Anderson v. Winston

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

RICHARD ANDERSON, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

TAMEKA SHANAE WINSTON, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0239
FILED 12-23-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022-006824
The Honorable John L. Blanchard, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Law Office of D. M. Godley Esq. P.L.L.C., Phoenix
By Davina M. Godley
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Tameka Shanae Winston, Avondale
Defendant/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
 ANDERSON v. WINSTON
Decision of the Court

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Tameka Winston appeals from the superior court’s order
denying her request for relief from a judgment obtained by Richard
Anderson. Because Winston did not establish grounds for relief, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the record in the light most favorable to upholding
the superior court’s refusal to set aside the judgment. See Goglia v. Bodnar, 156 Ariz. 12, 20 (App. 1987) (citation omitted).

¶3 Winston and Anderson were in a romantic relationship
during which Winston gave birth to two children, J.A. and C.A. In
proceedings filed after the parties’ relationship ended, the court
determined, without objection, that Anderson was the father of both
children. By stipulation of the parties, the court entered legal decision-
making and parenting time orders, and ordered Anderson to pay Winston
child support of $500 per month. After 2013, the parties went back to court
several times to modify parenting time and child support, including, in
2015, to modify child support to $0.

¶4 In 2020, Anderson used an at-home paternity test that showed
he was not J.A.’s biological father. In June 2021, the court, by stipulation of
the parties, set aside the judgment of paternity as to J.A.

¶5 In May 2022, Anderson sued Winston for paternity fraud,
alleging that he provided monetary and emotional support for J.A. in
reliance on her misrepresentation that he was the child’s father. In her
unverified answer, Winston neither admitted nor denied Anderson’s
paternity of J.A., but denied making any misrepresentations on that issue.

¶6 Anderson then filed a motion for summary judgment, which
he supported with evidence that included copies of filings in the family
court case, a copy of the DNA test results, and his own affidavit stating that
he provided financial support to J.A. in reliance on Winston’s false
representation that he was J.A.’s father. Winston filed no response.
Concluding that the undisputed evidence showed that Winston
“fraudulently represented to [Anderson] that he was [J.A.’s] biological
father[,]” the superior court granted summary judgment to Anderson on
the issue of Winston’s liability for paternity fraud. The court denied
summary judgment on the issue of damages, however, noting that
Anderson “did not provide any evidence (or a calculation) of his
damages[.]”

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¶7 Anderson then filed what he captioned as a “motion to alter
or amend [the] judgment to include damages,” which was, in effect, a
second motion for summary judgment, this time on the issue of damages.
Anderson supported his motion with a copy of an unverified disclosure
statement listing total damages of $136,740, and itemizing the claimed
damages in categories that included child support paid, clothing and gifts
for J.A., and punitive damages.

¶8 Winston did not respond to Anderson’s motion. Finding no
genuine issue of material fact about Anderson’s claimed damages, the court
granted the motion and awarded Anderson damages of $136,740.

¶9 After the court’s ruling but before final judgment was
entered, Winston filed a motion for reconsideration disputing Anderson’s
claimed damages. Among other things, Winston denied that Anderson
incurred the clothing and gift expenses that he claimed and noted that he
provided no “invoices, transaction records, or any other evidence that
would confirm the legitimacy of the alleged purchases[.]” In March 2024,
the superior court denied Winston’s motion for reconsideration and
entered final judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)
54(c) (the “March 2024 Judgment”). Winston did not appeal from the March
2024 Judgment.

¶10 Six months later, in September 2024, Winston moved for relief
from the March 2024 Judgment, challenging both the court’s determination
of her liability and its award of damages. In support of her challenge to the
court’s determination of liability, Winston asserted that because Anderson
stipulated that he was J.A.’s biological father at the outset of the family
court proceedings, principles of judicial estoppel barred him from later
disputing paternity. According to Winston, Anderson made equivocal
statements at a hearing in the family court case that suggested that he had
a “strong suspicion” that “he was not J.A.’s father[.]”Anderson nonetheless
agreed to the entry of a paternity judgment, she contends, and his decision
to proceed “with his eyes wide open” barred him from later disputing the
issue of paternity.

¶11 Winston further argued that she was entitled to relief from the
award of damages under Rule 60(b)(3) and (6) of the Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure. According to Winston, Anderson’s damages calculation was
“undocumented” and failed to “[meet] the admissibility threshold for
summary judgment motion practice.” In January 2025, the court denied
Winston’s motion in an order entered under Rule 54(c) (the “January 2025
Judgment”).

