Mayfield v. Mayfield

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

GILLIAN JANET BIGLER MAYFIELD, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

JAMES JEFFERSON MAYFIELD, IV, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0523 FC
FILED 02-13-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2022-051682
The Honorable Colleen E. O’Donnell-Smith, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND MODIFIED IN PART

COUNSEL

Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., Phoenix
By Kelly Mendoza
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Singer Pistiner, P.C., Scottsdale
By Robert S. Singer
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

MAYFIELD v. MAYFIELD
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs
joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Gillian Janet Bigler Mayfield (“Wife”) appeals from several
rulings in the decree dissolving her marriage to James Jefferson Mayfield
IV (“Husband”). For the reasons stated below, we affirm all the rulings
except for one, infra Section VI, which we vacate and modify.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This is the parties’ third marriage to each other. They married
in 2006, 2012, and this marriage took place in June 2015. Wife petitioned for
dissolution in September 2022.

¶3 After a one-day trial, the superior court issued a decree
allocating community and separate real property, personal property, and
debts. The court also awarded attorneys’ fees to Husband. We discuss the
relevant facts as we address each ruling on appeal. We have jurisdiction
over Wife’s timely appeal under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Duress

¶4 Before the marriage, Husband inherited several hundred
acres in Alabama that had been in his family for generations. The parties
agree this was Husband’s separate property at the time of the marriage.
Husband also owned a pre-marital real estate development business called
Black Warrior. Black Warrior held title to Husband’s Alabama property.
Sometime during the marriage, Black Warrior became Black Warrior
Living, LLC (“BWL”), with Husband as the sole owner.

¶5 On September 10, 2019, Husband deeded 160 acres of the
Alabama property to Wife, which she held in her name. On April 23, 2020,
Husband amended the BWL operating agreement to give Wife a 49%
ownership interest. According to Husband, he transferred these assets to

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Wife after years of emotional and physical abuse that centered on her
demands for an interest in the Alabama property. Therefore, he argued, the
transfers resulted from duress and were invalid. Wife argued the transfers
were legitimate exchanges. According to Wife, Husband conveyed the land
as payment for work her late husband did for Husband before 2005. And
she claimed Husband gave her an ownership interest in BWL because she
contributed significant labor and funds to BWL and saved it from financial
ruin. Husband denied these allegations.

¶6 The superior court rejected Wife’s version of events and
found that Husband acted under duress for each of these transactions.
Specifically, the court found “that Husband was under threat of serious
harm . . . throughout their marriage if he did not bend to her will and do as
she demanded to the point where he was unable to exercise free will and
judgment . . . .” Thus, the court found the deed conveying 160 acres of
Alabama property to Wife and the amended BWL operating agreement
were unenforceable and awarded the Alabama property and BWL to
Husband as his separate property.

¶7 Wife argues the superior court erred in finding Husband
acted under duress. She contends that Husband’s duress defense was
untimely and that he had reasonable alternatives available that defeat his
duress claim. We review de novo the validity and enforceability of the deed
and the BWL operating agreement. See Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 126,
129, ¶ 10 (App. 2019). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to upholding the decree, giving deference to the superior court’s
assessment of witness credibility. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284,
¶ 20 (App. 2019).

¶8 Duress occurs when one party induces another to enter a
contract by means of a wrongful threat that overrides the other’s exercise of
free will and judgment. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 355–56 (1967);
Inter-Tel, Inc. v. Bank of Am., Ariz., 195 Ariz. 111, 117, ¶¶ 35–36 (App. 1999);
see also Restatement (First) of Contracts (“First Restatement”) § 492(b) (1932)
(assent induced by wrongful threat that causes “such fear as precludes
[another] from exercising free will and judgment”); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts (“Second Restatement”) § 175(1) (1981) (assent induced by
“improper threat . . . that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative”). A
contract procured under duress is unenforceable. USLife Title Co. of Ariz. v.
Gutkin, 152 Ariz. 349, 356 (App. 1986).

