Trevizo v. Meacham

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

DAVID TREVIZO, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ELIZABETH MEACHAM, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0303
FILED 12-04-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-007782
The Honorable Jennifer C. Ryan-Touhill, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

FFox Law LLC, Tempe
By Frank M. Fox
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Hymson Goldstein Pantiliat & Lohr, PLLC, Scottsdale
By John L. Lohr, Jr., James-Henry R. Courteau, David B. Goldstein
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 33-401 states that
a deed for the transfer of real property is not valid unless it is signed by the
grantor. The question presented here is whether recording an unsigned
deed makes it valid. The superior court held that it does. Because we
conclude otherwise, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This case arises out of a dispute among family members over
ownership of a house. Rosario Felix and her daughter, Priscilla Felix
Trevizo, came into ownership of the house as joint tenants with right of
survivorship in 1978.

¶3 In 2006, a quitclaim deed (the “2006 deed”) was recorded that
purported to transfer Ms. Trevizo’s interest in the house to her mother, Ms.
Felix. About two years later, a beneficiary deed (the “2008 deed”) was
recorded that reflected Ms. Felix’s transfer of her interest in the house to
another daughter, Elizabeth Felix Meacham.

¶4 David Trevizo began living in the house in 2011 or 2012. Mr.
Trevizo’s grandmother, Ms. Felix, died in 2015, and his mother, Ms.
Trevizo, died in 2021. A dispute then arose between Mr. Trevizo and his
aunt, Ms. Meacham, over ownership of the house.

¶5 In 2023, Mr. Trevizo’s other aunt, Mary Felix Patton, executed
a quitclaim deed (the “2023 deed”) quitclaiming to Mr. Trevizo “all my
interest” in the house.

¶6 Unlike the 2008 deed and the 2023 deed, the 2006 deed is not
signed by the purported grantor. On the 2006 deed, the name “Priscilla
Trevizo” is printed by hand on the line next to the words, “Print Name of
Grantor,” but the line next to the words “Signature of Grantor” is blank.
The 2006 deed also contains an acknowledgment, bearing the signature and
seal of a notary named Amanda K. Young, reciting that “Priscilla

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Trevizo . . . acknowledged to me . . . that by his/her/their
signature(s) . . . the person(s) . . . executed the instrument.”1 No evidence in
the record explains why Ms. Young’s signature and notary seal appears on
the acknowledgement of the unsigned deed. At her deposition in this case,
the notary testified that she had no recollection of Ms. Trevizo or of
notarizing the 2006 deed. She further stated that any testimony she offered
about the 2006 deed would be “speculative.”

¶7 In April 2024, Mr. Trevizo brought a quiet title action against
Ms. Meacham, her husband, and a trust they established (“Appellees”),
alleging that the 2006 deed is void because his mother, the purported
grantor, didn’t sign it. Appellees asserted various counterclaims in
response, including claims for declaratory relief, quiet title, constructive
trust, and unjust enrichment. They also asserted a claim against Mr. Trevizo
under A.R.S. § 33-420 based on his recording of the 2023 deed.

¶8 Appellees moved for summary judgment on all claims. They
argued, first, that the 2006 deed “vest[ed Ms.] Felix with 100% ownership
of the [house]” that she formerly co-owned with Mr. Trevizo’s mother, and
therefore that Mr. Trevizo acquired no interest in the house when his
mother died in 2021. Because the 2006 deed was “duly recorded with the
Maricopa County Recorder’s [O]ffice,” Appellees argued, the deed “is
deemed to be valid” “pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 33-401(D) and 11-480.”

¶9 Noting the length of time that has passed since the 2006 deed
was recorded, Appellees further argued that, in any event, Mr. Trevizo’s
quiet title claim was barred by the three-year limitations period set forth in
A.R.S. § 12-523.

¶10 Appellees also asserted that over the years Ms. Meacham and
her husband maintained and paid the property taxes and other expenses
relating to the house “with no contribution from” Mr. Trevizo. If nothing

1The acknowledgment reads, “On June 4, 2006, before [name of notary],

appeared Priscilla Trevizo, personally known to me (or proved to me on the
basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that
he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies),
and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or
the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the
instrument.” Below this language is the notary’s signature and seal.

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else, Appellees insisted, they were “entitled to an equitable interest” in the
house and to an award of damages on their unjust enrichment claim.

¶11 Finally, Appellees asserted that Mr. Trevizo’s recording of the
2023 deed entitled them to statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs
under A.R.S. § 33-420. The 2023 deed was “groundless,” they explained,
because it purported to convey Ms. Patton’s interest in the house to Mr.
Trevizo even though Ms. Patton “had no interests [sic]” in the house to
begin with.