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¶12 Winston timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 12-201(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Winston challenges the court’s denial of her motion for relief
from the March 2024 Judgment, asserting, first, that the court improperly
failed to apply principles of judicial estoppel to bar Anderson from
disputing his paternity of J.A.

¶14 The doctrine of judicial estoppel generally prohibits a litigant
who has obtained judicial relief by asserting one position from asserting a
contradictory position in subsequent proceedings involving the same
parties. See State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 182 (1996). The party invoking
judicial estoppel must show three requirements: “(1) the parties must be the
same, (2) the question involved must be the same, and (3) the party
asserting the inconsistent position must have been successful in the prior
judicial proceeding.” In re Marriage of Thorn, 235 Ariz. 216, 222, ¶ 27 (App.
2014) (citation modified). A court’s application of judicial estoppel is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Terrenate Enters.,
Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 19-0081, 2020 WL 2730781 at *8, ¶ 42 (Ariz. App. May 26,
2020) (mem. decision).

¶15 Judicial estoppel does not apply unless a party has
“prevailed” on a disputed issue. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.
742, 749 (2001) (noting that judicial estoppel “generally prevents a party
from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on
a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” (citation omitted)).
Because success in a prior judicial proceeding is required for the application
of judicial estoppel, judicial estoppel cannot be predicated on a favorable
judgment that is later vacated or set aside. See Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf &
W. Indus., Inc., 865 F.2d 761, 773 (6th Cir. 1989) (declining to apply judicial
estoppel against party that obtained favorable verdict at trial because “[i]ts
verdict was reversed on appeal”). Here, the paternity judgment was
vacated by stipulation of the parties. Judicial estoppel cannot, therefore,
apply to either the vacated paternity judgment or to Anderson’s statements
at the time he consented to its entry. Cf. Campbell v. SZL Props., Ltd., 204
Ariz. 221, 225, ¶ 20 (App. 2003) (“[A] vacated judgment cannot have any
collateral estoppel effect.”); Bank of Am. Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. Maricopa
Cnty., 196 Ariz. 173, 176, ¶ 9 (App. 1999) (party was not judicially estopped
when action was voluntarily dismissed).

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¶16 Winston next argues that the court erred in denying her relief
from the judgment because it purportedly misinterpreted the requirements
of Rule 60(b)(3) and (6).

¶17 Rule 60(b) governs a party’s ability to seek relief from a
judgment or order entered. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The superior court has
broad discretion in deciding whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b).
Gonzalez v. Nguyen, 243 Ariz. 531, 534, ¶ 11 (2018). In exercising its
discretion, however, a court must be mindful of the “compelling interest in
the finality of judgments which should not be lightly disregarded.” City of
Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328 (1985) (citation modified); see also In re
Marriage of Zale, 193 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 11 (1999) (“A judgment is a solemn
record[,]” and “[i]t should not lightly be disturbed.” (citation omitted)). We
review a court’s order granting or denying relief under Rule 60(b) for an
abuse of discretion. Aloia v. Gore, 252 Ariz. 548, 551, ¶ 11 (App. 2022). The
scope of our review of the denial of a Rule 60 motion “is restricted to the
questions raised by the motion to set aside and does not extend to a review
of whether the trial court was substantively correct in entering the
judgment from which relief was sought.” Laveen Meadows Homeowners Ass’n
v. Mejia, 249 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 (App. 2020) (citation omitted).

¶18 Rule 60(b)(3) authorizes relief from a judgment where there
was “fraud[,] . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing
party[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Winston asserts that the superior court
erred in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(3) because, she contends,
Anderson’s motion for summary judgment and subsequent motion to
amend contained “material omissions, mischaracterizations, and
misrepresentations[.]” According to Winston, Anderson improperly
omitted or mischaracterized evidence relevant to his paternity of J.A.
Specifically, she alleges, in his motions he “[o]mitted any mention of his
2013 sworn admissions” to paternity, “[p]resented” the DNA test results
disproving paternity “without any foundation or authentication,” and
falsely claimed that he was “surprised” by the DNA test results even
though he had previously “expressed doubt” about his paternity of J.A.

