Larrea v. Chand

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

ANGEL JOSEFINA LARREA, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

RAVI CHAND, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0005 FC
FILED 10-29-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2022-002036
The Honorable Amy Michelle Kalman, Judge

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED
AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Alexander R. Arpad, Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Alexander R. Arpad
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Rose Law Group, PC, Scottsdale
By Audra E. Petrolle
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
 LARREA v. CHAND
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s opinion, in which
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Ravi Chand (“Husband”) appeals from the decree dissolving
his marriage to Angel Josefina Larrea (“Wife”).

¶2 We affirm the superior court’s rulings that Husband failed to
prove a right to an offset or reimbursement for separate-property
contributions he made to the community during and after the marriage. We
also affirm the court’s decision to treat a future tax benefit as community
property in its equalization analysis and its preclusion of Husband’s
appraiser’s opinion. We reverse the court’s valuation of a community
vehicle and its use of a rejected home-valuation boost to calculate Wife’s
equalization award, and we remand so that the court may adjust the award
accordingly.

¶3 We dismiss the appeal as much as it challenges the award of
attorney’s fees and costs against Husband because the court did not resolve
the award in the decree, and Husband did not file a notice of appeal after
the court entered the separate judgment awarding fees and costs.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 Husband and Wife married in 2018. Wife served a dissolution
petition in mid-2022.

¶5 The matter proceeded to a trial in March 2024. But the court
continued the trial to a second day in August because of late disclosures
from both parties. Finding Husband more at fault for the disclosure issues,
the court sanctioned him by awarding Wife interim attorney’s fees, to be
credited against any future fee award.

¶6 At the trial, Husband argued that he had a right to recoup
around $79,000 of separate funds he had deposited during the marriage into
a community bank account used for community expenses (“Wells Fargo
x3581”). He also argued that he should recoup post-service contributions of
separate funds to the community account used to pay a tax liability and

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recurring community debts, including the monthly car loan payments on
the parties’ Tesla.

¶7 Wife’s financial expert testified on the first trial day and
updated his opinions both on the second trial day and in connection with
Wife’s written closing argument. The expert testified that the transaction
history for Wells Fargo x3581 rendered Husband’s separate property
deposits untraceable. He explained that, “after [many, possibly] thousands
of transactions,” there was “no way to differentiate one dollar from
another,” analogizing the situation to both “a scrambled egg that I cannot
unscramble” and a can of white paint that, when mixed in with black paint,
made the color “completely grey.”

¶8 Wife’s expert also calculated the values of the parties’ two
community vehicles: the Tesla and an unencumbered Infiniti. In
determining the Tesla’s equity value, the expert accounted for the loan
payments due by the first trial day. Although the expert testified that he
understood more loan payments were due before the second trial day, he
did not update his valuation to reflect those payments.

¶9 Wife’s expert also opined on the future tax benefit arising
from the community’s investment in a cryptocurrency firm that went
bankrupt. He testified that the tax benefit for the loss was a real asset that
only Husband could realize given the investment’s structure. He assigned
it a value based on the applicable tax rates. On the second trial day, the
expert added that he believed Husband had begun to realize the tax
benefits.

¶10 Along with the financial expert, Wife offered the testimony
and report of an appraiser who valued the community home. In response,
Husband sought to introduce a competing appraiser’s report or recite the
appraiser’s opinion during his testimony. But the court precluded the
report and prevented Husband from testifying to anything except that he
had obtained an appraisal. The court reasoned that although neither party
had invoked application of the Arizona Rules of Evidence (“Evidence
Rules”) via Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Family Rule”) 2, the
Evidence Rules governing expert and lay opinions still applied, and
Husband was not qualified to offer an opinion under those rules.

