Farnsworth v. Moore

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

LAUREN MICHELLE FARNSWORTH, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

KEEGAN MOORE, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0596 FC
FILED 03-25-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2017-096843
The Honorable Michael Valenzuela, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Schiefer Law Firm PLC, Mesa
By Spencer Schiefer
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Keegan Moore, Mesa
Respondent/Appellant

FARNSWORTH v. MOORE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Keegan Moore ("Father") appeals the superior court's
judgment enforcing and modifying parenting time. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Lauren Michelle Farnsworth ("Mother") were
divorced in 2018. They share one minor child. The superior court modified
parenting-time orders in March 2021 and October 2023. In October 2023,
the superior court: (1) found that Father had committed domestic violence
against Mother in 2017; (2) prohibited physical discipline of the child; and
(3) ordered that the parties meet at an agreed-on public location to exchange
the child for Father's parenting time every other weekend.

¶3 Mother filed a petition to enforce and modify parenting time
in November 2023, alleging Father had physically restrained the child and
caused bruising.

¶4 In January 2024, Mother moved for emergency temporary
orders, alleging further physical abuse by Father against the child. Mother
requested Father's parenting time be supervised. The superior court issued
an emergency order suspending Father's parenting time and set an
emergency hearing.

¶5 At the emergency hearing in February 2024, Mother testified
that the child returned from Father's home in October 2023 with red marks
and small bruises on his back, arms, shoulders, and ribs. The superior court
admitted photographs of the injuries. Mother testified the child told her
that Father caused the injuries by "pinning" him down. Mother further
testified that in January 2024, the child again had red marks on his shoulder
and back after parenting time with Father. The superior court admitted a
text conversation between the parties in which Father asserted the right to
discipline the child as he saw fit. Father admitted to using a "behavioral
hold" to calm the child after an outburst. Mother contacted police and the

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Department of Child Safety ("DCS"), leading to Father's arrest, though the
charges were later dropped. A DCS case manager testified that she
attended a forensic interview of the child, reviewed the injury photographs,
and that DCS intended to substantiate Mother's abuse report. Father
testified that he viewed his actions as necessary intervention to calm the
child rather than abuse or discipline.

¶6 The superior court issued temporary orders requiring
supervised parenting time for Father to protect the child's physical, mental,
or emotional health. The superior court ordered two supervised visits per
week, up to two hours each, and required Father to complete at least 20
hours of parenting and anger-management classes.

¶7 At the April 2024 evidentiary hearing, Mother testified that
the child fears Father and was afraid Father was going to kill him. 1 The
DCS case manager testified that DCS substantiated the abuse report based
on photographs and the child's statements. Father admitted he had not
attended the required classes nor participated in supervised visits.

¶8 In June 2024, the superior court entered a final judgment
modifying parenting time. The superior court found Mother's testimony
credible regarding the child's fear of Father and concluded that Father used
excessive physical discipline, exceeding his parental authority. The
superior court ordered continued supervised parenting time under A.R.S.
§ 25-403.01(D) and A.R.S. § 25-411. The superior court ordered Father
attend parenting time and anger-management classes and implemented a
graduated parenting-time plan.

¶9 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §
12-2101(A)(1). See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 78(a).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Father's opening brief does not comply with ARCAP 13(a)
because it lacks citations to the record and legal authority. Father also fails
to develop his arguments with law and facts. See In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz.
62, 64–65, ¶ 6 (2013) (stating that arguments are waived if not properly
developed); see also Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009).

1 Father did not provide a transcript of the hearing. We therefore rely
on the superior court's recitation of evidence as documented in its judgment
modifying parenting time. See Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995)
("When a party fails to include [transcripts or other necessary documents],
we assume they would support the court's findings and conclusions.").

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But because the child's best interests are at issue, we attempt to discern and
address Father's arguments despite these deficiencies. See Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102–03, ¶ 18 (2003); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85
(1966).

¶11 We review orders modifying parenting time for an abuse of
discretion. DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2019). The
superior court abuses its discretion when its decision lacks competent
evidentiary support from the record. Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5
(1999).

I. Denial of Motion for Relief from Judgment.

¶12 Father argues the superior court erred in denying his motion
for relief from judgment on voidness grounds.

¶13 In November 2023, Father filed a notice in the superior court
attempting to vacate as void an unspecified child-support order, citing the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Father attached documents he claimed
constituted the judgment he was challenging. The documents included a
"UCC Lien Search" from November 2023 showing "no matches found" for
Father, and a DCS child-support arrearage calculation report dated April
15, 2022. The superior court treated Father's notice as a motion and denied
relief.

¶14 On appeal, Father argues the superior court did not follow
proper procedure in issuing an unspecified child-support-related income
withholding order. However, he fails to identify which specific order he
challenges. At best, the arrearage-calculation report references a superior
court order dated March 12, 2021, and entered pursuant to the parties'
stipulation. But Father's notice of appeal is directed only to the June 2024
judgment modifying parenting time. Even if Father could appeal from the
2021 order entered pursuant to stipulation, Father did not file a timely
notice of appeal from that order, which is a "jurisdictional prerequisite to
appellate review." In re Marriage of Gray, 144 Ariz. 89, 90 (1985). Nor can
we review the denial of a motion for relief from judgment when Father
never specified which underlying order he challenges.

