Jones v. Tempe

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

RUSSELL JONES, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CITY OF TEMPE, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0083
FILED 11-06-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-005836
The Honorable Scott Sebastian Minder, Judge

AFFIRM

COUNSEL

ZWILLINGER WULKAN PLC, Phoenix
By Larry J. Wulkan, Lauren Whittaker, Alexis J. Eisa
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Tempe City Attorney’s Office, Tempe
By Eric C. Anderson, Sarah R. Anchors
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
 JONES v. TEMPE, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey
joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Russell Jones appeals the superior court’s order denying his
request for attorney fees from the City of Tempe (“Tempe”) under Arizona
Revised Statutes Section 39-121.02(B). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Jones was arrested by the Tempe Police Department in
October 2023. In December, Jones submitted a public records request for,
among other things, the arresting officers’ body-worn camera (“BWC”)
footage. Tempe filed criminal charges against him three days later.

¶3 Tempe processes public records requests for BWC footage in
the order they are received. Each officer’s BWC footage must be reviewed
at least twice in “real time,” once to redact audio and once to redact video.
Requests can range from a single, minutes-long video to dozens of videos
involving hours of footage. This means a single request can take a reviewer
anywhere from a few hours to multiple weeks to process. Tempe typically
employs two specialists trained to redact BWC footage, but at the time of
Jones’ request, one specialist had retired, and Tempe had not yet been able
to hire a replacement. Accordingly, the personnel shortage, time-intensive
redaction process, and volume of requests led to a backlog of approximately
330 pending public records requests for BWC footage at the time Jones filed
his request.

¶4 In March 2024, Tempe informed Jones that due to the backlog
and personnel shortage, it estimated his request for BWC footage would not
be completed until the end of the year but could be expedited if he sought
a subpoena.

¶5 Tempe soon provided Jones with all requested records except
for the BWC footage. Two days later, Jones filed a special action to compel
production of the BWC footage, arguing Tempe failed to “promptly
respond” to his request as required under Section 39-121.01(E).

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Decision of the Court

¶6 At a status conference in early April, Tempe informed Jones
that he would receive the same BWC footage, unredacted, as part of his
criminal case. Indeed, he received the unredacted BWC footage a few weeks
later. Jones then filed an application for attorney fees under Section
39-121.02(B).

¶7 In October 2024, the superior court denied Jones’ application.
It found that Tempe promptly responded to his request under the
circumstances, and thus Jones was not entitled to fees because he had not
substantially prevailed. The court also found that even if Tempe was not
prompt and Jones had substantially prevailed, it would still deny Jones’
request because Tempe made appropriate efforts to comply with its
statutory obligations, including by providing alternatives to expedite the
request.

¶8 Jones appealed the denial. We have jurisdiction under
Sections 12-2101(A)(1) and 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 We review the superior court’s award or denial of attorney
fees under Section 39-121.02(B) for an abuse of discretion. Am. C.L. Union of
Ariz. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 458, 461, ¶ 11 (2021).

¶10 “If a plaintiff is found to have substantially prevailed in an
action seeking to enforce a public records request, the trial court has broad
discretion under [Section] 39-121.02(B) to award or deny attorney fees and
costs.” Id. “We will not disturb the trial court’s discretionary award of fees
if there is any reasonable basis for it.” Id. Finding that a party substantially
prevailed is merely a “threshold requirement” under Section 39-121.02(B);
the decision to award fees remains discretionary. Democratic Party of Pima
Cnty. v. Ford, 228 Ariz. 545, 547–48, ¶¶ 8–9 (App. 2012).

¶11 Even assuming Jones substantially prevailed, the superior
court would have still denied him fees. Our only relevant inquiry is
whether such denial was an abuse of discretion.

¶12 The record supports the court’s decision to deny fees. The
delay was due to a personnel shortage, the burdensome nature of redacting
BWC footage, and the backlog of requests. The record contains no evidence
of Tempe’s misconduct. Indeed, Tempe provided Jones with reasonable
alternatives, such as issuing a subpoena or merely accepting as satisfactory
the unredacted versions of the BWC footage that Tempe provided in his
criminal case. Jones did not challenge Tempe’s policies for redacting BWC

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Decision of the Court

footage and processing requests, and he gave no reason why his request
should receive priority over the 330 requests ahead of him. We see no basis
to conclude that the superior court abused its discretion.

¶13 Jones requests his attorney fees and costs on appeal under
Sections 12-341, 39-121.02, and ARCAP 21. Because Jones is not the
prevailing party on appeal, we deny his request.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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