Worker Power v. Glendale

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

WORKER POWER PAC, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.

CITY OF GLENDALE, et al., Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0593 EL
FILED 08-22-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-019995
The Honorable Scott McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Barton Mendez Soto PLLC, Tempe
By James E. Barton II, Jacqueline Mendez Soto, and Daniella Fernandez
Lertzman
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Pierce Coleman PLLC, Scottsdale
By Christina Estes-Werther, Aaron D. Arnson, and Matthew W. Schiumo
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix
By Eric H. Spencer, Derek C. Flint, and Cole M. Craghan
Counsel for Amici Curiae Arizona Lodging and Tourism Association and
the American Hotel and Lodging Association
Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Phoenix
By Michael G. Bailey and Nate Curtisi
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding
Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 The City of Glendale and the Glendale City Clerk appeal the
superior court’s order granting Worker Power PAC and Brendan Walsh’s
application for a preliminary injunction. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2023, Brendan Walsh submitted an initiative on behalf
of Worker Power PAC (collectively, “Worker Power”) for the November
2024 ballot. The initiative, the Hotel and Event Center Minimum Wage and
Wage Protection Act, “add[s] Article VII to Chapter 21 of the Glendale
Municipal Code; relating to minimum wage and wage protection.”
(Capitalization omitted.) The initiative aims “to regulate the minimum
wages and benefits of hotel and event center employees.”

¶3 Section 21-188 of the initiative requires a hotel employer to
provide twice the rate of regular pay to a hotel worker who cleans a space
exceeding a certain square footage, calculated based on factors such as the
number of guest rooms, floors, buildings, and hours worked in a day. That
section also provides that a hotel employer cannot require or allow a hotel
worker to work more than ten hours per day without the worker’s written
consent; the hotel employer must notify the employee in writing that
working more than ten hours is not mandatory.

¶4 Section 21-189 sets a minimum wage for hotel and event
center workers, which will increase annually based on the cost of living
starting in 2025. Section 21-190 requires hotel or event center employers to
distribute service charges paid by customers to the workers who performed
those services. It also prohibits employers from deducting the service
charge distributions from the employee’s hourly compensation.

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¶5 Section 21-196 establishes the Department of Labor
Standards, led by a Director of Labor Standards, to receive employee
complaints and investigate and enforce the initiative’s provisions against
employers. This Section authorizes the Director to promulgate regulations
to further the initiative and requires wage investigators to investigate
suspected violations, communicate with complainants, report violations,
and enforce the provisions under the Director’s supervision.

¶6 Section 21-197 requires hotel and event center employers to
give the City access to pertinent records and authorizes the City to initiate
civil actions against hotel and event center employers. It also requires the
Director to take enforcement action against employers who violate any
initiative section. Section 21-194 provides that a violation of administrative
regulations adopted by the Department to support the initiative’s
provisions violates the initiative. Sections 21-191 and 21-195 provide waiver
opportunities. A collective bargaining agreement may waive sections
21-188 through 21-290, and the Director must waive the initiative
requirement if the employer proves the requirement would impact certain
economic metrics.

¶7 Section 21-192 requires hotel or event center employers to
provide written notice to workers of their rights as outlined in the initiative.
Section 21-193 prohibits employers from retaliating against a hotel or event
center worker for asserting their rights established in the initiative. Section
21-198 creates a private cause of action for hotel and event center workers
against their employers if they are aggrieved by an employer’s violation of
their rights in the initiative.

¶8 The City Clerk rejected the initiative application because it
did “not meet the constitutional requirement for placement on the ballot.”
The City Clerk found that the initiative violated Article 4, Part 1, Section
1(9) of the Arizona Constitution because the measure was not “limited to
one subject.” See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(9) (form and contents of
initiative and referendum petitions).

¶9 Worker Power filed for statutory special action relief seeking
a writ of mandamus to “compel[] the City Clerk to receive and process the
[i]nitiative.” Worker Power also moved for a preliminary injunction
ordering the City Clerk to keep processing the initiative while the action
was pending. Worker Power argued that the City Clerk lacked the authority
to reject the initiative, and the initiative complied with the Arizona
Constitution’s single-subject rule. The City moved to dismiss the statutory
special action complaint. It opposed the preliminary injunction, arguing

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that the initiative did not comply with the single-subject rule or the title
requirement under Article 4, Part 1, Section 1(9) of the Arizona
Constitution.