¶11 After considering the evidence and the parties’ written
closing arguments, the court entered the dissolution decree in November
2024. The court determined that the community property should be divided
equally. The court adopted nearly all of Wife’s expert’s positions, finding

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that he “was credible and presented an appropriate and logically consistent
methodology for calculating community property as well as the competing
and offsetting equalization payments due to each spouse.” The court agreed
with the expert that Husband’s separate-property deposits into Wells Fargo
x3581 were untraceable and found that Husband provided no clear,
convincing, or credible tracing analysis. The court also found that Husband
failed to adequately or clearly show payment from his separate funds for
recurring community expenses post-service, and it gave him no credit for
paying the alleged community tax debt.

¶12 The court divided all community bank accounts (including
Wells Fargo x3581) equally, credited Wife for Husband’s receipt of the tax
benefit for the community’s cryptocurrency-investment loss, credited Wife
for Husband’s receipt of the community home, and awarded the Infiniti to
Wife and the Tesla to Husband. The court used Wife’s appraiser’s opinion
to value the home and her financial expert’s opinion to value the Tesla,
without regard to the loan payments due by the second trial day. The court
ordered Husband to pay Wife a substantial equalization.

¶13 The court found in the decree that Wife had a right to recover
attorney’s fees, expert’s fees, and costs under Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) § 25-324 because Husband had far more financial resources and
he acted more unreasonably in the litigation. The court certified the decree
as an appealable judgment under Family Rule 78(b) without deciding the
amount of fees and costs to be awarded. Some months later, the court
awarded Wife specific legal and expert fees and costs in an appealable
judgment under Family Rule 78(c).

¶14 Husband timely filed a notice of appeal from the Family Rule
78(b) decree, but he did not file a notice of appeal from the Family Rule 78(c)
judgment calculating the fees and costs. He challenges both the decree and
the fee judgment in his appellate briefs.

JURISDICTION

¶15 Our jurisdiction is limited to that specifically provided by
statute, Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 346, 349, ¶ 7 (App. 2019),
and “[w]e have an independent duty to determine whether we have
jurisdiction over an appeal,” Desert Palm Surgical Grp., P.L.C. v. Petta, 236
Ariz. 568, 576, ¶ 15 (App. 2015); Walker v. Walker, 256 Ariz. 295, 298, ¶ 10
(App. 2023) (A judgment must comply with the applicable procedural
rules.). We must dismiss an appeal when we lack jurisdiction. Davis v.
Cessna Aircraft Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 304 (App. 1991).

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¶16 A dissolution decree is generally appealable under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1). See Walker, 256 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 11. A family-court litigant
may appeal when fewer than all claims are resolved in a decree, so long as
“the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay and recites
that the judgment is entered under [Family] Rule 78(b).” Ariz. R. Fam. L.P.
78(b). A claim for attorney’s fees can be separate from the decree under
Family Rule 78(b). See Bollermann v. Nowlis, 234 Ariz. 340, 342, ¶ 8 (2014).
But for a fee judgment to be appealable, the court must first determine its
amount. Hernandez v. Athey, 256 Ariz. 530, 532-33, ¶¶ 5-9 (App. 2023). “Until
the court makes the entitlement decision and awards an amount, the court
cannot certify any portion of the attorney-fees claim” as appealable. Id. at
533, ¶ 8.

¶17 Here, the court in the dissolution decree resolved the
disputed claims and found that Wife was entitled to legal and expert fees
and costs, but did not determine the specific amounts. Thus, the court’s
Family Rule 78(b) certification made only the decree’s terms appealable.
The fee and cost awards did not become appealable until the court issued
the Family Rule 78(c) judgment, which settled the amounts. Because
Husband appealed only from the decree, we lack jurisdiction to consider
his challenges to the fees and costs awards and therefore dismiss that part
of the appeal. We address the balance of the appeal below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶18 We review the court’s property characterization as separate
or community de novo. Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 4
(App. 2007). We review the court’s allocation of community property for an
abuse of discretion, upholding the ruling if the evidence reasonably
supports it. Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the judgment, id.,
and we defer to the superior court’s determinations on witness credibility,
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347-48, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). We review the
court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice,
Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 493, 506 (1996), but we review the
court’s interpretation of procedural rules de novo, Gutierrez v. Fox, 242 Ariz.
259, 266, ¶ 28 (App. 2017).

