Emeofa v. Emeofa

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In Re the Matter of:

OVIE EMEOFA, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

TEKPEVWE EMEOFA, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0805 FC
FILED 11-10-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2020-096767
The Honorable Charlene D. Jackson, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART;
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART

COUNSEL

Law Offices of Kamille Dean, P.C., Phoenix
By Kamille R. Dean
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Cosmas Onyia, PC, Phoenix
By Cosmas Onyia
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Ovie Emeofa (“Husband”) appeals several rulings in the
decree dissolving his marriage to Tekpevwe Emeofa (“Wife”). For the
reasons stated below we vacate and remand in part to the superior court to
reconsider the disposition of certain community debts and reimbursement
requests. We affirm the past child support order as modified to reflect the
correct time period. In all other respects, we affirm the decree.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties married in 2002 and, at the time of dissolution in
2024, had one minor child. As relevant to this appeal, their marital
community owned the marital residence, several businesses, a commercial
property, and a vacant lot. According to Husband, only one of the
businesses, Serenity Tender Care Services (“Serenity”), was operational.
Husband runs Serenity from the community’s commercial property with
his adult children and other employees. Wife currently works as a realtor.

¶3 The superior court issued temporary orders giving Husband
exclusive use of the marital home and awarding Wife child support of $100
a month and spousal maintenance of $800 a month. The court granted
Wife’s pre-trial request to appoint a federally authorized tax practitioner
(“tax practitioner”) to review the accuracy of Husband’s self-employment
records under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 25-320.02(A).

¶4 After much delay, the superior court held a three-hour trial in
June 2024. The parties and the tax practitioner testified. The court entered
the decree and later awarded $5,000 in attorneys’ fees to Wife. Husband
timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. Section
12-2101(A)(1).

¶5 While this appeal was pending, several things occurred. First,
the parties agreed that the decree unintentionally omitted the community’s
commercial property. As a result, the parties agreed that Husband would
keep the commercial property, refinance it, and pay Wife her half of the

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equity. Husband paid Wife $142,926 for her interest in the commercial
property.

¶6 Second, Wife moved to clarify the reimbursement orders and
debt allocation in the decree. Third, Husband moved to enforce the order
that Wife pay her share of the community debts. Fourth, Wife counter-
petitioned to enforce the order awarding her the marital residence1 and
several items of personal property. Fifth, the superior court signed off on
the parties’ subsequent agreement that Husband would continue paying
the mortgage, refinance the marital residence, and pay Wife one-half of the
equity. According to this agreement, if Husband could not refinance the
marital residence, they would sell it and equally divide the equity. Later,
the parties jointly asked the court to reappoint the real estate commissioner,
suggesting that they intended to sell the home.

¶7 The superior court first ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider Wife’s motion to clarify absent an order staying the appeal and
revesting the court with jurisdiction but later scheduled a hearing on the
competing petitions to enforce. After the hearing, the court clarified its
ruling on the debts and reimbursement issue, explaining that Wife was
responsible for the assigned debts listed in the decree but did not have to
pay them by a certain date because she was presently unable to do so. The
court ordered the marital residence sold because Wife failed to refinance it
as ordered in the decree. The court noted Wife could pay her share of the
debts from the proceeds of that sale.

DISCUSSION

I. Property Allocation

¶8 “The superior court has broad discretion in apportioning
community property and debts to achieve an equitable division, and we
will not disturb its allocation absent an abuse of discretion.” Andrews v.

1 While the competing petitions to enforce were pending, Wife also
filed an emergency petition to appoint a special commissioner to sell the
marital residence because she could not refinance it. In response, Husband
asked to refinance the property and divide the equity after being
reimbursed for the refinance costs and mortgage payments he already
made. The court granted Wife’s motion and appointed a real estate special
commissioner on May 20, 2025. On May 28, 2025, the court signed the
parties’ Rule 69 Agreement that dispensed with the need for the real estate
commissioner. The court then vacated the order of appointment.

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Andrews, 252 Ariz. 415, 419 ¶ 18 (App. 2021); see also A.R.S. § 25-318(A). In
most cases, a substantially equal division is equitable unless there is “a
sound reason to divide the property otherwise.” In re Marriage of Inboden,
223 Ariz. 542, 544 ¶ 6 (App. 2010); see also Toth v. Toth, 190 Ariz. 218, 221
(1997). When making an equitable division, the court “should consider all
factors that bear on the equities of the division[.]” Inboden, 223 Ariz. at 547
¶ 18.

