Schneider v. Harris

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

SARA M. SCHNEIDER, Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

AUNDRAE K. HARRIS, Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0063 FC
FILED 12-17-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Nos. FC2018-095709, FC2019-095633
The Honorable William R. Wingard, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Aundrae Harris, Tempe
Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Sara Schneider, Queen Creek
Petitioner/ Appellee/Cross-Appellant
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Aundrae Harris (“Father”) appeals, and Sara Schneider
(“Mother”) cross-appeals, from the superior court’s post-judgment ruling
modifying legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support. For
reasons that follow, we vacate the child support order and remand for
recalculation. We affirm in all other respects.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father have one child together (“Child”), born in
September 2017. When Child was one year old, Mother petitioned to
establish legal decision-making, parenting time, and related issues, which
led to a judgment based on the parties’ agreement awarding joint legal
decision-making, giving Father multiple afternoons of parenting time each
week (to increase to every other weekend as Child got older), and no child
support beyond sharing daycare expenses.

¶3 Mother later petitioned to amend the judgment, alleging
domestic violence by Father and ultimately seeking sole legal decision-
making, supervised parenting time for Father, and a new child support
order. Meanwhile, Father petitioned to enforce the existing parenting time
order, leading to an agreed resolution as part of a temporary orders ruling.

¶4 Around the same time, a court-appointed advisor (“CAA”)
investigated the matter to make recommendations about Child’s best
interests. Although questioning both parents’ communication and co-
parenting track record, the CAA specifically noted Father’s violence against
Mother and recommended he complete services before beginning
overnight visits with Child.

¶5 After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court issued a
March 2021 modification judgment, finding grounds to modify the existing
judgment based largely on Father’s January 2020 domestic violence assault
on Mother during a parenting exchange. The court awarded Mother sole
legal decision-making, finding that Father had committed domestic

2
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

violence against her and had not rebutted the resulting statutory
presumption against joint legal decision-making. The court designated
Mother as Child’s primary residential parent and granted Father parenting
time two afternoons each week and every Saturday from morning to
evening. Consistent with the CAA’s recommendation, the court ordered
Father to complete an anger management assessment plus all
recommended follow-up, a 52-session domestic violence course, and at
least six months of individual counseling, after which he would resume
overnight parenting time from Friday afternoon into his existing Saturday
time. The court entered a child support order for Father to pay $652 in
current support monthly, plus past support from the date of Mother’s
petition.

¶6 Thereafter, Mother and Father continued to struggle with co-
parenting and effective communication, leading to multiple enforcement
actions and multiple protective order proceedings between the two.

¶7 In November 2023, Father petitioned to modify, alleging that
Mother had abused her legal decision-making authority to block his
relationship with Child, harassed him, and made false police reports
against him, all to Child’s detriment. He sought sole legal decision-making
and for Mother to exercise only supervised parenting time. Mother
responded and filed a cross-petition to modify, proposing supervised
parenting for Father. She also sought enforcement of the existing child
support order.

¶8 The court set an evidentiary hearing on the matter for late
March 2024. Just three weeks before the hearing, Father’s attorney
withdrew from representation without Father’s consent, citing “a severe
breakdown in the attorney–client relationship.” The court denied Father’s
self-represented motions to continue the evidentiary hearing, but during
the hearing granted a continuance on an oral motion by Father’s newly
retained attorney over Mother’s objection. The court authorized Mother to
apply for attorney’s fees related to preparation for and attendance at the
March hearing. After full briefing on this limited fees issue, and noting that
Father “was well aware of the evidentiary setting and associated deadlines”
despite his former counsel’s withdrawal, the court awarded Mother $4,500
(of more than $8,000 requested). The court then signed the attorney’s fee
award and included finality language, citing Rule 78(c) of the Arizona Rules
of Family Law Procedure.

¶9 Meanwhile, the court appointed the same CAA to investigate
and make recommendations about Child’s best interests. The CAA again

3
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

observed that both parties’ “co-parenting relationship and communication
has been chaotic and self-serving,” and she expressed concern that each
parent appeared more focused on gaining the upper hand rather than being
guided by Child’s best interests. Observing that Father had completed a
wide array of parenting classes and domestic violence services, this time
the CAA expressed more concern about Mother’s lack of truthfulness and
apparent pattern of false statements about Father. Opining that “Mother
having Sole Legal Decision-Making and being the Primary Residential
Parent has not worked for the parties or [Child],” the CAA recommended
awarding joint legal decision-making to encourage “more thoughtfulness
and accountability . . . versus random decisions” and a gradual transition
to an equal parenting time schedule.

