WALDEN v. MESA UNIFIED

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

RACHEL WALDEN, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

MESA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT #4, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0776
FILED 12-30-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-018263
The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART; REMANDED

COUNSEL

America First Legal Foundation, Washington, D.C.
By James K. Rogers
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Gust Rosenfeld P.L.C., Phoenix
By Charles W. Wirken and Robert D. Haws
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

WALDEN, et al. v. MESA UNIFIED, et al.
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Jane Doe (a pseudonym), a parent of a student enrolled in
Mesa Unified School District #4, colloquially known as Mesa Public Schools
(“MPS”), and Rachel Walden, a member of MPS’s governing board
(“Board”), appeal the superior court’s order dismissing their first amended
complaint (“Complaint”) against MPS and superintendent Andi Fourlis. In
this opinion, we focus primarily on Doe’s declaratory judgment claims
alleging, inter alia, violations of Arizona’s Parents’ Bill of Rights (“PBOR”),
which authorizes parents to sue government entities and officials for
usurping or interfering with fundamental parental rights. See A.R.S.
§ 1-602. Broadly stated, Doe claimed that MPS violated the PBOR and other
statutes by failing to inform her about her child’s sexual and gender identity
issues. We affirm the court’s order dismissing Walden’s claims and
dismissing Fourlis as a defendant, but we vacate the rest of the court’s
order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 MPS hired Fourlis in 2020. As the superintendent, she is
responsible for preparing administrative regulations to implement the
policies established by the Board. Walden was elected to the Board in
November 2022 and took office on January 1, 2023.

¶3 In 1980, to comply with Title IX of the Federal Education
Amendments of 1972, MPS adopted a general policy prohibiting sex-based
discrimination. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a), (c). To ensure “equal access to
. . . school[] education[al] programs and activities,” MPS established
“Guidelines for Support of Transgender and Gender Nonconforming
Students” (“Guidelines”) to protect such students from discrimination and
harassment. One or more versions of the Guidelines have been in place
since at least 2015.

¶4 The Guidelines outline how to “provide support” to “a
student [who is] transgender or gender nonconforming and consistently

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asserts at school a gender identity that is different from the student’s sex
assigned at birth.” The version of the Guidelines in place during the 2022–
23 school year included definitions of relevant terms and explanations of
district policies addressing discrimination, harassment, privacy, and how
to update a student’s name or gender in the electronic student information
system (“Synergy”). MPS also maintained two forms designed to be
completed with the student—a checklist and a support plan—detailing
how school staff could best address a particular student’s needs.

¶5 The 2022–23 support plan included the following notice:
“Parents/guardians will be notified if the student requests changes to
Synergy.” Absent a request for a name or gender change in Synergy, the
support plan does not require parental notification that a student has
completed a support plan. Emphasizing students’ right to privacy, the
support plan mandates that “[s]chool staff shall not disclose information
that may reveal a student’s transgender status or gender nonconforming
presentation to others except as set forth on this form.” Students could
mark whether their gender identity could be shared with various groups,
including “[s]chool leadership/administration,” “[t]eachers and/or other
school staff,” or “[o]pen to all adults and peers.” As of the filing of the
Complaint, “MPS still uses the support plan at all schools.”

¶6 Walden sued MPS and Fourlis (“Defendants,” except as
otherwise noted) in November 2023, alleging the Guidelines violated
multiple statutes, including the PBOR, and the Board had never voted to
adopt the Guidelines. Doe joined as a plaintiff on February 9, 2024. The
lengthy Complaint includes the following allegations.

¶7 In October 2022, Doe learned that her child, a biological
female named Megan (a pseudonym) was using the name Michael (a
pseudonym) at the child’s junior high school. In November, Doe contacted
a teacher to ask about her child’s name. Initially, the teacher declined to
answer and directed Doe to speak with the principal but later confirmed
that Megan “was known as Michael to all teachers and students at the
school.”

¶8 Doe attended a meeting with the school principal on
December 5, 2022, which Doe describes in part as follows:

[T]he principal confirmed that the school knew that Megan
used “Michael” as her chosen name and that the school
allowed and encouraged this. The principal further informed
[Doe] that the reason for the name change was Megan’s

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uncertainty about her sexual and gender identity, that Megan
had asked that she go by the name of “Michael” at school, and
that this request had been conveyed to all of Megan’s
teachers.

...

