Calbert v. Parsons

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

DEONDRIA SHAWNQUIL CALBERT,
Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

XAVIER TYRELL PARSONS,
Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0378 FC
FILED 12-17-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2025-091336, FC2025-091379
The Honorable Joanna Reihing, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Xavier Parsons, Mesa
Respondent/Appellant
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Xavier Parsons (Parsons) appeals from an order, entered after
an evidentiary hearing, (1) upholding an order of protection entered against
him in favor of Deondria Calbert (Calbert) and (2) denying Parson’s petition
seeking an order of protection against Calbert. Because Parsons has shown
no error, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Parsons and Calbert have one child together, A.B. (a
pseudonym), who was born in January 2022. Parsons and Calbert are
parties to a family court proceeding, filed in 2022. This appeal, however,
arises out of their competing petitions seeking orders of protection.

¶3 On March 27, 2025, Parsons petitioned for a protective order
against Calbert. The court declined to issue an ex parte order and set an
evidentiary hearing on Parsons’ petition.

¶4 On March 28, 2025, Calbert petitioned for a protective order
against Parsons. Later that day, the court issued an ex parte order of
protection prohibiting Parsons from having contact with Calbert or A.B.
except through attorneys, legal process and court hearings. At Parsons’
request, the court set an evidentiary hearing on Calbert’s petition.

¶5 The evidentiary hearings were held jointly on April 7, 2025,
beginning at 10:00 a.m. As the hearing began, the court noted Parsons
proposed calling six witnesses. The court told the parties that the hearing
was set for 45 minutes, with 20 minutes per side. Parsons’ attorney
responded “[t]hat will not be sufficient time,” adding the parties would
“need, if not two hours, perhaps more.” The court then expanded the time
allocated to each side, stating, “I’m going to start with 30 minutes a party.”

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¶6 Calbert testified first, describing the basis for her petition and
explaining why she sought an order of protection, including because she
“found a tracker on [her] car” and that Parsons was “sending people” to
harass and stalk her. Calbert then called her sister, who testified she feared
for her family’s safety because she had seen how Parsons had “been
following [Calbert] around and [had] people from their circle follow
[Calbert] around.” The court later told Calbert she was “at 35 minutes” and
her time was up, noting Parsons would also have 35 minutes to present his
evidence.

¶7 Parsons’ attorney cross-examined Calbert’s sister. The
attorney also cross-examined Calbert, focusing on her relationship with a
previous romantic partner. The court eventually sustained relevancy
objections to those questions, explaining that “it is completely irrelevant to
me whether or not [Calbert] is speaking to” her previous partner. Parsons’
attorney, however, continued to ask such questions, even after the court
said he was “wasting time” in doing so. Eventually, Parsons’ attorney asked
Calbert about the tracking device and her stalking allegations.

¶8 Parsons’ attorney then moved for a directed verdict on
Calbert’s petition, which the court denied. When Parsons’ attorney called
Parsons as a witness, the court said, “[y]ou have 12 minutes.” When
Parsons’ attorney again objected to the time allotted, the court noted it was
allocating equal time, adding “[y]ou should be able to prove acts of
domestic violence in a 20-minute period. And I’m giving you 35.”

¶9 Parsons then testified, including about concern for A.B.’s
safety, denying that he put a tracker on Calbert’s car and denying that he
told anyone to follow Calbert. Parsons was asked about allegations of
Calbert’s abuse of A.B., and actions about Calbert’s previous partner.
Parsons’ attorney then called Genna Jackson, Parsons’ mother, and asked
her questions about Calbert’s previous partner and contact with A.B. The
court then said, “[a]nd this is it, Counsel. We are officially out of time.”

¶10 During the hearing, which ultimately lasted two hours, the
court heard testimony from four witnesses and received more than 30
exhibits, including several videos played for the court. Having considered
the conflicting evidence and ruling from the bench, the court first addressed
Calbert’s petition. The court found by the preponderance of the evidence
that it was “clear that harassing behaviors are taking place,” noting the
videos “show stalking behaviors” by or on behalf of Parsons, adding, “I do
believe that if I don’t keep this order of protection in place, additional acts
of domestic violence will occur.” As a result, the court affirmed Calbert’s

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order of protection against Parsons, although removing A.B. as a protected
person, and provided notice of “Brady” indicators prohibiting Parsons
from purchasing or possessing firearms or ammunition. The court denied
Parsons’ petition, finding he failed to prove his case.