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DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Correctly Characterized Wells Fargo x3581 as
Community Property Without Regard to Separate-Property
Contributions During the Marriage.

¶19 Husband challenges the superior court’s characterization of
Wells Fargo x3581 as community property, asking to recoup separate funds
he deposited into the account during the marriage. We detect no error in
the court’s characterization of the account as community property without
accounting for the separate-property contributions made during the
marriage.

¶20 Separate funds do not become community property simply
because they are commingled with community funds during the marriage.
In re Marriage of Cupp, 152 Ariz. 161, 164 (App. 1986) (“[T]ransmutation of
separate property to community property [through commingling] occurs
only when the identity of the property as separate or community is lost.”);
see also O’Hair v. O’Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 239 (1973) (When a spouse deposits
separate funds into a joint bank account, the marital relationship alone does
not presume a gift of those funds to the community.). So long as the
separate funds remain identifiable in some manner, they retain their
character. Cupp, 152 Ariz. at 164.

¶21 But when the transactions (deposits and expenditures) are so
mixed that a court cannot tell how much money is separate and how much
is community, “a transmutation of separate money into community money
occurs.” Potthoff v. Potthoff, 128 Ariz. 557, 562 (App. 1981). That is, the
commingled funds become community property unless the separate
property is “explicitly traced” by its proponent. Kim v. Pak, 258 Ariz. 594,
597, ¶ 9 (App. 2024) (quotation omitted). The separate-property proponent
must meet the burden to identify and trace the separate funds “with clear
and satisfactory evidence.” Whitt v. Meza, 257 Ariz. 176, 181, ¶ 15 (App.
2024). Tracing with sufficient evidence may take various forms. The court
may consider circumstantial evidence, so dollar-for-dollar documentation
of every transaction is not required. Kim, 258 Ariz. at 598, ¶ 17. For example,
the separate-property proponent may use percentages to isolate and
account for the separate property. See id. at 597-99, ¶¶ 8, 15-19. Or he or she
may rely on account statements to show that separate contributions could
not have been used on community expenses because the balance never fell
below the separate amounts and there were no separate expenditures.
Whitt, 257 Ariz. at 181-82, ¶ 16. But the proponent may not simply rest on
the fact that he or she made separate-property deposits into a community

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account without accounting for separate expenditures. And that is what
Husband did here.

¶22 Husband testified that he deposited around $79,000 of his
separate funds into the community account during the four-year marriage.
But Husband provided no reliable, systematic analysis tracking the
disposition of the separate funds he deposited, including funds from his
separate investment account and his separate real estate investments. He
failed to trace his separate funds by any method explicitly. The court
reasonably found Husband’s testimony neither credible nor clear.

¶23 Husband urges that the court should have applied a
presumption that the separate funds in a commingled account are used for
separate expenses. See Walker, 256 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 33 (citing Blaine v. Blaine, 63 Ariz. 100, 113 (1945)). But he did not track his separate expenses from the
account, and he acknowledged that funds from the account were also used
for community expenses. When a spouse contributes separate property to
pay community expenses during the marriage, the contribution is treated
as a gift to the community unless there is a reimbursement agreement. See
Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146 (App. 1978). Husband failed to show how
much of the account was used for separate or community expenses.

¶24 The court reasonably adopted Wife’s financial expert’s
opinion that tracing the separate deposits was impossible on the evidence
presented. Husband’s contention that Wife’s expert performed the tracing
is untrue. Although the expert acknowledged commingling in the account
and at first acknowledged that certain rental deposits could be traced, upon
receiving more information, he unequivocally concluded that tracing the
separate funds was impossible. And even assuming the expert was
incorrect about the tracing being impossible, performing the tracing was
Husband’s—not Wife’s—burden, to a standard of clear and satisfactory
evidence. See Whitt, 257 Ariz. at 181, ¶ 15. Husband failed to satisfy that
burden. He did not prove how any of the separate funds he moved to (or
through) the account during the marriage remained separate.