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A. Husband’s Duress Claim Was Timely

¶9 Wife argues that Husband’s duress claim was untimely
because he first raised it in the pretrial statement nearly four years after he
signed the amended operating agreement giving her a 49% interest in BWL
and more than four years after he deeded 160 acres to her. She cites Hubbard
v. Geare, 77 Ariz. 262 (1954), which holds that a party seeking to void a
contract executed under duress must act promptly. Id. at 264–65.

¶10 In Hubbard, the court found the defendant ratified the lease
allegedly signed under duress because he remained in possession of the
property for eighteen months after the threat was removed. Id. at 265. By
contrast, here Wife’s threats and physical abuse did not abate after
Husband signed the deed to the 160 acres or after he amended the BWL
operating agreement. Wife also fails to cite to any evidence that Husband
manifested an intention to affirm the deed or operating agreement which
would constitute ratification. Wife equates silence with ratification. But
this ignores the ongoing nature of the abuse.

¶11 Wife asserts that after she obtained an order of protection in
September 2022, the threat of physical and emotional harm ceased. She
implies that therefore, Husband should have claimed duress at that time.
To be sure, Husband’s response to the dissolution petition did not assert a
duress claim. But neither Wife’s petition nor his response listed specific
assets as community or separate property, so the failure to assert duress at
that time does not necessarily waive the defense. Although duress was not
included among the several issues Husband listed when he asked for
additional trial time, this pleading does not limit the issues to be tried.
Husband properly raised duress in the joint pretrial statement.

B. The Record Supports the Duress Finding

¶12 Wife next argues that Husband did not show duress because
he had reasonable alternatives to signing the deed and amending the BWL
operating agreement. Duress requires the absence of a reasonable
alternative. See Inter-Tel, 195 Ariz. at 118–19, ¶ 42 (finding no reasonable
alternative where plaintiff could not find another lender due to defendant’s
conduct); Sharp v. Sharp, 179 Ariz. 205, 209 (App. 1994) (rejecting claim that
wife signed agreement under duress because she could have called her
attorney a second time or mailed a letter when the attorney did not take her
collect call), superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized in Hutki v. Hutki, 244 Ariz. 39, 43, ¶ 18 (App. 2018). The First and Second Restatements
express the same principle—one lacks free will when he or she has no

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reasonable alternative. Compare First Restatement § 492(b) (defining duress
as fear that “precludes [the] exercise of free will and judgment”), with
Second Restatement § 175(1) (duress is assent induced by “improper threat
. . . that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative”).

¶13 Wife contends Husband’s duress claim is based on his
loneliness. Not so. The superior court credited Husband’s testimony and
evidence of years of physical and emotional abuse at Wife’s hand. The
decree detailed Wife’s ongoing abuse to pressure Husband to give her his
Alabama property such that he did not act of his own free will when he
deeded 160 acres to Wife or when he effectively gave her 49% of the
remaining property by giving her a 49% interest in BWL. The record
supports these findings.

¶14 Wife also argues that Husband alleged duress only as to
transactions in which he gave up property, not those that worked to his
advantage. This argument, like Wife’s argument about the difference in
their physical stature, goes to the weight of evidence supporting duress,
and we do not reweigh evidence on appeal. See Lehn, 246 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 20.

¶15 Wife next argues that even if her threats were improper,
Husband had several opportunities to escape her control and seek
independent advice. Specifically, she notes that Husband met with his
physician and his attorney, and he had two sessions with his psychiatrist
without her. She also argues she did not control Husband because he often
left the home during their arguments, stayed at hotels, and they had
divorced two times before. Wife contends Husband could have divorced
her or obtained an order of protection rather than succumb to her alleged
threats. The superior court did not expressly state that Husband had no
reasonable alternative, but by finding duress, we presume the court made
this finding. See Rinegar v. Rinegar, 231 Ariz. 85, 90, ¶ 20 (App. 2012)
(presuming superior court found every fact necessary to support its ruling
where parties did not request written findings of fact or conclusions of law).