The principal told [Doe] that when a student went by a
nickname or other name different from her given name,
MPS’s student information system allowed the school to
input the student’s preferred name into [Synergy]. The
principal also informed [Doe] that any such change made to
the student information system would trigger an automatic
alert to the student’s parents and that if the school had
changed Megan’s preferred name to Michael in their
electronic system, [Doe] would have been made aware of the
name change.

The principal admitted that school personnel intentionally
had not changed Megan’s name in [Synergy] to avoid any
notification being sent to [Doe] and that there were no plans
to change Megan’s name in [Synergy]. The principal told
[Doe] that even if [she] had asked to be notified about any
name changes, pronoun changes, or other choices related to a
transgender identity by her child, it was official MPS policy
not to tell parents and that school personnel would not notify
[Doe] about any further developments related to these issues.

¶9 According to Doe, the principal did not further disclose to
Doe “the content of Megan’s discussions with the principal or other school
personnel about gender and sexuality issues.” Doe further alleged she

has been unable to obtain any records or information from the
school that disclose the specific content of the discussions
school personnel had with Megan about gender and
sexuality. The principal and other school personnel appear to
consider information about their discussions with Megan on
gender and sexuality to be confidential, even as to Megan’s
parents. They have treated [Doe] as if they believe she does
not have the right to know this information.

¶10 At the December 2022 meeting, Doe requested “that all school
personnel stop[] using the name ‘Michael’ and instead refer[] to Megan by
her given name.” The principal directed Doe to contact MPS’s general
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counsel if she wished to discuss the matter further. Doe called the general
counsel and left a message but received no return call.

¶11 On February 9, 2023, Doe and Megan’s father attended a
meeting with most of Megan’s teachers to discuss certain educational
services. However, contrary to their earlier demand made to the principal,
Megan’s parents discovered that only one teacher referred to Megan by her
given name, with the rest using the name Michael. Both parents “expressed
their anger and frustration that school personnel had hidden Megan’s in-
school gender transition.”

¶12 Doe also alleged that MPS’s implementation of the Guidelines
regarding Megan was dangerous, harmful, and unlawful for several
reasons, including the following:

[S]chool employees encouraged Megan to lie to her parents
and helped her to do so, which harmed the parent-child
relationship and delayed Megan from receiving needed
mental health counseling. Following the December 5, 2022
meeting with the principal, [Doe] became more completely
aware of Megan’s struggles. Consequently, [Doe] was able to
talk to Megan with love and empathy about these issues and
discuss how to resolve them. Furthermore, this led to Megan
talking to her psychotherapist about these issues as well.

Within a month of [Doe]’s meeting with the principal and
Megan being able to talk to her mother and mental health
counselor, Megan’s issues were completely resolved. Within
a month, [Megan] no longer needed counseling. [Megan] is
now very comfortable presenting herself as a female and
using her given name and is thriving in high school.

If MPS employees had immediately contacted [Doe]—as
required by law—when Megan first expressed concerns
about her sexual and gender identity, she could have had
those important discussions with her mother and her mental
health counselor sooner and avoided many months of
needless suffering. She also would have avoided the
difficulty and hardship of de-transitioning back to presenting
as a female and using the name “Megan” again.

¶13 Walden and Doe (“Plaintiffs,” except as noted) alleged MPS
violated several statutes, including (1) the PBOR, which establishes “[t]he
liberty of parents to direct the upbringing, education, health care and
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mental health of their children” without interference from any
governmental entity, A.R.S. § 1-601(A); (2) the prohibition on public
employees making “[a]ny attempt to encourage or coerce a minor child to
withhold information from the child’s parent[s],” A.R.S. § 1-602(C); (3) the
requirement that schools ensure that parents “will be notified in advance of
and given the opportunity to opt their children in to any instruction,
learning materials or presentations regarding sexuality, in courses other
than formal sex education curricula,” A.R.S. § 15-102(A)(6); and (4) the
prohibition on mental health screening or mental health treatment without
parental consent, A.R.S. § 36-2272(A). Plaintiffs therefore requested, inter
alia, a judgment declaring the Guidelines unlawful.

¶14 Plaintiffs also asked for an injunction and/or writ of
mandamus ordering MPS and Fourlis to (1) revoke the Guidelines, (2)
institute a policy to ensure that school employees do not secretly continue
to implement the Guidelines, (3) abstain from imposing any policies or
procedures about gender or sexual identity unless lawfully approved by
the Board, and (4) contact all parents whose children were affected by the
Guidelines.

