Lucky Horse v. Yarbrough

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

LUCKY HORSE BARN, INC., et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

DALLY YARBROUGH, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0244
FILED 12-09-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2021-010256
The Honorable John L. Blanchard, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Lily Richardson, Tempe
By Lily Richardson
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Tiffany & Bosco PA, Phoenix
By Lance R. Broberg, Nicholas A. Beatty
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
 LUCKY HORSE, et al., v. YARBROUGH, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Marie Sebastien and Lucky Horse Barn, Inc. (“Lucky Horse”)
appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of Dally Yarbrough,
Jennifer Yarbrough, and Rocking Dd, LLC. For the following reasons, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Sebastien established Lucky Horse as a “trail riding and
horseback riding lesson business.” Sebastien purchased six horses from
Low Arrow Performance Horses, LLC (“Low Arrow”) for $28,000 in early
2021 after communicating via Facebook and text with Alexis McQuarie.

¶3 At the time of purchase, McQuarie and Dally1 were
members of Low Arrow according to documents filed with the Arizona
Corporation Commission (“ACC”).2 Despite his membership status in
Low Arrow as recorded by the ACC, Dally had signed an agreement
selling his interest in Low Arrow to McQuarie in January 2021, before
Sebastien began negotiations to purchase the horses. After Dally resigned
his membership, Low Arrow paid pro-rated rent to the landowner as a
function of how many horses Low Arrow sold and Dally continued to
monitor Low Arrow’s operations on the ranch because of limited space.
McQuarie agreed she would provide Dally with bills of sale for his
“executive approval” for the purposes of tracking the pro-rated lease
payments and the number of horses present on the ranch.

1 Because Dally and Jennifer Yarbrough share the same last name,
we refer to them individually by first names and to the two of them
collectively as “the Yarbroughs.” The informal reference serves to avoid
confusion, and we intend no disrespect thereby.

2 McQuarie filed Articles of Amendment with the ACC for Low
Arrow to remove Dally as a member in August 2021.

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¶4 After purchase negotiations, Sebastien and Low Arrow
executed bills of sale stating the horses were sold “as is.” The bills of sale
identified Sebastien as the buyer and Low Arrow as the seller. McQuarie
signed the bills of sale on behalf of Low Arrow and Dally initialed them
for “executive approval,” as agreed. Sebastien initialed the provisions in
the bills of sale that stated, “no exchanges” and “no refunds,” and that she
had not had the horses examined by a veterinarian or viewed the horses in
person.

¶5 After payment and delivery of the horses, Sebastien believed
the horses had chronic injuries and age-related deficits. Ultimately the
horses were returned to Low Arrow.

¶6 Sebastien and Lucky Horse Barn sued Low Arrow,
McQuarie, the Yarbroughs, and Rocking Dd.3 Sebastien essentially alleged
that McQuarie made false statements and misrepresented the age and
condition of the horses.

¶7 As against the Yarbroughs, Sebastien pleaded claims of
rescission, fraud in the inducement, consumer fraud, common law fraud,
intentional misrepresentation, breach of the implied contractual duty of
good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation and conversion,
and constructive fraud and unjust enrichment. She pleaded claims against
Rocking Dd for consumer fraud, intentional misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation and conversion, constructive fraud and unjust
enrichment, and aiding and abetting.

¶8 The superior court granted summary judgment to the
Yarbroughs and Rocking Dd on all claims. The court found they were not
parties to the contract for the sale of the horses. Further, the court found
Dally had formally withdrawn from Low Arrow at the time of the sale,
had not participated in the sale, and did not make any statements or
otherwise communicate with Sebastien about the horses.

