Gurule v. Mays

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

GREGORY GURULE, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

SHANEE CARLEANE MAYS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0189 FC
FILED 01-21-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2023-094558
The Honorable Quintin H. Cushner, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Offices of Holly A. Bartee, Chandler
By Holly A. Bartee
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Shanee Carleane Mays
Pro Per Respondent/Appellant
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Shanee Mays (“Mother”) appeals from the superior court’s
decree dissolving her marriage to Gregory Gurule (“Father”) with respect
to its provisions regarding custody, parenting, and financial matters.
Mother argues the court erred in: (1) awarding joint legal decision-making
and parenting time despite evidence of domestic violence, (2) calculating
Father’s income for the purposes of child support and spousal maintenance,
(3) limiting the duration of spousal maintenance to 36 months, and (4)
awarding Father attorney’s fees and costs. For the following reasons, this
Court affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In October 2008, Mother and Father married in Arizona. The
parties have two minor children. In October 2023, Father filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage. The court held an evidentiary hearing in
September 2024 and thereafter issued a decree of dissolution.

¶3 The decree awarded joint legal decision-making to Mother
and Father, created a shared parenting time plan, ordered Father to pay
Mother $187 in monthly child support and $1,750 in monthly spousal
support for a period of 36 months, and divided the parties’ property. The
court also found that “Mother’s conduct, including regarding disclosure
and discovery, was so unreasonable that an award of some portion of
Father’s reasonable attorney fees is warranted.” In January 2025, the court
issued final judgment, which included an award of $3,000 in attorney’s fees
to Father. Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶4 This Court views the facts in the light most favorable to
upholding the decree, In re Marriage of Foster, 240 Ariz. 99, 100 ¶ 2 (App.
2016), and “defer[s] to the trial court’s determination of witnesses’
credibility and the weight to give conflicting evidence.” Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347 ¶ 13 (App. 1998).

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I. Legal Decision-Making and Parenting Time.

¶5 Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will “affirm the
family court’s order of parenting time and legal decision-making.”
Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471 ¶ 4 (App. 2018). A court abuses its
discretion “when the record is devoid of competent evidence to support its
decision [or] when the court commits an error of law in the process of
reaching a discretionary conclusion.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted).

A. Mother Has Not Shown the Parenting Time Schedule Is
Impractical.

¶6 Mother argues the parenting time schedule is not practical
because Father’s work schedule changes every year. A.R.S. § 25-
403.02(C)(3) provides that parenting plans should include a “practical
schedule of parenting time for the child, including holidays and school
vacations.” Here, considering Father’s alternating shift-work schedule, the
court implemented a comprehensive parenting plan, including a rotating
schedule, specific times, an exchange location, and details regarding
holidays and vacations. The court further ordered that “the parties shall
cooperate in the best interests of the children should Father’s work schedule
change.” Mother has not shown how the parenting time order fails to
consider Father’s potential changes in work schedule in an impractical
manner and has not shown an abuse of discretion. See Engstrom, 243 Ariz.
at 471 ¶ 4.

B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Its Domestic
Violence Findings.

¶7 Mother argues the court erred in not finding that significant
domestic violence precluded the court’s award of joint legal decision
making. Under A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A), “joint legal decision-making shall not
be awarded if the court makes a finding of the existence of significant
domestic violence pursuant to § 13-3601” or “if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that there has been a significant history of
domestic violence.” Although “significant” is not defined by the statute,
reasonable factors to consider include: “(1) [t]he seriousness of the
particular incident of domestic violence, (2) the frequency or pervasiveness
of the domestic violence, (3) and the passage of time and its impact.”
DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 424 ¶ 15 n.6 (App. 2019) (alteration in
original).

¶8 Here, the court considered these factors and made the
following specific findings pertaining to domestic violence:

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Mother has alleged domestic violence against
Father. Mother alleges that Father grabbed her
and squeezed her, in the presence of a child.
Mother also alleges that Father grabbed
Mother’s hair on one occasion and threw
Mother into a wall on another occasion. Father
denies domestic violence. The Court finds,
based upon the credible evidence and testimony
presented, and all the facts and circumstances of
this case, that Father has committed domestic
violence against Mother under the applicable
statutory authority. The Court further finds,
based upon the credible evidence and testimony
presented, and all the facts and circumstances of
this case, that the burden has not been met to
find that Father has committed significant
domestic violence or engaged in a significant
history of domestic violence under the
applicable statutory authority.

