Gipson v. Shinnink

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

NARVETTA GIPSON, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

KEVIN SHINNICK, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0750
FILED 12-08-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2021-004651
The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Narvetta Gipson, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant

Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., Phoenix
By Neal H. Bookspan, Ian M. Fischer
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Rental Renovators, Inc.
 GIPSON v. SHINNICK, et al.
Opinion of the Court

Platt & Westby, P.C., Phoenix
By Peter H. Westby, Andrew Rahtz, Grant W. Davis
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Kevin & Laura Shinnick

OPINION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 In this case arising out of the purchase and repair of a duplex,
plaintiff Narvetta Gipson appeals from orders (1) precluding her, given a
failure to provide proper disclosure, from testifying about prior rent
charged and (2) finding defendants Laura and Kevin Shinnick (the sellers)
and Rental Renovators, Inc. (the repair company) were successful parties in
awarding defendants attorneys’ fees and costs. Gipson has shown no error
in the order precluding her testimony or the award of fees and costs to the
Shinnicks. Because the “net judgment rule” applies to the competing
monetary claims by Gipson and Rental Renovators, and Gipson won on all
of those claims, Gipson was the successful party between those parties for
an award of fees and costs. Moreover, Gipson was entitled to prejudgment
interest from the date of the jury verdict. Accordingly, the court vacates the
award of fees and costs to Rental Renovators, vacates the denial of
prejudgment interest and remands for the superior court to determine
whether to award Gipson fees and costs against Rental Renovators,
including to address the impact of a settlement offer Rental Renovators
made to Gipson.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2019, Gipson purchased a residential rental duplex in
Phoenix from the Shinnicks. The purchase contract required the Shinnicks
to replace the property’s sewer line before the sale closed. The Shinnicks
hired Rental Renovators, an arm of the company that managed the duplex,
to replace the sewer line. Rental Renovators replaced the sewer line,
providing a warranty for the work. In September 2019, the purchase closed,
Gipson took possession of the duplex and the Rental Renovators’ warranty
transferred to Gipson.

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Opinion of the Court

¶3 After taking possession, the sewer line had blockages and
backups. Gipson contacted Rental Renovators to fix the problem. After
working on the sewer line, Rental Renovators told Gipson the work was not
covered by the warranty and invoiced her for the work. Gipson refused to
pay the bill and, when the sewer line failed again, she had others do the
work. Gipson later claimed that Rental Renovators had improperly
replaced the sewer line. She also claimed the sewer line issues prevented
her from renting out the duplex.

¶4 Gipson filed this action for money damages claiming (1)
breach of the real estate purchase contract and negligent misrepresentation
by the Shinnicks and (2) breach of the warranty and negligent
misrepresentation by Rental Renovators. Rental Renovators
counterclaimed, seeking money damages from Gipson for breach of
contract as well as unjust enrichment, based on Gipson’s failure to pay the
bill for the sewer line work it had done.

¶5 The parties later filed competing summary judgment
motions, which were denied. Rental Renovators then moved in limine to
preclude Gipson from testifying about rent she had collected from renters
at the duplex, alleging a failure to timely disclose that testimony. After
briefing and oral argument, the court granted the motion in limine, noting
Gipson “failed to timely and sufficiently disclose anticipated testimony
about rental amounts she allegedly collected from renters at the property.”

¶6 On February 6, 2024, after a five-day trial, the jury found: (1)
for the Shinnicks on Gipson’s claims against them; (2) for Gipson on her
claims against Rental Renovators and (3) for Gipson on Rental Renovators’
counterclaims. Gipson had asked the jury for nearly $180,000 in damages,
representing lost rent of $114,000; $59,925 to replace the sewer line and
$5,000 in other expenses. The jury, however, awarded Gipson no lost rent
or other expenses and awarded her $42,500 in replacement costs against
Rental Renovators.

¶7 Each of the parties sought an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs, claiming they were the successful party. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.)
§§ 12-341.01(A) and -341 (2025).1 The Shinnicks also sought fees and costs
under the purchase contract. After full briefing and oral argument, the court
denied Gipson’s request for prejudgment interest and entered judgments

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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Opinion of the Court

awarding the Shinnicks $120,076 in fees and $6,334 in costs and awarding
Rental Renovators $222,287 in fees and $6,395 in costs.

