Williams v. Williams

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STEPHEN JOHN WILLIAMS II, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

STEPHEN HODGKINS WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0271
FILED 01-21-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV 2023-054810
The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Stephen John Williams II, London, UK
Plaintiff/Appellant

Rubin Law PLC, Phoenix
By David A. Rubin
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Stephen John Williams II (“Williams”) challenges the
dismissal of his complaint against his parents, Appellees Stephen Hodgkins
Williams and Pat Ann Williams. Because Williams has not shown any error,
we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Williams sued appellees in Maricopa County Superior Court,
alleging they violated federal criminal law. Notably, he pleaded no specific
acts or particular dates for the alleged misconduct; he instead broadly
alleged, for example, that in February 2022 appellees “drugged” his “Food,
Toothpaste, and Protein Powered (sic)” with prescription drugs and hacked
the “federal computer” he used as a “Federal Employee.” Williams sought
imprisonment of appellees, criminal fines, and monetary damages.

¶3 In January 2024, appellees moved to dismiss the complaint.
Noting that Williams had filed two previous complaints against them,
appellees contended that the current complaint “fail[ed] to allege any
coherent legal claim upon which relief can be granted.” Williams did not
respond to the motion to dismiss until early March 2024, when he filed an
“Answer to Motion and Counter of Amended Pleading.” The same day, the
court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded appellees taxable costs.
That ruling was filed on March 11, 2024. On March 13, the court noted by
minute entry that it would not take action on Williams’ March 8 filing
because the filing was untimely and the case had already been dismissed.
This appeal followed and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶4 We review dismissal of a complaint de novo. CVS Pharmacy,
Inc. v. Bostwick, 251 Ariz. 511, 516 ¶ 10 (2021).

¶5 To begin, “[t]his court has a responsibility to see that litigants
conform to an acceptable, minimal level of competency and performance
and we owe this responsibility to the judiciary, the bar and, more

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importantly, to all litigants and the people as a whole.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (cleaned up). To that end, our supreme
court has set forth rules to which litigants must adhere to bring an appeal.
Id. These include the requirement that an opening brief must, at a
minimum, provide a “statement of facts” relevant to the issues presented
for review and include appropriate citations to the record. Id. (citing
ARCAP 13(a)(5)). Further, the brief must present coherent arguments that
explain the litigant’s position concerning each issue presented for review,
“with supporting reasoning, citations to legal authorities, and appropriate
references to the record.” Id. (citing ARCAP 13(a)(7)). Those who fail to
make a bona fide and reasonably intelligent effort to comply with the rules
“waive issues and arguments not supported by adequate explanation,
citations to the record, or authority.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶6 Williams’ appeal fails because his opening brief is entirely
deficient. The statement of facts in his opening brief does not contain a
single citation to the record and is inadequate to explain his positions.
Further, his arguments are presented largely as mere conclusions without
structure or explanation. Those that have some semblance of reasoning are
nevertheless inadequately explained. And again, Williams fails to include
even a single citation to either the record or to any legal authorities to
support his arguments. Williams has failed to provide a bona fide and
reasonably intelligent effort to comply with ARCAP 13, waiving all issues
in this appeal. Id. at ¶ 9 (citing In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64–65 ¶ 6 (2013)).
We therefore affirm the superior court’s dismissal of his complaint.

¶7 But even if his opening brief’s failings did properly preserve
issues for review, Williams’ appeal still fails on its merits. Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a)(2) requires that all pleadings that set forth a
claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A pleading that does not
comply may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz.
417, 419 ¶ 7 (2008). In assessing the sufficiency of a pleading, “Arizona
courts look only to the pleading itself and consider the well-pled factual
allegations contained therein.” Id. Mere conclusory statements are
insufficient to state a claim upon which a court can grant relief. Id. Motions
to dismiss for failure to state a claim are not favored and should not be
granted unless no relief could be given “‘under any state of facts susceptible
of proof under the claim stated.’” State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589,
594 (1983) (quoting Sun World Corp. v. Pennysaver, Inc., 130 Ariz. 585, 586
(App. 1981) (citation omitted)).

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¶8 The dismissal was appropriate here because Williams’ claims
are based on federal criminal statutes over which Arizona courts have no
jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction for
prosecuting federal crimes). Additionally, he made only conclusory
allegations to support the alleged criminal acts. On appeal, he does not try
to show otherwise; instead, he broadly argues that the superior court erred
by denying him a “trial or hearing” and demands polygraph testing of
appellees.

¶9 Moreover, Williams’ untimely motion to amend the
complaint did not proffer amendments that would have cured the
complaint’s defects. He invoked victim rights to demand a jury trial. In any
event, the defects are incurable. See Wigglesworth v. Mauldin, 195 Ariz. 432,
439 (App. 1999) (because inmate had no entitlement to commutation of
sentence, court “[could not] imagine that an amendment would cure the
legal defects of his complaint” alleging violation of his constitutional rights
by governor’s failure to follow clemency board’s recommendation to do so).

¶10 Williams’ brief on appeal repeats his flawed pleading. He lists
many alleged “errors” by the trial court, though none of them deal with the
defects of his complaint. He speaks in the same conclusory manner as his
complaint and fails to reference the superior court record or cite legal
authority. He has not shown any error by the superior court.

CONCLUSION

¶11 We affirm the dismissal of Williams’ complaint.

¶12 Appellees request an award of their costs and attorneys’ fees
on appeal. Since appellees are the successful party on appeal, they meet the
requirement in A.R.S. § 12-341, and we award them costs upon compliance
with ARCAP 21.

¶13 In support of their request for attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. §
12-349, appellees contend that Williams’ “position on appeal is unjustified,
unreasonable, and brought solely for the purpose of harassment . . . .” A.R.S.
§ 12-349(A)(1) and (F) authorizes courts to assess reasonable attorneys’ fees
against parties who bring appeals “without substantial justification,”
meaning “groundless and not made in good faith.” We conclude Williams’
appeal is groundless because the superior court did not have jurisdiction
over allegations of federal criminal violations from the start of this action.
Given the legal baselessness of the claims, there is no good-faith reason for
appealing the dismissal. See Rogone v. Correia, 236 Ariz. 43, 50 ¶ 22 (App.
2014) (citing Evergreen W., Inc. v. Boyd, 167 Ariz. 614, 619 (App. 1991) (“A

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claim . . . is frivolous if a proponent can present no rational argument based
upon the evidence or law in support of that claim.”)). Therefore, we award
appellees their reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal upon their compliance
with ARCAP 21.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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