¶25 The court did not err by finding Wells Fargo x3581 to be
community property, despite the separate-property deposits made during
the marriage.

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B. The Superior Court Correctly Declined to Order Reimbursement
for Separate-Property Contributions After Service of the Dissolution
Petition.

¶26 Husband challenges the superior court’s failure to order
reimbursement for his payment of community liabilities with separate
funds after he was served with the dissolution petition, including a tax debt
and the recurring payments for the Tesla and other obligations. The court
found: “Husband has not adequately or clearly made a claim for payment
of recurring expenses after date of service. There are also significant and
legitimate concerns with the adequacy and timeliness of his disclosures on
the subject, but even without that issue, the Court is not convinced.” We
affirm the court’s ruling.

¶27 First, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to
reimburse Husband for the community tax debt because he failed to prove
its existence. Second, we agree that Husband was not entitled to
reimbursement for his post-service separate-property contributions to
Wells Fargo x3581, from which community debts (such as the Tesla debt)
continued to be paid.

¶28 Separate funds used to pay community obligations during the
marriage are presumed to be gifts to the community. See Baum, 120 Ariz. at
146. But because the community ends upon service of a petition that results
in a dissolution decree, A.R.S. § 25-213(B), separate funds used to pay a
community expense post-service are not presumed to be a gift to the
community, Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 596, ¶ 15 (App. 2017). Thus,
Husband was entitled to reimbursement for the separate funds he
contributed to the community account post-service, which the parties used
to pay community debts (or that remained unspent), absent clear and
convincing evidence that he intended to make a gift to the community. Id.
at 596-97, ¶¶ 15, 19-20. To prove his claim, Husband had the burden to
prove his right to reimbursement—i.e., he had to show that his post-service
separate contributions financed community obligations. See Robertson v.
Petz, ___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶¶ 25-27, 574 P.3d 232, 240-41 (App. 2025).

¶29 The record shows that Husband and Wife contributed
separate funds to the account post-service. But Husband failed to meet his
burden of proving a specific amount to which he had a right to be
reimbursed for his separate contributions made after service. Husband
argues that his post-service separate deposits must have been used to pay
community debts because, in mid-June 2022, the month after service, Wells
Fargo x3581’s balance dropped to around $300. He ignores, however, that

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his separate deposits were not the only potential source of community
post-service debt payments after the balance dropped to $300. Soon after
the drop, Wells Fargo x3581 received significant infusions of community
funds from a community investment account—$20,000 in June 2022 (which
Husband briefly transferred to a different account that the court later found
transmuted to community property) and $31,000 in August 2022.
Furthermore, Wells Fargo x3581 was not later used solely for community
expenses—it was also used to pay the separate debts of both parties.
Although Husband provided a spreadsheet at trial listing expenditures and
deposits, he did not show, by any measure of evidence, when or how his
separate funds were used above the community deposits.

¶30 We detect no error in the superior court’s determination that
Husband was not entitled to reimbursement because he failed to prove that
he spent his separate property on behalf of the community post-service.

C. The Court Correctly Characterized the Future Tax Carry-Forward
Credit as Community Property.

¶31 Husband challenges the court’s award of an equalization
amount to Wife based on his receipt of a tax benefit arising from the
community’s failed investment in the bankrupt cryptocurrency firm. We
affirm the court’s ruling.

¶32 Wife’s financial expert testified that the community’s lost
capital investment based on the company’s bankruptcy created a tax benefit
that, even when unrealized, was a “real,” “tangible,” “[c]alculatable,” and
“verifiable” asset. He valued it in his report based on its carry-forward
benefit to Husband on future tax returns. The expert’s characterization and
calculation of the tax benefit was not error.