¶16 Husband contends Wife waived this argument because she
did not assert at trial that he had reasonable alternatives. Even though Wife
did not specifically assert that he had “reasonable alternatives” at trial, the
parties testified to the facts she relies on in arguing this theory. For this
reason, there was no waiver.

¶17 There is no duress “if the victim has a reasonable alternative
to succumbing and fails to take advantage of it.” Second Restatement § 175,
cmt. b; see also First Restatement § 492, cmt. c (“A state of such fear may

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continue long after the threats that cause it, but in determining the
probability of this, time, distance, opportunity to obtain disinterested
advice and protection, are all important.”). Wife fails to state how visits
with his physician and psychiatrist offered Husband a reasonable
alternative as neither could prevent her abuse. Husband’s attorney
proposed giving Wife a conditional ownership interest in BWL, but for
reasons not apparent in the record, Husband instead gave Wife a 49%
ownership interest. Although this shows Husband consulted his attorney,
Husband also testified that the abuse continued after that date and supports
the reasonable inference that the abuse would continue until Wife had an
actual ownership interest in BWL.

¶18 Generally, asserting one’s rights in court is a reasonable
alternative to acquiescence. See Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Rudine, 137
Ariz. 62, 66–67 (App. 1983). “This alternative may not, however, be
reasonable if the threat involves, for instance, . . . the use of oppressive
tactics, or the possibility of emotional consequences.” Second Restatement
§ 175, cmt. b. “The standard is a practical one under which account must
be taken of the exigencies in which the victim finds himself . . . .” Id.

¶19 Here, record evidence supports that Wife’s years of abuse
constitute oppressive tactics with emotional consequences to Husband.
Husband documented and testified to Wife’s continued emotional and
physical abuse intended to exert pressure on him to give her the Alabama
property that had been in his family for generations. The superior court
found Husband feared Wife throughout the marriage, which implies that
his fears did not abate in the nights he spent at hotels. Husband testified
that he had to transfer the property to Wife or else endure more abuse.

¶20 We affirm the conclusion that Husband had no reasonable
alternative when he signed these contracts. See, e.g., Baer v. Baer, 904 S.E.2d
815, 821 (N.C. App. Ct. 2024) (holding that ongoing abuse and threats
created a question of fact about whether spouse signed a settlement
agreement under duress); Coburn v. Rhodig, 1 CA-CV 18-0194 FC, 2019 WL
1530298, at *4, ¶ 16–17 (Ariz. App. Apr. 9, 2019) (mem. decision) (finding
that enforcing spousal support obligation in court was not a reasonable
alternative where the obligor-spouse threated to leave the state or commit
suicide unless obligee-spouse agreed to a lesser amount).

Domestic violence is often characterized by a pattern of
“coercive control” that affects the battered partner’s
perception of the choices available and the consequences of
those choices. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion:

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Squaring Civil Protection Orders with the Reality of Domestic
Abuse, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 35, 47–48 (2008) (“A batterer’s
coercion does not force a victim’s compliance by physical
assault but does deprive a victim of liberty and volition by
distorting her choices or perceived choices, and the price to
pay for disobedience.”). Courts must be sensitive to this
dynamic when evaluating the validity of a prenuptial
agreement if allegations of domestic violence are made.

Andrew B. v. Abbie B., 494 P. 3d 522, 538, n.47 (Alaska 2021).

¶21 The record supports the finding that Wife’s continual abuse
caused Husband to give her his separate Alabama property and that
Husband did not have a reasonable alternative to her demands for the
property. We affirm the ruling that the 160 acres and BWL are Husband’s
separate property.