¶10 After an evidentiary hearing at which Father, Mother, and the
CAA testified, the superior court made comprehensive best-interests
findings and entered modified parenting orders reflected in a final
judgment entered in December 2024. Although acknowledging the parents’
difficulties with each other, the court found that each was a “very capable”
parent with a safe, nurturing, and healthy relationship with Child. The
court awarded them joint legal decision-making (ordering “each parent [to]
give good faith consideration to the views of the other and put forth best
efforts to reach a consensus decision,” and giving Father final say over
educational issues and Mother final say over religion, extracurriculars, and
medical issues), gave Father parenting time the first three weekends of each
month, and ordered Father to pay Mother $478 monthly in current child
support. The court denied each party’s request for an award of attorney’s
fees. As to Mother’s request for child support enforcement, the court
referred the matter to the family law enforcement court for an updated
arrearage calculation.

¶11 Father timely appealed the modification judgment and
concurrently filed a motion for reconsideration. Mother timely moved to
alter or amend. The superior court denied both motions, and Mother timely
cross-appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶12 Father and Mother challenge various facets of the judgment:
the existence of changed circumstances warranting modification (Mother);
the court’s assessment of evidence bearing on best interests (primarily
Father); the court’s domestic-violence findings (both Father and Mother);
the award of joint legal decision-making and allocation of final say
authority (primarily Mother); the amount of parenting time (Father); the

4
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

child support order (Father); and an attorney’s fees award (Father).1 We
review the court’s rulings for an abuse of discretion with deference to the
court’s factual findings, but we consider de novo any questions of law. See
Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 179 (1982) (change of
circumstances); Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (best-
interests findings); Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009)
(credibility assessments and weighing evidence); DeLuna v. Petitto, 247
Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2019) (legal decision-making and parenting time);
Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 419, 422, ¶ 7 (App. 2017) (child support); Murray v.
Murray, 239 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 20 (App. 2016) (attorney’s fees). We address
each contention in turn.

I. Changed Circumstances.

¶13 The superior court is authorized to modify existing decision-
making and parenting orders when a material change of circumstances
affecting the child’s welfare has since occurred. See Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 343, ¶ 14 (App. 2020). Mother asserts that the court lacked a
basis for modification here because it was her salutary decisions as the sole
legal decision-maker that led Child to have a positive relationship with both
parents and become smart, healthy, and well-adjusted, as the court found.
Even though she denied grounds for modification by the time of trial,
Mother arguably conceded that a material change in circumstances
warranted revisiting the parenting orders by affirmatively seeking to
modify Father’s parenting time.

¶14 Moreover, although the court did not make an express
change-of-circumstances finding, its findings show close consideration of
changes since the last parenting order. For example, the court considered
and assessed Father’s post-ruling efforts to acknowledge and address his
prior domestic violence against Mother, which had a direct bearing on
availability and viability of joint legal decision-making. See A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(D)–(E); see also A.R.S. § 25-103(B)(2) (policy preference for shared

1 Mother also urges that Father waived all arguments on appeal by
failing to cite legal authorities or relevant record documents as required by
ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). Although largely lacking record and legal citations,
Father’s opening brief adequately explained his claims of error. Cf. In re
Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64–65, ¶ 6 (2013) (deeming waived only those
arguments the court is unable to “discern and address”). Accordingly, and
because the issues bear on Child’s best interests, cf. Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz.
99, 102–03 (2003), we decline to find Father’s arguments waived.

5
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

decision-making consistent with the child’s best interests). Although
Mother may disagree, the record supports the court’s decision.

II. Parenting Orders.

A. Best-Interests Findings.

¶15 Arizona courts determine legal decision-making and
parenting time “in accordance with the best interests of the child.” A.R.S. §
25-403(A). To do so, the court must consider all relevant factors bearing on
the child’s well-being. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A)(1)–(11), -403.01(B)(1)–
(4). In contested cases, the court must make express findings “about all
relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests
of the child.” A.R.S. § 25-403(B).

¶16 The court here made findings on all the §§ 25-403 and -403.01
factors. Father argues, however, that the superior court wrongly ignored
what he characterizes as Mother’s harassment and misrepresentations
designed to malign or discredit him. He presented police records (generally
prompted by his own reports) reflecting investigation of false statements
and harassment, but Mother presented countervailing evidence that no
charges were filed against her. The superior court weighed the parties’
conflicting accounts in its consideration of the best interest factors, and we
do not re-weigh the evidence on appeal. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16.

