1 CA-CV 25-0172-FC Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Goetzinger-Amendt v. Goetzinger-Poe

Arizona Court of Appeals · Filed November 25, 2025

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Opinion text

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

FRANCES GOETZINGER-AMENDT, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

SARAH R. GOETZINGER-POE, Respondent/Appellee,

and

FAYDE M. RIGGIN, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0172 FC
FILED 11-25-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2024-070182
The Honorable Jillian Francis, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Frances Goetzinger-Amendt, Protected Address
Petitioner/Appellant

Sarah R. Goetzinger, Surprise
Respondent/Appellee

Fayde M. Riggin, Protected Address
Respondent/Appellee
GOETZINGER-AMENDT v. GOETZINGER-POE, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Frances Goetzinger-Amendt (“Grandmother”) appeals the
superior court’s order denying her petition for grandparent visitation. For
the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In February 2024, Grandmother petitioned for third-party
visitation rights to her grandchild, C.G., who was born in 2022. The court
set a hearing, also involving C.G.’s unmarried parents, Sarah Goetzinger-
Poe (“Mother”) (Grandmother’s daughter) and Fayde Riggin (“Father”).1

¶3 At the start of the hearing, the court noted each side would
receive “a little under 30 minutes to present their evidence and testimony.”
The court said it would do its “best to adjust the time . . . based upon how
much everyone [was] speaking.”

¶4 Grandmother sought permission to allow her “moral
character” witness to appear telephonically and claimed she had filed a
request to that effect. The court noted it did not have a copy of the request.
Opposing counsel acknowledged she received it the previous evening at
5:44 p.m., and the courtroom clerk noted she “believe[d]” the court received
a copy.

¶5 Grandmother used all of her allotted time to testify, despite
the court reminding her, when two minutes remained, that her allotted time
was almost used up. During Mother’s testimony, she moved to admit a
police report in which Grandmother alleged Father molested L.G.
Grandmother objected, and the court admitted it over her objection. The
report noted that after investigating Grandmother’s complaint, “there was
no evidence to support the allegations[.]” Mother testified to the report’s
lack of veracity, namely that it was not physically possible for Grandmother
to have witnessed the alleged incident because “[Grandmother] wouldn’t

1 Although the hearing included Grandmother’s visitation request with her

other grandchild, L.G., L.G. is not part of this appeal.

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GOETZINGER-AMENDT v. GOETZINGER-POE, et al.
Decision of the Court
have been in the room at all” during the time of the alleged incident, the
police found no support for the allegations according to medical records
Mother provided, the Department of Child Safety did not get involved, and
Grandmother made the report for improper reasons.

¶6 After Mother and Father testified, Mother called a family
friend (“Friend”) who has known C.G. since birth to testify regarding her
observations of the parents’ relationship with C.G.

¶7 In denying Grandmother’s visitation request, the superior
court noted it considered the evidence presented during the hearing,
including parents’ testimony about Grandmother’s “animosity towards
Father and false claims of abuse.” It analyzed the requisite statutory third-
party visitation and best-interest factors and found Grandmother did not
meet her burden to show that visitation with C.G. is in the child’s best
interests.

¶8 Grandmother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Grandmother argues the superior court erred when it (1)
denied her request to allow her witness to testify telephonically, (2)
admitted the police report over her objection, (3) denied her the opportunity
to cross-examine Friend, and (4) considered Mother’s testimony about
Grandmother’s mental health without competent medical evidence that she
has any mental health issue that would impact her ability to care for C.G.
She asks us to reverse the court’s decision and order a new trial.

¶10 We note at the outset that Grandmother’s opening brief does
not include any citations to the record and includes citations to cases
without indicating how they support her arguments. Likewise, Mother’s
and Father’s answering briefs do not fare much better. Arizona Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13 requires appellate briefs to
include an argument containing the parties’ contentions about the issues
presented, along with supporting reasons and citations to the record and
legal authority. ARCAP 13(a)(7) (setting out requirements for arguments
in opening briefs), (b)(1) (applying ARCAP 13(a) requirements to
answering briefs). We hold self-represented litigants to the same standards
as attorneys. Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022). We may
find that a party who fails to comply with ARCAP 13 has waived their
arguments. See Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009).
Nevertheless, because a child’s best interests are at stake, we exercise our
discretion to address Grandmother’s arguments and Mother’s and Father’s

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GOETZINGER-AMENDT v. GOETZINGER-POE, et al.
Decision of the Court
responses, to the extent we can discern them. See Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz.
270, 273
, ¶ 10 (App. 2013).

I. The superior court did not err in denying Grandmother’s request
to allow her witness to testify telephonically at the hearing.

¶11 Grandmother argues the court erred by denying her request
for her character witness to testify telephonically, arguing it “directly
affected [her] rights and the negative outcome of [the] petition.” Mother
and Father argue Grandmother’s request was untimely because it was
submitted the night before trial.

