Stevenson v. Stevenson

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

BLAKE WILLIAM STEVENSON, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

CELENA STEVENSON, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0017 FC
FILED 11-24-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2022-091871
The Honorable Charlene D. Jackson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Barreda Law PLLC, Gilbert
By Joshua A. Barreda
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Cervone Law P.C., Phoenix
By Kristina L. Cervone
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
 STEVENSON v. STEVENSON
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Celena Stevenson ("Mother") appeals the superior court's
dissolution decree ("Decree"). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Blake Stevenson ("Father") and Mother married in 2014 and
have three minor children ("Children") together. Father petitioned for
divorce in April of 2022. Three months later, the parties entered into a
binding Rule 69 agreement ("Agreement") for joint legal decision-making
and equal parenting time. At the time of the Agreement, Father knew that
Mother suffered from mental-health issues, was medicated, and had
experienced auditory hallucinations—including a suicide attempt
prompted by imaginary voices.

¶3 In January of 2023, Father petitioned the court for an
emergency temporary order granting him sole legal decision-making and
suspending Mother's parenting time. Father cited Mother's untreated
mental-health issues, and Mother's discussions with the Children about the
voices in her head. In a deposition, Mother stated her hallucinations now
involved gang stalking, remote neural monitoring, and voices asserting that
she was not the Children's biological mother. Father expressed concern
about Mother's ability to care for the Children based on her mental-health
issues. The court granted Father's request and ordered a psychological
evaluation for Mother.

¶4 The court modified the order to allow Mother four hours of
supervised parenting time a week. The court stated that Mother's auditory
hallucinations had expanded to involve the Children and increasing
Mother's parenting time would depend on her psychological and medical
evaluations, treatment-plan compliance, and advisor recommendations.
The court set trial for August 30, 2023.

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¶5 In June of 2023, the court denied Mother's motion to modify
its prior order, reiterating its prior findings and noting that she had not
completed a psychological evaluation or begun counseling. At her request,
the court continued the trial to February 5, 2024. In January of 2024, the
court bifurcated the trial to allow further discovery into Father's online
banking records, investment activity, and electronic devices. This extended
Mother's opportunity to investigate her claim that Father's investment
activity could total $5.45 million dollars.

¶6 In December of 2023, Mother completed a court-ordered
psychological evaluation. The psychologist diagnosed her with "other
specified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder—
attenuated psychosis syndrome," and recommended various treatments.
But the psychologist concluded that Mother did not meet the criteria for
Schizophrenia Disorder and noted that she maintained a level of insight
and her auditory hallucinations were "less severe and more transient," than
required for a schizophrenia diagnosis.

¶7 At the time of evaluation, the psychologist determined that
Mother's disorder was in remission because she was not experiencing any
symptoms. But the psychologist noted that parts of the evaluation were
only marginally valid as Mother seemed to be trying to make a good
impression, as is common in child-custody cases. Mother also stated that
she felt her hallucinations occurred during times of stress, especially
involving Father's infidelity. The psychologist opined that nothing
indicated that Mother was unfit or had thoughts of harming her children.

¶8 On the first day of trial in February 2024, the court chose to
address all financial accounts except Father's account in an online investing
platform ("Robinhood Account"). Mother's counsel objected, stating that in
a prior order the court had indicated that financial matters would be
addressed on the second day of trial. But Mother's counsel then confirmed
readiness to proceed.

¶9 After the first day of trial, the court granted Mother's motion
to continue the second trial date. She later sought a second continuance for
further discovery into Father's electronic accounts and time for expert
analysis, which the court denied. Mother then moved to vacate the hearing
citing a lack of new evidence despite her ongoing discovery efforts and
requested the court enter the decree. The court granted this motion.

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¶10 The court issued the Decree with the following terms:

Parenting Time

¶11 The court designated Father as the primary residential parent,
with the Children spending every other weekend and one weeknight with
Mother. Applying the A.R.S. § 25-403(A) best-interest factors, the court
considered Mother's testimony that stress from the dissolution process had
exacerbated her auditory hallucinations. Acknowledging that her
symptoms were in remission around the time of trial, the court noted its
concern that the divorce becoming final could cause additional stress. It
also weighed Father's testimony that the Children were fearful and
confused when Mother asked if they heard the voices she heard. The court
stated that it would reevaluate the parenting-time arrangement if Mother
complied with treatment and demonstrated sustained mental stability.

