McManus v. McManus

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

MEREDITH CASEY MCMANUS , Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

RICHARD PAUL MCMANUS , Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0787 FC
FILED 08-12-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2022-006844
No. FC2022-053064
The Honorable Patricia Starr, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix
By Marlene A. Pontrelli, Alexandra Crandall, Aurora M. Walker
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

The Valley Law Group PLLC, Phoenix
By Ryan M. Reppucci
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Meredith Casey McManus (“Wife”) appeals the superior
court’s denial of her request for spousal maintenance. Because the
dissolution decree contains ambiguous and conflicting findings of
eligibility under Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) § 25-319(A) and fails to
apply the Spousal Maintenance Guidelines (“Guidelines”)1 as required by
§ 25-319(B), we vacate the maintenance ruling and remand for clarification
and, if necessary, further analysis.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Wife and Richard Paul McManus (“Husband”) married in
2009 and have two children, born in 2010 and 2014. The parties settled the
property issues in their dissolution but went to trial on child-related issues
and spousal maintenance. Wife requested $8,000 a month in spousal
maintenance for sixty months based on her application of the Guidelines.
The only issue on appeal is the denial of Wife’s request for spousal
maintenance.

¶3 The parties moved from New York to Arizona in 2014 to
advance Husband’s career. Husband is a regional vice president at a
financial services firm, earning more than $367,000 a year. Throughout most
of the marriage, Wife stayed home to take care of their two young children.
Wife started working part-time in 2019 and then full-time in 2021 as an
associate at a financial services firm where she still works. She earns $62,000
a year.

¶4 The parties agreed to equally divide their community
investment and retirement accounts and the proceeds from the sale of the
marital home. The record does not show exactly how much each party

1 Available at https://www.azcourts.gov/familylaw/Child-
Support-Family-Law-Information/Spousal-Maintenance-Guidelines.

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received, but Husband testified that they would each receive $700,000 total.
Of that, around $300,000 came from the home sale, and the remaining
$400,000 was a combination of retirement and investment assets.

¶5 After trial, the superior court found that, under a “generous”
view of the evidence, Wife “might” be eligible for spousal maintenance
under A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1) and (4). Nonetheless, without using the
Guidelines to calculate a presumptive award, the court denied spousal
maintenance, concluding that Wife was employed and self-sufficient. The
court denied Wife’s motion to alter or amend this ruling.

¶6 Wife timely appealed from the final, appealable order. We
have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Wife contends the superior court abused its discretion by
denying her request for spousal maintenance. She argues that because she
was eligible for spousal maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A), the court
was required to apply the Guidelines and the calculator to determine
whether she was entitled to a presumptive award. Husband counters that
Wife did not prove eligibility, so the court was not required to apply the
Guidelines.

¶8 We review the court’s spousal maintenance decision for an
abuse of discretion. Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 354 ¶ 9 (App. 2007). We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling and
will affirm if reasonable evidence supports it. Id. However, an abuse of
discretion occurs when the court misapplies the law in reaching a
discretionary decision. Olesen v. Daniel, 251 Ariz. 25, 29 ¶ 14 (App. 2021).

I. The Court Must First Determine Eligibility for Spousal
Maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A).

¶9 The spousal maintenance analysis begins with Section 25-
319(A), which sets out five independent grounds for eligibility. A spouse is
eligible if they establish any one of the following:

1. Lacks sufficient property, including property apportioned
to the spouse, to provide for that spouse’s reasonable needs.

2. Lacks earning ability in the labor market that is adequate to
be self-sufficient.

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3. Is the parent of a child whose age or condition is such that
the parent should not be required to seek employment
outside the home.

4. Has made a significant financial or other contribution to the
education, training, vocational skills, career or earning ability
of the other spouse or has significantly reduced that spouse’s
income or career opportunities for the benefit of the other
spouse.

5. Had a marriage of long duration and is of an age that may
preclude the possibility of gaining employment adequate to
be self-sufficient.

A.R.S. § 25-319(A); see In re Marriage of Cotter, 245 Ariz. 82, 86 ¶ 10 (App.
2018). If a requesting spouse satisfies one of these grounds, she is eligible for
an award of spousal maintenance. Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 86 ¶ 10. If the court
finds the spouse eligible, it must proceed to the second step: determining
entitlement under Section 25-319(B) and the Guidelines § I.D. See id. at 85 ¶
7.

¶10 Here, the superior court’s decree contains ambiguous and
conflicting language, making its eligibility finding unclear. The decree first
states that, “viewed in a generous light, [Wife] might qualify for spousal
maintenance under grounds 1 and 4.” However, it also expresses
skepticism about the sufficiency of the evidence on both grounds.
Regarding Section 25-319(A)(1), the court stated: “Mother did not present
sufficient evidence on this point for the Court to make such a determination
with any accuracy.” As to Section 25-319(A)(4), the court acknowledged
that Wife stayed home and allowed Husband to advance in his career but
concluded, “[Wife] failed to show the extent to which she could have
advanced in her career had she not done so.” Notwithstanding those
reservations, the decree later asserts: “Despite [Wife] establishing the grounds
for an award, the Court finds that no spousal maintenance award should be
granted.” (emphasis added).