II. Community Equitable Lien on Husband’s Alabama Property and
BWL

¶22 Wife argues the superior court erred by failing to award the
community an equitable lien for its contributions to Husband’s separate
Alabama property and BWL.1 Husband argues Wife waived this issue by
not raising it at trial.

¶23 Wife did not ask the superior court to award the community
an equitable lien on Husband’s separate Alabama property or BWL.
Presumably this is because Wife claimed she was entitled to nearly half of
that property under the 2019 deed and amended operating agreement. At
trial, Wife asked the court to award all the Alabama property and BWL to
Husband and all other community property to her. Thus, she waived the
equitable lien argument by not raising it at trial. See Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241
Ariz. 592, 597, ¶ 23 (App. 2017).

III. Community’s Equitable Lien on Wife’s Bramble Berry Property

¶24 Before the marriage, Wife owned a home on Bramble Berry
Lane in Arizona (“Bramble Berry”). Wife rented the property to tenants
except when the parties lived there. The parties disputed how long they

1 We combine our analysis of Wife’s arguments that the court failed to

award an equitable lien for the community’s contributions to BWL and the
160 acres of Alabama property. For purposes of the equitable lien issue,
these arguments are indistinguishable.

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lived in the Bramble Berry home during the marriage. According to
Husband, they lived there three years. Wife testified that they only lived
there for eighteen months, and she rented it all other times.

¶25 Wife testified that she deposited the rental income into US
Bank account #4116, the same account she used to pay the mortgage and
expenses. She asserts that she kept these funds separate, so the community
is only entitled to an equitable lien for the eighteen months the parties lived
there and paid the mortgage themselves. Husband argued that Wife did
not keep the rental income separate and that she failed to adequately trace
the commingled rental income. Therefore, he argues that community funds
paid the Bramble Berry mortgage throughout the marriage, and he
calculated the equitable lien accordingly.

¶26 The superior court found Wife failed to show that the rental
income in US Bank account #4116 was traceable. The court also accepted
Husband’s testimony that the parties lived at Bramble Berry and paid the
mortgage for three years. Thus, the court concluded that community funds
paid for all Bramble Berry mortgage payments during the marriage (84
months) and calculated the equitable lien based on that period. Wife argues
this was error.

¶27 “The commingling of separate and community funds into one
account does not transmute the entire account into a community account so
long as the funds remain traceable.” Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz. App. 89, 95–96
(1976). The Bramble Berry monthly mortgage payments of around $1,475
came from Wife’s US Bank account #4116 between January 2019 and
September 2022. Deposits into account #4116 consisted of Husband’s
separate funds and community funds in addition to the Bramble Berry
rental income. Thus, the commingled funds were transmuted to
community property absent a tracing.

¶28 A review of the deposits into US Bank account #4116 shows a
combination of rental income and transfers from Wife’s other bank accounts
and from some unknown sources. For example, over several months the
only deposits into account #4116 came from Wife’s individual US Bank
account #3521. Wife’s US Bank account #3521 included funds from BWL
and gas royalties (Husband’s separate property), rent from Bramble Berry
tenants (Wife’s separate property), and money Wife earned renovating and
selling homes (community earnings). Thus, Wife commingled her separate
funds, Husband’s separate funds, and community funds in account #3521.
She then transferred those comingled funds from account #3521 into
account #4116 and paid the Bramble Berry mortgage from account #4116.

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¶29 Wife failed to show that deposits from rental income were
enough to pay for the mortgage and expenses on her separate Bramble
Berry property. Absent more detailed evidence from Wife about the
amount of rental income and the source of the other deposits into account
#4116, her tracing was deficient. Thus, the commingled funds in US Bank
account #4116 are community property. Because these funds paid the
mortgage on Wife’s separate property, the community was entitled to an
equitable lien. See Saba v. Khoury, 253 Ariz. 587, 590, ¶ 8 (2022).

