Huber v. Arizona Naturopathic

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

COLLEEN HUBER, Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC PHYSICIANS MEDICAL BOARD, Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0551
FILED 09-30-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. LC2023-000039-001
The Honorable Joseph P. Mikitish, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Mahaffy Law Firm PC, Gilbert
By Steven C. Mahaffy (argued)
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Casey Hutchinson, Kathryn E. Boughton, Luci Danielle Davis (argued)
Counsel for Appellee

The Butler Law Firm, Phoenix
By Everett S. Butler
Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae Construction Lawyers

M.D. Williams Law, LLC, Scottsdale
By Matthew Williams
Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae Construction Lawyers

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined. Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
concurred in part and dissented in part.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 This case requires us to decide how trial courts should review
appeals from administrative agencies under A.R.S. § 12-910(D) when an
appealing party demands a trial de novo with a jury. That subsection says
that “[f]or review of final administrative decisions of agencies that regulate
a profession or occupation” under certain listed statutes, “the trial shall be
de novo” if demanded. A.R.S. § 12-910(D). The prior subsection—
subsection C—says that “[o]n demand of any party, if a trial de novo is
available under this section, it may be with a jury[.]” A.R.S. § 12-910(C)
(emphasis added).

¶2 The Naturopathic Physicians Medical Board (“Board”)
licensed Colleen Huber (“Huber”) to practice naturopathic oncology. After
a patient complained, the Board investigated Huber, held a hearing with an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and revoked her license. Huber
appealed to the superior court and requested a trial de novo with a jury.
The superior court denied her jury-trial request and deferred to the Board’s
decision while ruling against her.

¶3 We vacate and remand for a new trial. Huber was entitled to
have a jury decide whether her license should be revoked after a trial de
novo (without deferring to the agency); she received neither a trial de novo
nor a jury trial. We also answer various questions about how trial courts
should proceed after a party demands a trial de novo under § 12-910(D).1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶4 Huber owned a medical clinic practicing naturopathic
oncology. In September 2020, a patient to whom Huber gave therapeutic

1 Because the superior court did not hold a de novo jury trial,
we need not address what standard(s) of review apply when resolving an
appeal from a trial de novo under § 12-910(D).

2

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

intravenous (“IV”) treatments complained to the Board. Huber upset the
patient by not disclosing the nutrients in her IV treatments. Huber
responded that she disclosed the nutrients in the IV, but she would not
disclose the amounts of those nutrients because they are proprietary.

¶5 The Board investigated Huber by reviewing her medical
records for the complainant and other patients. Following that review, the
Board issued a complaint and noticed a hearing, alleging Huber engaged in
unprofessional conduct. An ALJ held an evidentiary hearing and,
afterward, concluded Huber committed unprofessional conduct. See A.R.S.
§ 32-1501(31)(b), (l) (r). The ALJ recommended the Board revoke Huber’s
license, and the Board adopted that recommendation.

¶6 Huber appealed to the superior court, requesting a trial de
novo with a jury. The court granted Huber’s request for a trial de novo but
denied her a jury. The court asked the parties for their positions on trial
procedure. Huber, citing A.R.S. § 12-914(B), claimed the Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure (“Civil Rules”) applied, so the parties should file new
pleadings, conduct more discovery, and move for summary judgment. The
Board thought A.R.S. § 12-910(F) governed the court’s review and the
parties should engage in no new disclosure or discovery.

¶7 The court sided with the Board, explaining that a trial de novo
is still an “Administrative Review action,” so the court could consider the
administrative record and the Board’s decision. The court, despite granting
a trial de novo, also would review the Board’s decision for substantial
evidence under § 12-910(F). Although the court noted it owed no deference
to the Board on legal or factual questions, it concluded that “[a] lack of
deference [did] not mean ignoring all previous proceedings.” On which
rules apply, the court agreed the Civil Rules do, but it concluded the parties
need not file formal pleadings or conduct more discovery. It also concluded
it would consider the administrative record in its decision and allow
motions “only as relevant to the trial, e.g., motions in limine.” The court
believed these procedures were consistent “with the Rules of Procedure for
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions[.]”

¶8 The superior court held a one-day bench trial. When the trial
started, the court required Huber to present her evidence first. Huber
testified. Then, during its case, the Board called its executive director and
an expert witness. Neither party supplemented the administrative record
with additional exhibits. At trial’s conclusion, the court requested
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from the parties.

3

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

¶9 Following those submissions, the court affirmed the Board’s
revocation order. The court, applying the standard in § 12-910(F),
concluded that the “record contains substantial evidence that Dr. Huber
engaged in unprofessional conduct” and she “has not shown that the
Board’s action was contrary to law[,] unsupported by substantial evidence,
arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”

¶10 Huber timely appealed; we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 12-
913.

DISCUSSION

¶11 This appeal turns on statutory interpretation. When
interpreting statutes, we ignore the superior court’s views—we start from
scratch (“de novo”). State v. Luviano, 255 Ariz. 225, 227 ¶ 7 (2023).

¶12 We start with the text. See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v.
Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142 ¶ 15 (2024). We interpret statutory terms using
their “commonly accepted meaning[],” unless they have a special meaning.
Id. ¶ 16. But focusing on text does not mean interpreting it hyperliterally or
in a vacuum—context matters. Id. ¶ 15; State v. Serrato, ___ Ariz. ___, 568
P.3d 756, 760 ¶¶ 15–16 (2025). Context stems from the statute’s “entire
text” and “related statutes on the same subject.” Planned Parenthood Ariz.,
Inc., 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 15. Context matters because statutes should blend
with the broader statutory scheme. See id. We should not, for example,
interpret a subsection limiting the length of “nails” without knowing
whether the broader scheme regulates salons or hardware stores.
Considering context achieves another aim—not rendering any part of a
statute “void or trivial” or absurd. Id.; Serrato, 568 P.3d at 762 ¶ 28.

¶13 If a term or phrase, in context, has an accepted meaning, we
apply it. See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc., 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 16. But parties
rarely agree on meaning in cases requiring statutory interpretation. Still,
party (or even judicial) disagreement does not create ambiguity. Id. at 143
¶ 17. Rather, ambiguity exists when, after reviewing a statute’s text and
that in other statutes on the same subject, we cannot tell which of two (or
more) reasonable meanings applies. Id. If that occurs, we also analyze the
statute’s “historical background, its spirit and purpose, and the effects and
consequences of competing interpretations.” Id. at 142 ¶ 17.