II. Fraudulent Concealment and Extrinsic Fraud Argument.

¶15 Father also asserts that Mother and the DCS case manager
provided false testimony during the evidentiary hearing that the child
suffered injury. He argues that the superior court's judgment is void due

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to fraudulent concealment of a forensic nursing examination ("FNE")
report.

¶16 "[W]e do not reweigh the evidence" on appeal and defer to the
superior court's credibility determinations. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz.
277, 284, ¶ 20 (App. 2019). Further, as noted above, because Father did not
provide a transcript, we assume the missing record supports the superior
court's ruling. ARCAP 11(c)(1)(B) (stating the appellant has the duty to
include the relevant transcript to challenge a judgment on contrary
evidence grounds); Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73 (same).

¶17 Regarding the alleged concealment of the FNE report, the
record contradicts Father's claim that the report was withheld. Father
included the report in his pretrial statement as a listed exhibit, but did not
offer it into evidence at trial. Even if the FNE report concluded there were
no injuries to the child on January 24, 2024, the record includes a separate
medical progress note dated January 22, 2024, in which a certified nurse
practitioner documented the child's statement that Father had injured him
the day prior and noted visible marks. The provider also reported safety
concerns to DCS. Thus, Father has provided no basis on which to vacate
the court's ruling, and has not shown any abuse of discretion in the superior
court's finding that Father used excessive physical discipline.

III. Jurisdiction.

¶18 Father argues the the superior court lacked personal and
subject matter jurisdiction, and that all orders are void due to the absence
of proof of service following Mother's November 8, 2017, dissolution
petition.

¶19 But the record refutes this claim. Father filed an acceptance
of service on the same day the petition was filed. He made appearances,
submitted responses, and filed post-judgment motions. He also affirmed
that his address remained in Maricopa County and did not dispute that the
child was physically present in Arizona.

¶20 Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, the superior court had jurisdiction to make an initial
child-custody determination because Arizona was the "home state" of the
child at the time the proceeding commenced. Gutierrez v. Fox, 242 Ariz. 259,
264, ¶ 19 (App. 2017). Father's conduct and arguments confirm that the
child was domiciled in Arizona, and jurisdiction was proper. Thus, his
argument lacks merit and provides no basis on which to vacate the superior
court's judgment modifying parenting time seven years later.

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IV. State Seal and Clerk's Signature.

¶21 Father challenges the validity of the judgment by asserting
that certain documents in the record (including the summons, complaint,
and an unspecified under-advisement ruling) are void because they lacked
a state seal or clerk's signature.

¶22 Father cites to 28 U.S.C. § 1691, a federal statute governing
federal court documents, to support his claim. This statute does not govern
Arizona state-court procedures. In Arizona, the applicable rules—Arizona
Rule of Family Law Procedure 40(f), and A.R.S. § 41-251—permit deputy
clerk stamps as valid notarial acknowledgments. The superior court
properly rejected this argument.

V. Denial of Jury Trial.

¶23 Father contends that the superior court erred by denying his
jury-trial request. Arizona law explicitly requires legal decision-making
and parenting-time matters to be decided by a judge, not a jury. See A.R.S.
§ 25-407(D) ("The court, without a jury, shall determine questions of law
and fact."). The superior court correctly denied Father's request.

VI. Judicial Bias Argument.

¶24 Father asserts the superior court judge was biased and erred
in denying his disqualification request.

¶25 The superior court judge referred Father's disqualification
request to the Family Department Presiding Judge, who viewed it as a
motion for a change of judge, and denied it. We review the denial of a
request to change judge for an abuse of discretion. Coffee v. Ryan-Touhill,
247 Ariz. 68, 72, ¶ 17 (App. 2019).

¶26 The superior court may grant a motion for a change of judge
if the judge harbors bias or prejudice against a litigant. Ariz. R. Fam. Law
P. 6.1(a); A.R.S. § 12-409(B)(5). The party seeking recusal must prove
prejudice or bias by a preponderance of the evidence because we presume
judges are impartial. Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. at 66, ¶ 14. "[J]udicial rulings
alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion"
absent a showing of "an extrajudicial source of bias or [] deep-seated
favoritism." State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 128, ¶ 40 (2006) (cleaned up).

¶27 On appeal, Father cites the judge's past employment with
DCS, denial of a jury trial, and rulings as evidence of judicial bias. But

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Father does not argue or point to any evidence that the judge had any
involvement with the parties or the child while working with DCS. And,
as noted supra ¶ 23, Father had no right to a jury trial, so the judge's denial
of that request does not provide a basis for a change of judge. Father points
to no extrajudicial source of bias or favoritism. Father's unsupported and
generalized allegations fail to meet his burden to prove bias or prejudice by
a preponderance of the evidence. Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 128, ¶ 37.

VII. Attorney Fees.

¶28 Mother requests attorney fees and costs under A.R.S. § 25-324
and ARCAP 21 for Father's: (1) failure to make any record citations; (2)
"fail[ure] to present any prima facie case or argument that support[s] his
claims on appeal; and (3) unreasonable positions. In the exercise of our
discretion, we award Mother reasonable attorney fees and costs upon her
compliance with ARCAP 21. See A.R.S. § 25-324.

CONCLUSION

¶29 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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