Child Support

¶12 Under the Arizona Child Support Guidelines, the court
calculated Mother's child-support obligation at $668 per month. However,
the court found this amount "inappropriate or unjust," due to her
unemployment and the need for time to adjust after the divorce and seek
work. The court ultimately ordered Mother to pay $300 a month for child
support, including back payments dating to when the petition was filed.

Spousal Maintenance and Bobrow Reimbursement

¶13 The court ordered Father to pay Mother $2,000 a month in
spousal maintenance for 24 months. It found Mother was entitled to
maintenance due to her current unemployment and her past willingness to
adjust her work schedule to support Father's career and travel.

¶14 The court reviewed the statutory factors for determining the
amount and duration of spousal maintenance and attributed $111,740 as
Father's income for 2023. In its discussion, the court stated:

Father claims he earns approximately $4,666.00 per month as an
Account Executive. He testified during the parties' marriage he was
a 1099 employee and earned significantly more money. However,
as of January 2022, his employer changed the pay structure. All
employees were terminated as 1099 employees and are now W2
employees earning a guaranteed base pay of $52,000 per year.
(Exhibit 12). However, Father also earns commission and receives

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other compensation from his employer. He testified while he is
eligible for commission, commissions are based on performance and
if you don't beat the sales from prior years, you don't get paid a
commission. He states he earns 35% less than years prior. Father's
social security statement reflects Father earned $96,013 in 2021 and
$88,251 in 2020. (Exhibit 13). Correspondence from Father's
employer reflects that as of August 9, 2023, Father was on track to make
$111,740 in 2023. This amount is in line with Fathers reported six
figure income in 2019 through 2021 as reported in his AFI and the
Court will use this amount for purposes of spousal maintenance.
(Emphasis added).

¶15 Notably, the correspondence from Father's employer
("Employer Correspondence") referenced by the court described Father's
"year to date" income as of August 9, 2023, from various income sources
including "Salary," "Car Allowance," and "Commission."

¶16 Additionally, the court granted Father a Bobrow
reimbursement for post-petition community expenses he paid using
separate funds. However, it denied Mother's request for retroactive
spousal maintenance citing her minimal living expenses during the
litigation. Later, in its division of community property, the court found no
exceptional circumstances warranting deviation from equal distribution
and reiterated its order that Mother reimburse Father for half of the amount
he paid towards their community debt during the litigation.

Division of Financial Accounts

¶17 At trial, the parties agreed to divide their three bank accounts
equally, having stipulated to their values. The court also found that Mother
was entitled to half of the value of "any assets, including cryptocurrency
accounts or proceeds therefrom that were not discovered or disclosed prior
to trial." The court found equal distribution appropriate, noting in its A.R.S.
§ 25-319(B) analysis that there was "no credible evidence" of excessive
spending, destruction, concealment, or fraudulent disposition of
community property.

¶18 Mother appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-
2102(A)(2).

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DISCUSSION

¶19 On appeal, Mother raises six issues: (1) modification of
parenting time, (2) calculation of Father's income, (3) Bobrow
reimbursements awarded to Father and denial of retroactive spousal-
maintenance payments, (4) division of community bank accounts, (5)
failure to address her waste claim regarding Father's investment accounts,
and (6) attorney fees.

I. Standard of Review.

¶20 We review the family court's rulings for an abuse of
discretion. Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471, ¶ 4 (App. 2018)
(parenting time); Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 112, ¶ 9 (App. 2016)
(child support); Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 376, ¶ 9 (App. 2007)
(spousal maintenance); Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 4
(App. 2007) (division of community property). An abuse of discretion
occurs "when the record is 'devoid of competent evidence to support the
decision,' or when the court commits an error of law in the process of
reaching a discretionary conclusion." Engstrom, 243 Ariz. at 471, ¶ 4
(quoting Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 19 (App. 2009)).

¶21 On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence, see Gutierrez v.
Fox, 242 Ariz. 259, 272, ¶ 49 (App. 2017), and "must view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most
favorable to upholding the decree." Spector v. Spector, 94 Ariz. 175, 179
(1963). We defer to the court's determination of witnesses' credibility and
the weight given to conflicting evidence. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz.
343, 347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). We will affirm a judgment if it is supported by
reasonable evidence. Boyle v. Boyle, 231 Ariz. 63, 65, ¶ 8 (App. 2012).

