Boatman v. Casey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

NEAL EVERETT BOATMAN, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

COSKHA CHRISTINA CASEY, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0431 FC
FILED 01-28-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2018-096057
The Honorable Keith A. Miller, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Barreda Law PLLC, Gilbert
By Patrick J. Waltz
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Coskha Christina Casey, Washington
Respondent/Appellee
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Neal Everett Boatman (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s
order denying his petition to prevent relocation of a minor child and
modifying parenting time and legal decision-making authority. For the
following reasons, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Coskha Christina Casey (“Mother”) were divorced
by consent dissolution decree in 2019. The parties have three minor
children in common, a daughter (“Daughter”) and two sons (“Sons”). The
decree awarded joint legal decision-making authority and parenting time
in accordance with a parenting-time agreement. The decree mentioned
Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 78 but did not cite Rule
78(c) and did not state that “no further matters remain pending.”

¶3 Upon Mother’s 2021 petition advising the court Father lived
out of state, the superior court awarded Mother sole legal decision-making
authority and ordered Father parenting time with the minor children in
Arizona four days per month.

¶4 In 2023, after Father relocated to Arizona, Mother notified
Father she intended to relocate the children out of Arizona. Father
petitioned to prevent relocation and to modify parenting time and legal
decision-making authority. Mother responded that she and Father had
previously agreed she and Daughter would relocate to New Jersey and that,
if Father could obtain stable housing, Sons would stay in Arizona with
Father as Sons had requested.

¶5 After a trial, the superior court entered an order denying
Father’s petition to prevent relocation of Daughter. The court awarded joint
legal decision-making authority as to Sons. The court awarded Mother sole
legal decision-making authority over Daughter. The court ordered Sons
would reside with Father in Arizona and awarded Mother parenting time
with Sons during half the summer. The court ordered Mother to be

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Daughter’s primary residential parent and that Daughter reside with
Mother, who by then had already moved to New Jersey without Daughter.
The court awarded Father parenting time with Daughter during half the
summer. The court denied Father’s expedited motion to stay relocation and
denied Father’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. The order cited
Rule 78(c) and expressly stated that no further claims or issues remained
for the court to decide.

¶6 Father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

¶7 Even where the parties do not dispute jurisdiction, we have a
duty to determine whether we have it. See Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co., 191
Ariz. 464, 465 (App. 1997). Relevant here, a “final judgment” is appealable
under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), while a “special order made after final
judgment” is appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).

¶8 The 2019 decree was not a final judgment. It did not recite
“that no further matters remain pending and that the judgment is entered
under Rule 78(c),” nor did it cite Rule 78(c). Because the 2019 decree was
not a final judgment, the 2023 modifications of that decree Father appeals
cannot, by definition, be special orders made after a final judgment. A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(2). It is true that orders ruling on post-decree petitions to
modify or addressing relocation are generally special orders made after a
final judgment. See, e.g., Cone v. Righetti, 73 Ariz. 271, 274-75 (1952) (holding
order modifying custody, visitation, and support appealable as a
“special order” made after final judgment). But that’s because they usually
follow decrees constituting final judgments, which isn’t the case here.

¶9 Despite that, the superior court helpfully cited Rule 78(c) in
its final 2023 order denying Father relief from its prior (and necessarily
interlocutory) orders. And the court likewise recited that no remaining
claims or matters remained before it. Because those recitals make the
court’s final decision a “judgment” under Rule 78(a)(1), the decision is
appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 78(a)(1)
(defining judgment as including “a decision defining or modifying legal
decision-making, parenting time, or child support[]”). We thus have
jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1); Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9.

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II. The Superior Court Erred by Omitting to Provide the Reasoned
Explanation for Its Decision That A.R.S. § 25-403(B) Requires.

¶10 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion in
determining that relocation was in Daughter’s best interests and in
applying statutory factors when determining legal decision-making
authority and parenting time. Mother did not file an answering brief. We
exercise our discretion not to take that omission as a confession of error
because this appeal involves a minor’s interests. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz.
App. 83, 85 (1966).