¶12 We review the superior court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse
of discretion. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284, ¶ 23 (App. 2019).
This includes the court’s discretion to control a witness’s manner of
testimony because the conduct and control of court proceedings are within
the superior court’s discretion. See Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 147 Ariz.
534, 543 (App. 1985).

¶13 Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 8(c) gives the superior
court discretion to allow a witness to testify telephonically if “it would not
substantially prejudice any party.” ARFLP 8(c). But a party must file a
request for a witness to appear telephonically “within a time that allows the
opposing party a reasonable opportunity to respond.” ARFLP 8(d).

¶14 Here, Grandmother admits she filed the request after 5:00
p.m. the evening before the hearing. And she does not dispute the court’s
statement that it did not see the request in the docket the morning of the
hearing; in fact, the request does not appear in the record on appeal, and
Grandmother does not provide any record citation to it. Even assuming
Grandmother filed the request, she failed to do so within a time that
allowed Mother and Father a reasonable opportunity to respond because
she filed it after business hours the evening before the hearing was
scheduled to begin. And she cites no legal authority to support her position
that the superior court abused its discretion in denying it. We discern no
error.

II. The superior court did not deny Grandmother her right to object
to the admission of the police report, nor did it err in admitting the
police report into evidence over her objection.

¶15 Grandmother next contends the superior court deprived her
of her right to object and legally erred in overruling her hearsay objection
to the police report. We review the superior court’s evidentiary rulings for
abuse of discretion. Lehn, 246 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 23.

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Decision of the Court
¶16 The superior court did not deprive Grandmother of her right
to object; the transcript indicates she objected to admission of the police
report. And the court did not abuse its discretion in overruling her hearsay
objection to the admission of the police report because Grandmother did
not invoke strict compliance with the Arizona Rules of Evidence, and
therefore, hearsay was admissible. See Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 533,
¶ 16 (App. 2019) (hearsay is admissible in family court proceedings unless
a party requests strict compliance with the Arizona Rules of Evidence);
ARFLP 2(a), (b)(1) (hearsay rules do not apply unless a party “file[s] a notice
to require compliance with the Arizona Rules of Evidence” at least 45 days
before the hearing). We discern no error.

III. The superior court did not err by not allowing Grandmother to
cross-examine a witness.

¶17 Grandmother next argues the court erred by not allowing her
to cross-examine Friend. Mother and Father respond that Grandmother
was unable to cross-examine the witness because she chose to use all of her
allotted time to testify.

¶18 The superior court has discretion over the management of its
docket. Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346, ¶ 29 (App. 2020). But
we review de novo whether a party was afforded due process. Id. at ¶ 28.
A court violates a party’s due process rights “when the time available for
each necessary witness does not allow for . . . efficient but adequate cross-
examination.” Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 468, ¶ 21 (App. 2014).

¶19 Due process includes a party’s right to notice and the
opportunity to be heard. Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 (1979). We
must balance this right against the superior court’s discretion to manage its
docket. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 29. A court does not need to “indulge
inefficient use of time by parties.” Volk, 235 Ariz. at 469, ¶ 22. But it “abuses
its discretion when it adheres to rigid time limits that do not permit
adequate opportunity for efficient direct testimony and cross-
examination.” Id. at 464, ¶ 1.

¶20 Here, it is not apparent from the record that Grandmother
actually sought to cross-examine Friend. After permitting Father to cross-
examine the witness, the court stated, “[a]nd [Grandmother], you’ve used
your time.” But nothing in the transcript indicates that Grandmother
expressly asked to cross-examine Friend or asked the court for additional
time to do so.

¶21 Further, the court instructed Grandmother at the start of the
hearing that she could “ask . . . questions on cross-examination.” But

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Decision of the Court
Grandmother opted to continue testifying after receiving the court’s two-
minute warning rather than reserve her remaining time for cross-
examination. We discern no error.

IV. The superior court did not make a factual finding about
Grandmother’s alleged mental health issues.

¶22 Grandmother argues the superior court erred by “considering
Mother’s testimony that Grandmother has ‘mental health issues.’” She
claims that “Mother provided no documentation or any proof
Grandmother [had] ‘mental health issues’ [that] directly or significantly
impair [her] judgement [sic], behavior, or ability to meet the child’s needs.”

¶23 We defer to the superior court’s credibility determinations
and accept its findings of fact if supported by reasonable evidence. Lehn,
246 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 20; Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151, ¶ 18
(2018).

¶24 In its order, the superior court concluded that Grandmother
had not met her burden of showing that visitation between her and C.G.
was in the child’s best interests in light of Mother’s and Father’s opposition
to it, as well as their “valid concerns” about Grandmother’s “animosity
towards Father and false claims of abuse.” The superior court’s only
mention of Grandmother’s alleged “mental health issues” was in
summarizing Mother’s testimony regarding Grandmother’s alleged
“mental issues”; it did not expressly find Grandmother was mentally
disabled. We discern no error.

CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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