¶15 Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Ariz. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). As pertinent here, Defendants asserted that (1) Walden and Doe
lacked standing, (2) Doe’s complaint was untimely, (3) Fourlis was not a
proper defendant, (4) a declaratory judgment was not an available remedy,
and (5) pursuit of relief through a special action was improper. After
briefing and oral argument, the superior court granted MPS’s motion,
finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing “to bring the present claims,” Doe’s
claims were untimely, the Complaint was not a proper special action, and
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for declaratory relief. The court noted it was
not addressing “whether MPS’s practices are lawful or whether immunity
applies.” Walden and Doe timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶16 We review the superior court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss
de novo and assume “the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and
indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts.” Coleman v. City of Mesa,
230 Ariz. 352, 355–56, ¶¶ 7–9 (2012). We also review issues of standing and
mootness de novo as issues of law. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix,
247 Ariz. 269, 279, ¶ 34 (2019).

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¶17 Plaintiffs attached various documents to the Complaint,
including the Guidelines, checklist, support plan, and email
correspondence. MPS’s motion to dismiss included several sections from
its Board’s policies. Because neither party has argued the court erred in
failing to convert this matter to a motion for summary judgment, we
consider these documents in resolving this appeal, viewing them in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6) or (c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to,
and not excluded by, the court, the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56.”).

I. Standing

¶18 Unlike the United States Constitution, “the Arizona
Constitution lacks a ‘case or controversy’ requirement, which is the
foundation of the standing doctrine.” Montenegro v. Fontes, __ Ariz. __, __,
¶ 17, 576 P.3d 692, 697 (2025). Thus, “standing is a prudential consideration
rather than a mandatory prerequisite to suit.” Id. at ¶ 18. But we “exercise
restraint” to ensure that we “refrain from issuing advisory opinions, that
cases be ripe for decision and not moot, and that issues be fully developed
between true adversaries.” Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 251
Ariz. 519, 523, ¶ 12 (2021) (citation modified). “For purposes of determining
standing, we assume that the plaintiffs are correct on the merits, although
that is not a binding or even preliminary determination.” Montenegro, 576
P.3d at 697, ¶ 19 (citation omitted). We also recognize that standing may
exist based on statutory provisions pertinent to the issues in a particular
case. See Welch, 251 Ariz. at 523, ¶ 12 (“Standing may be conferred by a
statute.”); see also Fay v. Fox, 251 Ariz. 537, 541, ¶ 21 (2021) (explaining that
the victim rights statute “expressly and very broadly confers standing upon
a victim to be heard in a matter that is directly traceable to those rights”).

A. Doe’s Standing

¶19 The superior court concluded that Doe lacks standing because
her Complaint “alleges a concern at her child’s prior school that has been
completely resolved” and thus Doe failed to allege a “current case or
controversy.” MPS relies on the superior court’s reasoning, asserting the
case is moot because Doe cannot properly assert claims for declaratory
relief under the PBOR given that her rights were no longer affected when
she joined the action. As explained below, whether Megan’s concerns had
been “completely resolved” when Doe filed the Complaint is not
dispositive because Doe’s standing to sue turns on whether she properly

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alleged claims for relief under the statutes cited in the Complaint, including
the PBOR.

¶20 The PBOR, adopted by the legislature in 2010, provides that
“[t]he liberty of parents to direct the upbringing, education, health care and
mental health of their children is a fundamental right,” and a governmental
entity “shall not infringe on these rights without demonstrating that the
compelling governmental interest as applied to the child involved is of the
highest order, is narrowly tailored and is not otherwise served by a less
restrictive means.” A.R.S. § 1-601(A), (B); 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 307,
§ 1 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1309). As pertinent here, the PBOR mandates that
“[a]ll parental rights are exclusively reserved to a parent of a minor child
without obstruction or interference from” any governmental entity,
including the right to (1) “direct the education of the minor child,” (2)
“access and review all records relating to the minor child,” (3) direct the
child’s “upbringing” and “moral or religious training,” and (4) make
“health care decisions.” A.R.S. § 1-602(A)(1)-(5). In 2022, the legislature
amended § 1-602 to add subsections (E)–(G), which authorize parents to sue
for violations of the PBOR. 2022 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 200, § 1 (2nd Reg.
Sess.) (H.B. 2161) (effective Sep. 24, 2022). Except as limited by subsections
(F) and (G), a governmental entity or official

shall not interfere with or usurp the fundamental right of
parents to direct the upbringing, education, health care and
mental health of their children. A parent may bring suit
against a governmental entity or official . . . based on any
violation of the statutory rights set forth in this chapter or any
other action that interferes with or usurps the fundamental
right of parents to direct the upbringing, education, health
care and mental health of their children.