¶33 Individuals may claim capital loss from one year as a
deduction from later-realized capital gains. See Brett R. Turner, Income Tax
Carry-Forwards, 22 No. 11 Equitable Distribution J. 122 (2005). Other
jurisdictions have recognized that such a “carry-forward” credit caused by
lost community capital is community property subject to distribution at
dissolution, valued in terms of the tax savings it is likely to generate. Id.
(collecting cases); Brett R. Turner, 1 Equitable Distribution of Property § 5:9,
n.19 (4th ed. 2024) (collecting cases). We agree. Even if the deduction is not
immediately possible, it “offer[s] a reliable guarantee of future tax savings
to the taxpayer who is able to claim [it].” Turner, Income Tax Carry-Forwards,
supra. It is not, as Husband contends, a speculative or hypothetical benefit.

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¶34 Thus, the court correctly characterized the carry-forward
credit as community property and correctly considered its value to
Husband when calculating Wife’s equalization payment.

D. The Superior Court Correctly Precluded Husband’s Appraiser’s
Opinion.

¶35 Husband challenges the court’s ruling precluding him from
admitting evidence of his appraiser’s opinion about the community home’s
value. We affirm the court’s ruling.

¶36 Because neither party chose to require compliance with the
Evidence Rules under Family Rule 2, certain Evidence Rules did not apply,
including those that limit the use of hearsay and require witnesses to have
personal knowledge. See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 2(b)(1) (specifying that Evidence
Rules 602 and 801-807 are among those that do not apply). But the Evidence
Rules governing the admissibility of opinion testimony—Evidence Rules
701-706—still applied. See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 2(b)(2).

¶37 Husband argued that he could offer his appraiser’s opinion
because the hearsay and personal-knowledge requirements did not
constrain him. The court reasoned, however, that the Evidence Rules on
opinion testimony still barred its admission. Husband now argues that he
could offer the evidence because a property owner is always entitled to
opine about the property’s value.

¶38 The principle that a property owner is competent to opine on
his or her property’s value is well-established, with our caselaw
recognizing it in condemnation cases predating the adoption of the federal
evidence rules (which our rules track as relevant here). See, e.g., Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. & State Colls. of Ariz. v. Cannon, 86 Ariz. 176, 177 (1959)
(describing principle); United States v. Martinez, 536 F.2d 1107, 1108 (5th Cir.
1976) (describing the 1975 promulgation of federal evidence rules); compare
Ariz. R. Evid. 701-02 with Fed. R. Evid. 701-02. And the evidence rules
accommodate the principle that an owner may testify about his or her
property’s value. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee notes to the
proposed 1972 rule (The rule governing the admission of expert opinions
includes “the large group sometimes called ‘skilled’ witnesses, such as
bankers or landowners testifying to land values.”); Fed. R. Evid. 701
advisory committee notes to the 2000 amendment (The rule governing the
admission of lay opinions, which added a provision that such opinions
cannot be based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702,” was “not intended to affect the ‘prototypical

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example[s] of the type of evidence contemplated by the adoption of Rule
701,’” such as a business owner’s opinion on the business’s value arising
not from “experience, training or specialized knowledge within the realm
of an expert, but . . . [from] the particularized knowledge that the witness
has by virtue of his or her position in the business.”). The rationale for
allowing owner opinions is that an owner “has, by definition, knowledge
of the components of value that are useful in ascertaining value.” United
Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 304 (App. 1983). In other
words, the owner has knowledge “rooted in [his or] her experience as a
landowner” about “what makes [the property] valuable.” City of Tucson v.
Tanno, 245 Ariz. 488, 493, ¶¶ 18, 20 (App. 2018).