¶14 Huber raises seven issues: (1) whether her claims should have
been tried to a jury; (2) whether the court conducted a trial de novo; (3)
whether she had the burden of proof; (4) whether the court should have
allowed her to counterclaim against the Board; (5) whether the court should

4

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

have required the parties to file new pleadings; (6) whether the court
properly admitted the entire administrative record; and (7) whether the
Civil Rules apply in a trial de novo challenging an administrative decision.
We resolve each issue in that order.

I.

¶15 Starting with the jury trial issue, a party has a right to a jury
“when afforded by a statute or the constitution.” Williams v. King, 248 Ariz.
311, 315 ¶ 15 (App. 2020). Unless a statute says so, “there is no right to a
jury trial on statutory claims” not existing at common law pre-statehood.
In re Estate of Newman, 219 Ariz. 260, 272 ¶ 45 (App. 2008). All agree Huber’s
claim did not exist pre-statehood, so a statute must grant her a jury trial.
Huber maintains § 12-910(C) (“910(C)”) does so.

A.

¶16 Huber’s appeal arises under § 12-910(D) (“910(D)”). One
might ask, then how can 910(C) grant her a jury trial? The answer: 910(C)
says, “[I]f a trial de novo is available under this section, it may be with a
jury[.]” (Emphasis added). The parties agree 910(D) gave Huber a trial de
novo, but they disagree whether 910(C) gave her a jury trial.

¶17 The Board argues it did not. The Board believes the jury trial
referenced therein applies only to appeals under that subsection. In the
Board’s view, because 910(C) expressly provides a jury trial, if the
legislature wanted 910(D) to do so as well, it would have said so in 910(D).
We should not, it says, draw a “technical distinction” between “section”
and “subsection.”

¶18 Section 12-910 governs judicial review in “[a]n action to
review a final administrative decision.” A.R.S. § 12-910(A). Subsection
(D)—which Huber invoked—governs “review of final administrative
decisions of agencies that regulate a profession or occupation” under title
32 and other chapters and articles in title 36. A.R.S. § 12-910(D). When a
party appeals under 910(D), “the trial shall be de novo if trial de novo is
demanded in the notice of appeal or motion of an appellee[.]” A.R.S. § 12-
910(D). The Board is correct that 910(D) says nothing about a jury trial.

¶19 But Huber claims 910(C) grants her a jury trial. That
subsection governs appeals from certain agencies exempt from title 41.
A.R.S. § 12-910(C). But, unlike 910(D), 910(C) grants a jury trial. It
concludes: “On demand of any party, if a trial de novo is available under
this section, it may be with a jury[.]” A.R.S. § 12-910(C) (emphasis added).

5

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

We must decide whether “section” in 910(C) references § 12-910
generally—so Huber could opt for a jury trial—or only 910(C)—so she
could not.

¶20 In 1954, the legislature codified judicial review of agency
decisions in Arizona Code § 4-911. 1954 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 101, § 11 (2d
Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 159); Ariz. Code § 4-911 (1939 & Supp. 1954). But the 1954
law did not use the term “section”; it provided that “[t]rial de novo with a
jury may be had upon the demand of any party.” Ariz. Code § 4-911 (1939
& Supp. 1954).

¶21 Then, in 1955, the legislature adopted the Arizona Revised
Statutes (“Revised Statutes”), publishing them in 1956. The legislature
delegated responsibility for compiling the Revised Statutes to the Arizona
Code Commission (“Commission”). While compiling the Revised Statutes,
the Commission renumbered § 4-911 as A.R.S. § 12-910 and made revisions.
Relevant here, the Commission split § 4-911 in two—subsections (A) and
(B)—and modified the last sentence in (B) to say: “When a trial de novo is
available under the provisions of this section, it may be had with a jury upon
demand of any party.” A.R.S. § 12-910(B) (1956) (emphasis added).

¶22 When interpreting statutes, we use “the original public
meaning understood by those who used and approved them.” Matthews v.
Indus. Comm’n., 254 Ariz. 157, 163 ¶ 29 (2022). Because we interpret statutes
to “mean what they conveyed to reasonable people” when enacted, we
must adopt the public meaning of “section” in 1955. Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 16 (2012)
(“Reading Law”); see also A.R.S. § 1-213.

¶23 But the legislature did not write the term “section.” Instead,
the Commission wrote it when compiling the Arizona Revised Statutes. See
1954 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 43, § 2 (2d Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 87). The legislature
then adopted the Commission’s work and enacted § 12-910 in the Revised
Statutes. See 1955 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 3, § 1 (3d Spec. Sess.) (H.B. 1).

¶24 Luckily, we know what the Commission meant by “section,”
and thus what that term meant to the public in 1955. The Commission
explained the term’s meaning. In a report (“Report”) at the beginning of
the Revised Statutes, the Commission’s Chief Counsel (“Chief Counsel”)
explained that “[a] compound or hyphenated numbering system is used in
the Revised Statutes.” 2 Ariz. Code Comm’n, Arizona Revised Statutes
Annotated at xii (1956); see 1956 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 129, § 2 (2d Reg. Sess.)
(S.B. 50) (directing the publication of prefatory material for the Arizona

6

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

Revised Statutes). Under that system, the numbers left of the hyphen
“represent the number of the title in which the section appears” and the
numbers to the right “indicate the section number.” 2 Ariz. Code Comm’n
at xii. The Report explained that “[w]here appropriate, sections are divided
into subsections, designated by a capital letter: i.e., Subsection A of § 1-
105.” Id. The Commission eventually adopted the Chief Counsel’s Report
and forwarded it to the legislature with the Revised Statutes. Id. at vii.

¶25 Applying the Commission’s explanation, “section” meant
§ 12-910 in its entirety. If the Commission or the legislature had limited jury
trials to appeals under § 12-910(B), it would have used “subsection,” not
“section.” 2 Ariz. Code Comm’n at xii. After all, § 12-910(B) was designated
with a capital letter, making it a subsection. So, in 1955, the term “section”
in § 12-910(B) (now 910(C)) referred to § 12-910 in its entirety.

