Porter v. Porter

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KATY LYNNE PORTER, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

NATHAN RAY PORTER, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0287 FC
FILED 02-20-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2023-003057
The Honorable Michelle Carson, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Montoya Lucero & Paster, PA, Phoenix
By Tiffani E. Lucero
Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Rubin & Ansel, PLLC, Scottsdale
By Yvette D. Ansel
Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Davis Miles, PLLC, Tempe
By Spencer T. Schiefer
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
 PORTER v. PORTER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Nathan Ray Porter (“Father”) appeals the decree dissolving
his marriage to Katy Lynne Porter (“Mother”). Father challenges the orders
denying retroactive modification of his temporary child support and
spousal maintenance obligations, the orders for final support and
maintenance awards, and several orders related to the parties’ property and
debts. We vacate and remand for the court to recalculate the retroactive
temporary support award based on a child’s emancipation during the
pendency of the proceedings, and for the court to revisit responsibility for
the minor children’s medical insurance. Regarding the decree’s division of
property and debts, we remand for recalculation of a reimbursement award
and vacate a sanctions order. We otherwise affirm the decree.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father were married for about twenty years,
during which time they had three children and acquired extensive
property, including Father’s dental practice and multiple real properties. In
mid-2023, Mother petitioned for dissolution.

¶3 In October 2023, by the parties’ agreement, a third party
purchased 51% of the dental practice and Father retained a 49% interest. A
few weeks later, the superior court entered temporary orders requiring
Father to make monthly payments of $3,581 for child support and $8,248
for spousal maintenance. To calculate those obligations, the court found
that Father’s annual income was $580,000.

¶4 In early 2024, Father ousted Mother from the community
residence and she moved into a community rental property (the “Manor
Court Property”) held by Father’s self-directed individual retirement
account. Father’s expert opined that Mother’s occupation of the property
caused the retirement account’s assets to be “deemed distributed as an early
withdrawal” under federal law, making Father responsible for taxes on the
distribution plus a penalty.

2
 PORTER v. PORTER
Decision of the Court

¶5 A few months after Mother moved into the Manor Court
Property, the parties’ oldest child graduated high school at age eighteen.
Father did not, however, request modification of his temporary child
support obligation until his December 2024 pretrial statement, when he
requested retroactive modification based not only on the child’s
emancipation but also on the court’s purported overestimate of his income.

¶6 The court held a dissolution trial in December 2024 and
entered a dissolution decree in February 2025. The court denied Father’s
retroactive modification requests and entered final orders requiring him to
pay $2,995 in monthly child support for the minor children and $7,500 in
monthly spousal maintenance for four years. In calculating the prospective
orders, the court attributed Father annual income of $580,000, plus $36,000
in additional investment return. For the child support calculation, the court
credited Mother for the cost of the minor children’s medical insurance, in
accord with its order assigning her that obligation.

¶7 In dividing the parties’ property, the court accepted their
multiple agreements under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure
(“Rule”) 69, including their agreements to sell the dental practice and all
their property holdings except one short-term rental (the “Lakeside
Property”). The court held that the remaining community property should
be divided equally, and that the parties identified no community debts for
allocation.

¶8 Consistent with an equal division of community property, the
court ordered the Lakeside Property sold and the equity split. But the court
accepted Mother’s claim that she separately paid some of the Lakeside
Property’s operating expenses during the pendency of the dissolution
proceedings and therefore ordered Father to reimburse her $3,993 as half
those expenses. The court denied Mother’s request to be reimbursed
expenses for the Manor Court Property, however, “[d]ue to the negative tax
consequence incurred by the parties and no rental expense incurred by
Mother.” The court found that Mother caused the negative tax consequence
but acted in good faith, and assigned financial responsibility to Father by
ordering the parties to file separate tax returns for the 2024 tax year and
beyond. The court further ordered that Father would be responsible for
Mother’s tax “fines, fees, [and] penalties for 2023” if he did not provide her
with a relevant tax form for the dental practice “by December 31, 2024.”

¶9 Father timely appealed the dissolution decree. We have
jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101(A)(1).

3
 PORTER v. PORTER
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶10 Father makes multiple arguments on appeal. We address
each argument in turn.