¶30 The parties disputed the number of months that the court
should use to calculate the equitable lien. We defer to the superior court’s
resolution of this disputed fact. See Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App.
2009) (appellate court defers to the superior court’s weighing of conflicting
evidence and judging of witness credibility). Based on Husband’s
testimony, the court properly awarded the community an equitable lien for
the entire length of marriage.

IV. Range Rover

A. Characterization of Vehicle as Community Property

¶31 The parties bought a Range Rover in November 2021.
According to Wife, it was her birthday gift from Husband. At the time of
the purchase, Husband wrote a note stating, “As a birthday Gift, I
relinquish my community property rights in the new 2020 Range Rover
serial #[XXXX] that we are buying from Benz and Beamer on 11-26-2021 . . .
For my wife Gillian Bigler . . . Happy Birthday Darling Love Jeff!” Husband
claimed Wife forced him to buy the Range Rover and he signed the note
under duress while Wife stood over him.

¶32 The superior court credited Husband’s testimony that he was
under duress when he relinquished his community interest in the Range
Rover “out of fear of abuse by Wife.” As a result, the court found the Range
Rover was community property, ordered it sold, and ordered Wife to pay
the remaining car loan balance.

¶33 Wife again argues that Husband failed to claim duress until
the pretrial statement some eighteen months after the transaction and that
he had reasonable alternatives. For the reasons stated above, see discussion
supra Section I.B, we reject these arguments.

¶34 Wife cites testimony from the salesperson as evidence that the
Range Rover was a gift. Although the note and the salesperson’s testimony
suggest that the parties bought the Range Rover for Wife’s birthday present,

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Husband’s testimony to the contrary supports the finding that any intent to
give Wife the Range Rover resulted from the ongoing abuse and coercion.
The superior court considered this conflicting evidence and accepted
Husband’s testimony. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
upholding the decree and giving deference to the superior court’s
assessment of witness credibility, Lehn, 246 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 20, we affirm the
finding that the Range Rover is community property.

B. Allocation of the Range Rover Debt

¶35 At trial, Wife asked to be reimbursed for the car payments she
made post-petition totaling $19,836. She also argued that Husband should
pay the remaining $34,094 car loan or reimburse her for all future payments
because the car was a gift. Despite finding the Range Rover was community
property, the superior court denied Wife’s request for reimbursement,
ordered it sold, and found the loan was Wife’s separate obligation.

¶36 On appeal, Wife argues Husband should be solely responsible
for all loan payments (past and future) because he bought the car as a gift
for her. Because we affirmed the finding that there was no gift, Wife’s
argument fails.

V. Equalization of the Bank Accounts

¶37 Wife argues the superior court erred in finding the following
accounts were community property: TD Ameritrade account, Arizona Bank
& Trust accounts, and seven US Bank accounts (#8553, #4082, #7287, #4132,
#3784, #3521, and #4174). According to Wife, the separate funds she
deposited into these accounts were traceable and therefore, did not
transmute the accounts to community property. See Cooper v. Cooper, 130
Ariz. 257, 259 (1981) (“[W]here community and separate property are
commingled, the entire fund is presumed to be community property unless
the separate property can be explicitly traced.”) (citation omitted); see also
In re Marriage of Cupp, 152 Ariz. 161, 164 (App. 1986).

¶38 Wife relies on Husband’s tracing evidence. Husband showed
that these accounts held a combination of Husband’s separate funds, Wife’s
separate funds, and community funds. But Husband’s evidence did not
identify which funds in Wife’s accounts are Wife’s separate property.
Instead, he showed that Wife regularly transferred his separate funds
among all of the multiple accounts, thereby commingling them with other
unidentified funds. For example, Husband wrote a $58,000 check to Wife
from his separate property BWL bank account after he sold one parcel of
land, and Wife deposited $58,000 on same date into her US Bank account

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#4082. This evidence did not sufficiently trace the source of the funds in
Wife’s separate accounts, so they were transmuted to community property.
See Cupp, 152 Ariz. at 164.