¶17 Father also asserts that the court arbitrarily and improperly
departed from the CAA’s factual assessment and recommendations, which
he characterizes as a due process violation. But the superior court “can
neither delegate a judicial decision to an expert witness nor abdicate its
responsibility to exercise independent judgment.” DePasquale v. Superior
Court, 181 Ariz. 333, 336 (App. 1995). While the court could (and did)
consider the CAA’s report and recommendations, the court had to make its
own findings and conduct its own best-interests assessment. Christopher K.
v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 301, ¶ 20 (App. 2013). Father thus has not shown
error.

¶18 Mother argues that Father threatened her under his breath
during trial. This incident was not raised with the superior court and is not
reflected in the record on appeal, so it provides no basis to challenge the
superior court’s ruling. And both Mother and Father cite the other’s
conduct after the modification ruling, which likewise cannot show error in
the ruling itself.

6
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

B. Domestic Violence Findings.

¶19 Among the factors bearing on best interests, the court must
consider “[w]hether there has been domestic violence or child abuse
pursuant to § 25-403.03.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(8). Section 25-403.03, in turn,
creates an array of prohibitions and presumptions applicable to legal
decision-making and parenting time when the court finds various types or
degrees of domestic violence by one or both parents. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(A)–(B), (D)–(E), (F).

¶20 First, the statute flatly prohibits an award of joint legal
decision-making if the court finds “significant” domestic violence as
defined in § 13-3601 or a “significant history” of domestic violence. A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03(A). Otherwise, if the court finds one parent committed “an act”
of domestic violence against the other, the statute imposes a rebuttable
presumption that awarding legal decision-making to the perpetrator is
contrary to the child’s best interests; no presumption applies if each parent
has committed domestic violence against the other. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D)
(qualifying acts and presumption), (E) (rebutting the presumption). A
parent found to have committed an act of domestic violence must prove
that granting parenting time will not endanger the child, and the court may
impose conditions on any parenting time awarded as necessary to protect
the child and the other parent. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F).

¶21 In all cases, the court must consider domestic violence to be
against a child’s best interests and place “primary importance” on the
victim’s and child’s safety. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(B). And as with any best-
interests factor relevant to a contested case, the court must make findings
about the existence of domestic violence and whether the statutory
presumption has been rebutted. Olesen v. Daniel, 251 Ariz. 25, 29, ¶ 17 (App.
2021); see also In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, 526, ¶ 5 (App. 2002)
(findings required whether granting or denying petition).

¶22 Here, the superior court found that Father had committed
domestic violence against Mother, but that his actions did not fall into the
category of “significant” or “significant history” for purposes of the § 25-
403.03(A) prohibition of joint legal decision-making. The court further
found that the § 25-403.03(D) presumption against awarding Father
decision-making authority applied because Father had committed an act of
domestic violence and Mother had not, but that Father had rebutted the
presumption through his subsequent recognition of the impact of his
actions and his efforts (domestic-violence treatment, anger management,
and parenting education) to address it. The court directed that parenting

7
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

exchanges occur at a police station and that Father communicate with
Mother only by electronic means to protect against further harm.

¶23 Mother argues that the superior court ignored undisputed
evidence of additional acts of domestic violence Father committed against
her after the previous parenting orders went into effect. In her view, the
court thus erred by declining to find a “significant history” of domestic
violence under § 25-403.03(A). But the only domestic violence allegations
in Mother’s pretrial statement were Father’s actions before the previous
(March 2021) parenting order, and Mother did not present evidence of
subsequent domestic violence at trial. The court considered those actions
when crafting the March 2021 judgment, which likewise did not find
“significant” domestic violence or a “significant history” of domestic
violence but awarded Mother sole legal decision-making based on Father’s
failure to rebut the § 25-403.03(D) presumption. Mother has not shown
error in this regard.

¶24 For his part, Father asserts that the superior court improperly
ignored his allegations of domestic violence by Mother, specifically
flagging her alleged false reports to law enforcement and violation of a
protective order. But Father did not raise these issues as “domestic
violence” in superior court, instead suggesting they showed Mother’s lack
of credibility and evidenced her intent to block Father from Child’s life.
And Father specifically asked that the parties be awarded joint legal
decision-making, which is logically inconsistent with an allegation of
domestic violence by Mother. See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A), (D). Although
some of the underlying facts could qualify as domestic violence under
certain circumstances, see, e.g., A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D)(3), Father did not allege
or show them as such, so the court did not err by failing to address them in
that light.