II. Parenting Time.

¶22 Mother argues that the court was required to find a change in
circumstances to modify the parenting-time arrangement in the Agreement.
See Engstrom, 243 Ariz. at 472, ¶ 10 (stating that once a Rule 69 agreement is
adopted, the court must find a change in circumstances to modify it).
Alternatively, Father asserts the court was not required to find a change in
circumstances before modifying parenting time because the matter
involved temporary orders governed by a different statute. We need not
resolve this dispute because reasonable evidence supports the court's
finding of changed circumstances.

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¶23 The court has "broad discretion to decide whether a change in
circumstances has occurred." Pridgeon v. Superior Ct., 134 Ariz. 177, 179
(1982). If the court finds changed circumstances, it then considers whether
a modification is in the child's best interests by applying the factors in A.R.S.
§ 25-403(A). See Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 343, ¶ 14 (App. 2020)
(stating that once the court makes a finding of changed circumstances, it
then determines whether a change in custody is in the best interests of the
child).

¶24 Mother had experienced auditory hallucinations at the time
the parties entered the Agreement, and her psychological evaluation
indicated that her disorder was in remission around the time of trial. But
reasonable evidence supports the court's finding that between the
Agreement and trial, the hallucinations had become more severe and
expanded to involve the Children and others. Because competent evidence
supports the court's conclusion that Mother's condition had changed in a
way that materially impacted the Children's welfare, the superior court did
not abuse its discretion in finding a change of circumstances. See Engstrom,
243 Ariz. at 471, ¶ 4 (stating that "an abuse of discretion results when the
record is 'devoid of competent evidence to support the decision'" (quoting
Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 19)).

¶25 Following its change-in-circumstances finding, the court
assessed whether modifying parenting time served the Children's best
interests using the factors in A.R.S. § 25-403(A). The court weighed both
Mother's and the psychologist's testimony that stress exacerbated her
hallucinations and the psychologist's evaluation indicating her disorder
was in remission. Mother also testified that the events related to the
dissolution caused her stress.

¶26 In this context, the court did not abuse its discretion in
drawing the inference that the stress of finalizing a divorce could cause
Mother's condition to worsen, affecting the Children's welfare. See Spector,
94 Ariz. at 179 (stating this Court should draw "all reasonable inferences"
from the evidence in support of upholding the decree). Accordingly, we
defer to the court's determination that the modification was in the
Children's best interests.

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III. Father's Income Calculation and Related Awards of Child
Support, Back Child Support, and Spousal Maintenance.
¶27 Mother argues that the court erred in calculating Father's
income by (1) misreading the Employer Correspondence, and (2) failing to
consider Father's investments.

A. Employer Correspondence.

¶28 Mother asserts that the court erroneously interpreted the
figures in the Employer Correspondence as Father's projected annual
earnings, rather than as his year-to-date earnings as of August of 2023. She
argues that no evidence was presented to support the court's attribution of
an annual income of $111,740 to Father. Instead, she argues that he was "on
pace to earn over $190,000 for 2023." Based on this alleged error, Mother
seeks to vacate the court's rulings regarding child support, spousal
maintenance, and denial of back payments.

¶29 We are not convinced. At trial, Mother and Father presented
conflicting evidence of what should have been attributed as Father's
income. And the Decree reflects the court's consideration of all the evidence
presented. At trial, Mother argued that the court should attribute $185,396
as Father's 2023 income, based on the Employer Correspondence showing
he had earned $111,745 by August 2023. Assuming he kept that pace, she
asserted that he was "on track to have a gross income of $185,396 and
change" by the end of the year.

¶30 Mother argued the court should rely only on the Employer
Correspondence because Father’s documented social security income was
unreliable. She argued the discrepancies between his 2021 social security
income ($96,013) and his tax return income for the year ($102,427),
suggested an understatement. She also pointed to a home equity loan
application where Father listed his monthly income as $11,666, reflecting
his anticipated earnings after transitioning to employee status.
Additionally, she testified that Father had failed to disclose any financial
documentation for 2022 or 2023 despite discovery requests and speculated
that his income during those years was significantly higher than in previous
years.

