Rhoads v. Adot

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

DOUGLAS C. RHOADS, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MVD,
Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0314
FILED 12-10-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. CV202380350
The Honorable Linda Wallace, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Douglas C. Rhoads, Camp Verde
Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Department of Transportation, Phoenix
Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
 RHOADS v. ADOT
Decision of the Court

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Douglas Rhoads challenges the superior court’s
dismissal of his appeal of the Arizona Department of Transportation’s
(“ADOT”) suspension of Rhoads’ driver’s license. Because Rhoads’ appeal
to the superior court of ADOT’s suspension was untimely, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On December 9, 2022, Rhoads was arrested on suspicion of
driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. He refused to
consent to alcohol testing during the stop. On July 19, 2023, ADOT issued
a decision suspending Rhoads’ driving privileges.

¶3 On December 12, 2023, Rhoads attempted to appeal the
suspension to the superior court. A December 27, 2023 minute entry
explained that Rhoads’ attempted appeal was deficient. Rhoads then filed
a corrected notice of appeal on January 26, 2024. On March 27, 2024, the
superior court dismissed Rhoads’ attempted appeal as untimely, meaning
the court lacked jurisdiction to review ADOT’s decision. Rhoads moved to
reinstate the case, and the court denied the motion.

¶4 Rhoads timely appealed the superior court’s decision. We
have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const., art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -913; see
Svendsen v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 234 Ariz. 528, 533 ¶ 13 (App. 2014).

DISCUSSION

¶5 We review the superior court’s dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction and issues relating to interpretation of statutes and rules de
novo. See Coombs v. Maricopa Cnty. Special Health Care Dist., 241 Ariz. 320,
321 ¶ 5 (App. 2016); Do v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 256 Ariz. 339, ¶ 5 (App. 2023).
Relevant here, a party seeking review of a final administrative decision
must file a notice of appeal in the superior court “within thirty-five days
from the date when a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed is served
upon the party affected.” A.R.S. § 12-904(A). And “[u]nless review is
sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner
provided in this article, the parties to the proceeding before the
administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of the
decision.” A.R.S. § 12-902(B).

¶6 Here, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to review ADOT’s
decision because Rhoads’ attempted appeal was untimely. See id. ADOT
issued its decision suspending Rhoads’ driving privileges on July 19, 2023.

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 RHOADS v. ADOT
Decision of the Court

Rhoads did not attempt to challenge that decision until December 2023,
well beyond the 35-day window A.R.S. § 12-904 affords for appeal. We thus
agree with the superior court that it lacked jurisdiction to review Rhoads’
appeal because it was untimely filed. See Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Holland, 120 Ariz. 371, 373 (App. 1978) (holding that a failure to file a complaint in
the superior court within the statutory 35-day period “deprive[s] that court
of jurisdiction to review the decision”).

¶7 Without citation to authority, Rhoads argues that owing to his
incarceration, the 35-day window “was equitably tolled and extended due
to impossibility and state action.” Because Rhoads fails to cite authority or
develop this argument, it is waived. See MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz.
584, 591 ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate
opening brief is insufficient.”). Waiver aside, Arizona no longer recognizes
legal disability due to incarceration as a reason to equitably toll statutes of
limitation. See A.R.S. § 12-502 (1996) (removing tolling provision applicable
to imprisoned persons previously contained in A.R.S. § 12-502 (1984)).

CONCLUSION

¶8 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: TM

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