¶11 When relocation is contested, the superior court must decide
whether to allow the relocation “in accordance with the child’s best
interests.” A.R.S. § 25-408(G). To determine the child’s best interests, the
court must consider the factors listed in A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A) and -408(I). See
Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 533 ¶ 12 (App. 2019). The parent seeking to
relocate has the burden of proving the relocation is in the child’s best
interests. A.R.S. § 25-408(G). Further, the best interest of a child is the
primary consideration in awarding legal decision-making authority and
parenting time. Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102 ¶ 18 (2003). The court must
“make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the
reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child.” A.R.S. §
25-403(B). This statutory mandate ensures the reviewing court can discern
which factors the superior court considered and which factors influenced
its decision. See Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 421-22 ¶ 12 (App. 2003).

¶12 Father argues the superior court erred when it found Mother
met her burden of showing the relocation was in Daughter’s best interests.
The court addressed each of the applicable statutory factors in A.R.S. §§ 25-
403(A) and -408(I). But many of the statutory findings it listed appeared
neutral or lacked specificity, and the court did not explain how the factors
influenced its decision. Instead, the court found “that while either result
would be passable, it would be best for Mother to be able to relocate with
her daughter.” It then concluded “Mother has met her burden of showing
that moving [Daughter] to New Jersey is in [Daughter’s] best interests.”

¶13 The court must provide reasons why the factors support a
relocation decision. A.R.S. § 25-403(B). Here, it did not because it omitted
to address a number of factors that it was required to analyze in providing
that reasoned explanation. The court omitted to address the impact
relocation would have on Daughter’s future relationships with Mother and
Father. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(1). In considering Daughter’s relationships
with others, the court described the absence of the parents’ family in

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Arizona and Mother’s potential support in New Jersey. See A.R.S. § 25-
403(A)(2). But the court did not describe Daughter’s interaction and
interrelationship with her own parents, with her two brothers, who reside
with Father in Arizona, and with Mother’s boyfriend and his children, with
whom Daughter apparently is now residing in New Jersey. And the court
did not explain how it balanced these important relationships.

¶14 Similarly, in considering the extent to which relocating will
affect the emotional, physical, or developmental needs of Daughter, the
court stated, “[t]here was not substantial testimony on this point.” See
A.R.S. § 25-408(I)(6). Mother testified about this factor, but the court did
not address her testimony in its ruling. Finally, in considering the potential
effect of relocation on Daughter’s stability, the superior court stated “[t]he
effect on [Daughter]’s stability is not a significant factor here.” See A.R.S. §
25-408(I)(8). The effect on Daughter’s stability is another factor the court
must consider in analyzing relocation that the court did not address.

¶15 The decision also omitted to provide the reasons A.R.S. § 25-
403(B) requires for the decision in favor of Mother by treating all of the
relevant factors it analyzed as in equipoise. Wright v. Farris, ___ Ariz. ___,
___ ¶ 1, 1 CA-CV 24-0438 FC, 2025 WL 52554, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Jan. 9,
2025) (“[Section] 25-403(B) requires the court to provide the reasons why
making Father the primary residential parent was in [child’s] best interests.
Declaring a tie in the findings of fact does not do this.”). In considering
which parent is more likely to allow Daughter frequent, meaningful, and
continuing contact with the other parent, the superior court concluded that
both parents “are likely.” See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(6). Similarly, in
considering the likelihood that the parent with whom Daughter will reside
after the relocation would comply with parenting time orders, the court
concluded that “neither parent has previously refused to comply with
parenting time orders.” See A.R.S. § 25-408(I)(4). The court likewise did not
address the parents’ testimony about previous non-compliance with court-
ordered parenting time and Mother’s testimony that future compliance
“would depend” on financial ability. Without these reasons, we cannot
assess whether the court abused its discretion in deciding Mother met her
burden to show that relocation was in Daughter’s best interests. See Wright,
___ Ariz. at ___¶ 1.

CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the superior court’s
ruling and remand for further proceedings. In our discretion, we deny

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Father’s request for attorneys’ fees on appeal. We award Father his
reasonable costs on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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