¶9 The superior court ordered Sebastien to pay $180,889.97 in
attorneys’ fees to the Yarbroughs and Rocking Dd and entered final
judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

3 Rocking Dd is a horse ranch and boarding facility where Dally is a
manager.

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¶10 We have jurisdiction over Sebastien’s timely appeal under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Grant of Summary Judgment

¶11 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to
determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact and whether
judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Glazer v.
State, 237 Ariz. 160, 167 ¶ 29 (2015). We view the facts in the light most
favorable to Sebastien as the non-moving party. See Carroll v. Robinson, 178
Ariz. 453, 456 (App. 1994). Summary judgment is proper if a defendant
fails to produce evidence creating a genuine issue of fact for the essential
elements of the claims against them. Aranki v. RKP Invs., Inc., 194 Ariz.
206, 209 ¶ 12 (App. 1999).

¶12 Sebastien seeks to hold the Yarbroughs personally liable for
contract, misrepresentation, and fraud-based claims stemming from
statements made by McQuarie. Sebastien admitted at her deposition that
she never communicated with either of the Yarbroughs and they never
made any representations to her about the horses. This admission defeats
her misrepresentation and fraud-based claims against the Yarbroughs, all
of which require the Yarbroughs to have made a misrepresentation to
Sebastien about the horses. See John Munic Enters., Inc. v. Laos, 235 Ariz. 12,
16 ¶ 10 (App. 2014) (fraudulent inducement); Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC of
Tucson, Inc., 136 Ariz. 338, 342 (App. 1983) (consumer fraud); Haisch v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 197 Ariz. 606, 610 ¶ 15 (App. 2000) (negligent
misrepresentation); Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Smith, 166 Ariz. 489, 494
(App. 1990) (intentional misrepresentation); Echols v. Beauty Built Homes,
Inc., 132 Ariz. 498, 500 (1982) (common law fraud); Rhoads v. Harvey
Publ’ns, Inc., 145 Ariz. 142, 148–49 (App. 1984) (constructive fraud).

¶13 As for her contract-based claims, Sebastien provided no
evidence to support any claims independently against Jennifer as to her
own liability, separate from the marital community. On appeal, Sebastien
focuses on Dally, arguing the superior court erred in granting summary
judgment because there are material facts in dispute, including when
Dally withdrew from Low Arrow, whether Dally was a party to the bills
of sale, whether the horses were sold “as is,” and whether Dally

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participated in the horse sales.4 But even if Dally were still a member of
Low Arrow at the time of the sale and gave his “executive approval” for
the sale, Arizona law prohibits his personal liability. Low Arrow is a
limited liability company governed by the Arizona Limited Liability
Company Act (“the Act”), A.R.S. §§ 29-3101 through 29-4202. The Act
provides that a member of a limited liability company is “not personally
liable” for the company’s debts or liability or “for the acts or omissions of
any other member . . . solely by reason of being or acting as a member.”
A.R.S. § 29-3304(A).

¶14 Sebastien argues Dally can be liable under the “piercing the
corporate veil” doctrine, which permits courts to disregard corporate
status when a corporation is the alter ego of an individual and “the
observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud or promote
injustice.” See Employer’s Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Lunt, 82 Ariz. 320, 323
(1957). No reported Arizona decision has explicitly held that a party may
“pierce the corporate veil” of a limited liability company, though at least
one recent unreported decision has assumed that they are capable of
doing so. See Barbano v. Brown, 2023 WL 6896980 (Ariz. App. 2023) (mem.
decision). Assuming, without deciding, that the veil of a limited liability
company can be pierced, Sebastien still must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that we can disregard Low Arrow’s “corporate” status. See
Ize Nantan Bagowa, Ltd. v. Scalia, 118 Ariz. 439, 443 (App. 1978).

¶15 The corporate veil may be pierced and the corporate entity
disregarded if the corporation is the “alter ego or business conduit of a
person.” See Loiselle v. Cosas Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 224 Ariz. 207, 214 ¶ 30 (App.
2010) (citation omitted). Factors used to determine the existence of an alter
ego relationship include the “plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the separate
corporate existence,” failure to maintain corporate formalities,
commingling of corporate and personal funds, and diversion of corporate
property for personal use, Deutsche Credit Corp. v. Case Power & Equip. Co.,
179 Ariz. 155, 160 (App. 1994), as well as undercapitalization and
unwarranted divestment or asset stripping, Scalia, 118 Ariz. at 443.