¶12 In response, Mr. Trevizo argued, inter alia, that the 2006 deed
is “invalid” because it is “not signed.” Accordingly, he maintained, when
“[his] grandmother died” in 2015, “the [house] went to Mr. Trevizo’s
mother by right of survivorship,” and that he acquired his mother’s interest
when she died six years later. At a minimum, Mr. Trevizo argued, he and
Appellees each own “half” of the house, “assuming” that the 2008 deed
transferring Ms. Felix’s interest to Ms. Meacham is “legitimate.” Mr.
Trevizo denied Appellees’ contention that they have maintained and paid
all expenses relating to the house, asserting that he has maintained the
house and paid its expenses since he moved in over ten years ago.

¶13 In December 2024, the superior court granted Appellees’
motion for summary judgment.2 Noting that the 2006 deed was “on file
with the Recorder’s office,” the court held that “any defects” in the deed
were “remediated” by A.R.S. §§ 11-480(E) and 33-401(D). Accordingly, the
court determined, the 2006 deed “is valid,” Ms. Meacham “obtained title to
the property after [Ms. Felix’s] death in 2015,” and Mr. Trevizo “has no
interest in the property.” And because Mr. Trevizo had no interest in the
house, the court concluded, his recordation of the 2023 deed violated A.R.S.
§ 33-420.

¶14 Mr. Trevizo moved for reconsideration, submitting a
declaration from a handwriting expert to bolster his challenge to the

2 In his response to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Trevizo

asserted a cross-motion seeking summary judgment in his favor. The court
issued an order striking Mr. Trevizo’s cross-motion for summary judgment
because the scheduling order issued in this case expressly prohibited the
parties from “combin[ing] any motion with a responsive pleading.”
Mr. Trevizo does not appeal the court’s order striking his cross-motion for
summary judgment.

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validity of the 2006 deed. The court denied Mr. Trevizo’s motion for
reconsideration.

¶15 In March 2025, the superior court entered final judgment
quieting title to the house in Appellees as its “sole owners,” with Mr.
Trevizo having “no legal or equitable interest” in it. The court further
determined that the 2023 deed was “wrongful” and “groundless,” and
awarded Appellees statutory damages under A.R.S. § 33-420. The court also
awarded Appellees attorney fees and costs under both A.R.S. §§ 33-420 and
12-349.

¶16 Mr. Trevizo timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶17 Mr. Trevizo challenges the court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees.

¶18 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the moving party
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P.
56(a). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Comerica Bank v.
Mahmoodi, 224 Ariz. 289, 291, ¶ 13 (App. 2010).

¶19 “Every deed or conveyance of real property must be signed by
the grantor and must be duly acknowledged before [a notary].” A.R.S. § 33-
401(B) (emphasis added). A deed that is not signed by the grantor is of no
effect. See Watts v. Hogan, 111 Ariz. 536, 537 (1975) (“All parties having an
interest in the land to be conveyed must sign the instrument of
conveyance.”); see also Meyer v. 23526 Florence, LLC, 1 CA-CV 22-0485, 2023
WL 3843321 at *5, ¶ 25 (Ariz. App. June 6, 2023) (mem. decision) (“To be
valid, deeds must, among other things, be signed by the grantor.”).

¶20 Mr. Trevizo asserts that the superior court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellees, arguing, inter alia, that “the
absence of [the] grantor’s signature” on a deed is “a fundamental defect”
that is not “cured” by recording the unsigned deed. In response, Appellees
argue, first, that the 2006 deed is valid because “Priscilla Trevizo signed [it]
in front of a notary, who acknowledged the signature and provided her
notary stamp.”

¶21 A review of the 2006 deed refutes Appellees’ assertion that
Ms. Trevizo signed it. The signature line is blank.

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¶22 Admittedly, the acknowledgment to the 2006 deed, which
bears the notary’s signature and seal, contains the notary’s statement
reciting that Ms. Trevizo “executed” it “by . . . her . . . signature[].” The
notary’s statement that Ms. Trevizo signed this unsigned document is
inexplicable, and, at her deposition, the notary had no explanation for it.
But the notary’s statement is irrelevant to the issue before us, because
whether a deed is unsigned is a matter that a court decides for itself. Cf. In
re Estate of Bixby, __ Ariz. __, __, ¶¶ 9, 16, 573 P.3d 113, 116, 118 (App. 2025)
(affirming trial court’s determination that purported will was not valid in
part because it bore no “signature in the usual sense[,]” and rejecting
purported beneficiary’s argument that the decedent’s handwritten notation
“XO” constituted her signature). The notary’s recital on the 2006 deed that
Ms. Trevizo signed it does not change the fact that the 2006 deed is
unsigned.