I. Child Support and Spousal Maintenance

¶11 Father raises several challenges to the superior court’s refusal
to retroactively modify the temporary child support and spousal
maintenance awards, as well as its imposition of the final awards. We
review child support and spousal maintenance determinations for abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 167 (App. 1983). The court
abuses its discretion only when the record, viewed most favorably to
affirming, is “‘devoid of competent evidence to support’ the decision.”
Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5 (1999) (citation omitted). We defer to
the superior court’s credibility determinations, and we do not reweigh the
evidence. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). Where
no party timely requests written findings under Rule 82, we presume the
court found every fact necessary to support its decision, Whitt v. Meza, 257
Ariz. 176, 180, ¶¶ 7-8 (App. 2024), inferring supportive findings of fact
where reasonably supported by the evidence and not in conflict with
express findings, Thomas v. Thomas, 142 Ariz. 386, 390 (App. 1984). We
interpret de novo the Arizona Child Support Guidelines, A.R.S. § 25-320
app. (“Support Guidelines”), and the Arizona Spousal Maintenance
Guidelines, A.R.S. § 25-319 app. (“Maintenance Guidelines”), which
prescribe the usual manner for calculating reasonable and necessary
support and maintenance. See Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 419, 422, 424, ¶¶ 7, 18-
20 (App. 2017); Support Guidelines § IX; Maintenance Guidelines § V.

A. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by attributing
$580,000 as Father’s income.

¶12 Father first contends the evidence did not justify the superior
court’s valuation of his income in both the temporary and the final support
and maintenance orders. We disagree.

¶13 The superior court applied the Support Guidelines and the
Maintenance Guidelines without deviation and stated in its final orders it
was attributing Father income in the same amount found for the temporary
orders: $580,000 (plus, for the final orders, unchallenged investment
returns). The Support Guidelines provide that the court may attribute
unearned income to a parent after considering multiple factors, including
the children’s best interests, the parent’s historical earnings, and the reasons
for underemployment. Support Guidelines § II(A)(4)(a), (d), (e). The

4
 PORTER v. PORTER
Decision of the Court

Maintenance Guidelines similarly provide that the court may attribute
income after balancing factors, including earning history and the reasons
for underemployment. Maintenance Guidelines § III(B)(2)(c), (f).

¶14 Mother specifically asked that the court look to Father’s
historical earnings to determine his income. She argues that income
attribution was appropriate because Father deliberately worked less during
the pendency of the dissolution to keep his performance below the level
that would require the third-party buyer to pay him funds held back from
the closing payment for the sale of the dental practice. Evidence that Father
voluntarily reduced his work hours could justify attributing him income.
See Support Guidelines § II(A)(4)(d), (e)(iii); Maintenance Guidelines
§ III(B)(2)(f). Moreover, the court also could attribute him income based on
his reduced earning potential due to the sale of the dental practice—even
assuming that the sale was a reasonable decision. See Support Guidelines
§ II(A)(4)(e)(ii) (providing, for child support income attribution, that if a
parent is voluntarily underemployed with reasonable cause, the court
should consider “whether the parent’s decision and its benefits outweigh
the effect that the reduced income has on the child’s best interests”);
Maintenance Guidelines § III(B)(2)(f)(ii) (providing, for spousal
maintenance income attribution, that if a spouse is voluntarily
underemployed with reasonable cause, the court should consider “whether
the party’s decision and its benefits outweigh the impact of the reduced
income on the party’s ability to become self-sufficient or pay spousal
maintenance”). And although Mother’s agreement to the sale was a
relevant consideration, it did not preclude the court from attributing Father
income under the factor-based analyses. See Child Support Guideline
§ II(A)(4)(e)(ii); Maintenance Guideline § III(B)(2)(f)(iii) (specifically
identifying as a relevant factor whether both spouses agreed to the income-
reducing conduct).

¶15 On this record, we cannot say the superior court abused its
discretion by attributing Father income of $580,000 and refusing to adjust
that amount when calculating retroactive child support. The attributed
amount was not unreasonable, as it was consistent with Mother’s testimony
that historically, the parties not only “were collecting at least 500 to 600
grand a year,” but also were using the dental practice to pay “close to
$60,000 in . . . personal expenses,” put “about 120 to 140,000 extra in
retirement accounts,” and “pay[] [their] kids through the practice.” And
because the court relied on the attribution of income, it was not constrained
by the evidence of Father’s actual earnings after selling the dental practice.
For the same reason, Father’s contention that the court improperly double-
counted actual income (specifically, the value of his retained business

5
 PORTER v. PORTER
Decision of the Court

interest and his later profit distributions), see Maintenance Guideline
§ III(C)(3)(a), is misplaced.

¶16 We note, however, that the attributed amount was not an
extreme deviation from the evidence of Father’s actual post-sale earnings.
To be sure, Father’s evidence showed that in 2024 he earned only about
$222,000 in wages and $103,000 in profit distributions as of November
(values not drastically different from the third-party buyer’s projections).
But Mother testified Father continued to live extravagantly.1 Moreover,
Father testified he had sold an additional 24.5% of his interest in the
practice—a transaction contemplated by the third-party buyer’s initial
projections as part of a staggered “likely path to full liquidity.”2 The court
therefore properly found that Father had income through his “retention of
part of his dental practice, and other things tied to the sale of his dental
practice,” and was “slated to receive another significant payout for the sale
of the dental practice in the future.”