B.

¶26 Nothing after 1955 changed what “section” meant in 910(C)
(formerly § 12-910(B)). Quite the opposite. Since then, the legislature
amended § 12-910 at least seven times without changing “section” to
“subsection.” See A.R.S. § 12-910 (1980); A.R.S. § 12-910 (1996); A.R.S. § 12-
910 (2000); A.R.S. § 12-910 (2012); A.R.S. § 12-910 (2017); A.R.S. § 12-910
(2018); A.R.S. § 12-910 (2021). What is more, the legislature repeatedly
amended § 12-910 to use “section” and “subsection” as described in the
Report. For example, in 1996, the legislature amended § 12-910(A) so
parties may request an evidentiary hearing “to the extent necessary to make
the determination required by subsection [(F)] of this section.” 1996 Ariz.
Sess. Laws, ch. 102, § 16 (2d Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1056) (emphasis added). And,
in 2018, the legislature added § 12-910(F) (now § 12-910(G)), which starts,
“Notwithstanding subsection [F] of this section.” 2018 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch.
180, § 1 (2d Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2238) (emphasis added). After its many
iterations, § 12-910 now uses “section” four times and “subsection” three
times. See A.R.S. § 12-910(A), (C), (F), (G), (H). By using those two terms
consistently throughout § 12-910, the legislature showed it understands the
difference between “section” and “subsection”—“section” means the
whole statute and “subsection” means parts of it.

¶27 Interpreting “section” to mean “subsection” would give
“section” two different meanings in the same statute. “[S]ection” in § 12-
910(A) refers to § 12-910 in its entirety—§ 12-910(A) uses the phrase
“required by subsection F of this section.” Ditto for “section” in § 12-
910(G)—it uses the phrase “[n]otwithstanding subsection F of this section.”
But the Board reads “section” in 910(C) to mean “subsection.” We usually

7

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

do not give a word two different meanings within one statute. We, instead,
presume that “a word or phrase bears the same meaning throughout a
text.” Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 442 ¶ 60 (2021). We also presume that, if
a statute uses one term in one place and a different term in another, “the
different term denotes a different idea.” Reading Law 170. The Board has
not overcome either presumption.

¶28 Add to this that, when the legislature enacted 910(D) in 2021,
it would have understood “section” in 910(C) as meaning § 12-910 in its
entirety. The legislature uses a Bill Drafting Manual (“Manual”) from the
Arizona Legislative Council. The 2021–2022 Manual explained that “A.R.S.
sections can be divided into the following division units, designated as: A.
Subsection (capital letter followed by a period). 1. Paragraph (Arabic
numeral followed by a period). (a) Subdivision (lowercase letter in
parentheses). (i) Item (lowercase Roman numeral in parentheses).” Ariz.
Legis. Council, The Arizona Legislative Bill Drafting Manual 2021–2022 § 6.7,
at 84. The Manual went on, “In referring to a section of the statutes within
the body of the bill, the word ‘section’ is written out, as ‘section 35-173.” Id.
at 85. But, “[i]f making a reference within a section to another division unit
in that section, use the following style: . . . as provided in subsection A,
paragraph 1 of this section.” Id.

¶29 So the 2021 legislature would have understood that, by
referring to “this section,” and not “this subsection,” 910(C)’s jury-trial
provision applies to any trial de novo available in § 12-910, not just in
910(C). See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc., 257 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 24 (using the
Manual to interpret a statute); see also Tamara Herrera, Getting the Arizona
Courts and Arizona Legislature on the Same (Drafting) Page, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 367,
388 (2015) (“[I]t makes sense for the Court to use the [M]anual as a statutory
interpretation tool.”). With that understanding, the legislature did not
include a jury trial right in 910(D)—because there was no need to do so.
The legislature, instead, granted a trial de novo in 910(D) and, by doing so,
gave those like Huber a jury trial right under the last sentence in 910(C).

C.

¶30 Caselaw also supports Huber. In Canon Sch. District No. 50 v.
W.E.S. Constr. Co. (“Canon”), 177 Ariz. 526 (1994), our supreme court
decided whether “section” means “subsection.” There, a construction
company claimed a school district breached a contract. Id. at 527. The
contract allowed arbitration, which the construction company demanded.
Id. The district sued, arguing § 15-213 invalidated the arbitration provision.
Id. The construction company responded that § 15-213(D) saved the

8

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

arbitration provision. Id. at 528. At that time, § 15-213(D) said, “This section
shall not be construed to void any provision in the contract” providing “for
arbitration[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Like the Board, the district maintained
“this section” referred only to subsection (D), not to all of § 15-213. Id.

¶31 On appeal, we “speculated” that the legislature borrowed
“this section” in § 15-213 from another statute but “inadvertently neglected
to change the words ‘this section’ to ‘this subsection[.]’” Id. at 529. We tried
to fix that mistake ourselves—we interpreted “section” to mean
“subsection.” Id.

¶32 Our supreme court disapproved. The court explained the
“most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language[.]” Id. And,
without “clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary,” the court was
“reluctant to construe the words of a statute to mean something other than
what they plainly state.” Id. The court concluded that “this section”
referred to § 15-213 in its entirety. Id. at 529–30. The court also noted the
legislature used “subsection” elsewhere in § 15-213. Id. at 529. So the
legislature “used the words ‘this section’ in subsections (E) and (F) to refer
to § 15-213 in its entirety.” Id. The court would not “depart from a literal
interpretation of” “this section.” Id. at 530.

¶33 We too will not depart. Instead, “we construe the words ‘this
section’ in [910(C)] to mean precisely what they say,”—“[o]n demand of
any party, if a trial de novo is available under [§ 12-910], it may be with a
jury[.]” Id.

¶34 Because a trial de novo is available under 910(D), Huber could
also opt for a jury trial—and she did exactly that. See Didlo v. Talley, 21 Ariz.
App. 446, 448 (1974) (The superior court cannot deny a trial de novo “once
the elements of § 12-910(B) [(which is now § 12-910(C))] are evident.”). The
superior court erred by not giving Huber a jury trial instead of a bench trial.
We vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial de novo with a jury.
See Brown v. Greer, 16 Ariz. 215, 221 (1914) (granting a new trial when the
court erroneously denied a jury trial); cf. State v. Le Noble, 216 Ariz. 180, 184–
85 ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (“The right to a jury trial affects the framework within
which the trial proceeds[.]” (cleaned up)).