¶39 As to the TD Ameritrade account specifically, Wife testified
that she opened that account during the marriage, and it included her
earning from selling houses and profits from BWL. Thus, the funds in the
TD Ameritrade account are a combination of community property (Wife’s
earnings), and Husband’s separate property (BWL profits). See A.R.S. § 25-
211(A) (property acquired during the marriage is community property
unless acquired by gift, devise, or descent); Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176,
181 (1986) (earnings received during marriage are community property).
Wife failed to trace her separate funds, if any, in the TD Ameritrade
account.

¶40 Wife had the burden to show how much of the separate funds
in her accounts remained traceable by clear and convincing evidence. See
Cooper, 130 Ariz. at 259–60. Husband’s evidence did not suffice, and
referring generally to exhibits containing hundreds of pages of bank
statements is not clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the finding that
the bank accounts listed above are all community property.

VI. Characterizing Jewelry as Community Property

¶41 The decree addressed three pieces of jewelry: a ruby bracelet,
diamond hoop earrings, and a yellow diamond ring. The court found the
bracelet and earrings were community property, and because Wife owned
the ring before marriage, it was her separate property. Wife argues that the
superior court erred in finding the bracelet and earrings were community
property given her uncontroverted testimony that Husband gave her these
two pieces as gifts before the 2015 marriage.

¶42 Whether property is community or separate is a question of
law reviewed de novo, but whether a gift has been made is a question of
fact. In re Marriage of McCulloch, 257 Ariz. 168, 172, ¶ 9 (App. 2024). We
affirm the court’s factual determinations absent clear error. Id.

¶43 Although the superior court had the discretion to decline to
credit Wife’s testimony, Husband’s evidence supports Wife’s testimony.
Husband argued, generally, that the parties acquired $45,000 in jewelry
during the marriage. He offered an exhibit showing the pieces of jewelry
he claimed were purchased during the marriage. The photos did not
include a bracelet or earrings. The trial and deposition testimony mostly
related to other pieces of jewelry not at issue on appeal. Given Husband’s

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evidence, we cannot say the evidence supports finding the bracelet and
earrings are community property. We therefore vacate that ruling and
modify the decree to award these pieces to Wife as her separate property.

VII. Post-Petition Credit Card Interest

¶44 After Wife filed for dissolution, the parties sold the Amber
Sun home, a community property investment property. The parties agreed
to split the sale proceeds and hold the funds in their attorneys’ trust
accounts. During the litigation, the parties disagreed about paying down
significant community credit card debt with the proceeds.

¶45 At trial, Husband argued that Wife alone should pay the
nearly $13,000 in credit card interest that accrued post-petition based on her
refusal to pay down the credit card debt with Amber Sun sale proceeds.
The superior court found the $74,619 in credit card debt was a community
obligation and assigned half the debt to each party. The court assigned the
credit card interest to Wife, plus any additional interest that accrued since
trial “based on her refusal to agree to pay off the credit card balances with
the Amber Sun proceeds . . . .” Wife argues the court unfairly penalized her
because Husband had rejected her counter-offer on this issue.

¶46 The superior court has broad discretion to equitably allocate
community debts. See Cadwell v. Cadwell, 126 Ariz. 460, 462 (App. 1980).
We will affirm this discretionary ruling absent an abuse of discretion,
McCulloch, 257 Ariz. at 173, ¶ 15, and defer to the weight the superior court
gave the disputed evidence. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16.

¶47 In response to Husband’s request to use the proceeds to pay
the community credit card debt, Wife counter-proposed that Husband’s
attorney “retain $100,000 and hold it in trust subject to reallocation” and
divide the remaining net sale proceeds equally. The email then stated, “The
$100,000 more than covers the debts that [Husband] alleges are community
debts that need to be paid. [Wife] would agree that those funds shall not
be distributed absent a final order or other order on how to use the funds
within the Trust.” A reasonable reading of this email is that Wife agreed to
hold $100,000 in the trust account—not pay off the debt—pending a court
order and divide the remaining sale proceeds to the parties. If, as Wife now
claims on appeal, she was proposing to pay off the credit card debt with the
$100,000, there would be no dispute.

