KRISHNAN v. KRISHNAN

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of:

THE AIYLAM AND SARANYA KRISHNAN LIVING TRUST,

________________________________________________________

SUNDAR KRISHNAN, et al., Petitioners/Appellees,

v.

VENKATESH KRISHNAN, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0139 PB

FILED 01-14-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. PB2021-003129
The Honorable Elizabeth T. Bingert, Judge Pro Tempore

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Alexander R. Arpad, Phoenix
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., Phoenix
By Kathi M. Sandweiss
Co-Counsel for Petitioners/Appellees

Lincoln & Lauer, Phoenix
By Michelle M. Lauer
Co-Counsel for Petitioners/Appellees
 KRISHNAN, et al. v. KRISHNAN
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Venkatesh Krishnan appeals from the superior court’s order
denying his motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the court’s award of
attorneys’ fees and costs to Sundar Krishnan and Suchitra Krishnan Myjak
and against Venkatesh.1 For the following reasons, we reverse the court’s
order, vacate the award of attorneys’ fees, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In November 2011, Aiylam and Saranya Krishnan established
“The Aiylam and Saranya Krishnan Living Trust” (“Trust”), designating
two of their children—Venkatesh and Suchitra—as beneficiaries, each
entitled to a 50 percent share upon the death of either grantor. The Trust
named Venkatesh as successor trustee.

¶3 In March 2017, after Aiylam had died, Saranya, as surviving
grantor and trustee, amended the Trust to add two additional children—
Sundar and Sujatha—as beneficiaries, each entitled to a 25 percent share
upon her death.

¶4 Following Saranya’s death two years later, Venkatesh notified
his siblings by email that he was then serving as successor trustee. In that
correspondence, he advised them that they could request relevant portions
of the trust instrument and would receive an annual accounting. Over the
following years, disputes arose among the four siblings regarding
Venkatesh’s administration of the Trust, the management of its assets, and
the distribution of Trust property.

1 Because the parties share a common family name, we respectfully refer to

them by their first names to avoid confusion.

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 KRISHNAN, et al. v. KRISHNAN
Opinion of the Court

¶5 In July 2021, Sundar and Suchitra jointly petitioned the
superior court to: (1) remove Venkatesh as trustee, (2) appoint Suchitra as
successor trustee, (3) compel Venkatesh to turn an asset over to the Trust,
(4) impose surcharges for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, and (5) award
them attorneys’ fees and costs. They later amended their petition to request
additional remedies, while maintaining their claim for attorneys’ fees and
costs.

¶6 In September 2023, Sundar and Suchitra moved to dismiss
their claims. The motion explained that they were unable to obtain
necessary documents from a foreign bank and that personal circumstances
made continuing the litigation impractical. Sundar and Suchitra asked the
court to permit them to voluntarily withdraw their claims so long as the
court directed Venkatesh to complete his administrative duties over the
Trust.

¶7 In January 2024, the court entered an order granting Sundar
and Suchitra’s motion to withdraw their claims and ordering Venkatesh to
complete administration of the Trust. In August 2024, the court dismissed
the case with prejudice, ordering that any motion for attorneys’ fees be filed
within 20 days.

¶8 Venkatesh filed an application seeking an award of attorneys’
fees and costs. Sundar and Suchitra each submitted their own applications
seeking attorneys’ fees and costs from Venkatesh.

¶9 Venkatesh opposed Sundar and Suchitra’s requests, arguing
that they had cited no authority supporting an award of attorneys’ fees and
had not prevailed on any of their claims. He maintained that the court’s
dismissal order had resolved their fee requests, and that, as the prevailing
party, he was instead entitled to recover a fee award—although his
response likewise cited no authority supporting such an award.

¶10 In December 2024, the court awarded Sundar approximately
$16,000 and Suchitra approximately $25,000 in attorneys’ fees citing A.R.S.
§ 14-1105(A). The court concluded that Venkatesh’s conduct throughout the
proceedings had unreasonably expanded the litigation.

¶11 In January 2025, Venkatesh moved for a new trial or to alter
or amend the judgment on attorneys’ fees, which the court ultimately
denied. We have jurisdiction over Venkatesh’s timely notices of appeal,
challenging the attorneys’ fees award as well as the denial of his motion for
a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment, under Article 6, Section 9, of
the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

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 KRISHNAN, et al. v. KRISHNAN
Opinion of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶12 Venkatesh argues the superior court erred in awarding
attorneys’ fees to Sundar and Suchitra based on § 14-1105(A) because (1)
they failed to cite any legal authority supporting their fee request, and (2)
the court misapplied the statute in granting the award. He also argues the
award included fees not reasonably attributable to any fault or
unreasonable action by him. Because the court misapplied § 14-1105(A) and
erred in granting attorneys’ fees to Sundar and Suchitra, we need not
address Venkatesh’s argument that the award included fees not caused by
his conduct.

¶13 We generally review a superior court’s award of attorneys’
fees for an abuse of discretion, but review questions of law de novo. King v.
Titsworth, 221 Ariz. 597, 598, ¶ 8 (App. 2009). When a rule is clear and
unambiguous, we give its language its ordinary meaning unless doing so
would lead to an absurd result. Searchtoppers.com, L.L.C. v. TrustCash LLC, 231 Ariz. 236, 239, ¶ 10 (App. 2012).