A. Agreement to Resolve the Real Estate Errors

¶9 The decree found that the community owned three real
properties: (1) a “marital residence” on 179th Drive, (2) another “marital
residence” on 173rd Avenue, and (3) a vacant lot. The parties agree that the
173rd Avenue property was Wife’s leased apartment, which the court
incorrectly found to be community property and awarded to Husband. The
decree did not address the community’s commercial property where
Serenity was located. The parties later reached a post-decree agreement to
address these errors. As a result, Husband kept the commercial property
and paid Wife $142,000 for her share of the equity in that property.

¶10 On appeal, Husband argues the erroneous finding that Wife’s
apartment was a community asset affected the overall property allocation
because the court must have attributed some value to the apartment. We
reject this argument for two reasons.

¶11 First, Husband waived this argument by failing to address it
in his opening brief, see In re Marriage of Johnson and Gravino, 231 Ariz. 228,
235 ¶ 26 (App. 2012), or cite evidence to support it, see J.W. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 252 Ariz. 184, 188 ¶ 11 (App. 2021) (“Arguments that are
unsupported by legal authority and adequate citation to the record are
waived.”); see also ARCAP 13(a)(7) (arguments in briefs must be supported
“with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the
portions of the record”).

¶12 Second, and perhaps more significantly, the parties settled the
issue of the omitted property in a post-decree agreement. Wife signed a
warranty deed transferring her interest in the commercial property to
Husband, and in turn, Husband paid Wife $142,000 for her interest in the
property. This is the relief Husband requested at trial, and the parties’ post-
decree resolution renders any argument about the omitted property issue
moot.

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B. Marital Residence

¶13 The decree awarded the marital residence to Wife on the
condition that she refinance the mortgage. If Wife could not refinance by a
certain date, the court ordered the home sold and the equity divided
equally. Husband argues this allocation was inadvertently made because
he was living in the marital residence at the time with several relatives, and
Wife lived with only their minor child. Both parties asked to be awarded
the marital home. Notwithstanding their respective living arrangements,
Husband does not show how the overall allocation, including equalization
payments, was inequitable. See J.W., 252 Ariz. at 188, ¶ 11; ARCAP 13(a)(7).
Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

¶14 Husband also argues that the court should have allowed him
to refinance the mortgage on the marital home if Wife could not. But
Husband waived this argument because he did not request this option at
trial. Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 597 ¶ 23 (App. 2017). Instead, he asked
the court to award him the marital home outright, rather than secondarily
award him the property if Wife was unable to refinance it. Thus, Husband’s
argument is waived.

C. Community Debts and Husband’s Reimbursement Claims

¶15 Husband argues that the court did not equitably allocate the
community debts. At trial, Husband offered a list of community debts and
community expenses he paid during the litigation and wanted reimbursed.
On appeal, he challenges the following specific debts: (1) $42,880 owed to
Degnan Law Group (“DLG”), (2) $3,032 for a Berkshire timeshare, and (3)
four personal loans. In relation to these debts, Husband also sought at trial
reimbursement for, among other things, $10,495 he paid to DLG for
attorneys’ fees, Hilton timeshare payments, and mortgage payments on the
marital residence and the commercial property.

1. Degnan Law Group

¶16 The court allocated to Husband the entire $42,880 DLG
attorneys’ fees debt, which resulted from a lawsuit Husband filed relating
to the community’s commercial property. The DLG invoice showing an
outstanding balance of $42,880 was dated September 2020, which is also
when the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage was filed. Thus, the debt is
presumptively a community obligation, see Hammett v. Hammett, 247 Ariz.
556, 562 ¶ 29 (App. 2019) (“Generally, all liability incurred by either spouse
during a marriage is presumed to be a community obligation.”), which
“may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the debt is

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intended as the separate debt of one of the spouses rather than both[,]”
Schlaefer v. Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 196 Ariz. 336, 339 ¶ 10 (App. 2000).

¶17 By allocating the entire DLG debt to Husband, the court
treated the debt as separate debt without identifying any evidence to rebut
the presumption of a community obligation. Further, even though the court
treated the debt as separate debt, it subsequently contradicted this treatment
by ordering that Wife reimburse Husband for the $10,495 he allegedly paid
to DLG. Because we can discern no reason for this inconsistency, we vacate
and remand for the superior court to reconsider or explain its reasoning.
City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 330 (1985) (holding that when the
trial court identifies “[n]o grounds for its action . . . and none clearly
appear[] from the record, we are not disposed to assume that the trial court
exercised its discretion and denied relief for some proper and permissible
reason.”).