¶8 This court has jurisdiction over Gipson’s timely appeal under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Precluding Gipson
from Testifying About Rental Amounts She Previously Collected.

¶9 This court “will not disturb a trial court’s rulings on the
exclusion or admission of evidence unless a clear abuse of discretion
appears and prejudice results.” Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 493,
506 (1996) (emphasis added; citation omitted). In reviewing for an abuse of
discretion, the question is “whether a judicial mind, in view of the law and
circumstances, could have made the ruling without exceeding the bounds
of reason.” Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 571 (1985)
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 78 Ariz. 174, 179 (1954)).

¶10 Gipson was allowed to testify at trial to her opinion on the
market value of the rent. What the court precluded Gipson from testifying
about was “rental amounts she allegedly collected from renters at the
property,” given her failure to properly and timely disclose that
information under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 26.1. Gipson argues the
court erred, pointing to her timely disclosures that: (1) tenants moved out
given sanitary issues caused by the sewer line problems; (2) she had
difficulty finding new tenants and (3) she listed a former tenant as a
potential trial witness. She also argues that the rental value was within the
knowledge of both the Shinnicks (former owners) and Rental Renovators
(former managers) of the rental duplex.

¶11 When, as here, a motion in limine seeks to enforce discovery
rules, “it is effectively a request for sanctions under” Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(c) and “must be considered and reviewed using the standards
of Rules 26.1 and 37(c) and the cases that have applied them.” Zimmerman
v. Shakman, 204 Ariz. 231, 235 ¶ 12 (App. 2003). By rule, “[u]nless the court
specifically finds that such failure caused no prejudice or orders otherwise
for good cause, a party who fails to timely disclose information, a witness,
or a document required by Rule 26.1 may not use the information, witness,
or document as evidence at trial . . . .” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (emphasis
added).

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Opinion of the Court

¶12 Gipson’s only timely disclosure regarding lost rent was her
initial disclosure, which estimated $3,240 in lost monthly rent based on (1)
the property listing, which was not offered at trial, and (2) a rental analysis,
which Gipson concedes was inadmissible hearsay. Gipson admitted in her
deposition that she did not know the market value rent, that her opinion on
rent was based solely on the rental analysis and she could not provide
foundation for the rental analysis. Moreover, it was months after the court-
ordered disclosure deadline that she disclosed that her rental value
testimony would also be based on her prior rental income from the
property. None of this shows that Gipson properly and timely disclosed the
prior rental amounts she had received.

¶13 Gipson also argues that her failure to disclose was not
prejudicial, as the information about the prior rental amounts she received
was known to the defendants, and there was good cause for any failure to
disclose. But Gipson failed to raise these arguments with the superior court,
meaning they are waived. See Odom v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 216 Ariz. 530,
535 ¶ 18 (App. 2007). Gipson also suggests a “culprit hearing” was required.
See Est. of Brady v. Tempe Life Care Vill., Inc., 254 Ariz. 122, 127 ¶ 20 n.3 (App.
2022) (a “culprit hearing” is “to determine the responsibility of a party, a
party’s attorney or both for disclosure violations”). Gipson, however, never
requested such a hearing and does not develop the argument on appeal,
meaning it is also waived. See Odom, 216 Ariz. at 535 ¶ 18; MacMillan v.
Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591 ¶ 33 (App. 2011). On this record, Gipson has not
shown that the superior court erred in excluding her testimony regarding
previously collected rent.

II. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs in Superior Court.

¶14 The court awarded fees and costs against Gipson and in favor
of defendants, awarding the Shinnicks more than $125,000 and awarding
Rental Renovators nearly $230,000. Gipson challenges those awards,
arguing that she was the “successful party” and the amounts awarded
“‘exceed the bounds of reason.’”