A.R.S. § 1-602(E) (emphasis added). In any such action, the governmental
entity or official “has the burden of proof to demonstrate both of the
following:

1. That the interference or usurpation is essential to
accomplish a compelling government interest of the highest
order, as long recognized in the history and traditions of this
state in the operation of its regulatory powers.

2. That the method of interference or usurpation used by the
government is narrowly tailored and is not otherwise served
by a less restrictive means.

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A.R.S. § 1-602(F). “If the governmental entity or official is unsuccessful” in
meeting those burdens, “the court shall grant appropriate relief, such as
declaratory or injunctive relief, compensatory damages and attorney fees,
based on the facts of the case and the law as applied to the facts.” A.R.S.
§ 1-602(G).

¶21 The PBOR provides an explicit statutory basis for a parent to
assert a claim against a school district or school official for interfering with
their fundamental parental rights and imposes a substantial obligation on
the governmental entity or official to justify the interference with or
usurpation of those rights. The superior court did not address the
obligation of MPS to justify the alleged interference or usurpation, or
whether that obligation should factor into questions of standing, even
though the PBOR states that a parent may sue for any PBOR violation or
any other action that conflicts with the parents’ fundamental rights. See
A.R.S. § 1-602(D) (“This chapter does not prescribe all rights of parents or
preempt or foreclose claims or remedies in support of parental rights that
are available under the constitution, statutes or common law of this state.
Unless otherwise required by law, the rights of parents of minor children
shall not be limited or denied.”).

¶22 Given the expansive rights afforded to parents under the
PBOR, accepting MPS’s position in a motion to dismiss—that every concern
Doe had has been resolved—would diminish those rights. Pursuit of
judicial remedies under the PBOR cannot be confined to a narrow question
of whether a parent’s concerns about the legal propriety of a specific factual
circumstance have been resolved. If a policy that triggered those concerns
remains in place, the PBOR expressly authorizes a suit to challenge the
lawfulness of the policy.

¶23 Doe also has standing under Arizona’s version of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”), which states that “[a]ny person . . .
whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
. . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal
relations thereunder.” A.R.S. § 12-1832. A court “may refuse to render or
enter a declaratory judgment . . . where such judgment . . . would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.”
A.R.S. § 12-1836. The UDJA is “remedial” and should be “liberally
construed and administered,” A.R.S. § 12-1842, but a plaintiff must have
“an actual or real interest in the matter for determination,” Ariz. Sch. Bds.
Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 252 Ariz. 219, 224, ¶ 16 (2022).

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¶24 Doe alleged statutory violations and other actions that either
interfered with or usurped her parental authority under A.R.S. § 1-602(E).
For example, she claimed that (1) MPS employees at Megan’s school
resisted efforts by Doe to learn details about her child’s education and
followed established procedures designed to prevent notifying parents of
changes to a student’s gender identity, (2) the support plan and checklist,
as used in the 2022–23 school year, contained provisions designed to help a
child evade notifying their parent of changes to their gender identity at
school, supra ¶¶ 3–5, (3) the support plan’s privacy notice barred school
employees from disclosing information about her child without any
exception for parents, and (4) MPS tacitly encouraged or enabled students
to “withhold information” from their parents in violation of A.R.S.
§ 1-602(C). Doe does not have to wait for additional violations of her
fundamental right to parent to file suit. If the Guidelines are unlawful, she
has the right under the PBOR and the UDJA to seek a judicial determination
on whether MPS has interfered with or usurped her parental rights, and
whether court intervention is appropriate to prevent further violations. See
A.R.S. § 1-602(E), (G); cf. Canyon del Rio Invs., L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff, 227
Ariz. 336, 341, ¶ 18 (App. 2011) (“When a justiciable controversy exists, the
[UDJA] allows adjudication of rights before the occurrence of a breach or
injury necessary to sustain a coercive action (one seeking damages or
injunctive relief).”).