¶10 After receiving briefing from the parties and amici curiae, the
superior court denied the motion to dismiss, granted the preliminary
injunction application, and ordered the City Clerk to accept and process the
initiative. The court found that the initiative embraces “one general subject”
because it “establishes a minimum wage for hotel and convention center
workers within the City” and “provides mechanisms to enforce the new
wage and to prevent employers from circumventing it.” It also found that
Worker Power showed “a strong probability of succeeding on the merits,”
“a strong possibility of irreparable harm,” “[t]he balance of hardships
favor[ed] Worker Power,” and “Arizona’s public policy strongly favors the
initiative process.”

¶11 The City appealed. Because this is an expedited election
matter, this court held an Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure
(“ARCAP”) 10(g) scheduling conference with the parties and ordered
simultaneous briefing from the City and Worker Power. Amici curiae
agreed to rest on their briefs presented to the superior court.

¶12 We have jurisdiction to review the order granting the
preliminary injunction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b).1

1 The City appealed both the order granting the preliminary
injunction and the denial of its motion to dismiss. But an order denying a
motion to dismiss is not appealable. See Nowell v. Rees, 219 Ariz. 399, 403,
¶ 10 (App. 2008).

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DISCUSSION

¶13 We review the superior court’s order granting a preliminary
injunction for an abuse of discretion. Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, 254
Ariz. 255, 259, ¶ 13 (2022). The superior court abuses its discretion if it
makes a legal error or issues an order unsupported by the record. Id.

¶14 The superior court may issue an injunction to compel positive
action by the enjoined party. See State ex rel. Corbin v. Portland Cement Ass’n,
142 Ariz. 421, 425 (App. 1984); see also McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners
Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 3, 5, ¶¶ 9, 23 (App. 2016). “To grant a preliminary
injunction, the [superior] court must find (1) a strong likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) a possibility of irreparable injury to the requesting party
irremediable without relief; (3) the balance of hardships favors the
requesting party; and (4) public policy favors the injunction.” Shinn, 254
Ariz. at 259, ¶ 14.

¶15 The City argues the superior court erred by granting the
preliminary injunction because the initiative did not comply with the
Arizona Constitution’s single-subject rule or title requirement. Whether the
initiative complied with the Arizona Constitution is a legal question, which
we review de novo. See State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289, ¶ 6 (2007).

¶16 The Arizona Constitution requires every legislative act to
“embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith”—the
single-subject rule. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 13; Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc. v.
State, 252 Ariz. 219, 226, ¶ 25 (2022). And the single subject in the legislative
act “shall be expressed in the title”—the title requirement. Id. The
single-subject rule’s purpose is “to prevent ‘log-rolling,’ or combining
different measures into one bill so that a legislator must approve a
disfavored proposition to secure passage of a favored proposition.”
Hoffman v. Reagan, 245 Ariz. 313, 316, ¶ 14 (2018) (citation omitted). The title
requirement informs the public of the legislation’s subject matter and
prevents surprise. In re Lewkowitz, 70 Ariz. 325, 331-32 (1950); Taylor v.
Frohmiller, 52 Ariz. 211, 215 (1938).

¶17 Until recently, the single-subject rule and the title
requirement did not apply to initiatives. See Ariz. Chamber of Com. & Indus.
v. Kiley, 242 Ariz. 533, 541-42, ¶¶ 33-34 (2017). But as of December 2022,
initiatives “shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected
therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title.” Ariz. Const. art. 4,
pt. 1, § 1(9). The single-subject rule and title requirement for legislative acts
and initiatives are virtually identical. Compare Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1,

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§ 1(9), with Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 13. Thus, following the parties’ lead,
we look to pre-existing caselaw to interpret the single-subject rule and the
title requirement for guidance in this case.