¶15 In general, a party seeking to shift fees typically has the
burden to: (1) show eligibility for fee shifting; (2) convince the court to
exercise discretion it has to award the party any fees and (3) demonstrate
the fees requested are reasonable and should be awarded. The first
requirement — whether a party is eligible for fee shifting — turns on the
application of law, which this court reviews de novo. Nolan v. Starlight Pines
Homeowners Ass’n, 216 Ariz. 482, 490 ¶ 34 (App. 2007). The second and third
requirements are discretionary, which this court reviews for an abuse of

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discretion. See Sanborn v. Brooker & Wake Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 178 Ariz. 425, 430
(App. 1994) (“who is the successful party for purposes of awarding
attorneys’ fees is within the sole discretion of the trial court”); Warner, 143
Ariz. at 570 (listing factors “to assist the trial judge in determining whether
attorney’s fees should be granted” under A.R.S. § 12-341.01). This court
views the facts in a light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s
ruling. Rowland v. Great States Ins. Co., 199 Ariz. 577, 587 ¶ 31 (App. 2001)
(citing cases).

A. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Awarding the Shinnicks
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

¶16 Although the Shinnicks sought fees under the purchase
contract and A.R.S. § 12-341.01, the purchase contract does not define
“prevailing party,” thus the court looks to the definition of “successful
party” in A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). See Am. Power Prods., Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc.,
242 Ariz. 364, 368 ¶ 15 (2017) (citing cases). Gipson argues the superior court
erred in finding the Shinnicks were the successful parties. The record shows
otherwise.

¶17 For the first requirement (a showing of eligibility for fee
shifting), Gipson raised two claims against the Shinnicks, and the jury
found for the Shinnicks on both of those claims. Moreover, there is no doubt
that Gipson’s negligent misrepresentation claim against the Shinnicks arose
out of the purchase contract. On these facts, the superior court properly
found the Shinnicks were the successful parties eligible for fee shifting.

¶18 For the second and third requirements, Gipson argues that the
approximately $120,000 in fees awarded to the Shinnicks was excessive.
Relying on the non-exclusive factors identified in Warner, Gipson argues on
appeal that those factors weigh in her favor because: (1) the court denied
Shinnicks’ motion for summary judgment, meaning her claims had merit;
(2) a settlement offer referenced by the Shinnicks was mischaracterized; (3)
the fees would create an extreme hardship to her and chill others who are
similarly situated and (4) the case was novel because it “required resolution
of competing facts and evidence.”

¶19 Gipson failed to raise some of these arguments in superior
court, meaning they are waived. See Odom, 216 Ariz. at 535 ¶ 18. Gipson
preserved, however, her arguments that: (1) the settlement offer was
mischaracterized and (2) the fees would create a hardship. For these
arguments, however, Gipson has shown no error.

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¶20 The settlement offer apparently was jointly made by all
defendants to pay Gipson $10,000, with the Shinnicks only responsible for
$2,000, and apparently was misunderstood by the superior court to be an
offer by the Shinnicks alone. That said, the Shinnicks’ offer to pay Gipson
$2,000 was more than she recovered at trial. And, as directed by Warner,
that settlement offer meant that “[t]he litigation could have been avoided
or settled and the successful party’s efforts were completely superfluous in
achieving the result.” Warner, 143 Ariz. at 570. Thus, the settlement offer
would appear to favor awarding the Shinnicks significant fees. Moreover,
other than stating that she had not been able to rent the property, Gipson
made no hardship showing and has shown no error in applying Warner
when addressing hardship. Id. (noting “[a]ssessing fees against the
unsuccessful party would cause an extreme hardship” is a “useful” factor
in addressing a fee request). The record presented provides a basis upon
which the superior court could award significant fees to the Shinnicks. Id.
at 571.

¶21 Although noting in passing concern about an award of “travel
expenses” in the costs awarded to the Shinnicks, Gipson failed to develop
the issue in her opening brief, meaning it is waived. See MacMillan, 226 Ariz.
at 591 ¶ 33 (“Merely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief
is insufficient.”). And her more robust attempt to develop the argument in
her reply on appeal comes too late. See Dawson v. Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84,
111 ¶ 91 (App. 2007) (“We will not consider arguments made for the first
time in a reply brief.”). On this record, Gipson has shown no error in the
superior court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the Shinnicks.

B. The Superior Court Erred in Awarding Rental Renovators
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

¶22 Gipson argues the superior court erred in awarding fees and
costs to Rental Renovators, arguing that she was the “successful party”
entitled to a fee award. That argument implicates the first requirement —
the appropriate legal standard — an issue of law this court reviews de novo.
Nolan, 216 Ariz. at 490 ¶ 34.