II.

¶35 The parties also dispute what review looks like when a party
demands a trial de novo under 910(D). Huber acknowledges the superior
court said it would hold a trial de novo, but she argues that did not happen.
The Board responds that the court correctly applied A.R.S. § 12-910(F)

9

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

(“910(F)”), “which requires courts to uphold an agency’s factual findings if
substantial evidence supports them even if other evidence before the
agency would have supported a different conclusion.”

¶36 We conclude 910(D) applies, not 910(F). When a party timely
demands a trial de novo, neither the court nor the jury defers to the agency’s
decision—on fact or law or anything else.

A.

¶37 As explained, subsection 910(D) requires a “trial de novo”
when demanded. In a trial de novo, the court does not defer. A trial de
novo, instead, requires a trial anew—as if the administrative decision never
happened. “‘De novo’ literally means ‘a second time.’” Schwab Sales, Inc. v.
GN Constr. Co., 196 Ariz. 33, 35 ¶ 5 (App. 1998). So in “a trial de novo . . . the
case should be tried in all manners as though the superior court were the
court of original jurisdiction.” Duncan v. Mack, 59 Ariz. 36, 40–41 (1942)
(emphasis added); see also Trial De Novo, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.
1957) (defining “trial de novo” as “[a] new trial or retrial had in an appellate
court in which the whole case is gone into as if no trial whatever had been
had[.]”). The court, during a trial de novo, takes evidence on all relevant
issues and “ignore[s] the [agency’s] findings thereon and make[s] its own
independent findings[.]” Duncan, 59 Ariz. at 41; see also id. at 42 (“The trial
court . . . acted within its jurisdiction in taking new evidence and forming
its independent conclusion.”).

¶38 We do not break new ground. Our supreme court has
repeatedly “interpreted ‘trial de novo’ to mean a case to be tried in all
manners as though the superior court were the court of original
jurisdiction.” Horne v. Super. Ct., 89 Ariz. 289, 291 (1961); see also Burris v.
Davis, 46 Ariz. 127, 132 (1935) (when “the defendant is entitled to a trial de
novo” “the case will be heard on both the law and the facts as though it has
originated in the superior court.”); cf. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 77(d) (in compulsory
arbitration appeals, “the proceeding is denominated as an ‘appeal,’ . . . [but]
[t]he arbitrator’s legal rulings and factual findings are not binding on the
court or the parties.”).

B.

¶39 The Board argues that, based on its last sentence, 910(F) still
supplies the framework for review, even in a trial de novo. That sentence
says, “Notwithstanding any other law, this subsection applies in any action
for judicial review of any agency action that is authorized by law.” A.R.S.
§ 12-910(F). There are two ways to read that text. One: it disclaims other

10

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

laws and other subsections in § 12-910—it clears the field. Two: it disclaims
other laws, but not other subsections in § 12-910—it keeps other subsections
intact. We adopt the latter reading.

¶40 That is the most natural way to read the last sentence’s
introductory phrase—“[n]otwithstanding any other law.” See City of
Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., 242 Ariz. 139, 144 ¶ 16 (2017) (The
“introductory phrase, ‘[n]otwithstanding any other statute,’ makes clear
that the statute of repose controls over other, potentially conflicting state
laws.”(emphasis added)). The last sentence does not negate other
subsections in § 12-910 (e.g., 910(D)), it only makes 910(F) control over other
conflicting laws.

¶41 Beyond its last sentence, the rest of 910(F) does not mesh with
a trial de novo—a strong contextual signal 910(F) does not always apply.
See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc., 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 15. Its first sentence
says, “After reviewing the administrative record and supplementing
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the court may affirm,
reverse, modify or vacate and remand the agency action.” A.R.S. § 12-
910(F). But when a court holds a trial de novo, it does not review the
administrative record. It creates a new record and reviews the parties’
evidence anew. See infra ¶ 59. And a trial de novo is not an evidentiary
hearing—it is a trial.

¶42 The rest of 910(F) meshes no better. To say 910(F) is internally
inconsistent is an understatement. Two sentences in, 910(F) says, “The
court shall affirm the agency action unless . . . the agency’s action is contrary
to law, is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious
or is an abuse of discretion.” That sentence in large part—except the
“contrary to law” portion—requires deference to agency decision-making.
See Simms v. Simms, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ 567 P.3d 92, 104 ¶ 43 (App. 2025)
(“Courts have repeatedly referred to substantial evidence review as
deferential.”). The Board tacitly admits this—it argues that reviewing for
substantial evidence requires us to affirm its decision if the evidence cuts
both ways—that is deference. But 910(F)’s third and fourth sentences
require courts, in regulated-party proceedings, to decide legal and factual
questions “without deference to any previous determination” “by the
agency.” A.R.S. § 12-910(F). So the second sentence in 910(F) gives
deference in all proceedings and the third and fourth sentences takes it
away when answering legal or factual questions in regulated-party
proceedings.

11

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

¶43 We attempted in Simms to reconcile this inconsistency. There,
we explained that “in regulated-party proceedings [under 910(F)],
reviewing courts independently review legal and factual questions[.]”
Simms, 567 P.3d at 104 ¶ 41. But courts may still defer to an agency when it
exercises statutorily granted discretion, including by using scientific or
technical expertise. Id. at 108 ¶¶ 56-57, 59-61. After resolving all legal and
factual questions de novo, the court decides “whether its independent
factual and legal conclusions, along with any unchallenged agency
conclusions, provide substantial evidence supporting the agency action.”
Id. at 109 ¶ 62. So 910(F)’s third and fourth sentences are consistent with a
trial de novo, but its second sentence and its overall framework are not.