¶19 Winston appears to misunderstand the court’s rulings
granting Anderson’s motions. The court did not, as Winston seems to think,
make a determination that Anderson was not, in fact, J.A.’s father, nor did
the court determine that the paternity judgment should be set aside. Those
matters were resolved by stipulation in the family court case. Since the
matter of Anderson’s purported paternity of J.A. was already resolved in
other proceedings, Anderson had no obligation to present admissible

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evidence on that issue in these proceedings, and his failure to do so entitles
Winston to no relief.

¶20 Winston complains that Anderson “masked material facts,
undermining the truth-finding process.” Because she does not identify any
“material facts” that were purportedly “masked,” we hold that she has
waived this argument by failing to develop it. See Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n,
214 Ariz. 489, 491, ¶ 6, n.2 (App. 2007).

¶21 Winston next argues that Anderson’s failure to present
evidence relating to J.A.’s paternity “denied [her] the opportunity to
challenge authenticity, cross-examine, or assert defenses like spoliation or
collateral estoppel.” She asserts, in other words, that the content of
Anderson’s motions somehow prevented her from responding to them.

¶22 This argument makes no sense. Winston has never denied
that Anderson timely served copies of his motions on her as required by
applicable court rules. Because she received the motions, she could have
responded in whatever manner she believed appropriate. The content of
Anderson’s motions does not excuse, justify, or explain Winston’s failure to
respond to them.

¶23 Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes relief from a judgment for “any other
reason justifying relief.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6), therefore, is
a “catch-all” provision, see Roll v. Janca, 22 Ariz. App. 335, 336 (1974), that
offers relief only where “extraordinary circumstances” are present, see Webb
v. Erickson, 134 Ariz. 182, 187 (1982).

¶24 Winston argues that Rule 60(b)(6) authorized relief for a
number of reasons. First, she asserts, Rule 60(b)(6) applies here because of
Anderson’s purported “[j]udicial estoppel abuse[.]” For the reasons
discussed above, see supra ¶¶ 14-15, judicial estoppel does not apply here,
and so Winston is entitled to no relief on her claim of “judicial estoppel
abuse.”

¶25 Winston next argues that Rule 60(b)(6) authorized relief here
because of Anderson’s purported “[m]aterial misrepresentations under
Rule 60(b)(3)” and “[e]xtrinsic fraud under Rule 60(b)(3)[.]” But Rule
60(b)(6) applies only when relief is not authorized by any other subsection
of Rule 60(b). Gonzalez, 243 Ariz. at 535, ¶ 15 (Rule 60(b)(6) is “mutually
exclusive” from the other subsections of Rule 60, applying only under
“circumstances that do not fit into the other Rule 60 . . . subsections.”
(citation modified)); Webb, 134 Ariz. at 186 (relief under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot
be based on a ground for which relief is available under Rule 60(b)(1-5)).

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Winston is entitled to no relief, therefore, on her claim for relief under Rule
60(b)(6) on grounds that she admits are cognizable under Rule 60(b)(3).

¶26 Winston asserts, in a cursory manner, that Rule 60(b)(6)
authorized relief here because of “[a] breakdown in the adversarial process
and erosion of public confidence.” Her failure to develop this argument
constitutes a waiver. See Boswell v. Fintelmann, 242 Ariz. 52, 54, ¶ 7, n.3 (App.
2017). Waiver aside, nothing in the record supports Winston’s allegation of
“a breakdown in the adversarial process.” She could have filed a response
to Anderson’s motions. For reasons she has never explained, she didn’t, and
her failure to do so does not reflect a flaw in the adversarial process.

¶27 Finally, Winston complains that Anderson’s “evidence” was
“unauthenticated.” Because she does not identify the specific evidence to
which she refers, she has waived this argument. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A);
Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (claims waived when
appellant fails to support argument with citations to the record). Further, to
the extent she is referring to the unverified disclosure statement that
Anderson submitted in support of his claim for damages, Winston could
have challenged the sufficiency of this document to support summary
judgment on appeal. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allen, 231 Ariz. 209, 214-
15, ¶¶ 19-21 (App. 2012) (vacating summary judgment because moving
party did not properly authenticate supporting exhibits as required by Rule
56). Because she failed to timely appeal from the judgment, she is not
entitled to now rely on Rule 60(b) as an alternative to an appeal. See Aloia,
252 Ariz. at 553, ¶ 20 (“Rule 60(b)(6) does not allow the trial court to re-
weigh evidence or review legal errors[, n]or does Rule 60(b)(6) provide an
alternative to an appeal.”).

CONCLUSION

¶28 We affirm. We grant Anderson’s request for an award of costs
on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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