separate
property. A.R.S. §§ 25-211, -213. “A basic tenet of Arizona’s ‘community
property law is that property acquires its character as community or
separate depending upon the marriage status of its owner at the time of
acquisition.’” Stock v. Stock, 250 Ariz. 352, 355 (App. 2020) (citation omitted).
¶12 The only mention on the trial record about the purchase date
of the Washington house is Wife’s testimony that the house was purchased
in August 2017, with Husband and Wife having gotten married in 2015.
Although Husband’s response to the petition for dissolution stated no
community property was acquired during the marriage, Husband listed the
house as community property and listed no separate property. Husband’s
response did not assert that the house was purchased before the 2015
marriage. On this record, Husband has shown no error in the superior court
finding the Washington house was purchased during the marriage.
¶13 On appeal, Husband argues what he describes as a
“nonverbal response that was assumed by the Court to be an answer to [a]
question tends to leave this writer flummoxed.” That question and answer,
however, was as follows: “Q. So is your name listed on the title of that
property? A. Uh-huh.” Although not a model of clarity, the transcript
2 Husband also asserts he was 20 minutes late to trial and unsuccessfully
tried to join by phone. But nothing in the record supports this argument.
The trial lasted 40 minutes and Husband did not raise any such issue in
superior court. Thus, Husband has waived any such argument on appeal.
See Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Riz. 299, 300 (1994) (“[A]bsent extraordinary
circumstances, errors not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on
appeal.”).
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LUQUE v. OCAMPO
Decision of the Court
reflects a verbal response that the superior court properly could consider as
an answer.
¶14 Turning to the alleged quitclaim deed, although asserting a
verbal agreement by Wife that she had no interest in the Washington house
and signed a quitclaim deed, Husband provided no evidence at trial
supporting those positions. Husband failed to file a pretrial statement and
failed to properly list any quitclaim deed as an exhibit. See Ariz. R. Fam.
Law. P. 76.1(g)(13). And as noted above, the trial record includes no
quitclaim deed.
¶15 The only evidence in the record relating to a quitclaim deed
was Wife’s testimony that she was unaware of any such document, until
Husband mentioned a quitclaim deed a month before trial. On this record,
Husband has shown no error in the superior court rejecting any argument
that a quitclaim deed mandated a different outcome. See, e.g., Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347 ¶ 13 (App. 1998) (appellate courts defer to trial
court’s credibility determinations); Goats v. A.J. Bayless Mkts, Inc., 14 Ariz.
App. 166, 171 (1971) (noting trial court is in the best position to weigh and
assess witness credibility and conflicting evidence) (citations omitted).
¶16 Finally, Husband appears to argue, without supporting
authority, that the superior court should have ordered an unequal
distribution of the community property. Much if not all of this argument is
based on what “Husband had stated in his pleadings,” which is not trial
evidence. Moreover, “[m]erely mentioning an argument in an appellate
brief is insufficient.” MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591 ¶ 33 (App.
2011) (citing cases). Thus, Husband has shown no error in the equal division
of the community property.
CONCLUSION
¶17 Because Husband has shown no error, the decree is affirmed.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV
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