Jp Morgan v. Complot

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

DEREK COMPLOT, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0348
FILED 02-03-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-001978
The Honorable Michael J. Herrod, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

The Moore Law Group, Phoenix
By Devin Izenberg, Nicholas Bullock, Stephen Ferlmann, James
Hammond
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Zwicker & Associates, PC, Tempe
By Darren Tallman
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Derek Complot, Buckeye
Defendant/Appellant
 JP MORGAN v. COMPLOT
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey
joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Derek Complot appeals the superior court’s grant of
summary judgment for JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and denial
of his cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons below, we
reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Chase alleges Complot opened a credit card account with
Chase and owes $13,843.62. Chase contends it sent nine monthly
statements to Complot—three to a P.O. Box in Florida and six to Complot’s
Buckeye residence. Complot insisted he never opened the account or
incurred the charges.

¶3 Chase filed this lawsuit seeking the unpaid balance in January
2024 and soon after moved for summary judgment. An officer from Chase,
Andrea Varela Villaquiran, provided an affidavit based on Chase’s business
records, avowing that Complot opened the account on November 28, 2021,
and that $342 had been paid toward the balance since the account charge-
off on August 31, 2022. Aside from this affidavit, Chase offered no other
evidence to prove Complot opened the account or made the $342 payment.

¶4 Complot opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary
judgment. He offered a declaration denying any contract with Chase. In
the alternative, he argued the debt was satisfied by accord and satisfaction.

¶5 The superior court granted Chase’s motion for summary
judgment, denied Complot’s cross-motion and entered judgment against
Complot for $13,843.62. The court found that Complot “provides no factual
basis” for his defenses and “raised no genuine issue of material fact.”

¶6 Complot timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-
2101(A)(1), -120.21(A)(1).

2
 JP MORGAN v. COMPLOT
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶7 We review de novo the superior court’s grant of summary
judgment. Jackson v. Eagle KMC L.L.C., 245 Ariz. 544, 545, ¶ 7 (2019).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the moving party shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment
was entered and we will affirm only if the facts produced in support of the
claim have so little probative value that reasonable people could not agree
on the outcome. Takieh v. O’Meara, 252 Ariz. 51, 56, ¶ 11 (App. 2021).

¶8 When a plaintiff moves for summary judgment in a breach of
contract action, that plaintiff bears a heavy burden to prove every element
of the claim with “undisputed admissible evidence that would compel any
reasonable juror to find in its favor.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allen, 231
Ariz. 209, 213, ¶ 18 (App. 2012) (citation omitted); Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v.
Thruston, 218 Ariz. 112, 115, ¶ 15 (App. 2008). “A plaintiff’s motion must
stand on its own and demonstrate by admissible evidence that the plaintiff
has met its burden of proof and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Wells Fargo Bank, 231 Ariz. at 211, ¶ 1. “[T]he mere absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to
judgment.” Id. at 213, ¶ 16.

I. Complot Provided a Declaration.

¶9 The superior court erroneously concluded that Complot
presented “no Declarations, Affidavits, Exhibits or other evidence.”
Complot filed a declaration, along with a verified statement under penalty
of perjury. Arizona law treats an unsworn written declaration with like
force and effect as an affidavit if it is “(1) signed by the person as true under
penalty of perjury; (2) dated; and (3) in substantially the following form: ‘I
declare [or certify, verify or state] under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct. Executed on [date]. [Signature].’” Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 80(c) (brackets in the original). Complot’s declaration was signed, dated
and supported by his statement: “I declare under penalty of perjury under
the laws of the State of Arizona that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief.”

¶10 The superior court’s characterization that Complot merely
“made assertions” erroneously discounted this admissible evidence.

3
 JP MORGAN v. COMPLOT
Decision of the Court

II. Dueling Affidavits Created Issues of Material Fact.

¶11 Chase alleged Complot was liable on an account stated. “An
account stated is an agreed balance between the parties to a settlement.”
Monte Produce, Inc. v. Delgado, 126 Ariz. 320, 321 (App. 1980); see also
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 282 (1981). “[R]etention without
objection for an unreasonably long time of a statement of account rendered
by the other party is a manifestation of assent.” Id. § 282(1). What length
of time is unreasonable “is a question of fact to be answered in the light of
all the circumstances.” Id. § 282 cmt. b.