¶39 The problem here is that Husband did not seek to offer his
opinion, but that of his appraiser. To be sure, an owner may rely on
collateral information to form his or her opinion. See, e.g., Town of Paradise
Valley v. Laughlin, 174 Ariz. 484, 486 (App. 1992) (A landowner who
purchased property on the advice of others, with no personal investigation,
should have been allowed to testify as to his opinion of the property’s
value.); United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 304 (An owner who calculated value
using the Consumer Price Index was offering his own opinion.). Such
reliance typically goes only to the evidence’s weight, not its admissibility.
See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Dikomey Mfg. Jewelers, Inc., 409 A.2d
1076, 1079-81 (D.C. 1979) (The court correctly admitted an owner’s opinion
of her jewelry’s value that was based on appraisals because she stated that
“her own opinion as to value formulated by synthesizing information
received from knowledgeable sources,” and the opposing party could
cross-examine her about the basis for her opinion and could cross-examine
one of the appraisers as well.). But the owner must be offering his or her
opinion—not merely introducing an absent expert’s opinion wholesale. See
id. at 1080 & n.6 (An owner’s flat recitation of an absent expert’s opinion
was inadmissible.) (citing Yonan Rug Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Auto. Ass’n, 69 A.2d
62 (D.C. 1949)); United States v. 68.94 Acres of Land, 918 F.2d 389, 398 (3d Cir.
1990) (“The rationale which justifies landowners’ opinion testimony—i.e.,
their special knowledge of the property—does not extend to the mere
repetition of another’s assessment of the property’s value.”).

¶40 Here, Husband argued that he wanted to “testify to the
existence of the appraisal and the amount that it appraised for.” He
elaborated that he was “not offering expert testimony, [but] . . . factual
information that he requested an appraisal, and this was the amount,” and
was “just saying this is the appraisal I had done, and this is the resulting
amount.” But he also stated that he wanted the court to “consider the
number.” Husband’s request was not a request to offer his opinion of the

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property’s value as informed by the appraisal—it was a request to have the
expert’s opinion admitted and considered without complying with
Evidence Rule 702. The court correctly precluded the evidence.1

E. The Superior Court Erred in Valuing the Tesla.

¶41 Husband challenges the superior court’s failure to account for
all payments on the Tesla in calculating its value. We agree with Husband
that the court erred by calculating the Tesla’s value based only on select
payments, which impacted the court’s equalization analysis.

¶42 Payments that reduced the Tesla’s debt affected the
community’s equity value in it. Wife’s financial expert recognized this
when he accounted for the payments in calculating the vehicle’s equity
value as of the first trial day. He then conceded that additional payments
came due before the second trial day. But neither the expert nor the court
considered those added payments when assigning the Tesla’s equity value.
That was error. The Tesla was a community asset, so its equity value when
awarded to Husband was relevant to the court’s determination of an overall
equitable division of the community property. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A).

¶43 On appeal, Wife argues that the court’s decision not to
consider the payments after the first trial day was intended to compensate
her for Husband’s role in creating the need for the second trial day. We
reject Wife’s argument for two reasons. First, Wife’s theory is speculative as
the court never stated it. Second, although the court has broad discretion to
determine valuation dates to achieve equity, e.g., Sample v. Sample, 152 Ariz.
239, 242-43 (App. 1986), its equitable determinations about property
division must be made without regard to fault, see A.R.S. § 25-318(A), (C)
(Absent waste, the court must divide community property “equitably,
though not necessarily in kind, without regard to marital misconduct.”). In
short, although a party’s litigation conduct may be relevant to sanctions, see
Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 26, or attorney’s fees, see A.R.S. § 25-324, it does not affect
an equitable property division.

¶44 The record reflects no justification for the court’s disregard of
the effect of the added loan payments on the Tesla’s value. We remand so
the court may revise the Tesla valuation to account for those payments and

1 Because we affirm the court’s determination on the merits, we need
not explain why we reject Wife’s argument that Husband waived his
objection to the preclusion of the appraiser’s opinion.

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make any necessary adjustments to Wife’s equalization award. We also
reverse and remand for the court’s use of Wife’s boosted home valuation in
calculating the equalization—an act that the parties agree was error, given
the court’s previous rejection of the boost.

CONCLUSION

¶45 We dismiss the part of the appeal that challenges the fee and
cost awards. We reverse the dissolution decree’s valuation of the Tesla and
its use of the boosted home valuation to calculate the equalization payment,
and remand so that the court may adjust the equalization in view of all
relevant Tesla payments and without regard to the home valuation boost.
We otherwise affirm the decree.

¶46 Both parties request attorney’s fees and costs on appeal under
A.R.S. § 25-324. Per our discretion, we deny both parties’ requests.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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