Danko v. Wilson

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JOHN DANKO, III, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

KATHERINE ROSE MYERS WILSON, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0401
FILED 01-07-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-092772
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

John Danko, III, Mesa
Plaintiff/Appellant
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 John Danko appeals from the superior court’s order
dismissing his complaint against Katherine Myers, a South Carolina
attorney, for lack of personal jurisdiction.1 For the following reasons, we
affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In June 2023, Danko sued Myers, alleging he contracted with
her to enforce a “division of property and debt,” but that Myers performed
no “form of legal services or representation in exchange for monies paid”
and that she “simply took [his] money.” Danko further alleged he hired
several debt collection companies, and that Myers “knowingly and
purposefully repeat[ed] numerous false statements and degrading insults”
about him. From these allegations, Danko asserted various claims against
Myers, including breach of contract, trespass, conversion, abuse of process,
defamation, and fraud. Danko also claimed that Myers resides in and does
business in Arizona. However, all of Danko’s subsequent attempts to serve
the complaint indicate that he tried to serve Myers in South Carolina.
Ultimately, Danko’s affidavit of service likewise stated that “[d]efendant is
known to be located outside the state of Arizona.” The affidavit and
attached exhibit also show that the complaint was mailed to Myers’s home
and work addresses in South Carolina.

1 In October 2024, this court issued an order declaring Danko a
vexatious litigant. Admin. Order 2024-10 (amended by Admin. Order 2024-
11, filed on December 3, 2024). The order requires Danko to file an
application explaining the merit of any proposed appeal and that any
application deemed meritless will result in dismissal of that appeal. The
order also requires payment of filing fees. Because Danko filed this appeal
before the vexatious litigant order took effect, and has paid his filing fee,
we consider his appeal.

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¶3 Myers answered the complaint and moved to dismiss it
“because Arizona does not have jurisdiction over [her].” She maintained
that she had no contact with Arizona, had not conducted any business,
owned any real property, or resided in the state. Myers also included
“counterclaims” against Danko for filing a frivolous lawsuit and for
recovery of fees and costs in defending it.

¶4 Danko conceded that Myers did not live in Arizona, but
claimed that Arizona had jurisdiction because Myers was involved in
“business litigation” with him in Arizona for years. Danko also asserted
that Myers had “established [herself] in Maricopa County for years, with
business contacts, relationships, and vast amounts of money exchanged for
goods and services.” Danko’s supporting declaration added that he had
paid $3,275 directly into Myers’s trust account and they had entered an
“attorney-client contract” to enforce property division and debts from an
Arizona divorce decree. Danko asserted that his breach of contract claim is
“one of Arizona law, not of South Carolina law, despite [his] ex-spouse
moving to South Carolina.” Danko repeated his unsupported claim that
Myers owns real property in Arizona and claimed their attorney-client
relationship “was never severed.”

¶5 The superior court dismissed the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. In granting Myers’s motion to dismiss, the court
noted it had considered the complaint and the parties’ signed pleadings.
The court then summarized the facts alleged in Danko’s complaint and
determined there was “no evidence to support a finding that [Myers] ha[d]
‘systemic and continuous’ contacts with Arizona.” Specifically, the court
concluded there was no evidence that Myers’s “contacts with Arizona
reflect a purposeful conduct targeting the forum” as opposed to “accidental
contacts or those created by [Danko’s] unilateral acts.”

¶6 The court also found that Danko had alleged no other basis in
the complaint “to establish personal jurisdiction over [Myers] in Arizona
state court.” The court explained that amending the complaint would not
rectify the defect, given that Danko had been previously apprised of the
jurisdictional problem and had made no indication that amending the
pleadings would resolve it. Although the court did not address Myers’s
counterclaims, the court’s subsequent entry of a final order dismissing the
case under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) implicitly confirmed the
counterclaims were abandoned. Danko timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

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DISCUSSION

¶7 Danko’s primary argument on appeal is that the superior
court erred in concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Myers.
Danko’s opening brief, however, does not comply with Arizona Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure (ARCAP) 13(a)(7)(A), which requires, in part,
that a brief include arguments explaining the party’s contentions on each
issue raised on appeal, along with supporting reasons, citations to legal
authorities, and appropriate references to the record. A party’s failure to
comply with Rule 13 may result in waiver of that party’s arguments. See
Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022). Danko’s brief fails to
include citations to the record supporting his assertions. Nor does it
include any meaningful citation of legal authority as required by the rule.
Despite the deficient briefing, in our discretion, we address Danko’s
arguments to the extent we can discern them. See In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz.
62, 64–65, ¶ 6 (2013); Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 (1966).

¶8 As for Myers, she has not filed an answering brief. When
debatable issues exist, we generally treat the failure of a party to file an
answering brief as a confession of error. See Navarro v. State, 32 Ariz. 119,
120 (1927); Turf Irrigation & Waterworks Supply v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel.
Co., 24 Ariz. App. 537, 540 (1975). Because the issues Danko has attempted
to raise in his opening brief are not debatable, we decline to apply that
doctrine here.

¶9 We review de novo whether a court has personal jurisdiction
over a defendant. Beverage v. Pullman & Comley, LLC, 232 Ariz. 414, 417,
¶ 10 (App. 2013). Arizona courts “may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a person . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the Arizona Constitution
and the United States Constitution.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a). Whether a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant “depends on
the defendant’s having such ‘contacts’ with the forum State that ‘the
maintenance of the suit’ is ‘reasonable’ . . . and ‘does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth
Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021) (quoting Int’l. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945)). Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific.
Id.