2. Timeshares

¶18 There was scant evidence about the Hilton and Berkshire
timeshare debts or Husband’s request for reimbursement for the Hilton
timeshare. The statements show that the parties incurred both timeshare
debts during the marriage. Wife did not dispute that both timeshares are
community debts, see Hammett, 247 Ariz. at 562 ¶ 29, but Wife claimed that
only Husband used the “timeshares.”

¶19 On appeal, Husband specifically argues that it was
inequitable to award the entire Berkshire timeshare debt to him. But he
argues more generally that the court did not equitably allocate the
“community debts.” As to the Berkshire timeshare, Husband offered a
statement showing annual charges and late fees from 2017 to 2024 totaling
$3,032. The court ordered Husband to pay this entire debt. As to the Hilton
timeshare, Husband listed a debt of $14,896 and a reimbursement claim for
$22,601. He did not explain the difference in these amounts. The court
ordered Wife to pay half of the $22,601 Hilton reimbursement claim and
allocated the entire $14,896 Hilton debt to Husband.

¶20 Even if we assume without deciding that the court properly
credited Wife’s testimony and ordered Husband to pay the entire Berkshire
timeshare based on his exclusive use, the court’s treatment of the timeshare
debts and the reimbursement claims is again inconsistent. Given the sparse
evidence about the timeshares, we cannot determine a reasonable and
equitable basis for these inconsistent orders. Therefore, we vacate the
timeshare orders and remand for reconsideration. Geyler, 144 Ariz. at 330.

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¶21 Given our resolution of these debts and reimbursement
orders, the superior court may exercise its discretion on remand to
reconsider the overall debt allocation and reimbursement claims as
necessary to achieve an equitable result.

3. Personal Loans

¶22 Husband claimed that he took out three unsecured personal
loans from friends and family during the marriage and one after the divorce
petition was served to pay community debts. Over Wife’s objections, the
superior court admitted the promissory notes that Husband offered as
evidence of these debts. Ultimately, the court rejected Husband’s claim that
these were community obligations. The court found the evidence of the
loans was not credible, noting in part that Husband’s prepared loan
documents “were prepared after the fact, were not signed by the parties
and did not include or contain loan or repayment terms.”

¶23 Husband argues the court erred in discrediting the
promissory notes because they lacked the lender’s signature. We need not
address this point because the record supports the court’s additional
finding that the promissory notes were prepared after the dissolution
litigation started and well after the alleged loans were purportedly made.
See Forszt v. Rodriguez, 212 Ariz. 263, 265 ¶ 9 (App. 2006) (“We may affirm
the trial court’s ruling if it is correct for any reason apparent in the record.”).
Thus, the court was within its discretion to reject the promissory notes and
Husband’s testimony as evidence of the loans. “On appeal, we do not
reweigh the evidence but defer to the family court’s determinations of
witness credibility and the weight given to conflicting evidence.” Lehn v.
Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284 ¶ 20 (App. 2019). Thus, we affirm the
allocation of the personal loan debts to Husband.

4. Personal Property

¶24 A temporary order granted Husband exclusive use of the
marital home but allowed Wife to return and retrieve her personal
property. Husband claimed that Wife took all her things from the home
soon after, but Wife testified that Husband moved several of her designer
handbags and accessories so she could not retrieve them that day. The
decree ordered Husband to turn over these items to Wife. Husband claims
he no longer had those items and the court erred in ordering their return to
Wife.

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¶25 The superior court credited Wife’s testimony over Husband’s
about the location of Wife’s personal property. We defer to this credibility
determination and find no error. Id.

5. Reimbursement for Mortgage Payments

¶26 The superior court rejected some of Husband’s
reimbursement requests, finding the business paid over $60,000 of these
expenses, “including but not limited to mortgage payments, utilities,
upkeep and repairs.” The tax practitioner’s report noted that Serenity made
various payments for several non-business expenses, including many
unidentified cash or check transactions. Husband did not challenge this
point on cross-examination or provide evidence to the contrary.