¶44 We know this because, for at least ninety years, the phrase
“trial de novo” has meant that “the case should be tried in all manners as
though the superior court were the court of original jurisdiction.” Duncan,
59 Ariz. at 40–41 (emphasis added); Burris, 46 Ariz. at 132. Applying 910(F)
in a trial de novo under 910(D) is inconsistent with that meaning. Under
910(F), the court does not act as though it has original jurisdiction. It
reviews the prior agency decision, holds (when requested) an evidentiary
hearing, and, after resolving factual and legal questions de novo,
determines whether the decision provides substantial evidence for the
agency action. Simms, 567 P.3d at 109 ¶ 62. Superimposing that framework
onto 910(D) would nullify its text allowing a trial de novo. Rather than
writing “trial de novo” out of 910(D) (and 910(C)), we interpret 910(F) to
keep each of § 12-910’s subparts intact. See Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz.
566, 568 ¶ 11 (2019) (we “give meaning, if possible, to every word and
provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

¶45 Under our interpretation, 910(F) retains full vitality—it still
applies in most circumstances. After our interpretation, there are only three
exceptions to 910(F)—in subsections (C), (D), and (G). But each applies only
when certain conditions are met. See A.R.S. §§ 12-910(C), (D), (G). In all
other instances, 910(F) applies. So our interpretation hardly makes 910(F)
superfluous. After all, “[l]anguage in a statute is not rendered superfluous
merely because in some contexts that language may not be pertinent.”
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 n.5 (1981).

¶46 Unlike our concurring colleague (see infra ¶ 85), we conclude,
as between 910(D) and (F), (D) is more specific. Again, 910(D) applies to a
subset of agency appeals and only when an eligible party makes a timely
demand. See A.R.S. § 12-910(D). On the other hand, 910(F) is a catchall—it
applies when subsections (C), (D), or (G) do not. A.R.S. § 12-910(F). So our
interpretation treats “the specific provision”—910(D)—“as an exception to

12

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

the general rule”—910(F). See Sholem v. Gass, 248 Ariz. 281, 288, ¶ 28 (2020)
(quoting Reading Law at 183).

¶47 Textualism “does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of
each word in the text.” See Serrato, ___ Ariz. at ___ ¶ 15 (quoting Reading
Law 356). It, instead, uses context to avoid making any statute or subsection
void or absurd. Supra ¶ 12. The Board’s interpretation—that 910(F) always
applies—erases “trial de novo” in 910(D) (and 910(C)) and makes § 12-910
even messier. Our interpretation retains “trial de novo” in 910(D) and does
not make § 12-910 more abstract than it already is. The superior court erred
by applying 910(F) when Huber demanded a trial de novo under 910(D).2

III.

¶48 Huber argues the superior court erred in other ways.

A.

¶49 Huber says the court erred by placing the burden of proof on
her. In its final ruling, the court said Huber had to “show[] that the Board’s
action . . . was contrary to law, unsupported by substantial evidence,
arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Huber is correct that, in
a trial de novo, the Board has the burden to show a licensee committed
unprofessional conduct and should have her license revoked.

¶50 At the administrative hearing, the Board had to show Huber
engaged in unprofessional conduct. See A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C.
R2-19-119. Once Huber requested a trial de novo, the court had to act like
it was “the court of original jurisdiction.” Duncan, 59 Ariz. at 41. So it was
“incumbent upon the [Board] . . . on appeal before the superior court, to
present its case first and bear the burden of proof.” Vazzano v. Super. Ct., 74
Ariz. 369, 372 (1952). Thus, on remand, the Board must show that Huber
committed unprofessional conduct justifying revocation of her license—
and it must present its evidence first.

B.

¶51 Huber next claims the superior court erred in prohibiting her
counterclaims against the Board. We disagree.

2 To be fair, the superior court did not have the benefit of Simms when
it made any of its decisions.

13

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

¶52 Our supreme court has explained that a party’s request for a
trial de novo does not allow the superior court to act as though the case
actually started there—it is still an appeal. See Rojas v. Kimble, 89 Ariz. 276,
279 (1961). Or, as we have put it, characterizing review as “a trial de novo
does have relevance to the scope of review, but it does not change the
essential character of the proceeding as an appeal.” Inspiration Consol.
Copper Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 147 Ariz. 216, 233 (App. 1985) (emphasis
added). Even in a trial de novo, the superior court’s jurisdiction remains
appellate. So “[t]he [s]uperior [c]ourt is limited to the questions properly
raised before the administrative hearing[.]” Madsen v. Fendler, 128 Ariz. 462,
466 (1981). And the court does not have “jurisdiction to hear new causes of
action between new parties[.]” Id.; see also Berry v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 133
Ariz. 325, 326 (1982) (“If the administrative agency has no jurisdiction to
consider a question, the [superior] court has none,” even if it could have
done so under its original jurisdiction.). Thus, the superior court correctly
disallowed Huber’s counterclaims against the Board.

¶53 In a similar vein, Huber raised constitutional issues in the
superior court. Huber, for example, argued the Board violated her
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because “[t]he [s]uperior [c]ourt is limited
to the questions properly raised before the administrative hearing,” Madsen,
128 Ariz. at 466, it must address Huber’s constitutional issues only if the
Board could have addressed them, see McMichal-Gombar v. Phoenix Civ. Serv.
Bd., 256 Ariz. 343, 349 ¶ 22 (2023) (“[A]gencies may apply constitutional
doctrines when resolving claims. An agency, however, can only apply
those doctrines to issues it is authorized to resolve.” (cleaned up)).
Otherwise, to raise issues (constitutional or otherwise) beyond the Board’s
adjudicatory authority, Huber must bring them in an original action.3 See
id. at 351 ¶ 26.

C.

¶54 Third, Huber contends the superior court should have
required new pleadings when the appeal started. We again disagree.

¶55 Ordinarily, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction attaches to the
superior court when a complaint or petition is filed.” Glenn H. v. Hoskins, 244 Ariz. 404, 408 ¶ 11 (App. 2018). But the process for initiating “[a]n
action to review a final administrative decision” is different. That process,

3 We do not address whether Huber’s counterclaims, if brought
separately, could be consolidated with the trial de novo on the Board’s
complaint against her. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

14

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

set out in A.R.S. § 12-904(A), says an action “shall be commenced by filing
a notice of appeal within thirty-five days from the date when a copy of the
decision sought to be reviewed is served upon the party affected.” A.R.S.
§ 12-904(A); see also A.R.S. § 12-907 (“Within twenty days after service of the
notice of appeal,” all appellees “shall file a notice of appearance in response
to the notice of appeal.”). The notice of appeal must “identify the final
administrative decision sought to be reviewed and include a statement of
the issues presented for review.” A.R.S. § 12-904(A). Subsection 12-904(A)
does not describe a different process when a party demands a trial de novo.