I. Sundar and Suchitra’s Pleadings Gave Venkatesh Notice They
Were Seeking Attorneys’ Fees.

¶14 Venkatesh argues Sundar and Suchitra never cited any statute
or rule authorizing a post-dismissal award of attorneys’ fees and thus
deprived him of notice of their intent to seek such an award. We disagree.

¶15 The notice requirement is governed by Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(g)(1), the interpretation of which we review de novo. King, 221
Ariz. at 598, ¶ 8. “We also seek to read court rules in conjunction with one
another and harmonize them whenever possible.” Searchtoppers.com, L.L.C.,
231 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 10; see Ariz. R. Prob. P. 4(a)(1) (“The Civil Rules apply to
probate proceedings unless they are inconsistent with these probate
rules . . . .”).

¶16 Civil Rule 54(g)(1) provides that a claim for attorneys’ fees
“must be made in the pleadings.” Probate Rule 2(u) defines a “pleading” as
“an application, a petition, or a response to a petition.” Here, Sundar and
Suchitra requested an award of attorneys’ fees and costs against Venkatesh
under §§ 14-1105 and -11004 in their joint petition and amended joint
petition. Accordingly, they provided Venkatesh with proper notice of their
intent to seek attorneys’ fees in compliance with Civil Rule 54(g)(1). See Fen
Investments, LLC v. Fonzi Food, 257 Ariz. 533, 541, ¶ 36 (App. 2024)
(concluding that party gave proper notice of an award of attorneys’ fees
because the party’s “complaint cited authority for a fee award”); accord

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 KRISHNAN, et al. v. KRISHNAN
Opinion of the Court

King, 221 Ariz. at 599, ¶ 11 (holding the superior court cannot award
attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 if the seeking party does not make
a claim for such award in its pleadings, including a complaint).

II. Under § 14-1105(A), the Superior Court May Grant an Award of
Attorneys’ Fees Only to a Decedent’s Trust, Not Its Beneficiaries.

¶17 Because Venkatesh’s procedural argument fails, we turn to
whether § 14-1105(A) authorized the superior court’s post-dismissal fee
award. Venkatesh argues that § 14-1105(A) permits only a decedent’s trust,
not its beneficiaries, to recover attorneys’ fees. We agree.

¶18 Sundar and Suchitra contend that Venkatesh failed to
preserve for appeal his argument that § 14-1105 does not authorize a fee
award to beneficiaries. Not so. Venkatesh argued in his response to Sundar
and Suchitra’s fee application in the superior court that they had “not
identified a single authority that would justify an award of fees.” That was
sufficient to preserve this issue for appeal.

¶19 “Arizona ‘follow[s] the general American rule that attorney
fees are not recoverable unless they are expressly provided for either by
statute or contract.’” L.H. v. Culbertson, 257 Ariz. 459, 462, ¶ 8 (App. 2024)
(quoting Kaufmann v. Cruikshank, 222 Ariz. 488, 490, ¶ 7 (App. 2009)).
“Whether a statute, rule, or contractual provision authorizes a fee award in
a particular case is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Culbertson, 257 Ariz.
at 462, ¶ 8 (citing State v. Shipman, 208 Ariz. 474, 474, ¶ 3 (App. 2004)).

¶20 Section 14-1105(A) states that

[i]f the court finds that a decedent’s estate or trust has
incurred professional fees or expenses as a result of
unreasonable conduct, the court may order the person who
engaged in the conduct . . . to pay the decedent’s estate
or trust for some or all of the fees and expenses as the court
deems just under the circumstances.

(Emphasis added).

¶21 The superior court cited only § 14-1105(A) as a basis for its
award, finding that Venkatesh unreasonably expanded the litigation by
filing a motion that: (1) created unnecessary delay, (2) disrupted the
established distribution timeline, and (3) prolonged the resolution of
distributions and fees. It then ordered Venkatesh to pay attorneys’ fees to
Sundar and Suchitra.

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 KRISHNAN, et al. v. KRISHNAN
Opinion of the Court

¶22 The plain language of § 14-1105(A), however, provides that
“the decedent’s estate or trust” is eligible for an award of fees. The statute
does not address fee awards to beneficiaries. Sundar and Suchitra were
named as beneficiaries in the Trust’s 2017 amendment. They are not the
decedent’s estate or trust, nor are they trustees. Accordingly, § 14-1105(A)
does not authorize an award of attorneys’ fees to them. We therefore vacate
the superior court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Sundar and Suchitra against
Venkatesh.

III. We Grant Costs to Venkatesh.

¶23 Venkatesh requests an award of costs incurred on appeal
under A.R.S. § 12-341. Sundar and Suchitra request attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred on appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 14-1105.

¶24 Because we vacate the superior court’s award of attorneys’
fees and costs to Sundar and Suchitra, they are not the prevailing party.
Accordingly, we deny their request, and award Venkatesh taxable costs,
subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶25 We reverse the superior court’s order denying Venkatesh’s
motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the court’s award of attorneys’
fees and costs, vacate the superior court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs
for Sundar and Suchitra against Venkatesh, and remand to the superior
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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