4 Sebastien does not challenge the court’s grant of summary
judgment to Rocking Dd in her opening brief. She also fails to develop any
argument as to her claims for conversion or unjust enrichment. Thus, she
waives these claims. See Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491 ¶ 6 n.2
(App. 2007).

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¶16 But in response to the motion for summary judgment,
Sebastien only argued that:

• [Dally] and McQuarie were the only members of Low
Arrow and [Dally] had final executive approval over
the horse sales;

• The actual ranch land where Low Arrow operates is
owned by [Dally];

• [Dally] admitted to never filing tax returns for Low
Arrow from 2018 to 2021;

• Plaintiff was told McQuarie and [Dally] were
business partners;

• Both McQuarie and [Dally] participated in the sale of
the horses.

¶17 Even taken as true, none of this evidence speaks directly to
any of the factors that would indicate Dally disregarded Low Arrow’s
“corporate” form. See Deutsche Credit Corp., 179 Ariz. at 160; Scalia, 118
Ariz. at 443. And even if some of this evidence could possibly relate
indirectly or impliedly to the factors, such an attenuated connection is
insufficient to establish that Low Arrow was Dally’s “alter ego” by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301,
309 (1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)
(explaining the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient” to
withstand a motion of summary judgment, and that “there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for plaintiff.”)). Thus,
Sebastien has not shown a genuine issue of material fact to vacate
summary judgment. See Aranki, 194 Ariz. at 209 ¶ 12.

II. Attorneys’ Fees

¶18 Sebastien challenges the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded
to the Yarbroughs and Rocking Dd.

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¶19 We review the amount of the court’s attorneys’ fee award for
an abuse of discretion. ABC Supply, Inc. v. Edwards, 191 Ariz. 48, 52 (App.
1996). We will affirm a reasonably supported fee award. Rudinsky v.
Harris, 231 Ariz. 95, 101 ¶ 27 (App. 2012).

¶20 The Yarbroughs and Rocking Dd hired three law firms
during the litigation: Rose Law Group, Gust Rosenfeld, and finally Tiffany
& Bosco. The Yarbroughs’ and Rocking Dd’s application for attorneys’
fees contained a supporting affidavit by their Tiffany & Bosco attorneys
and time entries from all three law firms specifying dates, times, and the
billing attorney for each task performed for the Yarbroughs and Rocking
Dd, as required by Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 187–88
(App. 1983).

¶21 Sebastien argues that some of the Rose Law Group invoices
were only addressed to McQuarie and not the Yarbroughs. But Rose Law
Group represented all the defendants. That some of the invoices were
addressed only to McQuarie does not prove that the legal services,
performed on behalf of all defendants, were severable for purposes of
determining a fee award.

¶22 Sebastien further argues the affidavit submitted in support
of the application for attorneys’ fees is insufficient to support the billing
rates charged by Rose Law Group and Gust Rosenfeld. But the affidavit
attested to the attorneys’ review of the other law firms’ invoices, which
were attached to the fee application, and attested to the reasonableness of
the rates and amounts billed, given the experience of the billing attorneys.

¶23 Finally, Sebastien fails to develop her argument5 that the fee
award is excessive and disproportionate to the scope of the litigation and
thus waives it. See Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305 ¶ 62 (App. 2009)
(failure to present and address arguments, supported by authority can
constitute abandonment and waiver of the claim). Because Sebastien did
not establish that any particular billing entry was unreasonable, the court
did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of the attorneys’
fees awarded. Rudinsky, 231 Ariz. at 102 ¶ 33.

5 To the extent Sebastien relies on her challenge to billing entries by
attorney Kyle Kopinsky, the record contains invoices confirming
Kopinsky’s fees.

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¶24 Therefore, we award costs to the Yarbroughs and Rocking
Dd as the prevailing parties upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 21. In our discretion, we deny the Yarbroughs’ and
Rocking Dd’s request for attorneys’ fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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