¶11 This court has jurisdiction over Parsons’ timely appeals from
the grant of Calbert’s petition and the denial of Parsons’ petition under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1) (2025).1

DISCUSSION

¶12 This court reviews an order of protection for an abuse of
discretion, reviewing issues of law de novo. Mahar v. Acuna, 230 Ariz. 530,
534 ¶ 14 (App. 2012) (citing cases). A superior court abuses its discretion
when the record is “devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.”
Michaelson v. Garr, 234 Ariz. 542, 544 ¶ 5 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). A
court may issue a protective order if it determines there is reasonable cause
to believe that the defendant may commit an act of domestic violence or has
committed an act of domestic violence within the past year. See A.R.S. § 13-
3602(E). The court may continue the order of protection after a hearing if
the petitioner proves his or her case by a preponderance of the evidence.
A.R.S. § 13-3602(L); Ariz. R. Prot. Order P. 38(g)(3).

¶13 Parsons’ opening brief fails to comply with ARCAP 13.
Among other things, Parsons failed to provide “citations of legal authorities
and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which [he]
relies.” ARCAP 13(a)(2) & (7)(A). Such deficiencies typically constitute a
waiver. See, e.g., Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 523 ¶¶ 10-11 (App. 2022)
(finding waiver where appellant “makes no attempt to refer to the record
or explain his contentions with citation to legal authority based on the
record”). Calbert, however, failed to file an answering brief, and the time to
do so has passed. That failure could be construed as a confession of error.
See Nydam v. Crawford, 181 Ariz. 101, 101 (App. 1994) (citing cases). Despite
these failures by both parties, given the issues involved, this court will
exercise its discretion and address the merits of Parsons’ arguments.

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statues and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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I. Parsons Has Not Shown the Superior Court Abused Its Discretion
in Upholding Calbert’s Order of Protection and Denying His
Petition for an Order of Protection.

A. Due Process.

¶14 Parsons argues the superior court “refused to provide [him]
the opportunity of due process under Arizona law.” Parsons alleges he was
“not allowed to present evidence” or “have witnesses that were present
testify,” “which were not only relevant to issues in both petitions, but
would have clearly shown the allegations [Calbert] submitted were false.”
Parsons emphasizes that this failure was “not due to relevance or objection
by [Calbert]. It was sole[l]y based on [the court] refusing to allow time.”
Parsons argues he was not “provided the opportunity to respond and
present relevant evidence or have witnesses testify,” and this denial was
solely based on “the court’s concern over time and not law or procedure.”

¶15 Due process requires that Parsons be given notice that was
“reasonably calculated to apprise him of the action in order to adequately
prepare his opposition,” Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 260 ¶ 16 (App.
2014) (citation omitted), and an “opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
manner and at a meaningful time,” Ariz. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ariz. Motor
Vehicle, LLC, 255 Ariz. 139, 142 ¶ 14 (App. 2023) (citation omitted). Here,
Parsons was personally served with the notice of hearing for both his
petition and Calbert’s petition, before the April 7, 2025 hearing. The
hearings were set at the same time, before the same judicial officer, and
Parsons attended the hearing and was represented by counsel at the
hearing. Although he objected to the time allocated to the hearing, Parsons
was given advance reasonable notice that apprised him of the nature of the
proceeding and had sufficient time to prepare for the hearing. See Armstrong
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (citing cases).

¶16 The superior court has substantial discretion to impose
reasonable time limits for hearings. See Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 194
Ariz. 85, 90-91 ¶ 29 (App. 1998) (citing cases). In contested order of
protection proceedings, the court “must hold the [evidentiary] hearing at
the earliest possible time.” Ariz. R. Prot. Order P. 38(b). Where, as here, both
parties filed petitions, the court properly can hold “a joint hearing on both
cases.” Ariz. R. Prot. Order P. 27(b)(2). The court “must ensure that both
parties have an opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and to call
and examine and cross-examine witnesses.” Ariz. R. Prot. Order P. 38(g)(1).