¶23 Appellees argue, next, that even if the 2006 deed wasn’t
signed by the purported grantor, that omission was cured when the deed
was recorded. Under Subsection D of A.R.S. § 33-401, Appellees assert, “any
document” containing a “defect [or] omission . . . can be deemed valid after
it is recorded.” Appellees’ reading conflicts with the statute’s text.

¶24 Subsection D of A.R.S. § 33-401 provides that

[f]or the purposes of this section, a deed or conveyance that
contains any defect, omission or informality in the certificate
of acknowledgment, or for which there is any failure to
perform a duty or meet a requirement in the taking of the
acknowledgment, and that has been recorded in the office of
the county recorder of the county in which the property is
located shall be deemed to have been duly acknowledged on
and after the date of its recording.

A.R.S. § 33-401(D). By its terms, Subsection D of A.R.S. § 33-401 applies only
to defects or omissions “in the certificate of acknowledgement” or in “the
taking of the acknowledgment[.]” See id. Relying on Subsection D of A.R.S.
§ 33-401, for example, this Court has held that a signed, recorded deed was
not invalid merely because the notary “did not affix her official seal to the
deed” as required by A.R.S. § 33-401(B) and “instead used her embossing
seal — also known as a ‘crimper’ — when she notarized the deed.” Larmer
v. Estate of Larmer, 241 Ariz. 15, 16, ¶¶ 1, 3 (App. 2016). Despite the absence
of the official seal required by A.R.S. § 33-401(B), the Larmer court held, the
deed was not invalid because the notary’s acknowledgement of the deed
satisfied the alternative requirements of the then-effective Uniform

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Recognition of Acknowledgments Act (the “URAA”), codified at A.R.S. §§
33-501 through -508.3 Id. at 19, ¶¶ 15-16.

¶25 But nothing in Subsection D of Section 33-401 indicates that
the subsection encompasses defects or omissions other than irregularities
in the acknowledgment of a deed. Because we must apply Subsection D as
written, we reject Appellees’ request to expand Subsection D to apply to the
omission of the grantor’s signature. See Mussi v. Hobbs, 255 Ariz. 395, 402, ¶
34 (2023) (“[A] court will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to
matters not falling within its expressed provisions.” (citation omitted)).
And accepting Appellant’s interpretation would require us to ignore
Section 33-401(B), which provides that “[e]very deed or conveyance of real
property must be signed by the grantor[.]” (emphasis added).

¶26 Appellees further contend that once the 2006 deed was
recorded, A.R.S. § 11-480’s “strict and arduous process to determine that a
document is suitable for recording” resulted in a conclusive determination
of the deed’s validity.4 Noting that Subsection E of Section 11-480 states that

3 Arizona’s URAA was repealed after Larmer was decided. See 2021 Ariz.

Sess. Laws ch. 66, § 7 (1st Reg. Sess.).
4 Section 11-480 reads, in relevant part,

A. Only an instrument that, on presentation to a county recorder for
recordation, fails to meet any of the following conditions may be
rejected for recordation at the time of presentation for recordation:

1. Each instrument shall have a caption briefly stating the nature of
the instrument [.] . . .

2. Each instrument shall be an original and shall be sufficiently legible
for the recorder to make certified copies from the photographic or
micrographic record.

3. Each instrument shall have original signatures except when
otherwise provided by law.

4. Each instrument dated and executed on or after January 1, 1991,
shall be not larger than eight and one-half inches in width and not
longer than fourteen inches and shall have a print size not smaller
than ten-point type.

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an instrument “accepted for recordation is not subject to a later claim of
invalidity for failure to comply with the requirements of this section[,]”
Appellees maintain that once the 2006 deed was recorded, Subsection E of
Section 11-480 barred any challenge to its validity even though it is not
signed by the purported grantor.

¶27 This is an untenable reading of Section 11-480. That statute
merely sets forth the requirements for the form of documents submitted for
recordation. The statute prescribes, for example, the maximum page size (8
½” x 14”), minimum font size (10 point type), and minimum length of the
top margin on the first page (two inches). A.R.S. § 11-480(A)(4), (C). And
the statute requires that, unless otherwise provided by law, the signatures
on recorded documents must be “original[.]” A.R.S. § 11-480(A)(3). But as
this Court recognized in Phipps v. CW Leasing, Inc., 186 Ariz. 397, 401 (App.
1996), Section 11-480 does not alter the substantive requirements for
conveyances of rights in real property.