¶17 On this record, the superior court acted within its discretion
in setting Father’s income for purposes of prospective child support and
spousal maintenance, and in denying Father’s motion to retroactively
modify the temporary orders based on the same value.

B. The superior court abused its discretion by denying a retroactive
modification of the temporary child support award based upon a
child’s emancipation.

¶18 Father next contends the superior court erred by denying
retroactive modification of the temporary child support order in view of the
oldest child’s eighteenth birthday and subsequent high school graduation.
We agree.

¶19 Except in circumstances not applicable here, a child support
award cannot continue past a child’s eighteenth birthday and high school

1 Mother also pointed to a bank statement to claim that Father was
continuing to run personal expenses through the dental practice. But that
statement showed only that he paid expenses from an account in which he
deposited his wages and distributions.

2 We note, however, that the balance of the projected transactions remained

hypothetical and could not support Mother’s repeated assertion that Father
would receive an additional $1 million over time. See Brevick v. Brevick, 129
Ariz. 51, 54 (App. 1981).

6
 PORTER v. PORTER
Decision of the Court

graduation. A.R.S. §§ 25-320(E), -503(Q)(2). But where the child support
obligation remains for other children, the court must affirmatively modify
the order to account for the emancipation. Guerra v. Bejarano, 212 Ariz. 442,
445, ¶ 13 (App. 2006). In the case of a final order, the court is statutorily
limited to ordering retroactive modification only so far back as the written
modification request. Id. But there is no such limitation with respect to a
temporary order. Maximov v. Maximov, 220 Ariz. 299, 301, ¶ 7 (App. 2009).
In that circumstance, the court may order retroactive modification as justice
requires. Id.

¶20 Where, as here, a child has undisputedly emancipated during
the pendency of a temporary order, the court has no discretion but to grant
a motion to modify the obligation retroactive to the emancipation event.
Indeed, Mother obliquely concedes the same, stating that counsel “can
work together to remove [the emancipated child] from the temporary
orders child support worksheet from June, 2024” (the month after her
graduation) as part of compliance with the court’s order that counsel
determine the balance of Father’s temporary support arrearages. We reject
Mother’s proposed solution for the error because Father is entitled to an
enforceable order recognizing that his obligation diminished when one of
the children emancipated. As such, we vacate the order denying
modification insofar as it related to the emancipation and remand for entry
of an appropriate order. Whether the order is styled as a change to the
obligation or as a change to arrearages is within the superior court’s
discretion.

C. The superior court abused its discretion by assigning responsibility
and credit for the children’s medical insurance without evidentiary
support.

¶21 Father next contends the superior court erred by crediting
Mother for paying the minor children’s medical insurance in the final child
support calculation. We agree.

¶22 Support Guideline § III(B)(3)(c) provides that “[u]nless
otherwise agreed, if medical insurance of comparable benefits and cost is
available to both parents, the order assigns responsibility to the parent who
has the greater amount of parenting time.” As Father concedes, the court
may reject the parties’ agreements—and so the superior court was not
bound by Mother’s testimony acquiescing to Father continuing to pay for
the insurance. See Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 134 (App. 1990) (holding
that the court is not bound to adopt parties’ proposed findings if
inconsistent with the court’s independent assessment of the facts). But

7
 PORTER v. PORTER
Decision of the Court

although the court could consider its award or primary parenting time to
Mother as a factor in assigning the obligation, it also had to consider
Mother’s cost to obtain comparable insurance. See Support Guideline
§ III(B)(3)(c). And the parties presented no evidence on that cost. Instead,
the court simply adopted for Mother (who was struggling to find full-time
work after a long absence from the workforce) the same cost that Father (a
working dentist) claimed in his pretrial statement to be paying for the
minor children: $245. And even that amount did not match Father’s
testimony that his lump-sum cost for insuring the minors and two adults
was $177 (plus $7 for dental and vision coverage).

¶23 On this record, insufficient evidence supports the superior
court’s order assigning the insurance obligation to Mother and its
recognition of the credit in the child support calculation. We vacate the
order assigning the obligation and remand for the court to determine an
assignment based on evidence or an accepted agreement. The decision may
necessitate modification of the support obligation.

II. Property and Debts

¶24 Father raises several challenges to orders related to the
parties’ property and debts. We review de novo the superior court’s
characterization of property as separate or community. Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-
Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 4 (App. 2007). We review the allocation of
property for abuse of discretion, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to affirming the court’s order. Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz.
448, 451, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). We defer to the court’s credibility
determinations. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347-48, ¶ 13.