¶11 These statements cannot be reconciled. If the court found Wife
ineligible under Section 25-319(A), it properly denied maintenance without
applying the Guidelines. But if the court found her eligible—even by the
thinnest of margins—it was required to calculate a presumptive award and
proceed in accordance with Section 25-319(B) and the Guidelines. See Cotter,
245 Ariz. at 87 ¶ 13. The decree suggests both conclusions, injecting
ambiguity and leaving the legal basis for the denial unclear.

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¶12 Additionally, the court erred by requiring Wife “to show the
extent to which she could have advanced in her career” had she stayed in
the workforce. The statute does not require any showing beyond a
“significant” reduction in the requesting spouse’s income or career
opportunities, or a “significant” contribution to the other spouse’s earning
ability or career. See A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(4). It is reasonable to infer that a gap
in the requesting spouse’s career path negatively affects that spouse’s
income or career potential. The court erred to the extent it implicitly
required Wife to show a quantifiable reduction.

¶13 Because we cannot determine whether the court’s ruling
reflects a proper exercise of discretion or a misapplication of law, we vacate
the denial of spousal maintenance and remand for clarification. If the court
determines on remand that Wife is not eligible, no further analysis is
required.

II. If the Court Finds Eligibility, It Must Apply the Guidelines to
Determine Entitlement.

¶14 Though we must vacate the court’s spousal maintenance
order as explained above, we further address Wife’s arguments regarding
the court’s error in assessing her entitlement without performing the
necessary calculations and analysis under the Guidelines. We do so because
that issue could reasonably present itself again in this case. See In re M.P.,
__ Ariz. __, __ ¶ 29, 2025 WL 1561175 at *7 (Ariz. App. June 3, 2025).

¶15 In 2022, the legislature amended A.R.S. § 25-319 and directed
the supreme court to establish spousal maintenance guidelines. See
Guidelines § I.A. As amended, Section 25-319(B) states that “[t]he amount
of spousal maintenance resulting from the application of the [G]uidelines
shall be the amount of spousal maintenance ordered by the court unless the
court finds in writing that applying the [G]uidelines would be
inappropriate or unjust.”

¶16 Consistent with the statute, Guidelines § I.D. provides that the
court must proceed with the spousal maintenance calculation if it finds a
party is eligible for spousal maintenance. The Guidelines use a calculator to
determine a presumptive amount range “from which the court determines
the appropriate amount.” Guidelines § I.A.

¶17 The court may nevertheless deviate from the presumptive
range or deny an award of spousal maintenance if it determines the amount
resulting from the Guidelines is inappropriate or unjust. Guidelines §§ I.D.,

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V. But to determine whether the presumptive award amount under the
Guidelines is inappropriate or unjust, the court must first apply the
Guidelines and run the calculator. Id. Only with that information in hand
can the court properly consider a deviation and make the necessary
findings to that end. Indeed, the deviation section of the Guidelines requires
the court to make written findings stating why the amount within the range
is inappropriate or unjust, what the amount range would have been under
the Guidelines, and what the amount is after deviating. Guidelines § VI.B.

¶18 Here, assuming that the court found Wife eligible, it skipped
the required second step. It did not apply the Guideline calculator or
determine a presumptive maintenance award. Instead, the court denied
maintenance based on its view that Wife was already self-sufficient and that
the goals of maintenance had already been met. That reasoning may
support a deviation from the presumptive award, but only after the court
performs the calculation and makes the required findings. Guidelines §
VI.B.2.

¶19 In light of this error,2 we vacate the court’s denial of spousal
maintenance and remand for the court to clarify whether Wife has
established her eligibility for spousal maintenance under at least one
ground specified in A.R.S. § 25-319(A). If Wife has failed to establish her
eligibility, then the court must unequivocally state as much in its findings
and its analysis ends there. However, if the court should determine that
Wife has established her eligibility for spousal maintenance under at least
one of the statutory grounds, then the court must first comply with the

2 We also reject Husband’s argument that the Guidelines only
apply where a spouse proves both eligibility and lack of self-sufficiency.
That interpretation improperly merges the eligibility inquiry with the
entitlement analysis. It is also contrary to Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 86 ¶ 10, since
a spouse need only show one factor in Section 25-319(A) to be eligible for
an award. The factors in Section 25-319(A) alone determine eligibility. To
be sure, some of those factors address self-sufficiency, but some account for
other circumstances in which spousal maintenance is appropriate. See
A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(3) and (4). If the legislature intended to add the lack of
self-sufficiency as another requirement for eligibility beyond the Section 25-
319(A) factors, we presume it would have done so when it amended
subsection (B). See Hart v. Hart, 220 Ariz. 183, 187 ¶ 17 (App. 2009)
(“[S]tandard principles of statutory construction require that we do not
judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not
to require.” (citation omitted)).

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Guidelines before deviating. And it must make appropriate further findings
to support its deviation.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

¶20 Husband requests an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324. In light of Husband’s significantly greater
financial resources, we deny his request. Because we are remanding for
further proceedings, we cannot yet determine whether either party is
entitled to costs under A.R.S. § 12-342(A) and instruct the superior court to
award costs on appeal consistent with this statute on remand.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We vacate the court’s denial of spousal maintenance and
remand for further proceedings. On remand, the court must clarify whether
Wife is eligible for maintenance under any of the grounds listed under
Section 25-319(A). If so, it must then determine her entitlement under
Section 25-319(B) by applying the Guidelines and calculating a presumptive
award. If the court finds a deviation is appropriate, it shall issue written
findings consistent with the requirements under the Guidelines. The court
shall also determine the award of costs on appeal.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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