¶28 In Phipps, McCormick and Phipps signed a contract giving the
latter a right of first refusal (“ROFR”) to purchase the former’s property. Id.
at 399. Although the contract was not notarized, Phipps recorded it. Id.
When McCormick later sold the property to someone else, Phipps sued to
set aside the sale and enforce his ROFR. Id. Rejecting his claim, the superior

B. Each instrument dated and executed on or after January 1, 1991,
shall have at least a one-half inch margin across the top, bottom and
the left and right sides from the top to the bottom. . . . Failure to meet
the one-half inch margin requirement of this subsection may affect
notice imparted by the document but shall not constitute grounds for
rejection for recordation pursuant to subsection A of this section.

C. The first page shall have a top margin of at least two inches, which
shall be reserved for recording information. The left three and one-
half inches of the top margin of the first page or sheet may be used by
the public to show the name of the person requesting recording and
the name and address to which the document is to be returned
following recording. . . .

***

E. Any instrument accepted for recordation is not subject to a later
claim of invalidity for failure to comply with the requirements of this
section.

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court held that the contract, though recorded, was ineffective to put
prospective purchasers on notice of the ROFR because the contract lacked
the statutorily-required certificate of acknowledgment. Id. On appeal, this
Court affirmed. Because the contract setting forth Phipps’s ROFR was “an
instrument affecting real property,” the Court held, A.R.S. § 33-401(B)
required that it be “acknowledged.” Id. at 401 (citation omitted). Because
the document was not acknowledged, the Court concluded, “the recording
of [the document] did not provide constructive notice” to prospective
purchasers of the ROFR. Id. at 402.

¶29 In reaching this conclusion, the Phipps court rejected Phipps’s
argument that under Section 11-480, “the recorder’s acceptance of the
document for recordation cured any defect in his failing to have it
acknowledged.” Id. at 401. The Court held that

[u]nder the express language of [Section 11-480(E)] . . . the
acceptance of an instrument for recordation excuses only the
failure to comply with the requirements set forth in the other
subsections of that particular statute, which deal mainly with
stylistic requirements. [Section 11-480(E)] does not excuse
failure to comply with the acknowledgment requirement.

Id.

¶30 The Phipps court’s holding that Section 11-480(E) does not
excuse compliance with the statutory requirement that a recorded
document be acknowledged, and therefore that a document lacking the
required acknowledgement is ineffective, applies equally here. Under
Section 33-401(B), a deed that is not signed by the grantor is void. If an
unsigned, and therefore void, deed is recorded, it’s still void. Section 11-
480(E) does not operate to breathe life into a void deed.

¶31 Appellees argue, in the alternative, that the court’s grant of
summary judgment should be affirmed because Mr. Trevizo’s quiet title
claim was time-barred. See Mining Investment Group, LLC v. Roberts, 217 Ariz
635, 640 (App. 2008) (appellate court can affirm superior court’s judgment
“even if the [superior court] has reached the right result for the wrong
reason.” (citation modified)). According to Appellees, Mr. Trevizo’s quiet
title claim is subject to a three-year limitations period, see A.R.S. § 12-523,
and therefore “his time to challenge the validity” of the 2006 deed “expired
in 2009.”

¶32 But the statute of limitations does not run against a deed that
is invalid on its face. See Estate of Dominguez v. Dominguez, __ Ariz. __, __,

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¶ 31, 567 P.3d 81, 89 (2025) (holding that the limitations period established
by A.R.S. § 12-524 begins to run upon recording of a deed as long as the
deed is “facially valid”); see also Anadarko Land Corp. v. Family Tree Corp., 389
P.3d 1218, 1223, ¶ 16 (Wyo. 2017) (“[A] void deed is a nullity, making it
ineffective to transfer title and ineffective to set a statute of limitations
running.”); Arnold v. Brent, 561 P.3d 426, 429, ¶ 11 (Colo. App. 2024) (“[A]
void deed is not subject to [limitation’s statute’s] time bar.”); Heppler v.
Esther, 534 S.W.2d 533, 535, 537 (Mo. App. 1976) (holding that deed which
was incomplete because “the space following the word ‘year’ was left
blank” was “void on its face” and so “did not start the running of” the
statutory limitations period). Because the 2006 deed is unsigned, it is invalid
on its face, and so its recording did not commence the running of any
limitations period. We cannot, therefore, affirm summary judgment on the
alternative ground that Mr. Trevizo’s claim is time-barred.

¶33 The court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees
on all of their claims was premised on its determination that the unsigned
2006 deed was valid because it was recorded. Because this determination
was in error, the judgment must be vacated and the matter remanded for
further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

¶34 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the award of summary
judgment, vacate the judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

¶35 Mr. Trevizo requests an award of attorney fees and costs on
appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-341, -341.01, and -349. In the exercise of our
discretion, we deny his request for attorney fees. He may recover his costs
on appeal, subject to his compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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