¶23 The parties concede the superior court did not state the
standard it used in finding Rental Renovators was the successful party.
They also agree that there are three possible tests the superior court may
have applied: (1) the “net judgment rule,” (2) the “totality of the litigation”
test or (3) the “percentage of success” test. Although Gipson claims to be
the successful party under all three tests, Rental Renovators concedes that
it did not seek fees under the “net judgment rule,” meaning that “[a]lthough

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Opinion of the Court

the trial court did not specify, it must have adopted” either the “totality of
the litigation” or the “percentage of success” tests.2 The question, then, is
whether the superior court erred in not applying the “net judgment rule.”

¶24 The “net judgment rule” provides that “a party will be
‘successful’ if he obtains judgment for an amount in excess of the setoff or
counterclaim allowed.” Trollope v. Koerner, 21 Ariz. App. 43, 47 (1973)
(citation omitted). Under the “net judgment rule,” “[i]n cases involving
various competing claims, counterclaims and setoffs all tried together, the
successful party is the net winner.” Ayala v. Olaiz, 161 Ariz. 129, 131 (App.
1989); see also Drozda v. McComas, 181 Ariz. 82, 85 (App. 1994) (“The term
‘successful party’ means the party who wins the lawsuit.”).

¶25 To date, there have been no comparable definitions or
explanations for the “totality of the litigation” or “percentage of success”
tests. One unpublished decision, later vacated in part, stated that for the
“totality of the litigation” test, “a court determines the prevailing party
based on all the circumstances of the case, including the multiple claims
made and the parties’ relative success on those claims.” Am. Power Prods.,
Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc., 1 CA-CV 12-0855, 2016 WL 2930686, at *2 ¶ 8 (Ariz.
App. May 19, 2016) (mem. decision), vacated in part, 242 Ariz. 364 (2017).
The “percentage of success” test is mentioned in several cases, but appears
to have been actually applied only once. See Pioneer Roofing Co. v. Mardian
Constr. Co., 152 Ariz. 455, 460 n.1, 467 (App. 1986) (finding use of
“’percentage of success factor’ . . . was not an abuse of discretion,” noting
“the complex and picayune issues resolved by the jury” and “[g]iven the
third-party posture of this litigation and its multiple parties and claims”).
Other cases, however, have stated that the “totality of the litigation” and
“percentage of success” tests may be applied “in a case involving multiple
claims and varied success.” Berry v. 352 E. Va., L.L.C., 228 Ariz. 9, 13-14 ¶ 22
(App. 2011) (citation omitted); accord Murphy Farrell Dev., LLLP v. Sourant,

2 The record suggests that, in awarding fees and costs to Rental Renovators,

the superior court had concerns about Gipson’s approach to the litigation,
noting she “took unreasonable positions throughout the course of
litigation;” “refused Rental Renovator’s reasonable offers of settlement,
which the Court finds unreasonable” and “made a record that infers she
and family members may have fabricated evidence.” Neither Gipson nor
Rental Renovators, however, assert that the court’s fee award in favor of
Rental Renovators was a sanction, as opposed to an award to a successful
party, an approach this court uses on appeal.

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229 Ariz. 124, 134 ¶ 36 (App. 2012); Schwartz v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 166
Ariz. 33, 38 (App. 1990).

¶26 These cases indicate that when, as here, parties have
conflicting claims and counterclaims for money damages arising out of the
same facts (here the contract between Gipson and Rental Renovators), the
“net judgment rule” is the presumptive standard applicable to determine
the successful party. Expressly adopting that standard, the finding that
Rental Renovators was the successful party cannot stand.

¶27 Gipson pressed contract and negligent misrepresentation
claims against Rental Renovators, seeking money damages arising out of
the repair contract. In response, Rental Renovators brought contract and
unjust enrichment counterclaims against Gipson, also seeking money
damages and also arising out of the repair contract. The jury found in
Gipson’s favor on all four claims and, as to damages, awarded her $42,500
for Rental Renovators’ breach of contract. Under the “net judgment rule,”
Gipson is the successful party. See Ayala, 161 Ariz. at 131; accord Ocean West
Contractors, Inc. v. Halec Constr. Co., Inc., 123 Ariz. 470, 473 (1979) (Noting
that, although not always dispositive, the “award of money is, however, an
important item to consider when deciding who, in fact, did prevail. The fact
that a party did not recover the full measure of relief requested does not
mean that he is not the successful party.”) (citation omitted).