¶56 Before 2012, § 12-904(A) required a complaint to start judicial
review. See A.R.S. § 12-904(A) (2011). But that year, the legislature
amended § 12-904(A) to replace the complaint process with a notice of
appeal process. See 2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 322, § 3 (2d Reg. Sess.) (S.B.
1193). Despite later adding a “trial de novo” in § 12-910(D), the legislature
did not change the process to obtain judicial review. See 2021 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 281, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1063).

¶57 This does not mean the superior court cannot allow new
pleadings after a party demands a trial de novo. If the court thinks allowing
new pleadings will help better frame the issues, it may (and should) do so.
See Vazzano, 74 Ariz. at 372 (“[T]he superior court failed to require the
parties (as it might well have done) to frame the issues before proceeding to
trial.” (emphasis added)).

D.

¶58 The parties agree the court erred by admitting the entire
administrative record, including the ALJ and Board decisions, into the trial
record. So do we.

¶59 Subsection 12-910(E) says the record “shall consist of the
record of the administrative proceeding, and the record of any evidentiary
hearing, or the record of the trial de novo.” A.R.S. § 12-910(E) (emphasis
added). Using “or” after the second comma is a tell. By doing so, the statute
groups the administrative record and the record of any evidentiary hearing
together using “and,” but it sets off the “record of the trial de novo” using
a comma and “or.” See A.R.S. § 12-910(E). So the statute identifies two
types of records: (1) the administrative record and the evidence from an
evidentiary hearing, and (2) the record from a trial de novo. The first
category does not apply in a trial de novo under § 12-910(D). Only the
second category applies, and it is composed only of evidence the court
admits during the trial de novo.

15

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

¶60 With that said, the court can admit evidence even if it was also
in the administrative record. The court can do so when the evidence is
otherwise admissible. For example, testimony from an administrative
hearing may be admitted under the rules of evidence. Cf. Hancock v. O’Neil,
253 Ariz. 509, 514 ¶ 20 (2022) (in attorney discipline proceedings
“transcripts and other evidence of collateral proceedings” may be admitted
“as permitted by the rules of evidence”). Similarly, written statements a
licensed party made to an agency may be admitted with proper foundation.
On the other hand, the court should rarely (if ever) admit the ALJ or agency
decision. And, in a trial de novo, the court should never automatically
admit the entire administrative record (unless the parties agree otherwise).

E.

¶61 Lastly, Huber argues the court should have applied the Civil
Rules and allowed additional discovery and summary judgment motions.
The Board does not dispute that the court could have done so; it instead
argues new discovery and summary judgment motions were unnecessary
here. Yet the superior court’s decision was not tied to this case. Rather, the
superior court concluded that “the presumptive levels of discovery
provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure . . . do not apply” and “[m]otions
for summary judgment are not contemplated by the statutes or rules.”

¶62 There is some tension between the Rules of Procedure for
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions (“JRAD”) and § 12-914(B).
JRAD 1 says that “[e]xcept for provided elsewhere in these rules, the [Civil
Rules] do not apply to proceedings held pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-901- to -
914.” Although JRAD 11 explains how to request a trial de novo, no rule in
JRAD says the Civil Rules apply during a trial de novo. Section 12-914(B),
on the other hand, says that “[t]he rules of civil procedure apply” when “the
superior court orders a trial de novo” under § 12-910. But we need not
resolve this tension—the Board concedes the Civil Rules apply in a trial de
novo. But see State v. Brearcliffe, 254 Ariz. 579, 584–85 ¶ 21 (2023).

¶63 Based on that concession, the superior court erred by refusing
discovery and summary judgment motions. Instead, the court should have
allowed the parties to conduct discovery (under Civil Rules 26 through 37)
and seek summary judgment (under Rule 56).

¶64 Because Rule 26 applies, the parties in a trial de novo may
conduct discovery only if it is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26. Depending on
the circumstances, the court may order the parties to exchange full

16

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

disclosure statements under Rule 26.1 or order truncated disclosure
statements like those under Rule 77. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 77(f)(1), (2) (in an
appeal from a compulsory arbitration award, the parties “may serve a ‘List
of Witnesses and Exhibits Intended to be Used at Trial’ that complies with
Rule 26.1.”). And the court may allow the parties the presumptive amount
of discovery under Rule 26.2(f)—or the court may instead allow a greater
or lesser amount. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26(b).

¶65 Although the superior court has wide discretion to manage
discovery, See v. Super. Ct., 144 Ariz. 346, 348 (1985), that discretion is not
unlimited. The Civil Rules, regardless of circumstances, allow some
relevant discovery; the court must heed that requirement in a trial de novo.
See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b). And the court must allow summary judgment
motions. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party may move for summary
judgment[.]”).

¶66 One last point. As explained, there is tension between JRAD
and § 12-914(B) about whether the Civil Rules apply in a trial de novo. And
the current Civil Rules say nothing about discovery or pleading and motion
practice when § 12-914(B) applies. We urge our supreme court to adopt
new rules, or amend the current ones, to eliminate that tension and provide
the bench and bar with guidance on how to proceed when a party requests
a trial de novo under § 12-910. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Civ. P. 77.

IV.

¶67 What does all this mean for Huber’s appeal? To understand,
let’s take one of the Board’s allegations and explain the correct process.

¶68 The Board alleged Huber committed unprofessional conduct
by “[o]ffering, undertaking or agreeing to cure or treat a disease, injury,
ailment or infirmity by a secret means, method, treatment, medicine,
substance, device or instrumentality.” A.R.S. § 32-1501(31)(l). An ALJ
found Huber did not adequately disclose the ingredients in her IVs. The
ALJ also found that “the evidence does not show that the nutrients and the
amounts included in the IVs” “were trade secrets under A.R.S. § 44-401(4).”
According to the ALJ, the Board proved its case and should revoke Huber’s
license.