¶31 Alternatively, Father asked the court to use his tax returns
and social security earnings to determine his 2023 income. As exhibits to

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his affidavit of financial information ("AFI"), Father submitted tax returns
showing incomes of $108,192 for 2019, $78,778 for 2020, and $102,427 for
2021. His social security earnings for those years, also attached as an
exhibit, showed incomes of $118,376 for 2019, $88,251 for 2020, and $96,013
for 2021. He asserted that his tax returns provided a more accurate tool for
estimating his income because the Employer Correspondence merely
summarized paycheck withholdings and would likely overstate his actual
earnings.

¶32 Father also testified that his income consisted of a $52,000
base salary plus variable commissions tied to sales performance. He
explained that his compensation had recently shifted from 1099 contractor
to W-2 employee, and that commissions fluctuated significantly year to
year—testifying that he had earned 35% less in January of 2024 than in
January of 2023. He noted that he would be penalized if he failed to exceed
prior benchmarks, making his income unpredictable. Father also stated in
his AFI that his gross monthly salary was $4,166. He explained that this
amount excluded commissions and bonuses because, due to his recent
transition to employee status, he "had no idea what income was going to
look like." Accordingly, as his income was prone to fluctuation, he asked
the court to rely on his prior years' tax returns and social security earnings
when determining his income.

¶33 On appeal, we review the record in the light most favorable
to affirming the court's order. Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 354, ¶ 9 (App.
2007). In this light, we presume that the court relied on all record evidence
"even if it is not specifically detailed in the minute entry." Id. at ¶ 11. It is
not our duty to reweigh conflicting evidence, and we defer to the court's
judgment of the credibility of witnesses. Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16; see also
Hoobler v. Hoobler, 254 Ariz. 130, 141, ¶ 26 (App. 2022) ("we have a duty 'to
affirm where any reasonable view of the fact and law might support the
judgement of the [family] court'") (quoting BNCCORP, Inc. v. HUB Int'l Ltd.,
243 Ariz. 1, 9, ¶ 35 (App. 2017) (alteration in original)).

¶34 Here, the parties presented conflicting evidence of Father's
earnings, and, ultimately, the court weighed both positions presented at
trial and attributed $111,740 as Father's yearly income, noting that this
amount was "in line with Father's reported six figure incomes." While the
Employer Correspondence may have informed the court's analysis, the
Decree also identifies a range of additional factors on which the court relied
in reaching its conclusion. These factors included the unpredictable nature
of Father's compensation structure, variability of his commissions, and his
prior years' tax returns and social security income.

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¶35 Accordingly, because evidence reasonably supported the
court's attribution of $111,740 for Father's 2023 income, Mother has not
demonstrated an abuse of discretion. See Engstrom, 243 Ariz. at 471, ¶ 4; see
also Boyle, 231 Ariz. at 65, ¶ 8 (stating we "will affirm the judgment if
reasonable evidence supports it").

B. Father's Investments.

¶36 Mother also argues that the court failed to consider Father's
alleged gains from the Robinhood Account. However, as discussed infra ¶
47, despite extended time for additional discovery, Mother failed to present
evidence of such gains and moved to vacate the second trial date during
which the court was to address these issues. Mother has not demonstrated
that the court abused its discretion by dividing the account equally and
failing to attribute investment income from it. See Thomas v. Thomas, 142
Ariz. 386, 391 (App. 1984) (stating that maintenance awards "cannot be
based upon mere hopes and speculative expectations").

IV. Award of Bobrow Reimbursement Claim and Denial of Back
Payments of Spousal Maintenance.
¶37 The family court has broad discretion to determine equitable
division of community property. Hoobler, 254 Ariz. at 137, ¶ 13 (App. 2022).
When one party uses their separate property to pay towards community
debt after a dissolution petition is filed, those post-petition payments "must
be accounted for in an equitable property distribution." Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 596, ¶ 19 (App. 2017).

¶38 Neither party disputes whether Mother was entitled to
spousal maintenance. However, Mother argues that the court erred by not
offsetting the Bobrow reimbursement against retroactive spousal
maintenance accrued since the petition's filing. We disagree.

¶39 The court may account for Bobrow reimbursement payments
in a variety of ways to achieve an equitable division of property. See
Hammett v. Hammett, 247 Ariz. 556, 561, ¶ 26 (2019). And whether to award
retroactive spousal maintenance is discretionary. See Huey v. Huey, 253
Ariz. 560, 565, ¶ 20 (App. 2022).

