DOUGLAS v. LESSARD

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

SHANE MICHAEL DOUGLAS, an individual,
GWEN ANN DOUGLAS, an individual,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

STEVEN RICHARD LESSARD, an individual,
Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0203
FILED 01-30-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300CV202400072
The Honorable Brent Davidson Harris, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Ladah Law Firm, Las Vegas, Nevada
By Donald P. Paradiso
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Stephanie Elliott, Jennifer Rethemeier
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Shane and Gwen Douglas (collectively “Douglas”) appeal
summary judgment for Steven Lessard on their negligence claim. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On October 24, 2022, Lessard was driving from Gila County
(the “County”) towards Flagstaff when his vehicle struck Douglas’s vehicle,
injuring Douglas.

¶3 At the time, Lessard was the County’s Chief Probation Officer
and was driving to the annual statewide Court Leadership Conference (the
“conference”) in Flagstaff in his marked County-issued vehicle. Though the
conference would not begin until October 26, Lessard planned to attend the
Chief Probation Officers’ Association (“CPOA”) meeting the day before the
conference at the same hotel as the conference. Since the CPOA meeting
was scheduled to begin the morning of October 25, Lessard had permission
from the County to check in to the hotel a day early and finish his October
24 workday from there.

¶4 In his deposition, Lessard testified he did not recall whether
he left for the conference from his home or from his County office in Payson,
but either way, he would have been “on duty.” He also testified he was
required to attend the conference or provide an explanation to his
supervisor, the County’s presiding superior court judge, if he were unable
to attend. In the event he would have been unable to attend the CPOA
meeting, Lessard explained he would not be subject to adverse employment
action but would have to explain to his presiding judge why he did not
participate.

¶5 In February 2024, Douglas sued Lessard, alleging negligence
in causing the vehicle collision. Lessard moved for summary judgment,
arguing Douglas’s claim was time-barred because it was brought more than
one year after the cause of action accrued. Lessard argued that because he

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was acting “in the course and scope of his employment” as Chief Probation
Officer when the collision occurred, the one-year statute of limitations
governed Douglas’s claim. A.R.S. § 12-821. Douglas objected, contending a
two-year statute of limitations applied under A.R.S. § 12-542 because
Lessard “was not subject to his employer’s control at the time of the crash.”

¶6 The superior court agreed with Lessard that Douglas’s claim
was time-barred and granted Lessard’s motion for summary judgment.

¶7 Douglas timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 On appeal, Douglas contends genuine issues of material fact
exist whether Lessard was acting within the course and scope of his
employment when the collision occurred, rendering the superior court’s
grant of summary judgment error.

¶9 Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review the superior court’s
grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to Douglas as the nonmoving party.
Rosenberg v. Sanders, 256 Ariz. 359, 364, ¶ 24 (2023).

¶10 A one-year statute of limitations applies to claims against
public employees arising out of “acts within an employee’s scope of
employment.” McCloud v. Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 217 Ariz. 82, 91, ¶ 27
(App. 2007); A.R.S. § 12-821. To determine whether an employee was acting
within the scope of his employment at the time of the act from which the
claim arose, courts look to the extent to which the employee was subject to
the employer’s control. Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., 230 Ariz. 55,
57–58, ¶ 10 (2012).

¶11 But where an employee’s conduct did not arise within the
scope of employment, a two-year statute of limitations applies. A.R.S.
§ 12-542. An employee’s “conduct falls outside the scope of employment
when the employee engages in an independent course of action that does
not further the employer’s purposes and is not within the control or right
of control of the employer.” Engler, 230 Ariz. at 58, ¶ 13.

¶12 Douglas contends the County did not have control, or right of
control, over Lessard’s travel because Lessard could choose whether to

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drive his personal vehicle or the County-issued vehicle, which route to take,
and what time and day to leave for Flagstaff, and that Lessard was not
required to attend the CPOA meeting at all because he admitted he would
not have been subject to adverse employment action had he failed to attend.
In support of the argument, Douglas primarily relies on Engler, where our
Supreme Court iterated it has generally not “found the requisite employer
control when the employee maintained the right to choose where, when,
and how to travel, and by what route.” Id. at 58, ¶ 12.

¶13 In Engler, an out-of-state employee traveled to Arizona for
extended work stays. Id. at 57, ¶ 2. While in Arizona, he lodged at a hotel in
Yuma but would travel to and from his job site in Mexico each day. Id. at
57, ¶¶ 2–3. The employee was reimbursed for business expenses, including
lodging, rental cars, and meals. Id. The employer considered the employee’s
workday to begin when the employee left the hotel in Yuma and ended
when he returned. Id. Outside of work hours, the employee was free to do
as he wished and his actions were not controlled or supervised by the
employer. Id. One evening, after returning to the Yuma hotel, the employee,
with a co-worker, left the hotel for dinner at a restaurant. Id. at 57, ¶ 4. On
their way back to the hotel after dinner, the employee caused an accident
resulting in serious injuries to a motorcycle driver. Id. Our Supreme Court
held that “at the time of the accident . . . [the employee] was on his own
time, was not subject to his employer’s control, and was not serving his
employer’s purposes in traveling from the restaurant during his off hours.”
Id. at 60, ¶ 20.