¶10 A court can exercise general jurisdiction only for defendants
who have continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state, which
renders them “essentially at home” in that state. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
LeMaire, 242 Ariz. 357, 359, ¶ 4 (App. 2017). For individuals, this is typically
their domicile. Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 358–59. On the other hand,

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specific jurisdiction covers “a narrower class of claims,” often referred to as
“purposeful availment.” Id. at 359. It exists when a defendant takes “some
act by which [she] purposefully avails [herself] of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State.” Id. Thus, a court may exercise
specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only if the plaintiff’s
claims “’arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’” with the forum
state. Id. Such contacts cannot be “’random, isolated, or fortuitous.’” Id.

¶11 If a defendant challenges a court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction, the “plaintiff must offer facts establishing a prima facie
showing of jurisdiction.” Beverage, 232 Ariz. at 417, ¶ 10 (cleaned up). And
the plaintiff “cannot meet this burden with bare allegations” but instead
“must come forward with facts, established by affidavit or otherwise,
supporting jurisdiction.” Van Heeswyk v. Jabiru Aircraft Pty., Ltd., 229 Ariz.
412, 416, ¶ 6 (App. 2012).

¶12 Danko contends the superior court erred by concluding it
lacked jurisdiction over Myers because he believes she has sufficient
contacts with Arizona. Danko emphasizes that his underlying divorce case
originated in Arizona, and that he has resided in Arizona for many years.
Danko also asserts that Myers has “numerous contacts in Arizona” through
several other law firms, that she “does business in Maricopa County,” and
that she harmed him in Arizona through her defamatory conduct. But the
record does not support Danko’s assertions. Instead, the only evidence
Danko provided was his own declaration in which he merely reasserts the
conclusory allegations in his complaint.

¶13 Even assuming the truth of Danko’s allegations, the superior
court still would not have personal jurisdiction over Myers. Danko never
established or even claimed that Myers is domiciled in Arizona, making
general jurisdiction inapplicable. Neither are the contacts Danko alleged in
his declaration sufficient to create specific jurisdiction. “[T]he unilateral
activities of the plaintiff” cannot create the minimum contacts necessary to
justify jurisdiction but “must instead arise from the defendant’s
‘purposeful’ conduct.” Plan. Grp. of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews Min.
Props., Ltd., 226 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 16 (2011). Danko has failed to make any
showing that Myers purposefully reached out to him to establish an
attorney-client relationship. Instead, his own declaration indicates that he
unilaterally created any connections Myers had with Arizona. That Myers
accepted Danko’s offer for work, even for a matter concerning an Arizona
resident and dissolution decree issued in Arizona, does not qualify as
intentional conduct by Myers to establish contacts with this state sufficient
to give Arizona courts jurisdiction over her. See id. at 271, ¶ 41 (“[I]t is not

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enough that a defendant know that he is dealing with an Arizona resident
. . . the requisite activity must instead be purposefully directed at the
forum.”); Hoag v. French, 238 Ariz. 118, 123, ¶ 24 (App. 2015) (finding that
simply accepting a trustee appointment for Arizona trusts did not create
personal jurisdiction over the defendant trustee).

¶14 Our analysis here is consistent with several decisions issued
by this court where Danko has appealed orders dismissing his lawsuits
against other South Carolina attorneys for lack of personal jurisdiction. See
e.g., Danko v. Grantland, No. 1 CA-CV 24-0265, 2024 WL 4564680, at *2, ¶ 15
(Ariz. App. Oct. 24, 2024) (mem. decision); Danko v. Strom, No. 1 CA-CV 22-
0583, 2023 WL 5977229, at *2, ¶ 8 (Ariz. App. Sept. 14, 2023) (mem. decision);
Danko v. Ameika, No. 1 CA-CV 24-0045, 2024 WL 4026000, at *4, ¶¶ 19–20
(Ariz. App. Sept. 3, 2024) (mem. decision); Danko v. Whiting, No. 1 CA-CV
24-0001, 2024 WL 3949057, at *2, ¶ 11 (Ariz. App. Aug. 27, 2024) (mem.
decision). Like those cases, Danko’s arguments challenging the superior
court’s ruling on personal jurisdiction are groundless.

¶15 Danko further contends that Myers’s motion to dismiss was
untimely and that the superior court erred in considering the merits. A
defendant has 20 days to file a responsive pleading after being served with
a summons and complaint. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Myers filed her
motion to dismiss on September 15, 2023. Because Danko filed his
complaint and summons on June 13, 2023, he believes that Myers’s motion
was untimely. However, though Danko filed these documents in June, his
affidavit shows he did not serve them until September 9, 2023. Thus, her
motion to dismiss was timely.

¶16 Finally, Danko argues the court’s dismissal deprived him of
his due process rights and the dismissal “invalidate[d] all Arizona law
everywhere.” He also requests an evidentiary hearing and the opportunity
to submit expert witness testimony. Because Danko provides no authority
or any meaningful legal analysis supporting these arguments and requests,
and also fails to establish any connection to the issue of personal
jurisdiction, we decline to address them. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). We also
deny Danko’s request for oral argument.

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CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: TM

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