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¶17 Here, the court held a joint hearing lasting two hours. When
the court raised timing at the beginning of the hearing, the court stated that
such hearings were normally completed with each side getting 20 minutes.
The court then gave the parties 30 minutes, later extended to 35 minutes.
During that time, counsel for Parsons repeatedly pursued lines of
questioning that the court found “irrelevant” and were “wasting time.”
Given the allocation of time as the hearing began, the court extending the
time allocated to Parsons, and Parsons using a significant amount of that
allocated time to pursue irrelevant topics, he has shown no denial of his due
process rights.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

¶18 Parsons argues that Calbert’s “petition contained false
allegations that would have” undeniably “been proven false” had the court
“not refused to provide [him] the opportunity to present evidence relevant
to him contesting the order.” Parsons also claims that Calbert “perjured
herself,” and “the court would have had sufficient evidence to deny her
petition” if Parsons had been allowed to present “pertinent evidence.”
Parsons also alleges his position could have been corroborated by
testimony from a private investigator who was present at the hearing.

¶19 Parsons made no proffer to the superior court about what
other evidence would have shown. Cf. Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). And he has
not cured that deficiency on appeal. Accordingly, there is nothing in the
record supporting his arguments on appeal about what other evidence
would have shown. To the extent that he asserts the superior court should
have evaluated the evidence differently at the hearing, this court does not
reweigh conflicting evidence on appeal and gives “due regard to the
[superior] court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009). Further, even if conflicting
evidence may exist, this court will affirm the superior court’s ruling “if
substantial evidence supports it,” id. (citation omitted), construing the
record in a light most favorable to upholding the ruling, see Michaelson, 234
Ariz. at 544 ¶ 5 (citing cases).

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¶20 The record provided supports the superior court’s ruling. The
court weighed and assessed the evidence and continued the order of
protection because it was “clear that harassing behaviors [were] taking
place,” see, e.g., A.R.S. § 13-2921(A), and if the order of protection was not
kept in place, “additional acts of domestic violence [would] occur.” This
finding was based not only on the testimony from the parties but also the
exhibits received, including the “amount of videos that were submitted”
that “in fact, do show stalking behaviors.” See, e.g., A.R.S. § 13-2923(A). The
court also found that, even though Parsons claimed Calbert was giving her
previous partner access to A.B., “there was not a single video” that showed
A.B. in the presence of Calbert’s previous partner. On this record, Parsons
has not shown that the superior court abused its discretion by granting and
continuing Calbert’s requested order of protection. See Savord, 235 Ariz. at
259 ¶ 10.

C. Alleged Procedural Irregularities.

¶21 Parsons asserts there were procedural irregularities between
his order of protection and Calbert’s order of protection. This argument
appears to be based on the fact that the initial judge assigned to Calbert’s
petition issued the order ex parte the day it was filed, while the initial judge
assigned to Parsons’ petition (a different judge) did not rule on the petition
and, instead, set it for the hearing held on April 7, 2025. Parsons accurately
sets out the procedural history of these matters between the late March 2025
filing and the hearing on April 7, 2025. But he does not show how those
differences had any impact on the court’s findings at the end of the April 7,
2025 evidentiary hearing.

¶22 If “opposing parties file separate petitions for protective
orders, the judicial officer may: (1) hear each petition at separate ex parte
hearings, or (2) set a joint hearing on both cases.” Ariz. R. Prot. Order P.
27(b); see also A.R.S. § 13-3602(H) (If opposing parties have filed separate
orders of protection, “the courts after consultation between the judges
involved may consolidate the petitions of the opposing parties for hearing.
This does not prohibit a court from issuing cross orders of protection.”).
Parsons apparently requested an evidentiary hearing on Calbert’s petition
after being served with the ex parte protective order, as was his right. See
A.R.S. §13-3602(L) (“a party who is under an order of protection or who is
restrained from contacting the other party is entitled to one hearing on
written request”). The superior court here followed these procedures by
setting a joint hearing on both cases for April 7, 2025. On this record,
Parsons has shown no reversible error.

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CONCLUSION

¶23 The order of protection in favor of Calbert and against
Parsons is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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