Clay v. Geiser

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

IVY MARIE CLAY, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

BRETT MICHAEL GEISER, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0241 FC
FILED 12-22-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2022-053113
The Honorable Cassie Bray Woo, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Ivy Marie Clay, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant

Brett Michael Geiser, Whittman
Respondent/Appellee

CLAY v. GEISER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Clay appeals from the superior court’s orders denying her
post-dissolution motion for injunction to halt property sale immediately.
Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied her
motion, the court affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The court views the facts in the light most favorable to
upholding the superior court’s ruling. IB Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Rancho Del
Mar Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 228 Ariz. 61, 63 ¶ 2 (App. 2011). The superior
court digitally recorded the trial, and Clay filed a motion with the superior
court about accepting digital recordings; she did not file that motion with
the court. And she has not provided a transcript or the digital recording for
appellate review. As the appellant, Clay must ensure the record on appeal
contains all transcripts necessary for the court to consider the appeal. See
Ariz. R. Civ. App. Proc. 11(c)(1)(A) (ordering transcripts of the superior
court not already in the official record is the appellant’s responsibility).
With no transcript or electronic recording, the court “assume[s] the missing
portions of the record would support the [superior] court’s findings and
conclusions.” State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30 ¶ 16
(App. 2003).

¶3 In 2022, Clay filed for divorce after 15 years of marriage. One
year later, the superior court dissolved the marriage. In the decree, the
superior court awarded Clay the marital residence as her “sole and separate
property subject to any and all outstanding liens and encumbrances
thereon.” The superior court ordered Clay to refinance the residence by
January 26, 2024. If Clay could not refinance the residence, then she had to
sell it, and she and Geiser each would receive 50% of the net proceeds.
Neither Clay nor Geiser appealed the decree.

¶4 Because Clay did not refinance and refused to cooperate in
selling the residence, Geiser filed a Petition to Enforce Court Order about

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CLAY v. GEISER
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Division of Property. Clay filed many motions after that, none of which are
before the court in this appeal. Clay ultimately filed a Rebuttal to Motion
for Sale of Marital Home. The superior court ultimately entered an order
appointing a special commissioner to “market and sell” the residence. The
superior court said, “[t]he parties must timely cooperate with the
production, completion, and execution of all documentation requested by
the Special Commissioner, related to the Property and reasonably necessary
to facilitate the marketing and sale of said property.”

¶5 Clay refused to work with the special commissioner and filed
the motion at issue: Clay’s January 17, 2025 Motion for Injunction to Halt
Property Sale Immediately. The superior court denied that motion in a
February 13, 2025 unsigned minute entry. Clay filed a notice of appeal from
that minute entry. Ultimately, Clay secured a signed, appealable order from
the denial of her request for injunctive relief. In denying the motion, the
superior court explained its ruling:

[B]ased on Wife being unable to refinance the mortgage and
pay Husband one-half of the equity in the home, this Court
has repeatedly affirmed the Court’s Order for the marital
residence to be placed on the market and sold, including most
recently in the Court’s January 10, 2025, Order on
Respondent/Husband’s Petition to Enforce. To the extent that
Wife asserts she has been unable to refinance due to Husband
failing to fulfill his financial obligations under the Decree,
Wife is required to seek enforcement of the terms of the
Dissolution Decree or pursue remedies in civil court for any
judgments entered against Husband.

¶6 Clay’s opening brief covers many issues not relevant to the
issue on appeal. She makes a 1-paragraph argument about the superior
court’s order she appealed, writing:

The trial court abused its discretion by denying the May 23,
2025, injunction (CR 88), ignoring Appellant’s $515,000 offer,
Respondent’s $76,924.28 in debts ($17,830.53 judgment,
$59,093.75 child expenses), and $4,110,821.18 in concealed
assets ($3,486,450.86 PPS, $581,077.22 Chase accounts,
$43,293.10 other) (Exhibit A-2, A-7, A-9). The $515,000
contract nets only $435,000 after an unheard of whopping
$75,000+ in closing costs (I could sell for zero costs—I’m a
broker), including $19,032.80 in sanctions, breaching RESC’s
fiduciary duty (Exhibit A-8; Realty Executives Int’l Servs. LLC