C. Legal Decision-Making.

¶25 In contested cases, the superior court must “make specific
findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which
the decision is in the best interests of the child.” A.R.S. § 25-403(B). Here,
Mother argues that the court failed to adequately explain its rationale for
awarding joint legal decision-making, asserting that the parents’ track
record of issues communicating and co-parenting undermines the ruling.
The court acknowledged the interpersonal conflict driven by both parents’
past bad behavior. But it also heard evidence that Father had pursued
parenting education to develop better communication skills. And it
received evidence that, at least to some degree, sole decision-making (e.g.,

8
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

Mother’s unilateral decisions in choosing and changing Child’s school)
proved a flashpoint for the parents’ conflict. Even if the court could have
reached a different conclusion, the record supports its findings that both
Father and Mother are capable parents and are capable of interacting
appropriately to serve Child’s interests.

¶26 Mother also asserts that the superior court erred by giving
Father final say over educational decisions, noting that Father has only
weekend parenting time and is thus less affected by the location of Child’s
school. Location, of course, is not the only consideration in educational
decisions. But even if it were, Father (who volunteers regularly in Child’s
classroom) testified that he would prioritize finding, in consultation with
Mother, a school that meets Child’s needs and is most convenient for all
involved. The superior court thus did not abuse its discretion in allocating
final say authority.2

D. Parenting Time.

¶27 Father asserts that the court erred by declining to adopt the
CAA’s recommendation of equal parenting time. But as previously noted,
the court cannot delegate the decision to the CAA and is not bound by the
CAA’s recommendations. See DePasquale, 181 Ariz. at 336. Apart from the
fact that the CAA made a different recommendation, Father offers no legal
basis to displace the court’s determination that granting Father parenting
time for the first three weekends of each month is in Child’s best interests.

III. Child Support.

¶28 Father next challenges the superior court’s order that he pay
Mother $478 per month in current support. Although he asserts that the
court used outdated income information, the court calculated child support
using the data to which the parties testified at trial.

¶29 As Father points out, however, the court transposed the
parties’ roles on the child support worksheet, completing it as though
Father were the primary residential parent and Mother owed him child

2 In his reply/cross-answering brief, Father raises new contentions
that he should be awarded sole legal decision-making or, alternatively, final
say over medical and extracurricular decisions as well. Father waived these
requests to enlarge his rights by failing to raise them until his reply brief.
See In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 583 n.5 (App. 2000); see also
ARCAP 13(c) (reply brief “must be strictly confined to rebuttal of points
made in the appellee’s answering brief”).

9
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

support. The court also omitted the mandatory parenting time adjustment
for Father’s allotted parenting time days. See A.R.S. § 25-320 app.
(“Guidelines”) § V. Accordingly, we vacate the child support order and
remand for a corrected calculation and order.

IV. Attorney’s Fees.

¶30 Finally, Father asserts that the superior court erred when,
after Father’s attorney withdrew just weeks before trial, the court
sanctioned Father for that attorney’s failure to submit exhibits timely.3
Father did not raise this issue in his opening brief and has thus waived it.
See In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. at 583 n.5. Moreover, the record
shows that the court designed the limited attorney’s fee award (presumably
the sanction at issue) not to penalize Father, but rather to compensate
Mother for the time and expense of preparing for a trial that the court
continued at Father’s request and over Mother’s objection. Waiver aside,
we discern no error.

3 The superior court signed the fee award and designated it as an
ostensibly final judgment under Rule 78(c). This fee award, which ruled on
one subset of Mother’s claim for attorney’s fees while the modification
proceedings remained ongoing, did not resolve “all claims, issues, and
parties” as necessary to qualify as a final judgment on this basis. See Ariz.
R. Fam. Law P. 78(c). Despite the reference to Rule 78(c), the ruling thus
was not (at that time) substantively final or immediately appealable. Cf.
Madrid v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Chandler, L.L.C., 236 Ariz. 221, 224–25, ¶¶ 6, 11
(App. 2014) (in analogous civil context, noting that including Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 54(c) language when claims remain pending is inaccurate). The court
also did not include the requisite determination or certification for entry of
judgment under Rule 78(b). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider
this issue as part of Father’s appeal from the final modification judgment.

10
 SCHNEIDER v. HARRIS
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶31 We vacate the child support order and remand for
recalculation. In all other respects, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

11