¶25 By pleading violations of various provisions of the PBOR,
including “any other action” that interferes with or usurps her fundamental
right to parent, Doe has shown there are justiciable controversies, and the
relief she seeks is not merely advisory. See Montenegro, 576 P.3d at 697,
¶ 18 (finding a clear case or controversy because “the parties here are
adversarial to each other over the issues in the lawsuit and have fully,
vigorously, and capably argued the law”); Samaritan Health Servs. v. City of
Glendale, 148 Ariz. 394, 395 (App. 1986) (stating that a justiciable controversy
exists if there is “an assertion of a right, status or legal relation in which the
plaintiff has a definite interest and a denial of it by the opposing party”); see
also Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 252 Ariz. at 224, ¶ 16 (“[U]nder the [U]DJA, a
plaintiff must show that its rights, status or other legal relations are affected
by a statute, but it need not demonstrate past injury or prejudice so long as
the relief sought is not advisory.” (citation omitted)). And because Megan
is currently enrolled in an MPS school, the issues are not moot. Cf. Welch,
251 Ariz. at 528–30, ¶¶ 34, 39 (explaining that a claim asserting a violation
of open-meeting laws is not moot and remains actionable even after the
relevant entity “ratifies” its action). Thus, the superior court erred by
concluding Doe lacks standing to assert her claims.

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¶26 MPS argues the Complaint was not a proper special action
complaint because Plaintiffs asked the court to order MPS to take
discretionary actions, rather than seek performance of a non-discretionary
act. See Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 68, ¶ 11 (1998). At this point in the
litigation, it is premature to determine what specific types of relief (if any)
Doe may be entitled to if she prevails on the merits of her claims. Instead,
on remand the superior court may address the specific remedies available
to Doe (i.e., declaratory, mandamus, or injunctive relief) after further
development of the record and application of the PBOR. See A.R.S.
§ 1-602(G) (stating that if the government fails to meet its burden of proving
justification for the statute, policy, or practice at issue, the superior court
“shall grant appropriate relief, such as declaratory or injunctive relief”
(emphasis added)); A.R.S. § 12-2021 (providing that a “writ of mandamus
may be issued . . . to compel . . . performance of an act which the law
specially imposes as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station”);
Boruch v. State ex rel. Halikowski, 242 Ariz. 611, 620, ¶ 33 (App. 2017)
(recognizing that whether injunctive relief should have been granted “is a
separate question, which must be addressed on a developed record in the
first instance by the superior court, not this court”).

B. Walden’s Standing

¶27 Walden argues the superior court erred in dismissing her
claims because she has standing as an individual Board member. She
argues she suffered particularized harm because she was denied the right
to vote on whether to adopt the Guidelines, relying on Adams v. Comm’n on
App. Ct. Appointments, 227 Ariz. 128, 131, ¶ 9 (2011). Her reliance on Adams
is misplaced. The government official in that case had an individual right
to make an appointment to a commission, id., not a right to vote alongside
others as part of a group as Walden must do.

¶28 As noted in the Board’s policies, “[i]ndividual [B]oard
members exercise authority over [MPS] affairs only by way of votes taken
at a legal meeting of the Board. An individual board member has authority
only when and to the extent that the Board, by vote, has so delegated such
authority.” Here, Walden disagrees with how Fourlis has implemented the
Board’s nondiscrimination policy through the Guidelines and related
forms, supra ¶¶ 3–5, but as far as the record shows, that implementation
predates Walden’s time on the Board. The remedy she seeks—voting on
the Guidelines as a Board member—is not judicial, but rather the right to
participate in decisions about the superintendent’s continuing employment
or taking action to change MPS’s official policies at Board meetings by
voting on such proposals. Cf. Brewer v. Burns, 222 Ariz. 234, 237, ¶ 12 (2009)

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(“To have standing, a party generally must allege a particularized injury
that would be remediable by judicial decision.”).

¶29 Walden contends the superior court should have granted her
leave to amend her complaint again to address the court’s concerns about
standing. We review a denial of a motion to amend a pleading for an abuse
of discretion. Carranza v. Madrigal, 237 Ariz. 512, 515, ¶ 13 (2015). A motion
to amend a pleading need not be granted if the amendment is futile.
MacCollum v. Perkinson, 185 Ariz. 179, 185 (App. 1996). Noting that Walden
already had the opportunity to amend the complaint after conferring with
MPS and Fourlis, the court determined that “further leave to amend
[would] not cure the deficiencies.” The court did not err in dismissing
Walden’s claim.

II. Timeliness of Doe’s claim

¶30 The superior court found that Doe’s claims were untimely
under A.R.S. § 12-821, which requires “all actions” against public entities or
employees to be filed “within one year after the cause of action accrues and
not afterward.” Determining when a cause of action accrues is usually a
factual question for the jury, Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 316, ¶ 23 (2002),
but “it may be decided as a matter of law if the record shows when the
plaintiff unquestionably [was] aware of the necessary facts underlying [his
or her] cause of action,” Cruz v. City of Tucson, 243 Ariz. 69, 71–72, ¶ 7 (App.
2017) (citation modified).