¶27 The court ordered Wife to reimburse Husband for the marital
residence mortgage payments. Conversely, the court declined to order
reimbursement for the commercial property mortgage payments, finding
the business made those payments, not Husband. Husband contends the
superior court erred in finding that the business paid any mortgage
payments. Yet he cites no evidence contradicting this finding. See J.W., 252
Ariz. at 188 ¶ 11; ARCAP 13(a)(7). Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

II. Child Support

A. Current Child Support Obligation

¶28 We review child support awards for an abuse of discretion
and accept the superior court’s findings of fact absent clear error. Engel v.
Landman, 221 Ariz. 504, 510 ¶ 21 (App. 2009).

¶29 The court calculated the current child support order based on
Husband’s monthly income of $21,916.67 ($263,000 annually). It found
Wife’s monthly income was $6,666.67 ($80,000 annually). Husband argues
that the income attributed to him is inaccurate. This argument ignores the
fact that he stipulated in his pretrial statement that he should be attributed
an average income of $263,674 to determine his prospective child support
obligation. Given this trial stipulation, Husband has waived this argument
on appeal. Wolf Corp. v. Louis, 11 Ariz. App. 352, 355 (1970) (“[O]ne who has
stipulated to certain facts is foreclosed from repudiating them on appeal.”).

¶30 Husband also argues, without citing any factual or legal basis,
that the income attributed to Wife is “completely inaccurate and
underestimated.” Because Husband failed to develop this argument, it is
waived. See J.W., 252 Ariz. at 188 ¶ 11.

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B. Past Child Support Order

¶31 Based on the evidence at trial, the court found that the
temporary child support order significantly underestimated Husband’s
income. As a result, the court recalculated the temporary child support
order using Husband’s corrected income figure for the period from
December 1, 2020 through June 30, 2024. But in determining the accurate
past child support, the court miscalculated the number of months. The
relevant period covers 43 months, not 55 as stated in the decree. Therefore,
the arrearage amount is $50 a month for 43 months, totaling $2,150.
Accordingly, we vacate the past child support judgment of $2,805 and
modify it to $2,150. See Cagle v. Carr, 101 Ariz. 225, 228 (1966) (appellate
court may modify a judgment entered for the wrong amount due to a
mathematical error).

III. Spousal Maintenance

¶32 The court found that Wife was eligible for spousal
maintenance and awarded her $1,500 a month for 36 months. We review
the award of spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion. Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 348 ¶ 14 (App. 1998).

¶33 Husband initially challenges the amount and duration of
spousal maintenance awarded, but fails to provide any factual or legal basis
to support his challenge. Thus, this argument is waived. See J.W., 252 Ariz.
at 188 ¶ 11; ARCAP 13(a)(7).

¶34 Husband also challenges the court’s eligibility finding.
Spouses are eligible for spousal maintenance if they satisfy one of the
statutory factors in A.R.S. Section 25-319(A). The superior court found that
Wife lacked sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs. See
A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1). Husband argues this was error because Wife received
the marital home.

¶35 For purposes of determining a spouse’s eligibility for spousal
maintenance under Section 25-319(A)(1), “sufficient property means
property that, standing alone, can provide for a spouse’s reasonable needs
during his or her lifetime.” In re Marriage of Cotter and Podhorez, 245 Ariz. 82,
86 ¶ 10 (App. 2018). According to evidence propounded by Husband at
trial, the parties would each receive $174,408 if the marital residence were
sold and the equity divided equally. Other than the equity in the marital
residence, Wife received $142,000 for her share of the commercial property,
an unspecified amount for her share of a vacant lot, and around $2,800 in
bank deposits. Wife is fifty years old. Based on the expenses shown in

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Wife’s financial affidavit, the court reasonably concluded that the property
was not sufficient to last her lifetime. See id.

¶36 Husband also contends that the court failed to consider that
Wife has an MBA and a certificate in data analysis in addition to her real
estate license. But Husband did not provide evidence of the earning
capacity of an individual with these credentials, so his argument that Wife
“has the ability to make an income with her educational background” is
speculative. Husband also notes—without citing record support—that by
contrast, he does not have a data analysis certificate. But Husband’s earning
ability is not relevant in determining whether Wife is eligible for spousal
maintenance. See id., at 85 ¶ 7 (citing A.R.S. § 25-319(A)).

¶37 In a related point, Husband argues the court “inadvertently”
found Wife’s income was lower because of a depressed real estate market.
But the record supports this finding. Wife testified that the market has been
slow in recent years. Husband cites no evidence to controvert this claim,
other than alleging it is “simply not true.” Thus, we defer to the court’s
resolution of conflicting evidence and witness credibility. Lehn, 246 Ariz. at
284 ¶ 20.