¶28 Rental Renovators counters that the “net judgment rule” is
inapplicable because the jury verdict of $42,500 for Gipson was far less than
the nearly $180,000 she requested in damages, meaning it was the
successful party under both the “totality of the litigation” and “percentage
of success” tests. But Rental Renovators misperceives the applicable legal
standard.

¶29 Rental Renovators claims that, under Schwartz, the superior
court is “not bound to the net judgment rule in a multi-party, multi-claim
case and may use other tests to determine the parties’ relative success
concerning the various claims.” Schwartz, however, recognized the primacy
of the “net judgment rule,” citing Trollope v. Koerner, 21 Ariz. App. 43 (1973),
for the proposition “that a party is successful when he obtains a judgment
in excess of any setoff or counterclaim awarded to the other party.” 166
Ariz. at 38. That proposition, as noted above, precisely describes what
happened here.

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¶30 True, Schwartz found that the “net judgment rule” did not
apply when a defendant “successfully defended against” a plaintiff’s claim
without pressing a counterclaim for money damages. Id. (noting “the net
judgment rule articulated in Trollope is not applicable” when a defendant
“did not assert an independent claim and obtain an award”). Such an
exception to the “net judgment rule,” however, does not describe the
competing claims between Gipson and Rental Renovators in this case. And
cases applying Schwartz make clear that, when the “net judgment rule”
applies, the court will not resort to the “percentage of success” or “totality
of the litigation” tests. Indeed, only “when a case ‘involve[s] multiple claims
and varied success’ and the ‘net judgment rule’ is inapplicable,” should the
superior court look to “a ‘percentage of success’ factor or a ‘totality of the
litigation’ rubric to determine which party prevailed.” Sourant, 229 Ariz. at
134 ¶ 36 (emphasis added; citing cases); accord Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235
Ariz. 551, 562 ¶ 40 (App. 2014) (quoting Sourant; stating that “[b]ecause each
side recovered less than the amounts sought, we conclude the net judgment
rule is applicable”) (citation omitted).

¶31 Recognizing the primacy of the “net judgment rule” in cases
like this is consistent with both the statute’s intent to “mitigate the burden
of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense.” A.R.S.
§ 12-341.01(B). It is also consistent with prior interpretation of “successful
party,” which goes beyond the “net judgment rule” only when it cannot
easily or readily be applied. See, e.g., Iverson v. Nava, 248 Ariz. 443, 450 ¶ 24
(App. 2020) (stating, in forcible entry and detainer (FED) cases, “the
summary nature of such cases and that the classic FED remedy is eviction
(not an award of damages), it is unsurprising that the net judgment rule
would have no application to such cases”); Pioneer Roofing Co., 152 Ariz. at
467 (applying “percentage of success” test given the complex nature of the
“third-party posture of this litigation and its multiple parties and claims”);
Watson Constr. Co. v. Amfac Mortg. Corp., 124 Ariz. 570, 585 (App. 1979)
(deviating from “net judgment rule” when there were monetary and non-
monetary equitable claims with varied success); Nataros v. Fine Arts Gallery
of Scottsdale, Inc., 126 Ariz. 44, 45, 49 (App. 1980) (applying “totality of the
litigation” test when no damages were awarded in case where defendant
successfully defended plaintiff’s claim but lost on its counterclaims).3

3 Accord Desert Mountain Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 225

Ariz. 194, 212–13 ¶¶ 79–85 (App. 2010) (refusing to apply “totality of the
litigation” test when plaintiff recovered net judgment against defendant),
aff’d, 226 Ariz. 419 (2011); Crowe v. Gierst, 567 P.3d 759, 761 ¶ 4, 763 ¶ 16

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¶32 Here, there is no reason to set aside the “net judgment rule”
and resort to the “percentage of success” or “totality of the litigation” tests.
Gipson and Rental Renovators brought competing contract and related
claims against each other arising out of the same contract and seeking
monetary damages. The claims between Gipson and Rental Renovators are
easily distinguishable from Gipson’s claims against the Shinnicks, again
negating the need to look to a standard other than the “net judgment rule.”
And under the “net judgment rule,” Gipson is the “successful party.”