¶31 Neither party disputes that accrual of Doe’s claims is
governed by A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B), which provides that a cause of action
under § 12-821 “accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has
been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source,
act, event, instrumentality or condition that caused or contributed to the
damage.” See State v. Ariz. Bd. Of Regents, 253 Ariz. 6, 13, ¶ 26 (2022); Dube
v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406, 411, ¶ 7 (App. 2007). Under the PBOR, a court has
the authority to award damages, but Doe has not requested damages. See
A.R.S. § 1-602(G). Thus, it is not entirely clear that § 12-821 applies here.
Cf. W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Evans, 130 Ariz. 333, 335 (App. 1981) (“[T]he
question of whether and when statutes of limitations are applicable to
declaratory relief actions is a less than clear area of the law.”).

¶32 Yet, the legislature’s use of “all” compels the conclusion that
the one-year statute of limitations under § 12-821 is applicable to Doe’s
claims. See Cao v. PFP Dorsey Invs., LLC, 257 Ariz. 109, 115, ¶ 28 (2024)
(“‘All’ means all—not less than all.”); State v. Jones, 246 Ariz. 452, 455, ¶ 9

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(2019) (“The word ‘all,’ one of the most comprehensive words in the English
language, means exactly that.”). We apply a statute’s plain language as
written unless doing so would yield an absurd result. N. Valley Emergency
Specialists, LLC v. Santana, 208 Ariz. 301, 303, ¶ 9 (2004). And Doe makes no
argument that requiring “all” actions against a public entity to commence
within one year of accrual would be absurd.

¶33 Doe first learned Megan was using the name Michael at
school in October 2022. At the December 2022 meeting with the principal,
Doe learned about the school’s actions at issue here, including that the
school “intentionally had not changed Megan’s name in [Synergy] to avoid
any notification being sent to” Doe. At that meeting, Doe requested that
school personnel only refer to her child as Megan. The superior court
considered Doe on notice of her potential injury on that date and thus
considered her February 2024 complaint to be untimely. On de novo
review, we view the record differently.

¶34 Accepting the truth of Doe’s factual allegations, unbeknownst
to her, MPS did not abide by her request, or at the least, inform her it would
not do so. Instead, as Doe discovered at the February 9, 2023 meeting with
most of Megan’s teachers, all but one continued to refer to Doe’s child as
Michael. Ignoring a parent’s express request to refer to a child by his or her
given name, and hiding the issue from the parent, at the very least presents
a legitimate issue of whether MPS violated the broad protections offered to
parents under the PBOR, A.R.S. § 1-602(E) (“any other action”). Failing to
abide by Doe’s wishes was a second violation that triggered a new accrual
date. Because Doe alleges she was unaware of MPS’s concealment until the
February meeting, at this stage of the proceedings we conclude her
Complaint, filed on February 9, 2024, was timely under § 12-821. See
Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 356, ¶ 9.

III. Dismissal of Fourlis

¶35 The Complaint named Fourlis in her official capacity as
superintendent of MPS. A superintendent acts under the supervision of a
school district’s governing board, Batty v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No.
205, 221 Ariz. 592, 595, ¶ 11 (App. 2009), but only possesses authority
specifically granted or lawfully delegated by a school district’s governing
board, Godbey v. Roosevelt Sch. Dist. No. 66 of Maricopa Cnty., 131 Ariz. 13, 19
(App. 1981). Plaintiffs acknowledge that Fourlis “has no independent
authority to implement policies for [MPS],” but she may “issue binding
‘regulations for the administration of [MPS].’” Although Plaintiffs assert

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WALDEN, et al. v. MESA UNIFIED, et al.
Opinion of the Court

that Fourlis was acting beyond the authority granted to her, they did not
assert a claim against her personally.

¶36 At oral argument in this court, counsel for MPS confirmed it
is defending the claims alleging unlawful Guidelines and improper actions,
and counsel for Plaintiffs agreed that the lawsuit may proceed without
Fourlis as a defendant. Thus, a claim against Fourlis in her official capacity
is equivalent to the claim against MPS, and she is considered a redundant
defendant. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff
Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 167 n.14 (1985). The superior court did not err in dismissing Fourlis
from the lawsuit.

CONCLUSION

¶37 We affirm the superior court’s order dismissing Walden’s
claim for lack of standing and Plaintiffs’ claims against Fourlis. We vacate
the order dismissing Doe’s claims and remand for further proceedings.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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