¶9 The court’s determination that there was no significant
domestic violence or a significant history of domestic violence was based
on reasonable and appropriate factors. Thus, Mother has not shown the
court abused its discretion. See Engstrom, 243 Ariz. at 471 ¶ 4.

C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding Father
Rebutted the Presumption Against Joint Legal Decision-
Making.

¶10 Mother next argues the superior court did not make the
appropriate findings necessary to determine Father rebutted the
presumption against joint legal decision-making after finding Father
committed an act of domestic violence.

¶11 A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D) provides:

If the court determines that a parent who is
seeking sole or joint legal decision-making has
committed an act of domestic violence against
the other parent, there is a rebuttable
presumption that an award of sole or joint legal
decision-making to the parent who committed

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the act of domestic violence is contrary to the
child’s best interests.

Subsection E lists the factors a court must consider in determining whether
a parent has rebutted that presumption. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(E)(1), (6). Those
include whether “the parent has demonstrated that being awarded sole or
joint legal decision-making or substantially equal parenting time is in the
child’s best interests,” and “the parent has committed any further acts of
domestic violence.” Id.

¶12 Here, contrary to Mother’s assertion, the court made findings
on all of the required factors, including that: (1) “based upon the credible
evidence and testimony presented, and all the facts and circumstances of
this case, that it is in the best interests of the children that Mother and Father
exercise joint legal decision-making and that the parties exercise equal
parenting time” and (2) there was not “substantial credible evidence and
testimony that further domestic violence has occurred.” The court therefore
found Father had “rebutted the presumption under A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D).”
Mother has not shown the court abused its discretion in its finding. See
Engstrom, 243 Ariz. at 471 ¶ 4.

D. The Court Was Not Required to Make an Explicit Finding
Under A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F).

¶13 Mother contends that as to parenting time, the court erred by
not “explicitly stat[ing] how Father has affirmatively shown that parenting
time will not endanger the children or significantly impair the children’s
emotional development.”

¶14 A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F) provides:

If the court finds that a parent has committed an
act of domestic violence, that parent has the
burden of proving to the court’s satisfaction that
parenting time will not endanger the child or
significantly impair the child’s emotional
development. If the parent meets this burden to
the court’s satisfaction, the court shall place
conditions on parenting time that best protect
the child and the other parent from further
harm.

¶15 In making those findings, a superior court must “determine
whether [the offending parent] had affirmatively shown that ‘parenting

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time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the child’s
emotional development.’” DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 425 ¶ 18 (quoting A.R.S. §
25-403.03(F)). “The court must then make specific findings explaining its
reasoning and conclusions.” Engstrom, 243 Ariz. at 474 ¶ 18. The
requirement of specific findings is derived from A.R.S. § 25-403(B). See
DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 425 ¶ 19 (“Such findings are required by [A.R.S. § 25-
403(B)] to be stated on the record and cannot be presumed or implied.”).
A.R.S. § 25-403(B) provides: “[i]n a contested legal decision-making or
parenting time case, the court shall make specific findings on the record
about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the
best interests of the child.” (Emphasis added).

¶16 Here, before the superior court, Mother did not contest an
award of parenting time to Father. She merely disputed the details of the
parenting time schedule, including specific dates and times. Because
Mother did not contest the court’s award of parenting time to Father,
specific findings were not required. See Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz.
297, 301 ¶ 18 (App. 2013); A.R.S. § 25-403(B). Instead, the “general rule”
applies that this Court “may infer that the trial court has made the
additional findings necessary to sustain its judgment . . . as long as the
additional findings are reasonably supported by the evidence and are not
in conflict with any of the trial court's express findings.” Elliott v. Elliott, 165
Ariz. 128, 135 (App. 1990).

¶17 The court made several findings that support a determination
that parenting time will not endanger the parties’ children or impair
significantly the children’s development. The court found “it is in the best
interests of the children” that “the parties exercise equal parenting time.”
The court also placed protective conditions on parenting time regarding
communication between the parties to protect the children and Mother.
This is an express finding consistent with the court’s satisfaction that
“parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the
child’s emotional development” in light of those conditions. A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(F).