¶33 For these reasons, the superior court erred in finding Rental
Renovators was the “successful party” under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and
-341.01(A) as to Gipson. Accordingly, the finding that Rental Renovators
was the successful party eligible for an award of fees and costs, and the
resulting award of fees and costs to Rental Renovators, are vacated and this
matter is remanded for the superior court to determine the award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to Gipson. In determining the fees to
be awarded, the court should take into account the impact of the settlement
offer Rental Renovators made to Gipson.

III. Prejudgment Interest.

¶34 Gipson argues that the superior court erred in failing to award
her prejudgment interest on the $42,500 award. Prejudgment interest is
governed by A.R.S. § 44–1201 and “is awarded as a matter of right on a
liquidated claim.” John C. Lincoln Hosp. & Health Corp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 208
Ariz. 532, 544 ¶ 39 (App. 2004). A claim is liquidated if a party provides a
basis for precisely calculating the amount owed. Id. A claim can be
liquidated in a variety of ways, including a pre-filing demand, a claim in a

(App. 2025) (in addressing award of costs in case with “mixed” jury
verdicts, stating that “[a]lthough the net winner in a case involving
competing claims, counterclaims, and setoffs generally qualifies as
successful, the court may instead apply a percentage of success or totality
of the litigation test when the litigants achieved varied success on multiple
claims.”) (citation omitted); Sirrah Enters., LLC v. Wunderlich, 240 Ariz. 163,
169 ¶¶ 16–18 (App. 2016) (affirming use of totality of the litigation test when
parties had varied success on their respective claims), vacated on other
grounds, 242 Ariz. 542 (2017); cf. Lee v. ING Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 240 Ariz. 158,
161 ¶ 10 (App. 2016) (noting, where partial summary judgment precluded
party “from recovering a significant portion of the damages he sought” and
an offer of judgment was accepted obviating a jury trial, “[i]n light of the
totality of the litigation, there is a reasonable basis for the superior court’s”
successful party conclusion).

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pleading, a jury verdict, a superior court order, a judgment or an appellate
court decision or mandate. See, e.g., Metzler v. BCI Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of
Los Angeles, Inc., 230 Ariz. 26, 29 ¶ 10 (App. 2012) (entry of judgment after
reversal on appeal); Alta Vista Plaza, Ltd. v. Insulation Specialists Co., Inc., 186
Ariz. 81, 83 (App. 1995) (demand or pleading); Hall v. Schulte, 172 Ariz. 279,
284–85 (App.1992) (jury verdict); see also John C. Lincoln Hosp., 208 Ariz. at
544 ¶ 39 (“A claim is liquidated if” the party against whom the claim is
made is “provide[d] a basis for precisely calculating the amount[] owed.”)
(citation omitted). Prejudgment interest starts from the date of the demand
for, or award of, a liquidated amount. See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Cendejas, 220 Ariz. 281, 289 ¶ 37 (App. 2009); Alta Vista Plaza, 186 Ariz. at 83.

¶35 The parties’ positions on prejudgment interest range from
Gipson arguing she was entitled to prejudgment interest on $42,500 from
the October 17, 2019 closing on the property, to Rental Renovators arguing
Gipson waived the issue and is not entitled to any prejudgment interest.
Although rejecting Rental Renovators’ waiver argument, at no time before
the jury verdict had Gipson demanded payment for $42,500. In rendering
that verdict on February 6, 2024, however, the jury in this case liquidated
the claim. See Hall, 172 Ariz. at 284.

¶36 Rental Renovators counters that Hall “was wrongly decided
and has been overruled by Arizona’s Legislature.” Rental Renovators
argues that, under Schwartz v. Schwerin, 85 Ariz. 242 (1959), Rental “interest
on unliquidated claims does not accrue until rendition of judgment.”
Schwartz, relied on Ariz. Eastern R. Co. v. Head, 26 Ariz. 259, 262 (1924),
which declared that “interest is added, after the claim is liquidated.” Under
Hall, Schwartz and Head, the verdict for $42,500 liquidated Gipson’s claim
and, by doing so, entitled her to prejudgment interest. See also Hyatt Regency
Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn, 184 Ariz. 120, 138 (App. 1995)
(concluding jury verdict liquidated claim making it entitled to prejudgment
interest). Contrary to Rental Renovators’ argument, Hall was not
“overruled” by the addition of A.R.S. § 44-1201(D)(1) in 2011. That statute
prohibits a court from awarding “[p]rejudgment interest for any
unliquidated damages, future damages, punitive damages or exemplar
damages that are found by the trier of fact.” A.R.S. § 44-1201(D)(1)
(emphasis added). Here, the February 6, 2024 jury verdict for $42,500
liquidated Gipson’s damages.