¶14 The uncontroverted facts in the record before us are readily
distinguishable from those in Engler. In his deposition, Lessard testified his
drive in the County-owned vehicle was governed by several County
policies mandating him to use the vehicle only for work purposes and to
use his County vehicle “for travel when possible.” And though Lessard
seemingly maintained some discretion over which route he took to the
conference, as well as what time of day he left to travel to Flagstaff, he also
testified he took “the quicker route,” and that because he left the County
during his workday, and would conclude his workday once arriving in
Flagstaff, that he was “on duty” while traveling that day.

¶15 Lessard further testified that both the CPOA meeting and the
conference were mandatory and that he would have to provide an
explanation to his supervisor if he did not attend the conference or
participate in decisions the CPOA made. That Lessard would not suffer
adverse employment action if he were unable to attend does not transform
the CPOA meeting or the conference into non-work-related activities.

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¶16 Once Lessard presented this evidence, the burden shifted to
Douglas “to produce sufficient competent evidence to show that an issue
exists” precluding summary judgment. Kelly v. NationsBanc Mortgage Corp., 199 Ariz. 284, 287, ¶ 14 (App. 2000). Douglas produced no evidence refuting
Lessard’s testimony. On this record, no genuine issue of material fact exists
impacting whether the requisite employer control was present for Lessard
to be acting within the scope of his employment during his drive to
Flagstaff.

¶17 Douglas also cites to three memorandum decisions, which we
find unpersuasive in light of the record before us. See Davis v. Casida,
1 CA-CV 22-0306, 2023 WL 2250426, at *1, ¶¶ 1–5, *2–3, ¶¶ 10–16 (Ariz. App.
Feb. 28, 2023) (mem. decision) (finding no requisite employer control where
employee injured coworker at non-work-related after-hours social event);
Cravens v. Montano, 2 CA-CV 2020-0115, 2021 WL 2105425, at *3, ¶¶ 13–14
(Ariz. App. May 25, 2021) (mem. decision) (finding genuine issue of
material fact where record contained conflicting deposition testimony
regarding degree to which employee’s actions were controlled by
employer); Estrada v. Nguyen, 2 CA-CV 2022-0081, 2023 WL 2034250, at *8,
¶¶ 30-31 (Ariz. App. Feb. 16, 2023) (mem. decision) (finding genuine issue
of material fact where record included deposition testimony contradicting
prior statement regarding purpose of employee’s travel).

¶18 Finally, Douglas argues the “dual purpose doctrine” applies
to preclude summary judgment. The “dual purpose doctrine” is the dual
purpose exception to the “going and coming rule.” Faul v. Jelco, Inc., 122
Ariz. 490, 492 (App. 1979); see also Gurtler v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 237 Ariz.
537, 540, ¶ 11 (App. 2015). The “going and coming rule” provides that, for
an employee’s use of a vehicle to be in the scope of their employment, the
use “must be directly involved with or in furtherance of an employer’s
business purpose,” and cannot be “a routine commute to or from an
employer’s office.” Cravens v. Montano (Cravens II), 259 Ariz. 444, 452, ¶ 31
(2025). “[T]he dual purpose exception to the coming and going rule
. . . applies only when, in addition to merely commuting, the employee
performs a concurrent service for his employer that would have
necessitated a trip by another employee if the commuting employee had
not been able to perform it.” Bruce v. Charles Roberts Air Conditioning, 166
Ariz. 221, 226 (App. 1990).

¶19 To the extent Douglas argues the “going and coming rule”
applies, in our view, it does not. Lessard was not engaged in his “routine
commute to or from [his] employer’s office.” Cravens II, 259 Ariz. at 452,
¶ 31. Rather, he was traveling from one working location to another in

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furtherance of the County’s business purpose at both the CPOA meeting
and the conference. See id. But even if the “going and coming rule” applied,
the dual purpose exception still has no application here because Douglas
has not identified another purpose for Lessard’s travel to Flagstaff other
than to attend the CPOA meeting and conference.

¶20 Though not relevant to our scope-of-employment analysis,
we note that Douglas maintains he did not, nor did he intend to, sue Lessard
in his capacity as a public employee. But a review of the record shows that
Douglas served a notice of claim on both Lessard and the State of Arizona,
a requirement to bring a claim against a public employee under A.R.S.
§ 12-821.01(A). In any event, Douglas’s subjective intent is not a factor in
determining whether Lessard was acting within the course and scope of his
employment when the accident occurred.

CONCLUSION

¶21 No genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether
Lessard was acting in the scope of his employment when the vehicle
collision occurred. The one-year statute of limitations set forth in A.R.S.
§ 12-821 thus applies. Because Douglas did not bring suit within one year
of the cause of action, we affirm summary judgment for Lessard.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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