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CLAY v. GEISER
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v. Devonshire W. Can. Ltd. P’ship, 248 Ariz. 496, 462 P.3d 568
(App. 2020)). The $372,869 UWM payoff included $3,869 in
Respondent’s costs (Exhibit A-5). Enforcing his payment of
$76,924.28 would have enabled refinancing, equitable
division, and child’s best interests, avoiding the sale (Hays
v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 67 P.3d 695 (2003); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974)). Respondent’s fraudulent disposition
justifies stopping the sale & crediting his $23,394.18 equity
share to Appellant (A.R.S. § 25-318(C); Kline v. Kline, 221
Ariz, 564, 212 P.3d 902 (App. 2009); In re Marriage of lnboden,
223 Ariz. 542, 225 P.3d 599 (App. 2010); Hatch v. Hatch, 23
Ariz. App. 487, 534 P.2d 295 (1975)). The court should
immediately reverse the denial, restore the home, and
garnish Respondent’s accountss for what he owes
Appellant. (A.R.S. § 12-1801 et seq.).

The above is directly from Clay’s opening brief without edits.

¶7 The court has jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9, of the
Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A(1) and -2101.A.5(b) (giving
court of appeals jurisdiction over the “[g]ranting or dissolving an injunction
or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction or appointing a receiver”).

DISCUSSION

¶8 The court’s April 14, 2025 order limited its jurisdiction in this
appeal to Clay’s Motion for Injunction to Halt Property Sale Immediately
under A.R.S. § 12-2101.A.5(b). The court’s first task in any case is to ensure
the court has jurisdiction. See Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. of Ariz., 191 Ariz. 464
(App. 1997) (dismissing the appeal after finding the court did not have
jurisdiction). The court must dismiss an appeal over which it lacks
jurisdiction. See Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 304 (App. 1991).
Clay’s opening brief raises arguments about many orders, including the
decree. The court has no jurisdiction over any of those other issues.

I. Though Clay’s opening brief does not comply with the Arizona
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, the court will reach the merits
of the appeal.

¶9 The court must ensure “litigants conform to an acceptable,
minimal level of competency and performance and we owe this
responsibility to the judiciary, the bar and, more importantly, to all litigants
and the people as a whole.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App.
2022) (cleaned up). “An appellant who fails to make a bona fide and

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reasonably intelligent effort to comply with the rules will waive issues and
arguments.” Id. (cleaned up). The court holds Clay, a self-represented
litigant, to the same standards as a lawyer and does not afford her special
leniency. See id. Though the court limited this appeal to one order, Clay’s
opening brief attempts to appeal every single superior court order. The
court focuses its discussion on the relevant order.

¶10 As to the relevant order, Clay’s opening brief does not set
forth any legal grounds or identifiable arguments for reversing it. Clay also
does not properly cite any legal authority or make any substantive
argument. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. Proc. 13(a)(7)(A) (“Appellant’s contentions
concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for
each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate
references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies.”). For
that reason, the court could consider Clay to have abandoned and waived
her claim. See id.; see also State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“Failure
to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that
claim.”) (citation omitted).

¶11 Even so, the court exercises its discretion and decides Clay’s
appeal on its merits based on its own review of the record. See Adams v.
Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340 (App. 1984) (recognizing courts
prefer to decide each case upon its merits rather than dismissing on
procedural grounds).

II. Though Geiser did not file an answering brief, the court will not
treat that omission as a confession of error.

¶12 The court could treat Geiser’s failure to file an answering brief
as a confession of error. See Welch v. United Mut. Benefit Ass’n, 48 Ariz. 173,
174 (1936) (quoting Navarro v. State, 32 Ariz. 119, 120 (1927)); see, e.g., Skelsey
v. Kuhn, 23 Ariz. 367 (1922); Hatch v. Leighton et al., 24 Ariz. 300 (1922). But
the court grants relief on confession of error only if the appellant raises a
debatable question, and “no reasonable excuse is shown for the [appellee’s]
failure to appear and file a brief.” Welch, 48 Ariz. at 175; see also Navarro, 32
Ariz. at 120–21 (assuming appellee confesses error if appellant raises a
debatable question and appellee has no reasonable excuse for not filing an
answering brief); see also Carter v. State ex rel. Eyman, 5 Ariz. App. 415, 415
(1967) (“[T]he failure to file an answering brief does not constitute a
confession of reversible error since no debatable issue is presented.”).