A. The Initiative Complied with the Single-Subject Rule.

¶18 Under the single-subject rule, the initiative should
contemplate “one general subject,” meaning that all the matters in the
initiative “should fall under some one general idea.” See Ariz. Const. art. 4,
pt. 1, § 1(9); see also Hoffman, 245 Ariz. at 316, ¶ 14 (quoting Litchfield
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 79 v. Babbitt, 125 Ariz. 215, 224 (App. 1980)). A
“subject” includes “all matters having a logical or natural connection.” See
Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 252 Ariz. at 227, ¶ 34 (quoting Litchfield, 125 Ariz. at
224). The matters in the initiative should “be so connected with or related
to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of,
or germane to, one general subject.” See id. An initiative would violate the
single-subject rule if it included “dissimilar and discordant subjects that by
no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection
with or relation to each other.” See id. at 227-28, ¶ 34 (quoting Litchfield, 125
Ariz. at 224).

¶19 In Arizona School Boards Association, Inc. v. State, our supreme
court held that a bill “span[ning] approximately thirty distinct subjects”
violated the single-subject rule. 252 Ariz. at 228, ¶¶ 35-37. The bill’s
identified purpose was the State’s budget, but the challenged provisions
were “devoid of any reference or significance to budget procedure.” Id. at
¶ 36. Instead, the bill contemplated “matters ranging from dog racing, the
lottery, voter registration, election integrity, the Governor's emergency
powers, the Board of Trustees’ duties and powers, the definition of
‘newspaper,’ political contributions, management of the state capital
museum, and COVID-19.” Id. at ¶ 35.

¶20 On the other hand, in Hoffman v. Reagan, the supreme court
found no single-subject rule violation when two amendments to the
Citizens Clean Election Act were reasonably related. See 245 Ariz. at 316,
¶ 16. One proposed amendment prohibited the transfer of Clean Elections
funds to political parties, and the other provided that the Clean Elections
Commission’s rulemaking would be subject to oversight by the Governor’s
Regulatory Review Council. Id. at 314-15, 316, ¶¶ 1, 3, 16. It was enough
that both amendments related to the Citizens Clean Election Act. See id. at
316, ¶ 16.

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¶21 The City argues that the initiative’s provisions are unrelated.
The City asserts that the unrelated provisions seek to regulate employee
benefits and working conditions, allow “collective bargaining agreements
to supersede the legislation,” and establish the Department of Labor
Standards.

¶22 The initiative aims to regulate hotel and event center
employees’ minimum wages and benefits. The initiative does not define
“wage” or “benefit,” so we use their ordinary meanings. See Meyer v. State, 246 Ariz. 188, 193-94, ¶¶ 14-16 (App. 2019) (applying the ordinary meaning
to an undefined word in the statute). A “wage” is “[p]ayment for labor or
services,” usually “based on time worked or quantity produced.” Wage,
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). A “benefit” is an “advantage or
privilege something gives” or “the helpful or useful effect something has.”
Benefit, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

¶23 We start with the service charge provisions. The initiative
ensures that service charges are paid to the employees when they perform
the services related to the charge. Thus, the initiative’s requirement has a
logical and natural connection to protecting the employees’ payments for
labor or services performed. See Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 252 Ariz. at 227, ¶ 34.

¶24 We now address the provisions about pay premiums,
workload, and overtime. The initiative’s purpose explains that the wage
premiums connected to cleaning quotas ensure that hotel workers are
adequately compensated when the workloads required in a certain
timeframe are too burdensome. And the overtime provisions prevent
employers from requiring hotel workers to work overtime to circumvent
the wage premiums from increased workloads. These provisions all protect
the employees’ payment for labor or services performed. See Ariz. Sch. Bds.
Ass’n, 252 Ariz. at 227, ¶ 34.

¶25 We disagree with the City that the initiative has “wage
provisions and benefit provisions—two distinctly separate subjects.” Even
though “wages” and “benefits” have different meanings in this context, see
Meyer, 246 Ariz. at 193, ¶ 15, the only “benefits” contemplated in the
initiative are wage protections—employer rules and obligations that
protect employee payments under the proposed scheme.

¶26 For the first time on appeal, the City also challenges the
initiative’s provision authorizing waiver of Sections 21-188, -189, or -190
through a collective bargaining agreement. But the ability to waive
minimum wage requirements or wage protections is logically and naturally

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connected to the workers’ rights to have such protections under the
initiative. See Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 252 Ariz. at 227, ¶ 34; see generally Rental
Housing Ass’n of Washington v. City of Federal Way, 520 P.3d 87, 90-91, 95,
¶¶ 5, 31 (App. 2022) (A city initiative that provided tenant protections and
included “notice requirements and a provision prohibiting waiver of the
ordinance’s protections” did not violate the single-subject rule.).

