Garcia v. Vallon

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

JAMES FELIX GARCIA, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

SYDNEY DANIELLE VALLON, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0177 FC
FILED 11-18-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2024-003721
The Honorable Lauren R. Guyton, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Novo Law PLLC, Chandler
By Caitlin L. Andrade
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

James Felix Garcia, Buckeye
Petitioner/Appellee
 GARCIA v. VALLON
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s opinion, in which
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Sydney Danielle Vallon (“Mother”) appeals from the superior
court’s judgment awarding James Felix Garcia (“Father”) joint legal
decision-making and equal parenting time for the parties’ child. We vacate
the judgment and remand for the court to consider the statutory
presumptions after a domestic violence finding.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father discovered he had a child with Mother when the child
was about five. After Father learned of the child, the parties began a
parenting arrangement. In June 2024, during a parenting exchange, Father
was arrested for a domestic violence assault against Mother.

¶3 Mother petitioned for a protective order against Father the
next day.1 The court granted a protective order prohibiting Father from
contacting Mother or the child. Father requested a hearing, and on October
15, 2024, Mother and Father participated in a contested evidentiary hearing
about the protective order. At the hearing, Father did not dispute the
domestic violence toward Mother but asked the court to remove the child
from the protective order. The court removed the child from the protective
order, allowing Father to have contact with the child. The court entered the
mandatory protective order form, stating it found “reasonable cause to
believe that [Father] may commit an act of domestic violence or has
committed an act of domestic violence within the past year.” See Ariz. R.
Protective Order P. 13(a) (“All courts and parties must use only those
protective order forms adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court.”). In the
minute entry from the October 15 hearing continuing the protective order,

1 We take judicial notice of the record in the protective order case. See
In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 4 (App. 2000) (An appellate court may
take judicial notice of other actions tried in the same court.).

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Opinion of the Court

the court found “by a preponderance of the evidence that there is
reasonable cause to believe that [Father] has committed an act of domestic
violence within the last year.” Father did not appeal the order.

¶4 About a month after the court issued the June 2024 protective
order, Father petitioned the superior court to establish legal
decision-making and parenting time for the child, requesting equal
parenting time and joint legal decision-making. The superior court held an
evidentiary hearing on the parenting matters on October 16, 2024, the day
after the contested protective order hearing. During the parenting trial,
Mother asked the court to take judicial notice of the protective order, and
the court did so.

¶5 Three weeks later, the court awarded joint legal
decision-making and equal parenting time to the parties. The court found
Mother “failed to establish any of the three categories of domestic violence.”
See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D) (listing three acts as acts of domestic violence for
the subsection). While the court acknowledged the protective order, it
found that the instance giving rise to the protective order did not “show
that Father, ‘engage[d] in a pattern of behavior,’ as contemplated by the
law.” See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D)(3) (An act of domestic violence includes
“engag[ing] in a pattern of behavior” which could allow for an order of
protection.).

¶6 Mother moved to amend the parenting order, claiming the
domestic violence finding in the protective order precluded the court from
finding in the parenting judgment that no domestic violence occurred. At a
hearing on the motion to amend the parenting judgment, Mother asked the
court to take judicial notice of the entire protective order record, including
the minute entry from the hearing that stated an act of domestic violence
had occurred. The court affirmed the parenting judgment, noting that it
took judicial notice of the actual protective order, which “did not state that
the [c]ourt had found an act of domestic violence.”

¶7 Mother appealed, and we have jurisdiction under the Arizona
Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
§ 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Mother challenges the court’s parenting order, its finding of
no domestic violence, and its failure to apply required statutory
presumptions after finding an act of domestic violence. Because the

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Opinion of the Court

domestic violence issue is dispositive, we do not reach Mother’s other
arguments.

¶9 We review the superior court’s award of legal
decision-making and parenting time for an abuse of discretion. Gish v.
Greyson, 253 Ariz. 437, 444, ¶ 31 (App. 2022). We review the court’s
conclusions of law de novo. Id.