¶69 The Board “adopt[ed] the ALJ’s Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law” and revoked Huber’s license. Huber appealed to the
superior court and timely demanded a trial de novo with a jury.

17

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Opinion of the Court

¶70 At that point, the court could have ordered (but did not have
to order) the parties to file a complaint and answer, see supra ¶ 57, but it
correctly refused to allow Huber’s counterclaims, see supra ¶ 52. The parties
should have been allowed to conduct discovery and seek summary
judgment (if desired). See supra ¶ 65. If the Board’s claim survived
summary judgment, a jury should have decided Huber’s appeal de novo.
See supra ¶¶ 37-38. Like any other trial, the parties should have created the
trial record by admitting exhibits and offering witness testimony under the
Rules of Evidence. See supra ¶ 60.

¶71 During trial, the parties should have presented evidence
about whether Huber engaged (or not) in “unprofessional conduct” as
defined in § 32-1501(31)(l). Having the burden to prove Huber did so, the
Board should have presented its evidence first. See supra ¶ 50. Huber
should have responded with evidence she did not engage in such conduct
and the Board should have presented rebuttal evidence she did. If any legal
questions arose, the court should have resolved them with no deference to
the Board. After the parties finished, the jury should have resolved whether
the Board proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Huber engaged
in unprofessional conduct without the jury knowing, let alone deferring to,
what the ALJ or Board decided on that question.

¶72 If the jury found Huber engaged in unprofessional conduct,
then it should have decided whether her license should be revoked using
the standard in A.R.S. § 32-1551(H). If yes, then the superior court should
have entered judgment ordering the Board to revoke her license. If no, then
the jury could have imposed any lesser sanction in § 32-1551(H) or no
sanction at all. The court should have proceeded this way in resolving the
Board’s other allegations.

CONCLUSION

¶73 Because the court did not hold a de novo jury trial, we vacate
its order affirming the Board’s decision and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

18

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Weinzweig, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:

¶74 I agree with Sections I, III and IV of the majority opinion, but
I disagree with Section II. I write separately to harmoniously interpret
A.R.S. § 12-910(D) and (F). See Powers v. Isley, 66 Ariz. 94, 100 (1947) (“[A]
statute should be so construed as to render it a consistent and harmonious
whole.”).

I. Section 12-910(F) applies here.

¶75 The majority holds that § 12-910(F) does not apply in this
agency action; only § 12-910(D) does. Op. ¶ 47. I disagree. Subsections (D)
and (F) both apply here. The final sentence of § 12-910(F) says so:

Notwithstanding any other law, this subsection applies in any
action for judicial review of any agency action that is
authorized by law.

¶76 The plain and ordinary meaning of these words direct that
§ 12-910(F) applies to any agency action. Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v.
Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142, ¶ 15 (2024) (“Clear and unequivocal language
determines a statute’s meaning.”); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 69 (2012) (“The
ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of
interpretation.”). The Board is an “agency,” A.R.S. § 12-901(1), and its
revocation of Huber’s license was an “action.” That is uncontested.

¶77 The majority tries to cabin § 12-910(F) with the first four
words of the final sentence, interpreting “notwithstanding any other law”
to mean notwithstanding any other statutes except § 12-910. Op. ¶¶ 39–40.
That interpretation would mean that § 12-910(F) dominates over “all agency
actions” in all other statutes, but is subservient to other subsections in § 12-
910. I am not persuaded. First, the legislature qualified the very next
subsection with a “[n]otwithstanding subsection (F) of this section.” A.R.S.
§ 12-910(G). It knew how to be specific and could have started this sentence
with: “Notwithstanding any other law except § 12-910,”but it did not. See
Indus. Comm’n Lab. Dep’t v. Indus. Comm’n, 253 Ariz. 425, 427–28, ¶ 13 (App.
2022) (“[T]he legislature knows how to craft location-based restrictions,
which appear elsewhere in the same statute.”).

¶78 Second, the majority’s interpretation breaks from our
supreme court’s frequent reminder that Arizona courts must “read[] each

19

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Weinzweig, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
word, phrase, clause, and sentence in such a way to ensure no part of the
statute is void or trivial.” Planned Parenthood, 257 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 15 (emphasis
added). Despite the plain language of § 12-910(F), the majority concludes
it is ineffectual here. Summing up, the plain language of § 12-910(F) says
that it applies in all agency actions, including this one.

II. Section 12-910(F) can be read harmoniously with Section 12-
910(D).

¶79 The majority contends that § 12-910(D) and (F) are
incompatible. Op. ¶ 46. I disagree. The third and fourth sentences of
subsection (F) announce a specific rule in proceedings brought by or against
regulated parties—the superior court must decide all questions of fact and
law anew:

In a proceeding brought by or against the regulated party, the court
shall decide all questions of law, including the interpretation
of a constitutional or statutory provision or a rule adopted by
an agency, without deference to any previous determination
that may have been made on the question by the agency. In a
proceeding brought by or against the regulated party, the court
shall decide all questions of fact without deference to any
previous determination that may have been made on the
question by the agency.

A.R.S. § 12-910(F) (emphasis added).

¶80 The second sentence of subsection (F) announces the general
rule—deference remains in all other proceedings:

The court shall affirm the agency action unless the court
concludes that the agency’s action is contrary to law, is not
supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious or
is an abuse of discretion.

A.R.S. § 12-910(F) (emphasis added).

¶81 This interpretation is supported by an arsenal of canons of
statutory interpretation, including the ordinary meaning canon, the
harmonious canon and the general-specific canon. These canons yield a
plain and simple rule: Deference is required in all administrative
proceedings except for proceedings brought by or against regulated parties.

20

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Weinzweig, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
¶82 Only that interpretation satisfies the harmonious canon
because it forges a harmonious statute, resolving all conflicts and
recognizing all subsections of § 12-910. Baker v. Gardner, 160 Ariz. 98, 101
(1988) (directing Arizona courts to “construe seemingly conflicting statutes
in harmony when possible”); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 180 (“The
imperative of harmony among provisions is more categorical than most
other canons of construction because it is invariably true that intelligent
drafters do not contradict themselves.”).