II. Child Support and Spousal Maintenance.

¶18 Mother claims the superior court erred by not attributing the
appropriate income to Father for the purposes of child support or
maintenance. This Court reviews child support and spousal maintenance
awards for an abuse of discretion and accepts the superior court’s findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 30 ¶ 6 (App.
2002); Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 376 ¶ 9 (App. 2007). “A finding of

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fact is not clearly erroneous if substantial evidence supports it, even if
substantial conflicting evidence exists.” Kocher v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ariz.,
206 Ariz. 480, 482 ¶ 9 (App. 2003). “Substantial evidence is evidence which
would permit a reasonable person to reach the trial court’s result.” In re Est.
of Pouser, 193 Ariz. 574, 579 ¶ 13 (1999).

¶19 Mother argues the superior court erred in attributing Father
$8,554 in monthly income for the purposes of child support and spousal
maintenance. She claims the attribution should be higher because the
calculation did not account for Father’s second job and evidence in other
exhibits would lead to a different calculation of monthly income. The court
received Father’s Affidavit of Financial Information, which listed Father’s
gross monthly income at $8,554. Father testified this figure was accurate
and that income from a second job was minor and not calculable. He also
testified now that he has joint custody, he will have little opportunity to
work a second job in the future. Because substantial evidence supports the
court’s determination, Mother has not demonstrated the court’s attribution
of income was clearly erroneous and the court did not abuse its discretion.

¶20 Mother also argues the superior court erred in not awarding
her 60 months of spousal maintenance, the maximum length of
maintenance to which she was entitled. The court awarded Mother 36
months of maintenance. Based on the length of the parties’ marriage, just
over 180 months, the Arizona Spousal Maintenance Guidelines recommend
a standard award duration between 12 to 60 months. A.R.S. § 25-319 app. §
IV.B.2.a.iv. Here, the length of the award was within the range specified in
the guidelines. Mother makes no argument as to why awarding 36 months
of maintenance was inappropriate and has not demonstrated the court
abused its discretion in making its award. See Leathers, 216 Ariz. at 376 ¶ 9.

III. Attorney’s Fees.

¶21 This Court reviews an award of attorney’s fees for an abuse
of discretion, In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 167 (App. 1983), and the
interpretation of procedural rules and statutes de novo. See Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 231 ¶ 8 (App. 2012); Clark v. Clark, 239 Ariz. 281, 282 ¶ 6 (App.
2016).

¶22 Before the evidentiary hearing, Mother filed a document
titled “interim help,” requesting an award of $3,500 to retain an attorney.
The court took no action on this request but stated it would consider “an
appropriately filed Motion for Temporary Orders in due course.” The
record does not show Mother filed an appropriate motion thereafter.

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¶23 On appeal, Mother argues the superior court erred in taking
no action on her request pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure
47. This Court is unaware of any basis for obtaining attorney’s fees before
they are actually incurred. However, even if such relief were available, Rule
47 requires a motion to include an Affidavit of Financial Information. Ariz.
R. Fam. Law P. 47(a)(4). Mother failed to include an affidavit with her
request. Therefore, the court did not err in taking no action on her request.

¶24 Mother also argues the superior court should have awarded
attorney’s fees to her and not Father because of their relative financial
disparity. Here, the court found a “substantial disparity of financial
resources between the parties.” However, the court also found Mother
“acted unreasonably” because she “did not participate in aspects of this
litigation, including discovery and disclosure.” The court concluded:

[W]hile Father earns more income such that
financial resources are disparate, the Court does
not find that financial resources are so
substantially disparate as to warrant an award
of attorney fees. The Court does find that
Mother’s conduct, including regarding
disclosure and discovery, was so unreasonable
that an award of some portion of Father’s
reasonable attorney fees is warranted.

¶25 A court, in granting attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 25-324(A),
must consider both “the financial resources of both parties and the
reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the
proceedings.” If a court finds a disparity of financial resources, it may
nonetheless weigh the unreasonableness of a party’s positions against the
disparate financial resources of the parties and award attorney’s fees based
on unreasonableness and decline to award fees based on disparate
resources. See Mangan v. Mangan, 227 Ariz. 346, 351-53 ¶¶ 25-28 (App.
2011). Here, the court considered both factors and found that the
unreasonableness of Mother’s conduct outweighed the disparity in
financial resources of both parties. Mother has not shown the court abused
its discretion in awarding Father attorney’s fees.

¶26 As the prevailing party, Father is entitled to his costs on
appeal upon compliance with Rule 21 of the Arizona Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure. See A.R.S. § 12-341. This Court, in its discretion,
denies Father’s request for his attorney’s fees on appeal. See Motley v.
Simmons, 256 Ariz. 317, 323 ¶ 20 (App. 2023).

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CONCLUSION

¶27 For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the decree of
dissolution.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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