¶27 The remaining challenged provisions establish oversight and
enforcement of the wage protections, which are also logically and naturally
connected to the protections. See, e.g., Hoffman, 245 Ariz. at 316, ¶ 16. All the
challenged provisions relate to one general subject: protecting hotel and
event center employees’ wages. The initiative does not violate the single-
subject rule.

B. The Initiative Complies with the Title Requirement.

¶28 An initiative’s subject must be “expressed in the [initiative’s]
title.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(9). The title must notify people of the
initiative’s contents, but it “need not be a complete index to its contents.”
Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 252 Ariz. at 226, ¶ 26 (citation omitted). The title should
not be misleading. Dennis v. Jordan, 71 Ariz. 430, 439 (1951); see also White v.
Kaibob Rd. Improvement Dist., 113 Ariz. 209, 211-12 (1976). Each provision in
the initiative should “directly or indirectly relate” to the title’s subject and
either have a natural connection to the subject or be relevant to the subject.
See Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 252 Ariz. at 226, ¶ 26 (citation omitted).

¶29 In Arizona School Boards Association, Inc. v. State, portions of
bills about “COVID-19-related directives[,] an expansion of Attorney
General authority[,] election-related requirements[,] and the formation of a
Senate election committee” violated the title requirement because the bills
were titled as “appropriation,” “budget reconciliation,” and “budget
procedure” provisions but were “devoid of any form of appropriation or
budgetary purpose.” 252 Ariz. at 227, ¶¶ 30-31. Because “the contested
sections contain[ed] substantive legislative measures for which the titles
d[id] not provide notice,” the bill sections were void. Id.

¶30 But our supreme court held that the State Bar Act, an act
“creating a public corporation to be known as the ‘State Bar of Arizona,’”
complied with the title requirement even though it included provisions to
discipline members of the bar and enforce ethical rules. See Lewkowitz, 70
Ariz. at 329-30, 332-33. The court reasoned that provisions relating to
disciplinary action and disbarment of bar members were “germane” to the
idea of an integrated bar, and the title gave sufficient notice that the

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legislation would include “such closely allied, relevant and germane
provisions as those having to do with disciplinary action.” Id. at 331-32.

¶31 The City argues the initiative does not comply with the title
requirement because its provisions go beyond what a voter would
reasonably understand as “minimum wage” and “wage protection.” The
City argues the initiative violates the title requirement because a “reader
would not expect to see provisions related to benefits, collective bargaining,
working conditions, or the establishment of an entire Department of Labor”
based on the initiative’s title.

¶32 Ostensibly, the Hotel and Event Center Minimum Wage and
Wage Protection Act, “an initiative measure . . . relating to minimum wage
and wage protection,” (capitalization omitted) would put the public on
notice that any matter relating to the employees’ minimum wage and the
protection of wages could be addressed in the initiative. See Taylor, 52 Ariz.
at 217 (Court considered a section in the “spirit” of the title “without being
so narrowly technical.”). And as discussed above, the overtime, service
charge, and workload provisions are wage protections. See supra ¶24. These
provisions are not outside the title’s scope.

¶33 The initiative’s establishment of the Department of Labor
Standards and other enforcement mechanisms are also within the scope of
the title because methods of enforcing the wage protections are “germane”
to the wage protections themselves. See Lewkowitz, 70 Ariz. at 331-32; see also
State v. Harold, 74 Ariz. 210, 215 (1952) (It is unnecessary to include the act’s
penalties in the title.); State v. Gastelum, 75 Ariz. 271, 273-74 (1953) (same).
Relatedly, the provision discussing the collective bargaining agreement is
also within the title’s scope because the waiver of the wage protections is
closely related and relevant to the wage protections. See Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n,
252 Ariz. at 226, ¶ 26. Thus, the initiative did not violate the title
requirement.

¶34 Because the initiative complied with the single-subject rule
and the title requirement, we need not address whether the City Clerk could
deny the petition. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by
granting the preliminary injunction application.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

¶35 The City requests fees and costs. We deny the request. See
ARCAP 21(a)(2) (The court may decline to award fees if the claimant fails
to cite authority for the award.). Worker Power is entitled to costs upon
compliance with ARCAP 21 as the prevailing party.

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CONCLUSION

¶36 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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