¶13 The Arizona Supreme Court has characterized a debatable
question as one which would “require much industry and independent
research to refute.” Merrill v. Wheeler, 17 Ariz. 348, 350 (1915). It must spark

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“at least grave doubt” in the superior court’s order. Adkins v. Adkins, 39
Ariz. 520, 532 (1932). And any questions asked must raise a novel legal
issue. See Childs v. Frederickson, 21 Ariz. 248, 249 (1920).

¶14 Clay’s opening brief contains none of these characteristics.
First, because Clay makes no arguments, Geiser had nothing to research.
Second, Clay insists the superior court was acting biased towards her, but
she provided no evidence to create a “grave doubt” in the superior court’s
decision. And third, rather than raising any novel legal questions, Clay
continues to make conclusory statements about the superior court’s bias
towards her.

¶15 After examining both the record and Clay’s opening brief, the
court concludes Clay raises no debatable questions and thus does not treat
Geiser’s failure to file an answering brief as a confession of error. The court
thus may affirm the superior court’s decision. See Verdex Steel & Constr. Co.
v. Bd. of Supervisors, Maricopa Cnty., 19 Ariz. App. 547 (1973) (citation
omitted).

III. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Clay’s Motion for Injunction to Halt Property Sale Immediately
under A.R.S. § 12-2101.A.5(b).

¶16 The court reviews for abuse of discretion the denial of
injunctive relief. See Cnty. of Cochise v. Faria, 221 Ariz. 619, 621 ¶ 6 (App.
2009). The court will not reverse the superior court’s findings absent “a
mistake of law” or clear error in determining the facts to the legal standard.
Shoen v. Shoen, 167 Ariz. 58, 62–63, 66 (App. 1990). And the court will not
reweigh the evidence on appeal. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App.
2009).

¶17 Because neither Clay nor Geiser appealed the decree, it
became a final order. The decree directed Clay to refinance the residence
and remove Geiser from the mortgage, or Clay had to sell the residence.
Nothing in the decree excused Clay from those obligations. The superior
court affirmed that provision of the decree and ordered the “residence to be
placed on the market and sold.”

¶18 At its core, Clay’s request to have the superior court enjoin the
sale was an effort to modify the property provisions in the decree, which
the superior court could not do under this case’s procedural posture. See
A.R.S. § 25-327.A (“The provisions as to property disposition may not be
revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that
justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.”); Quijada

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v. Quijada, 246 Ariz. 217, 220 ¶ 6 (App. 2019) (discussing A.R.S. § 25-327.A).
Rule 85(b), Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure permits relief “from a
final judgment if the moving party shows special circumstances justifying
relief.” Id. ¶ 7. Similar to Quijada, Clay is not entitled to relief because she
did not ask for relief within 6 months after the superior court entered the
decree. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 85 (c)(1). Clay offers no basis as to why the
judgment should be void. See id. at (b)(4). So she must rely on whether ”the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or . . . any other reason justifying relief.” Id. at (b)(5)–
(6).

¶19 In that regard, Clay asked the superior court for relief and
explained why she had not refinanced the residence. The superior court
denied her request. On appeal, Clay asks the court to reweigh the evidence.
She again lists all the reasons she did not refinance the residence. But she
does not explain how the superior court abused its discretion when it
enforced the Decree’s unambiguous terms: “If unable to refinance by
January 26, 2024, the property will be placed on the market to be sold.
Equity is to be divided as follows: Ivy Marie Clay 50% Brett Michael Geiser
50%.” The court will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Hurd, 223 Ariz. at
52 ¶ 16.

¶20 Finally, Clay makes conclusory statements alleging the
superior court was biased against her. Opinions formed “on the basis of
facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible.” State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 546
(1997) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994)) (emphasis
added). The court thus presumes the superior court here acted free of bias
and prejudice. State v. Ramsey, 211 Ariz. 529, 541 ¶ 38 (App. 2005). To
overcome that presumption, Clay had to show bias by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id. She did not.

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CONCLUSION

¶21 The court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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