goetzinger/poe v. Goetzinger-Amendt

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

SARAH R. GOETZINGER, Respondent/Appellee,

and

STEVEN J. POE, Respondent/Appellee,

v.

FRANCES GOETZINGER-AMENDT, Intervenor/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0170 FC
FILED 11-28-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2021-070453
The Honorable Jillian Francis, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Frances Goetzinger-Amendt, Wickenburg
Intervenor/Appellant

Sarah R. Goetzinger
Respondent/Appellee
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in
which Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Maternal Grandmother appeals the superior court’s denial of
her request for grandparent visitation with her grandchild (“Child”). For
reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Child lived with Grandmother from Child’s birth
until Child was three years old. During that time, Grandmother helped
“care [for Child’s] every need.” Father, too, lived at Grandmother’s home
for Child’s first two years until Father returned to prison. Then Mother and
Father divorced.

¶3 Mother and Grandmother’s relationship soon deteriorated
when Mother’s boyfriend was introduced. Grandmother refused to allow
the boyfriend to move into her home and reported to police the boyfriend
was molesting Child. Police conducted an initial investigation before
closing the matter. After Grandmother made disparaging comments about
both Mother and the boyfriend, Mother blocked all contact between
Grandmother and Child.

¶4 Grandmother twice petitioned the superior court for
grandparent visitation—one petition sought visitation with Child, and the
other sought visitation with a grandchild born to Mother and the boyfriend.
This appeal only concerns Grandmother’s petition for visitation with Child.
The superior court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to address both
petitions, allotting two hours for the combined hearing, and stating through
minute entry that each party would have “about 1/2 of the available time
to present your case.”

¶5 At the hearing, Grandmother, Mother, Father, and the
boyfriend all testified. A portion of the testimony focused on
Grandmother’s medical marijuana use. Grandmother testified she used
medical marijuana to treat her workplace injury that resulted in her being
“permanently disabled” “physically and emotionally, mentally” but

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stopped using it because of Mother’s concerns. Mother testified she cut off
Grandmother’s access to Child, in part, because of her marijuana use,
explaining that Child “knew how to use a bong, . . . knew how to hold a
pipe,” and had access to lighters.

¶6 After taking the matter under advisement, the superior court
denied Grandmother’s request for visitation, finding she had not met her
burden to show that visitation would be in Child’s best interests. A.R.S.
§ 25-409(C), (E). Following entry of final judgment, Grandmother timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Grandmother does not challenge the superior court’s finding
that she failed to prove visitation would be in Child’s best interests. In re
Marriage of Friedman and Roels, 244 Ariz. 111, 115, ¶ 12 (2018) (explaining
courts consider a “non-exhaustive list of relevant [child’s best interests]
factors” when presented with a third party’s petition for visitation (citation
modified)); A.R.S. § 25-409(E) (directing Arizona courts to “give special
weight to the legal parents’ opinion of what serves their child’s best
interests”). Instead, Grandmother alleges several due process violations.
“We review constitutional questions, including compliance with due
process, de novo.” Matter of Guardianship of A.K., 258 Ariz. 336, 342, ¶ 16
(App. 2024) (citation omitted).

¶8 First, Grandmother asserts the superior court erred by
denying her motion (filed the day before trial) to present evidence of her
good moral character through a witness who would appear telephonically
or by the admission of the witness’ written character statement. “A ruling
admitting or excluding evidence will not be overturned on appeal absent
abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice.” In re Conservatorship for Hardt,
242 Ariz. 449, 452, ¶ 9 (App. 2017).

¶9 Regarding the motion for telephonic appearance, Arizona
Rule of Family Law Procedure (“ARFLP”) 8(d)(1) requires a party who
wishes to present telephonic testimony to file the request “within a time
that allows the opposing party a reasonable opportunity to respond.” Given
the timing of Grandmother’s motion, the court was within its discretion to
deny the request.

¶10 As for the written character statement, the court explained: “I
don’t know what it is, what the document that you’re referring to is. If it’s
a character statement…I don’t allow those. But you’re welcome to proceed

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with the other evidence that you wanted to present today.” Grandmother
offers no legal authority requiring the court to admit into evidence a written
character statement. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a) (“Evidence of a person’s character
or a trait of character is [generally] not admissible[.]”). Regardless,
Grandmother has not argued or shown how she was prejudiced by the
court’s refusal to consider the same.

¶11 Next, Grandmother argues the superior court denied her the
opportunity to cross-examine Mother’s witness. At the start of the
evidentiary hearing, the court explained, “I’m going to give each side a little
under 30 minutes to present their evidence and testimony to the Court.
We’ll do our best to adjust the time if we can based upon how much
everyone is speaking today.” Because Grandmother was the petitioner, she
testified first. The court reminded Grandmother of the time limitations
three times during her testimony. Grandmother used the entirety of her
allotted thirty minutes to testify. That is why the court did not allow
Grandmother to cross-examine Mother’s witness.

¶12 On appeal, Grandmother points to the superior court’s
minute entry setting aside two hours for the evidentiary hearing. Because
the hearing concluded after only one hour and seven minutes,
Grandmother seems to argue the court should have allowed her additional
time. Though the court certainly could have afforded each party additional
time, the court has discretion to “impose reasonable time limits appropriate
to the proceedings.” ARFLP 22(a); see Gamboa v. Metzler, 223 Ariz. 399, 402,
¶ 13 (App. 2010) (“[A] trial court has broad discretion over the management
of a trial.”). “A party may request additional time,” ARFLP 22(a), but
Grandmother never did. And because this hearing involved multiple
parties (Grandmother, Mother, and Father in the first petition and
Grandmother, Mother, and the boyfriend in the second), the court provided
each party thirty minutes to “present their case.” Because Father and the
boyfriend did not use all their allotted time, the hearing concluded short of
the allotted two hours. But each party was afforded equal time. Moreover,
“to merit reversal, a party must show they incurred some harm as a result
of a court’s time limitations.” Gamboa, 223 Ariz. at 402, ¶ 17 (citation
modified). Grandmother has not shown any harm.

¶13 Finally, Grandmother contends the superior court erred by
considering Mother’s assertion in her pretrial statement that Grandmother
has “mental health issues” without corroborating evidence “such as
medical records or mental health evaluations.” But Grandmother herself
testified she “was determined totally, permanently disabled[,] . . .
physically and emotionally, mentally.”

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¶14 Regardless, in its written summary of the best interests factors
under A.R.S. § 25-403(A), the superior court noted “Mother has concerns
about [Grandmother’s] mental health,” but then made no findings of its
own regarding that health. In finding Grandmother failed to establish that
her visitation was in Child’s best interests, the court did not rely on
Grandmother’s health. Instead, the court focused on the animosity between
Grandmother and the boyfriend, and “Mother’s valid concerns about
[Grandmother’s] past behavior.” Grandmother has not shown that the
court erred.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s
denial of Grandmother’s petition for visitation.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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