Vohland v. Maricopa County

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL S. VOHLAND, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

MARICOPA COUNTY, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0432
FILED 05-08-2025
AMENDED PER ORDER FILED 05-08-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022-012466
The Honorable John Napper, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Barrett & Matura, P.C., Scottsdale
By Jeffrey C. Matura, John J. Daller
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Sean M. Moore, Maxine S. Mak, Rosa Aguilar
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

VOHLAND v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al.
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the Opinion of the Court, in
which Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs
joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Michael Vohland challenges the constitutionality of Section
2.1.2 of the Maricopa County Justice Courts Bench Policy. He argues the
policy violates Article 6, Section 31(A) of the Arizona Constitution by
disqualifying applicants without a juris doctor (“law”) degree for
appointment as a justice of the peace pro tempore. We disagree and hold
that, even assuming the Arizona Constitution prohibits disqualification of
applicants without a law degree, the policy does not so disqualify. We thus
affirm the superior court’s grant of summary judgment finding the policy
constitutional.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Vohland is not admitted to practice law and does not have a
law degree. He applied to be a pro tem Justice of the Peace for the Maricopa
County Justice Court system. Previously, he had served as a pro tem
magistrate for the Nogales Municipal Court.

¶3 The Maricopa County Justice Courts impose several
qualifications upon pro tem applicants. First, “[a]ll new applicants shall
attach a signed letter of reference from a sitting Justice of the Peace
recommending their appointment.” Maricopa Cnty. Just. Cts. Bench Policy
2.1. Additionally, “one or more of the following qualifications shall be met”:
the applicant is (A) “[a] formerly elected or appointed Justice of the Peace”;
(B) “[a] present or former City Magistrate”; (C) “[a]n individual holding a
J.D. degree from an accredited law school”; or (D) “[a] non-attorney Pro
Tem, who has been appointed previously as a Pro Tem.” Maricopa Cnty.
Just. Cts. Bench Policy 2.1–2.1.2.1 (emphasis added).

¶4 The Maricopa County Justice Courts rejected Vohland’s
application. Initially, the courts told Vohland that he was ineligible for
appointment because he both did not hold a law degree and did not submit
a letter of recommendation from a sitting justice. However, in a subsequent

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VOHLAND v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al.
Opinion of the Court

email the courts informed Vohland that although his service as a former
magistrate exempted him from the law degree requirement, he could not
be considered without a letter of recommendation.

¶5 Vohland sought declaratory relief in the superior court
against the Maricopa County Justices of the Peace alleging that his
application was denied because he lacked a law degree and that Section
2.1.2 of the Bench Policy violates Article 6, Section 31(A) of the Arizona
Constitution. Section 31(A) allows for the “appointment of members of the
bar” to work as pro tems in the “courts inferior to the Supreme Court.” Ariz.
Const. art. 6, § 31(A). But it continues that “justices of the peace pro tempore
shall have the same qualifications as justices of the peace.” Id. Vohland
argued the Bench Policy violated Section 31(A) because Arizona law does
not require a justice of the peace to hold a law degree and the “shall have
the same qualifications” language was “intended to prevent a Justice of the
Peace from using membership in the Arizona bar as criteria for
appointment of Pro Tems.” Vohland, however, did not challenge the letter
of recommendation requirement.

¶6 The Justices of the Peace moved for summary judgment,
arguing Vohland lacked standing to challenge Section 31(A) because his
application was denied for lack of a letter of recommendation and not for
lack of a law degree. In response, Vohland argued that no sitting justice
would give him a letter of recommendation because he did not hold a law
degree. The court denied the motion, finding a genuine dispute of material
fact whether Vohland was unable to obtain a letter of recommendation
because he lacked a law degree.

¶7 The Justices of the Peace moved for summary judgment a
second time, arguing Vohland’s facial challenge failed because Section
31(A) was “intended to create the baseline for appointment and was not
intended to prevent a Justice of the Peace from requiring additional
qualifications.” They also argued that holding a law degree is not “the sole
option for qualification,” and therefore the Bench Policy does not impose
an additional qualification not required of justices of the peace. Although
the court disagreed that the Bench Policy’s non-law degree qualification
options meaningfully enabled appointment of applicants without a law
degree, the court granted the motion. It found that Section 31(A) allows an
elected justice of the peace to “choose what criteria it will employ in
deciding who to appoint as a Pro Tem in their court [including] whether or
not the applicant must be a member of the bar.” Thus, the court found the
Bench Policy constitutional.