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¶37 For these reasons, the superior court erred in failing to award
Gipson prejudgment interest on the $42,500 jury verdict starting February
6, 2024.

IV. Attorneys Fees and Costs on Appeal.

A. Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs On Appeal.

¶38 All parties request attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under
A.R.S. §§ 12 -341 and -341.01(A). The Shinnicks also request attorneys’ fees
and costs on appeal as the prevailing party under the real estate purchase
contract.

¶39 Because Gipson represented herself on appeal, she is not
entitled to an award of fees. See Munger Chadwick, P.L.C. v. Farwest Dev. &
Constr. of the Sw., LLC, 235 Ariz. 125, 126–27 ¶ 5 (App. 2014) (citing cases).
Because the Shinnicks are the successful party on appeal against Gipson,
the court awards them reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. See ARCAP 21.

¶40 Because Rental Renovators is not the successful party on
appeal, its request is denied. As the successful party against Rental
Renovators, Gipson is awarded her taxable costs on appeal as to Rental
Renovators. See ARCAP 21.

B. Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Awarded on Appeal.

¶41 The Shinnicks seek an award of $19,089 in attorneys’ fees and
$1,029.60 in taxable costs against Gipson. As the Shinnicks concede, a
significant portion of those amounts ($5,864 in fees and $701.38 in costs)
were incurred in superior court and will not be awarded by this court. That
leaves $13,225 in fees and $328.22 in taxable costs sought by the Shinnicks
on appeal.

¶42 The Shinnicks’ affidavit seeking fees complies with Schweiger
v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 138 Ariz. 183 (App. 1983). The affidavit states that
59 hours were spent on the appeal at hourly rates from $475 for the senior
partner to $165 for paralegal work. The affidavit states that, based on
experience, “fees charged by attorneys in Maricopa County range from
$195.00 to well over $500.00 per hour.” Detailed billing entries are provided,
evidencing the work performed. The corresponding statement of costs
details the components of the $328.22 sought in taxable costs.

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 GIPSON v. SHINNICK, et al.
Opinion of the Court

¶43 In response, Gipson asserts the fees sought are the product of
“exorbitant hourly rates, inefficient case management, and unnecessary,
duplicative, and unwarranted charges.” Gipson, however, provides
nothing to support those objections. Nor do her objections show that the
fees sought by the Shinnicks are not reasonable in light of the work
performed. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, ER 1.5(a). Gipson’s objections to the
costs sought assert that they fall outside of the limited taxable costs allowed
under A.R.S. § 12-331. The information provided shows that $172.12 in costs
requested by the Shinnicks are related to the appeal and are taxable costs
under A.R.S. § 12-331. Based on the foregoing, the court awards the
Shinnicks $13,225 in attorneys’ fees and $172.12 in taxable costs against
Gipson.

¶44 Gipson seeks $3,540.20 in taxable costs against Rental
Renovators, consisting of $458.16 in filing fees with this court and $3,082.04
in transcription costs. Rental Renovators has not objected to that request,
and the time to do so has passed. See ARCAP 21(b)(4). Accordingly, and
because the costs sought fall within the limited taxable costs allowed under
A.R.S. § 12-331, the court awards Gipson $3,540.20 in taxable costs against
Rental Renovators.

CONCLUSION

¶45 The award of Rental Renovators’ attorneys’ fees and costs
against Gipson is vacated. Moreover, Gipson was entitled to prejudgment
interest from the date of the jury verdict. Accordingly, this matter is
remanded for the superior court to determine the award of reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs to Gipson, including a determination on whether
Rental Renovators was the “successful party” from the date of its settlement
offer to Gipson under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). In all other respects, this court
affirms the superior court’s rulings challenged by Gipson on appeal.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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