¶10 “The relationship between domestic violence and legal
decision-making is governed primarily by A.R.S. § 25-403.03.” In re
Marriage of Morris & Mandel, 255 Ariz. 158, 162, ¶ 15 (App. 2023). If a court
finds a parent has committed domestic violence, the court must consider
that finding contrary to the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(B). The
parent found to have committed domestic violence then must prove “to the
court’s satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the child or
significantly impair the child’s emotional development.” A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03(F). And if a parent seeking legal decision-making committed
domestic violence against the other parent, there is a rebuttable
presumption that awarding legal decision-making to that parent is against
the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D).

¶11 Mother argues the parenting court had to make a domestic
violence finding because the protective order’s finding is subject to issue
preclusion. “Issue preclusion is a judicial doctrine that, when applicable,
prevents a party from relitigating an issue of fact decided in a prior
judgment,” and we review its application de novo. Hancock v. O’Neil, 253
Ariz. 509, 512, ¶¶ 9-10 (2022).

¶12 A domestic violence finding in a protective order judgment
raises issue preclusion in a parenting matter. See Oleson v. Daniel, 251 Ariz.
25, 30, ¶ 20 (App. 2021). Issue preclusion “prevents relitigation [1] of an
issue that was actually litigated in a previous proceeding if [2] the parties
had a full and fair opportunity and motive to litigate the issue, [3] a valid
and final [judgment] on the merits was entered, [4] resolution of the issue
[was] essential to the decision, and [5] the proceedings share a common
identity of the parties.” Clusiau v. Clusiau Enters., 225 Ariz. 247, 249, ¶ 9
(App. 2010) (quotation omitted). Each element for issue preclusion was
satisfied here, so the court erred by failing to enforce the previous domestic
violence finding.

¶13 The allegations in the protective order petition make clear that
the petition was based on behavior resulting in domestic violence. See
A.R.S. §§ 13-1203 and -3601(A)(2) (Domestic violence crimes include assault

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Opinion of the Court

against the parent of a shared child.). For that reason, the issue of past
domestic violence was essential to the order. The issue was actually
litigated, as the court affirmed the order after a contested hearing. Chaney
Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 573 (1986) (“When an issue is
properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for
determination, and is determined, the issue is actually litigated.”). Father
had the opportunity and motive to litigate the domestic violence finding
when he attended the contested hearing. A continued protective order after
a contested hearing is a final judgment against the defendant. See Vera v.
Rogers, 246 Ariz. 30, 36, ¶ 22 (App. 2018) (“An Order of Protection that is
affirmed after a hearing at which both parties had an opportunity to appear
is a final, appealable order.” (cleaned up)) (citing Ariz. R. Protective Order
P. 42(a)(2)); Ariz. R. Protective Order P. 42(a)(2) (“An Order of Protection
. . . that is entered, affirmed, [or] modified . . . after a hearing at which both
parties had an opportunity to appear” is appealable.). Father did not appeal
the judgment in the protective order proceeding, meaning it is final. And
the parties in the protective order and parenting cases were the same.

¶14 The superior court’s focus on a domestic violence finding
requiring a “pattern of behavior” was misplaced. That language appears in
A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D)(3), which defines an act of domestic violence as “a
pattern of behavior for which a court may issue an ex parte order to protect
the other parent.” When a parent engages in any behavior resulting in an
act of domestic violence under A.R.S. § 13-3601(A), the definition in A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03(D)(3) is satisfied because, under A.R.S. § 13-3602(E)(2), the court
may issue an order of protection based on a single past act of domestic
violence. The definition in A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D)(3) is also satisfied when a
court does, in fact, issue an ex parte protective order based on past behavior
for the same reason.

¶15 Furthermore, the “pattern of behavior” definition applies
only to legal decision-making, not to parenting-time arrangements. See
A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D). Instead, for parenting time, the court must look at all
relevant factors of domestic violence, including findings from another
court. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(C). The court’s focus on a pattern of behavior for
parenting time was also error.

¶16 Because the parenting court did not find domestic violence, it
failed to apply the presumption against joint legal decision-making or
consider Father’s burden to prove that parenting time would not endanger
the child. See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D), (F).

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Opinion of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶17 We vacate the court’s order about legal decision-making and
parenting time and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this decision.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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