¶38 Husband further objects to the appointment of a tax
practitioner to examine his self-employment income but not Wife’s. At trial,
he did not object to the tax practitioner’s evidence on this basis. Instead,
Husband argued the request was untimely and unnecessary because his
own certified public accountant could provide the relevant information.
Because he did not ask the court to appoint a tax practitioner to examine
Wife’s self-employment income at trial, we find no abuse of discretion. See
Bobrow, 241 Ariz. at 597 ¶ 23 (arguments not raised below are considered
waived).

¶39 According to Husband, the tax practitioner’s report contained
many errors. He rejects the characterization of several expenses as personal
instead of business-related. He challenges the characterization of payroll
and wages and alleges that the report incorrectly attributed loans as
income. Significantly though, Husband did not question the tax practitioner
about these points on cross-examination or cite where in the 250-page
report most of these alleged errors occurred. Thus, Husband waived these
arguments by not making them at trial and by citing no evidence to support
his claims. See id.; J.W., 252 Ariz. at 188 ¶ 11. Thus, the court did not abuse
its discretion by relying on the income information provided by the tax
practitioner.

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IV. Award of Attorneys’ Fees to Wife

¶40 The court awarded $5,000 in attorneys’ fees to Wife, finding a
“substantial disparity of financial resources” and that Husband acted
unreasonably in the litigation. We review the award of attorneys’ fees
under A.R.S. Section 25-324 for an abuse of discretion. Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 494 ¶ 6 (App. 2014).

¶41 Husband erroneously contends the court awarded Wife’s
attorneys’ fees “based solely on income.” Not so. The court also cited
Husband’s unreasonable actions throughout the litigation as further
grounds for the award. For example, Husband’s evasiveness about his
income caused the appointment of the tax practitioner, who concluded that
Husband had vastly understated his income. The court also found the
promissory notes Husband offered were questionable. See supra ¶ 23.
Further, the court found Husband’s request for reimbursement was
unreasonable because the business paid some of the expenses and then
claimed them as a tax deduction. The court also relied on A.R.S. Section 25-
415 to support the award of fees based on Husband seeking reimbursement
for expenses his business paid. We have addressed and rejected Husband’s
challenges to each of these findings above. See supra ¶¶ 23, 26–27. Thus, the
fee award is supported by the court’s finding of Husband’s
unreasonableness.

¶42 In any event, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that Husband had greater financial resources than Wife. Husband agreed
that his average income over the past four years was over $20,000 a month,
with the highest earnings in the last two years. Thus, we affirm the $5,000
attorneys’ fees award.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

¶43 Both parties seek an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal under
A.R.S. Section 25-324. In the exercise of our discretion, after considering the
parties’ financial resources and reasonableness, we find Husband has
greater financial resources. He also unreasonably challenged his income for
child support purposes after agreeing to the amount at trial and failed to
provide legal authority or record citations for several issues he raised on
appeal. Even so, not all of Husband’s positions were unreasonable, so we
will award Wife a portion of her reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal upon
compliance with ARCAP 21.

¶44 But we are unable to determine costs on appeal at this time.
When the appealing party is the one against whom judgment was entered

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by the superior court, A.R.S. Section 12-342(A) indicates which party will
receive costs on appeal:

[I]f the judgment of the appellate court is against [appellant],
but for a lesser amount, he shall recover costs in the appellate
court, but shall be adjudged to pay costs in the court below. If
the judgment of the appellate court is against him for the same
or a greater amount than in the court below, the adverse party
shall recover costs in both courts.

Because the superior court must reconsider the allocation of certain debts
and reimbursement claims, we cannot conclude if the judgment against
Husband will be less than, equal to, or greater than the superior court’s
judgment. Thus, after reconsidering the allocation of debts and
reimbursements as outlined above, see supra ¶¶ 16–21, we order the
superior court to determine costs on appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶45 The orders regarding the DLG and timeshare debts and
reimbursement requests are inconsistent. Accordingly, we vacate those
rulings and remand for reconsideration consistent with this decision. We
affirm judgment for past child support as modified to $2,150. All other
orders in the decree are affirmed. We award Wife a portion of her attorneys’
fees on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21. We further order the court
to determine costs on appeal after reconsidering the identified debts and
reimbursement requests.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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