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¶40 In its division of property and debts, the court found that
because this case did not present "a unique set of facts or circumstances . . .
an equal division of property [was] appropriate to achieve equity."
Consequently, the court found that Father was entitled to reimbursement
for half of the amount he paid towards their community debt during the
litigation. It also found that Mother incurred minimal expenses during the
litigation. Because the overall property distribution was equitable, Mother
has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion in the court's denial of her
request for retroactive spousal maintenance. See Barron v. Barron, 246 Ariz.
580, 591, ¶¶ 43–44 (App. 2019) (affirming the denial of Husband's
reimbursement request "[b]ecause the overall property allocation was
equitable"), vacated in part (¶¶ 24–30) on other grounds, 246 Ariz. 449 (2019).

V. Division of Community Bank Accounts.

¶41 Mother argues that the court erred in its division of
community property based on the absence of bank records for one account
and her counsel's understanding that financial accounts were to be
addressed at the second trial date. But, when presented with a bank
statement of the account at trial, Mother testified that the amount in the
disputed account was $5,850 and requested an equal division. This is the
amount the court used in dividing that account. Second, her attorney said
he was prepared to address all financial accounts, except the Robinhood
Account, on the first trial day. Mother later moved to vacate the second
trial date after her counsel stated that she had no further evidence to
present.

¶42 The court did not abuse its discretion in basing its division on
Mother's uncontested testimony about the amount held in the account, nor
accepting her counsel's willingness to proceed on the first trial date. See
Boyle, 231 Ariz. at 65, ¶ 8 (stating we "will affirm a judgment if reasonable
evidence supports it").

VI. Waste Claim.

¶43 Allocation of community property, including the
determination of the existence of waste, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 5. We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the court's findings and determine whether the
evidence reasonably supports those findings. Id.

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¶44 When allocating community property, "the court may
consider 'excessive or abnormal expenditures, . . . concealment or
fraudulent disposition' of community property." Goodell v. Goodell, 257
Ariz. 563, 571, ¶ 35 (App. 2024) (quoting A.R.S. § 25-318(C)). If one party
demonstrates waste of community property, the court may award the
innocent party a greater share of community property to offset the loss. Id.
The alleging party must first make a prima facie showing that the other's
use of community property was excessive, abnormal, or concealed.
Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 7. The burden then shifts to the spending
spouse to rebut the allegation. Id. at 346–47, ¶ 7. When evidence is
conflicting, we defer to the trial court's determination of witnesses'
credibility and the weight to give conflicting evidence. Id. at 347–48, ¶ 13.

¶45 If requested by a party, the court must find the facts specially
and state its conclusions of law. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 82(a)(1). Absent such
a request, we presume the court found every fact necessary to support its
decision. Whitt v. Meza, 257 Ariz. 176, 180, ¶ 8 (App. 2024).

¶46 Mother did not request specific factual findings or
conclusions of law regarding her waste claim. Nonetheless, reasonable
evidence supports the court's conclusion that she failed to make a prima
facie showing of waste.

¶47 The court found no credible evidence of abnormal
expenditures or the concealment of community property. Mother's waste
claim centered on allegations that Father deposited community funds into
undisclosed investment accounts, totaling up to $5 million. Since
September of 2022, Mother investigated this allegation and sought multiple
continuances, leading the court to bifurcate the trial for further discovery of
Father's investment activity. After the court denied her final continuance
request, Mother vacated the second trial date, citing a lack of new evidence.
The court then ordered an equal division of any undiscovered or
undisclosed assets, including, but not limited to, Father's cryptocurrency
accounts.

¶48 The court had discretion to evaluate conflicting evidence, and
the record reasonably supports its conclusion that Mother presented no
credible proof of excessive or abnormal expenditures, despite multiple
discovery extensions. Thus, Mother failed to meet the prima facie showing
required to maintain a waste claim.

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VII. Attorney Fees.

¶49 Mother and Father both request attorney fees and costs on
appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324(A). In our discretion, we decline to award
either party attorney fees. Because Father is the successful party on appeal,
he is entitled to recover costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21. See A.R.S.
§ 12-342.

CONCLUSION

¶50 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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