Danko v. Dorton

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JOHN DANKO, III, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

SHELBY DORTON, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0447
FILED 01-07-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-093823
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John Danko III, Mesa
Plaintiff/Appellant

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Phoenix
By Kevin C. Nicholas, Margaret T. McCarthy, Joshua D. Kalanick
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe
joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 John Danko, III appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his
complaint against four defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and
service. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶2 This is not Danko’s first lawsuit—both this Court and the
Maricopa County Superior Court have designated him a vexatious litigant.
Ariz. Ct. App., Div. 1, Admin. Ord. No. 2024-10; Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct.
Admin. Ord. No. 2023-0135. We recently chronicled Danko’s pattern that
led to those designations, see Danko v. Reash, 1 CA-CV 24-0301, 2024 WL
4705801 (Ariz. App. Nov. 7, 2024) (mem. decision), and he continues that
pattern here.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 Danko initiated this case by suing ten defendants who lived
in Arizona and South Carolina. The defendants in this appeal interacted
with Danko as behavioral health and social service workers years ago in
South Carolina. Danko insisted an individual defendant, without
specifying which one, “resides in” and “does business in Maricopa
County,” and the events described in the complaint “occurred in Maricopa
County.” Danko alleged defendants, again unspecified, attempted to
“murder [him] by standing on his neck” and by “thirsting [him] to death”
without providing any detail about the time or place of these actions. He
also alleged the defendants committed “intentional torts,” “dignitary
torts,” and “liability” among many other assertions. For example, the
defendants “violate[d] nuisance laws against [Danko]” and “harass[ed],
abuse[d], and degrad[ed]” him. And Danko claimed his damages
amounted to $3.5 million.

¶4 Four of the defendants (“Defendants”) each moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service, arguing they only
interacted with Danko in South Carolina and that Danko improperly served

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them. In response, Danko asserted the Defendants “own real property in
Arizona” and “do business in Arizona.” But Danko provided no support
for those assertions, even after the court gave him the opportunity to amend
his complaint.

¶5 The court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over
Defendants because Danko failed to provide evidence of their contacts with
Arizona. The court dismissed Danko’s complaint as to Defendants. Danko
then appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Danko argues the court erred in dismissing his complaint
because Arizona has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. His brief
contains additional arguments and details that are irrelevant to this appeal.

I. Compliance with Rules

¶7 A party appealing from a civil judgment must comply with
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13. An appellant’s
opening brief must include a “table of citations” listing the sources the brief
cites and the page number each citation appears on. ARCAP 13(a)(2). Briefs
must contain a “statement of facts . . . relevant to the issues presented for
review” with references to the record. ARCAP 13(a)(5). The Rule also
requires that appellants’ briefs include an “argument” section discussing
each contention on appeal with supporting reasons for each contention,
citations to legal authorities, and appropriate references to the record.
ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A).

¶8 An appellant who fails to make “a bona fide and reasonably
intelligent effort to comply with the rules will waive issues and arguments
not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or
authority.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (cleaned up).
Although we prefer to decide cases on the merits instead of dismissing on
procedural grounds, “there is a limit to which judicial leniency can be
stretched.” Adams v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1984).
We offer self-represented litigants no “special leniency” and hold them to
the “same standards as attorneys.” Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 8.

¶9 Danko does not comply with these rules. His opening brief
does contain a section titled “Table of Citations,” but otherwise violates
ARCAP 13(a)(2). The table of citations lists many statutes, constitutional
amendments, procedural rules, and cases. But the table makes no attempt
to alphabetize the cases and provides nothing besides the case name—no

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reporter, no volume or page number, and no indication where the brief cites
each case. The latter omission is perhaps understandable: nowhere does the
brief even cite or discuss the cases listed in the table of citations. The statutes
the brief does cite do not deal with the relevant topics of personal
jurisdiction or service of process. By failing to provide proper citations,
Danko failed to make a bona fide effort to comply with ARCAP 13. Danko
waived his arguments, see id., and we affirm the superior court’s judgment.

¶10 We would affirm even if we reviewed Danko’s personal
jurisdiction arguments on the merits. “To survive a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must offer facts establishing a
prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” Beverage v. Pullman & Comley, LLC, 232
Ariz. 414, 417, ¶ 10 (App. 2013). Here, Danko’s briefs provide no support
for his statement that he properly served Defendants or that Arizona had
jurisdiction over them. Danko mentions jurisdiction in his opening brief
“but cites no relevant supporting authority and does not develop it
further.” Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491, ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007).
He thus waived the issue. See id.

II. Attorney Fees

¶11 We “may impose sanctions on . . . a party if [we] determine[]
that an appeal or a motion is frivolous.” ARCAP 25. One such sanction is
“imposing costs or attorney[] fees.” Id.

¶12 Defendants also request attorney fees and costs pursuant to
A.R.S. § 12-349, which allows us to award attorney fees if a party appeals
“without substantial justification.” A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1). This occurs when
“the claim . . . is groundless and is not made in good faith,” A.R.S. § 12-
349(F), and is determined objectively, Rogone v. Correia, 236 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶
22 (App. 2014). A groundless claim is not made in good faith when “the
party . . . knows or should know that it is groundless, or is indifferent to its
groundlessness, but pursues it anyway.” Ariz. Republican Party v. Richer, 257
Ariz. 210, 221, ¶ 38 (2024).

¶13 Danko has made yet another frivolous and groundless
appeal. He fails to comply with ARCAP 13, makes unsupported arguments
about personal jurisdiction, remarks on issues not before the court, and
lodges unnecessary and inflammatory attacks on non-parties. Danko has
made these same errors numerous times before this Court, and we have
reminded him of these insufficiencies on each appeal. See Reash, 1 CA-CV
24-0301, at *3, ¶¶ 15–19 (collecting cases).

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¶14 We have repeatedly sanctioned Danko for similar
shortcomings and do so again to “discourage similar conduct in the future.”
ARCAP 25. Pursuant to ARCAP 25 and A.R.S. § 12-349, we award
Defendants their reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal upon
compliance with ARCAP 21.

¶15 Danko filed a Motion to Process Application for Waiver of
Court Fees, requesting that we waive his fees for this appeal. We deferred
Danko’s filing fees due to his inability to pay and his motion is still pending
before us. Because he has paid his filing fees, we deny his motion as moot.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: TM

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