¶48 Our reading is consistent with Wife’s later email questioning
how much of the debt was for community purposes—an issue Wife wanted
to review before agreeing to use the Amber Sun proceeds to pay the credit

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card debt. Husband presented evidence that Wife then delayed reviewing
the credit card statements until just before trial, causing more interest to
accrue. Husband’s continued position that the Amber Sun proceeds should
be used to pay down the debt was reasonable under the circumstances.
This evidence supports the court’s discretionary ruling that it was equitable
to order Wife to pay all the interest that accrued on the community credit
cards post-petition. See Toth v. Toth, 190 Ariz. 218, 221 (1997) (holding that
A.R.S. § 25-318 requires an equitable, not necessarily equal, allocation of
community property).2

VIII. Award of Attorneys’ Fees to Husband

¶49 The superior court may award attorneys’ fees to a party “after
considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness
of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings . . . .”
A.R.S. § 25-324(A). The superior court reviewed these factors and found
Wife acted unreasonably, thereby increasing the costs of litigation. The
court awarded Husband attorneys’ fees of $21,000, citing Arizona Rule of
Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 92. We review an award of attorneys’ fees
for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, 548, ¶ 8
(App. 2008). The court abuses its discretion if it commits an error of law in
making a discretionary decision. Id.

A. Wife’s Unreasonable Positions

¶50 Courts apply an objective standard when assessing the
reasonableness of a party’s position. Id. at 549, ¶ 12. Wife argues she was
objectively reasonable and did not cause Husband to incur significant
additional fees. Although the court did not cite specific instances of Wife’s
unreasonable positions, it was not obligated to do so because neither party
requested written findings of fact or conclusions of law under Rule 82.
Thus, we presume the court found every fact necessary to support its
ruling. See Rinegar, 231 Ariz. at 90, ¶ 20.

¶51 The superior court found Wife made several claims that were
not supported by any evidence. Wife also removed funds from and closed
several bank accounts just before she petitioned for dissolution. This
caused Husband to spend significant time at trial and in discovery detailing

2 We do not consider Wife’s argument that the calculation of the amount of

interest was mathematically incorrect because she raised that argument for
the first time in the reply brief. See Johnson v. Provoyeur, 245 Ariz. 239, 243
n.5, ¶ 13 (App. 2018) (issues first raised in a reply brief are waived).

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Wife’s various financial transfers. These positions support the decision to
award Husband a portion of his attorneys’ fees.3

¶52 We defer to the superior court’s weighing of Husband’s
alleged unreasonableness or other issues on which Wife claims she was
reasonable. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16. The record supports the award
of fees to Husband based on a finding that Wife acted unreasonably.

B. The Superior Court’s Citation to Rule 92

¶53 Wife argues the superior court committed legal error because
it cited to Rule 92 when it awarded fees to Husband. Rule 92 applies to
contempt proceedings. But Husband did not allege and the court did not
find Wife in contempt. The reference to Rule 92 is misplaced, but the court
properly focused on the relevant A.R.S. § 25-324 factors when addressing
attorneys’ fees. The parties also addressed the reasonableness factors at
trial and on appeal. Thus, Wife has not shown how she was prejudiced by
the erroneous reference to Rule 92. The error is harmless and does not
warrant relief.

IX. Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal

¶54 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324. After considering the parties’ financial
resources and reasonableness of their positions, we order each party to pay
their own attorneys’ fees. However, Husband is entitled to an award of
costs under A.R.S. § 12-342 upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 21.

CONCLUSION

¶55 We affirm the decree except for the ruling relating to jewelry,
see supra Section VI, which we vacate and modify.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

3 Contrary to Wife’s assertion, the superior court did not apply a prevailing

party standard.

14