¶83 The interpretation also creates harmony between the last
sentence of subsection (A) and the promised “evidentiary hearing” in the
first sentence of subsection (F). See Planned Parenthood, 257 Ariz. at 142, ¶
15 (statutes are interpreted “in view of the entire text” (quoting Nicaise v.
Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568, ¶ 11 (2019))). An evidentiary hearing provides
the mechanism for the court to hear the facts, one-half of the promised de
novo review. See A.R.S. § 12-910(A).

¶84 Only that interpretation satisfies the ordinary meaning canon
because it recognizes the plain and ordinary meaning of each word in each
sentence of A.R.S. § 12-910(F). Scalia & Garner, supra, at 69, 174; see Planned
Parenthood, 257 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 15.

¶85 And that interpretation satisfies the general-specific canon
too because the specific provision controls in “a conflict between a general
provision and a specific provision.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 183. The
rationale of this canon is that “the two provisions are not in conflict, but can
exist in harmony.” Id. at 180, 185 (“[T]here can be no justification for
needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if they can be interpreted
harmoniously.”). Applied here, deference is still required in all agency
actions (the general rule) except for proceedings brought by or against
regulated parties (the specific rule), where no deference is permitted.

¶86 To reiterate, deference is still afforded to many agencies
under this interpretation—e.g., Arizona Corporation Commission, Arizona
Board of Executive Clemency and Arizona Industrial Commission. But no
deference is afforded to agencies that regulate a profession or occupation in
actions by or against the professionals they regulate—e.g., Arizona State
Board of Nursing, Arizona Medical Board and the Board here.

III. The majority’s interpretation.

¶87 The majority contends that subsection (F) is “internal[ly]
inconsisten[t]” because the third and fourth sentences prohibit deference
and the second sentence requires it. Op. ¶ 42. But by limiting deference to

21

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Weinzweig, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
actions by or against a regulated party, we mend the tension in subsection
(F). See Powers, 66 Ariz. at 100 (“[A] statute should be so construed as to
render it a consistent and harmonious whole.”). A trial de novo is available
under subsection (D) to review the “final administrative decisions of
agencies that regulate a profession or occupation,” A.R.S. § 12-910(D), and
the superior court (or jury) must not defer to the agency at trial, A.R.S. § 12-
910(F).

¶88 The majority also insists that subsections (D) and (F) cannot
be reconciled under the first sentence of subsection (F) because a trial de
novo is impossible when the superior court “review[s] the administrative
record and supplement[s] evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing.”
Op. ¶ 41; A.R.S. § 12-910(F).

¶89 I respectfully disagree. Our supreme court has described a
trial de novo when, as here, the superior court hears an “appeal[] from an
inferior court or administrative board.” Duncan v. Mack, 59 Ariz. 36, 42
(1942). The court explained that a trial de novo includes the right “to take
new evidence and to ignore the department’s findings, and make its own
independent findings.” Id. at 41. That’s precisely what regulated parties
get under subsection (F): A new trial, unshackled from administrative
deference, with a mechanism to take more evidence.

¶90 The majority also contends that a trial de novo is impossible
under subsection (F) because the first sentence directs the superior court to
“review” the administrative record and requires continued deference under
the recent decision in Simms v. Simms, ___ Ariz. ___, 567 P.3d 92 (2025). Op.
at ¶¶ 41, 43–44. Not so. A directive to review the administrative record
should not be confused with deference; it only directs the superior court to
review the administrative record, which is not inconsistent with a trial de
novo. See Duncan, 59 Ariz. at 41.

¶91 A trial de novo means a new trial—zero deference on facts or
law, Trial De Novo, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), unlike the
deference still afforded to administrative proceedings on issues of
credibility and expertise under Simms. 567 P.3d at 107–08, ¶¶ 54, 58. A trial
de novo starts the action anew; the superior court is untethered from prior
findings of fact and law; allowed to review the administrative record, but
empowered to hear more evidence collected and presented by the parties
at a robust evidentiary hearing. A.R.S. § 12-910(A), (F). As a result, the
superior court hears from the witnesses and assesses their credibility itself;
and nothing prevents the superior court from hearing from the agency’s
scientific and technical experts and assessing the expertise itself.

22

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Weinzweig, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
¶92 The majority also reasons that the general-specific canon
supports its interpretation that only subsection (D) applies here, not
subsection (F), because subsection (D) “applies to a subset of agency
appeals and only when an eligible party makes a timely demand,” and
subsection (F) is a general catch-all provision. Op. ¶ 46; see A.R.S. § 12-
910(D), (F).

¶93 That argument is not persuasive. For starters, the rationale
behind the general-specific canon is that “two provisions are not in conflict,
but can exist in harmony.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 180, 185. As explained
above, subsections (D) and (F) can exist in harmony. By contrast, the
majority wields the general-specific canon to neuter subsection (F) and
create only more conflicts, not resolve them. See id. at 180 (“[T]here can be
no justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if they can be
interpreted harmoniously.”).

¶94 The majority’s reliance on Sholem v. Gass, 248 Ariz. 281 (2020)
is misplaced. There, the supreme court had to choose between two wholly
irreconcilable rules of civil procedure, and it held the specific rule eclipses
the general rule because “the specific provision is treated as an exception to
the general rule.” Id. at 288, ¶ 28 (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 183).
At issue here are partially reconcilable subsections that can be
harmoniously interpreted.

IV. This case.

¶95 Section 12-910 offers no definition for “regulated party,” so
we may look to related statutes to determine its meaning. Planned
Parenthood, 257 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 15 (“[Arizona courts] interpret statutes ‘in
view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the
same subject.’” (quoting Nicaise, 245 Ariz. at 568, ¶ 11)). The related statute
in this case is the enabling statute that created the Arizona State Board of
Nursing. That statute defines a “regulated party” as “any person or entity
that is licensed, certified, registered, recognized or approved pursuant to
this chapter.” A.R.S. § 32-1601(26).

23

HUBER v. ARIZONA NATUROPATHIC
Weinzweig, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
¶96 Huber is a regulated party. She is entitled to a jury trial de
novo at which the Naturopathic Physicians Medical Board receives no
deference on issues of fact or law.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

24