¶12 The threshold question is whether an account stated existed.
Chase does not point to an express agreement entered by the parties, but
instead argues an account stated exists because Complot received monthly
statements and failed to timely object. Chase presented an affidavit from
its officer, who avowed that Complot opened the account and incurred the
charges. But Complot submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury
directly contradicting that affidavit. He declared he did not open the
account and did not incur the debt. He also pointed to geographic evidence
supporting his position—charges made in Gilbert and Chandler while he
resided in Buckeye.

¶13 When a plaintiff seeking to establish an account stated
presents evidence that the defendant opened the account and incurred
charges, but the defendant presents evidence that he did not open the
account and did not incur the charges, a genuine issue of material fact exists
on whether an account stated exists. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This is not
a case where the parties dispute the amount owed while agreeing that
transactions occurred. Rather, Complot disputes that any legitimate
debtor-creditor relationship ever existed. Whether Complot opened the
account and authorized the charges goes to the heart of Chase’s claim and
cannot be resolved through competing affidavits at the summary judgment
stage.

¶14 And even assuming that Complot received the statements,
whether he did not object for an unreasonable amount of time “is a question
of fact to be answered in the light of all the circumstances” by the superior
court. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 282 cmt. b (1981); Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).

¶15 We express no opinion on the ultimate merits of Complot’s
defenses or the likelihood that he will prevail at trial. We hold only that
when a plaintiff presents evidence that a defendant opened a credit card

4
 JP MORGAN v. COMPLOT
Decision of the Court

account and incurred charges, but the defendant presents evidence under
oath that he did not open the account and did not incur any charges,
genuine issues of material fact exist that preclude summary judgment on
an account stated theory.

¶16 Because we reverse on the threshold issue of whether an
account stated was established, we need not reach Complot’s alternative
arguments related to accord and satisfaction.

III. Conduct of Chase’s Counsel.

¶17 We are troubled by the repeated mischaracterization of
precedent throughout Chase’s briefing. A significant number of the cases
cited do not support—and in some instances directly contradict—the
propositions for which they are offered. Most of the authorities cited by
Chase’s counsel contain substantial defects like unsupported premises or
fake holdings. By way of example:

• Counsel cited Abbott v. Banner Health Network, 239 Ariz. 409, 414
(2016), for the proposition that “[a] de minimis payment, absent a
substantive dispute over specific charges, does not constitute a bona
fide attempt to compromise.” But the case never mentions “de
minimis payment,” and instead holds that the settlement of a bona
fide dispute constitutes consideration in an accord and satisfaction
unless the claim is known to be entirely without foundation. Id. at
413, ¶ 12.

• Counsel cited Flagel v. Sw. Clinical Physiatrists, P.C., 157 Ariz. 196
(App. 1988), for the proposition that “debtor’s error in delivery
negates accord.” But Flagel does not discuss delivery’s impact on
accord and instead affirmed the debtor’s accord and satisfaction
defense. See generally id.

• Counsel cited Yollin v. City of Glendale, 219 Ariz. 24 (App. 2008), for
the proposition that “[t]he trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and
costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 was proper given Appellant’s
unsupported defenses.” Yollin is about the notice-of-claim statute
and does not discuss A.R.S. § 12-341.01. See generally id.

¶18 We remind counsel the Arizona Rules of Professional
Conduct (“ER”) require competence and diligence in representation, and
that candor toward the tribunal is not merely aspirational but mandatory
under ER 1.1, ER 1.3 and ER 3.3. The pattern of inaccurate citations here
undermines that trust and wastes precious judicial resources. Chase’s

5
 JP MORGAN v. COMPLOT
Decision of the Court

counsel must devote more attention and resources to ensure this does not
happen again. We forward this memorandum decision to the State Bar of
Arizona to determine whether counsel violated any rules of professional
conduct.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We reverse the superior court’s grant of summary judgment
to Chase and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

6