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VOHLAND v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al.
Opinion of the Court

¶8 Vohland timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction. Ariz.
Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Vohland argues that the superior court erred by granting
Defendants summary judgment because Section 2.1.2 of the Bench Policy
violates Section 31(A) by requiring that pro tem applicants “hold a law
degree.” He contends that because Section 31(A) states that “justices of the
peace pro tempore shall have the same qualifications as justices of the
peace” and because justices of the peace are not required to hold a law
degree, Section 2.1.2 is facially unconstitutional. As in his complaint,
Vohland does not on appeal challenge the letter of recommendation
requirement. The Justices of the Peace respond that (1) Section 2.1.2 does
not require that applicants hold a law degree, and (2) Section 31(A) does
not prevent the justices from imposing additional qualifications beyond
those required of the Justices of the Peace.

¶10 “We review the superior court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, affirming if there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Quinn v. Cardenas, 256 Ariz. 77, 83 ¶ 19 (App. 2023). “We will affirm summary judgment if it
is correct for any reason supported by the record.” KB Home Tucson, Inc. v.
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 236 Ariz. 326, 329 ¶ 14 (App. 2014). “A facial
constitutional challenge requires an inquiry into whether the law itself is
unconstitutional, not into whether the application of the law violates a
particular individual’s rights.” Hernandez v. Lynch, 216 Ariz. 469, 472 ¶ 8
(App. 2007).

¶11 “In interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions, we
give words ’their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or
otherwise that a different meaning is intended.’” Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425,
434 ¶ 25 (2021) (quoting Ariz. ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll.
Dist. Bd., 243 Ariz. 539, 541 ¶ 7 (2018)); accord A.R.S. § 1-213. Accordingly,
“[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, [and]
consider[] the context.” Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11 (2019);
see also Adams v. Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, 227 Ariz. 128, 135 ¶ 34
(2011) (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and,
indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined
in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’”
(quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993))). “We also avoid
interpreting a statute in a way that renders portions superfluous.” Fann, 251
Ariz. at 434 ¶ 25. If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous, this Court

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VOHLAND v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al.
Opinion of the Court

“must give effect to that language without employing other rules of
statutory construction.” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 320,
323 ¶ 11 (App. 2017).

I. The Bench Policy Does Not Require Pro Tem Applicants to Hold a
Law Degree.

¶12 Vohland’s interpretation of Section 2.1.2 of the Bench Policy
would require us to read it in isolation. If Section 2.1.2 were the only
qualification and only means of qualifying to be a pro tem, then the Bench
Policy would bar the appointment of applicants without a law degree. But
we do not read statutory text in isolation. See Nicaise, 245 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 11.

¶13 Read in context of the larger Bench Policy, Section 2.1.2 does
not require a pro tem applicant to hold a law degree. Section 2.1 states that
“one or more of the following qualifications shall be met.” (Emphasis added.)
Although holding a law degree is one means of qualification, the Bench
Policy provides three other means of qualifying, none of which require the
applicant to hold a law degree. See Maricopa Cnty. Just. Cts. Bench Policy
2.1–2.1.2.1. In fact, when the Maricopa County Administrative Pro Tem
reviewed Vohland’s application, “she realized he was eligible for
appointment because of his prior experience as a City Magistrate.” See
Maricopa Cnty. Just. Cts. Bench Policy 2.1.1. Thus, Vohland’s application
was not denied because he did not hold a law degree. In a facial challenge
to a regulation or policy’s constitutionality, the plaintiff must show “no
circumstances exist under which the regulation would be valid.” Hernandez
v. Lynch, 216 Ariz. 469, 472 ¶ 8 (App. 2007). But here, such “circumstance”
exists because a person without a law degree may still be eligible to serve
under the Bench Policy by holding other qualifications, as Vohland himself
did. Accordingly, even assuming that the Arizona Constitution prohibits a
law degree requirement, Section 2.1.2 of the Bench Policy is not facially
unconstitutional.

¶14 Because we hold that Section 2.1.2 is not facially
unconstitutional, we do not decide whether Section 31(A) prohibits a law
degree requirement for appointment as a justice of the peace pro tempore.

II. Costs.

¶15 Because Vohland is not successful on appeal, we decline his
request for costs. See ARCAP 21.

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VOHLAND v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al.
Opinion of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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