Smith v. Reynolds

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

MICHELET MICHAEL SMITH, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

JESSICA REYNOLDS, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0147
FILED 09-30-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-029230
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Michelet Michael Smith, Mesa
Plaintiff/Appellant

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, P.C., Phoenix
By Kelley M. Jancaitis, Danielle N. Chronister
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Vice Chief Judge David D.
Weinzweig joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Michelet Michael Smith appeals the superior court’s dismissal
of his complaint under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).
We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In October 2024, Smith filed a complaint against Jessica
Reynolds and Nikki Petit (collectively, “Defendants”), raising claims of
professional misconduct, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and seeking $300,000 in damages. Smith alleged Reynolds
improperly substituted as opposing counsel for his then-wife in a separate
family law matter and filed pleadings that “exacerbat[ed] procedural
delays and prejudic[ed] [his] legal standing.” He alleged Petit, acting as
Reynolds’ paralegal, engaged in improper and threatening
communications, causing him severe emotional distress.

¶3 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), arguing Smith alleged insufficient facts to support his claims.
After full responsive briefing, the superior court issued a minute entry on
December 4, 2024, granting the motion to dismiss, allowing Defendants to
apply for an award of costs, and directing them to submit a proposed form
of judgment.

¶4 Defendants then filed a verified statement of costs, and Smith
filed an objection. On December 23, 2024, the court entered a signed
judgment with Rule 54(c) finality language that awarded Defendants
$265.75—the amount requested—in taxable costs.

¶5 Smith filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction
under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1).

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DISCUSSION

I. Smith’s due process rights were not violated.

¶6 Smith does not challenge the merits of the superior court’s
ruling granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Rather, he argues the court
committed several procedural errors, which he alleges deprived him of his
right to due process.

¶7 We review de novo constitutional issues, including an alleged
violation of due process. Wassef v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 242 Ariz.
90, 93, ¶ 11 (App. 2017). “Due process entitles a party to notice and an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Cook v. Losnegard, 228 Ariz. 202, 206, ¶ 18 (App. 2011) (citation omitted).
“Due process errors require reversal only if a party is thereby prejudiced.”
Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 470, ¶ 26 (App. 2014) (citation omitted).

A. The superior court entered a final, appealable judgment.

¶8 Smith argues the superior court never entered a final,
appealable order or judgment because the December 4 ruling dismissing
his complaint was unsigned. He further argues the court’s subsequent
signed judgment, which incorporated the December 4 ruling, caused
procedural ambiguity that deprived him of due process.

¶9 Smith is correct that the December 4 ruling was not a final,
appealable order or judgment because it was unsigned. See Ariz. R. Civ. P.
58(b) (requiring that a judgment be signed by a judge or authorized court
commissioner). But the December 4 ruling became appealable when the
court entered a signed final judgment for Defendants on December 23. A
judgment as to all claims and parties is final if the judgment recites that no
further matters remain pending and that the judgment is entered under
Rule 54(c). Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

¶10 The December 23 judgment incorporated the December 4
ruling by reference, and stated that “no further matters remain pending”
and that judgment was entered under Rule 54(c). Because the court entered
a signed judgment that included Rule 54(c) language and disposed of all
issues, the court’s ruling granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss became
appealable under § 12-2101(A)(1).

¶11 Smith also argues the December 4 ruling was improperly
titled and created ambiguity because it was titled “Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.” But even assuming the ruling was titled incorrectly, its subject

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was clear from its contents. See Hegel v. O’Malley Ins. Co., 117 Ariz. 411, 412
(1977) (reasoning that examining only the title of a motion is contrary to the
purpose of the rules of civil procedure).

¶12 Nor does Smith identify how he was prejudiced either by the
court’s final judgment or by the title of its December 4 minute entry. And
although he alleges the court’s actions may have created procedural
ambiguity, he does not explain how either deprived him of his right to
notice or to be heard. We discern no error.

B. Smith had no right to file a surreply, and his due process
rights were not violated on that basis.

¶13 Smith also alleges the superior court denied him due process
by granting the motion to dismiss without permitting him to file a surreply.

¶14 Here, Smith received due process. He was given a full and
fair opportunity to respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss and filed a
response defending against dismissal. Smith, however, contends the court
should have allowed him to address new arguments raised in Defendants’
reply brief. But he identifies no such arguments, and Defendants did not
raise new arguments in their reply. And nothing in Rule 7.1, which covers
motions, provides for a response to a reply, known as a surreply, let alone
entitles Smith to one. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a). Moreover, Smith never
moved to file a surreply and thus waived any argument that the court erred
by not allowing him to file one. See Gross v. Shores at Rainbow Lake Cmty.
Ass’n, 258 Ariz. 365, 373, ¶ 24 (App. 2024).

II. Smith was not entitled to an opportunity to amend his complaint.

¶15 Smith next argues the court erred when it did not sua sponte
offer him leave to amend his complaint under Rule 15(a)(2), which
generally provides that leave to amend the complaint should be granted
liberally. Under Rule 7.1(a)(1), “[a]n application to the court for an order
must be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, must be in
writing, state with particularity the grounds for granting the motion, and
set forth the relief or order sought.”

¶16 Here, the record shows Smith never moved for leave to
amend his complaint. And Smith’s reference to repleading in his objection
to Defendants’ application for costs is not a motion and is not pleaded with
particularity as required by Rule 7.1(a)(1). Thus, the court did not err
because it did not sua sponte grant Smith leave to amend his complaint.

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¶17 Smith also contends the court erred by not granting leave to
amend because the court should have considered his unrepresented status
to ensure he had a fair opportunity to be heard. But in Arizona, pro se
litigants are not afforded any special leniency and are held to the same
standards as attorneys. Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022).
The court did not err by not affording Smith any special leniency.

III. The superior court did not err in granting Defendants their taxable
costs.

¶18 Smith argues the superior court erred in granting Defendants
their taxable costs. Smith is incorrect.

¶19 Smith’s challenge to Defendants’ recovery of taxable costs
largely turns on his mistaken belief that the court’s December 4 ruling and
subsequent judgment were invalid and unenforceable. But the judgment
properly incorporated the valid December 4 ruling and resolved all issues
implicated by Smith’s complaint in a signed and certified writing that was
final and appealable. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Further, a request for costs
is properly submitted before final judgment enters. See Ariz. R. Civ. P.
54(f)(2)(A).

¶20 And although Smith maintains “the court failed to provide
adequate findings or justification” before awarding costs, the court is
generally not required to state findings or conclusions when ruling on a
motion, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3), including a request for costs, see Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 54(f). Further, although Smith argues he was not given a fair
opportunity to oppose Defendants’ request for costs, the record reflects,
and Smith admits, that he timely objected to Defendants’ statement of costs.

¶21 Having achieved dismissal of the complaint against them,
Defendants were entitled to an award of costs under A.R.S. § 12-341. See
Assyia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Ariz. 216, 223, ¶ 32 (App. 2012).
The superior court did not err in awarding Defendants their taxable costs.

IV. Defendants are entitled to their taxable costs on appeal.

¶22 Citing A.R.S. § 12-332 and the private attorney general
doctrine, Smith requests costs and attorneys’ fees on appeal. Even ignoring
the questionable applicability of Smith’s authorities, we note Smith is not
the successful party, is not an attorney, and has not otherwise incurred
attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, we decline to award Smith costs or fees.
Defendants request costs on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341. As the prevailing

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party, Defendants are awarded their taxable costs upon compliance with
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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