A. The superior court properly ordered reimbursement for the Lakeside
Property’s operating expenses, but it miscalculated the amount.

¶25 Father contends the superior court erred by ordering him to
reimburse Mother for half of the expenses she separately paid to continue
operating the Lakeside Property as a short-term rental during the
dissolution proceedings. Although reimbursement was justified, the
amount ordered was inconsistent with the evidence.

¶26 Because the marital community terminates upon service of a
dissolution petition that results in a decree, a spouse’s post-petition
expenditures of separate funds to maintain a community asset are
reimbursable absent clear and convincing evidence of donative intent.
Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 596-97, ¶¶ 15, 19-20 (App. 2017). Mother
presented evidence that she used her separate funds to pay post-petition

8
 PORTER v. PORTER
Decision of the Court

operating expenses for the Lakeside Property. Father argues the
expenditures were unnecessary because Mother testified the property’s
rental income covered its expenses—albeit “barely.” But he ignores
Mother’s clarifying testimony that the property’s ability to cover its
expenses varied from month to month, and that because of Father’s actions,
she could no longer rely on additional community funds to be in the
expense-paying account and guarantee funding for auto-payments. Father
also ignores his own testimony that the Lakeside Property had never been
profitable and varied by month between breaking even and operating at a
loss. On this record, the court properly ordered reimbursement to Mother.

¶27 However, the court did not calculate the reimbursement
award in accord with the evidence. First, although Mother’s evidence
identified her total expenses as $6,987.27, the court mistakenly used the
figure $7,987.27. Second, Mother’s evidence in support of the total included
an entry for $1,900 described as “nate stole 1900 to XX1791.” On its face,
that entry describes something other than a Lakeside Property expense and
therefore should not have been included in the reimbursement award. We
remand for modification of the award consistent with the evidence.

B. The superior court erred by conditioning Father’s avoidance of
sanctions on him acting by a past date.

¶28 Father next contends the superior court erred by ordering in
the February 2025 decree that he would be responsible for Mother’s 2023
tax penalties if he did not provide her a tax form for the dental practice “by
December 31, 2024.” That order was logically faulty because it conditioned
Father’s avoidance of sanctions on him acting by a deadline that already
expired. Consequently, we vacate the order without prejudice and remand
for the superior court to fashion an appropriate order under Rule 92. See
Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 92 (authorizing court to use civil contempt sanctions to
compel compliance with a court order or to compensate for losses caused
by a failure to comply with a court order); see also Trombi v. Donahoe, 223
Ariz. 261, 267, ¶ 26 (App. 2009).

C. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in addressing the tax
consequence caused by Mother’s occupation of the Manor Court
Property.

¶29 Father also contends the superior court erred by not equally
dividing, as community debt, the negative tax consequence caused by
Mother moving into the Manor Court Property. We disagree.

9
 PORTER v. PORTER
Decision of the Court

¶30 Because the tax consequence occurred after the marital
community terminated, it was not a community debt. See A.R.S. § 25-
213(B). To be sure, it was a non-speculative detriment related to community
property caused by one spouse’s unilateral conduct—so the court properly
considered it under A.R.S. § 25-318(B) and (C) as either a “debt[] or
obligation that was related to the property” or a “destruction” of property.
Cf. Larrea v. Chand, __ Ariz. __, ¶ 33, 580 P.3d 554, 562 (App. 2025) (holding
that a non-speculative carry-forward tax credit is properly allocated as
community property even if not immediately usable). But the court was
not required to equally allocate it. See A.R.S. § 25-318(C)-(D). The court
reasonably found that although Mother caused the tax consequence by
occupying the Manor Court Property, she acted in good faith in response to
her ouster from the marital residence. The court then reasonably balanced
the considerations by tacitly assigning the consequence to Father but citing
it as a reason for denying Mother’s expense-reimbursement claim. On this
record, Father has shown no abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶31 We vacate and remand with respect to the superior court’s
denial of retroactive modification of the temporary child support order
based upon a child’s emancipation, and with respect to the assignment of
the medical-insurance obligation in the final support order. We otherwise
affirm all orders related to child support and spousal maintenance.

¶32 With respect to property and debts, we affirm the order
reimbursing Mother for her expenses related to the Lakeside Property but
remand for a recalculation of the amount. We vacate the order threatening
sanctions for Father’s failure to provide a tax form. We affirm the orders
regarding the tax consequence caused by Mother’s occupation of the Manor
Court Property.

¶33 After considering the reasonableness of the positions taken,
as well as each party’s financial resources, in the exercise of our discretion
we deny the parties’ competing requests for attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

10