Carreon v. Rivera
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Cordova v. Lucero 629 P.2d 1020
- Ray v. Mangum 788 P.2d 62
- Hill-Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust 799 P.2d 810
- Buckholtz v. Buckholtz 435 P.3d 1032
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
In re the Matter of:
ABIUD ROSAS CARREON, Petitioner/Appellee,
v.
MARIA G. ROSAS RIVERA, Respondent/Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0415 FC
FILED 02-04-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2023-001729
No. FC2023-092803
The Honorable Melissa Zabor, Judge
VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED
COUNSEL
Abiud Rosas Carreon
Pro Per Petitioner/Appellee
Hildebrand Law PC, Tempe
By Kip M. Micuda and Carlos Noel
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
CARREON v. RIVERA
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Vice Chief Judge David D.
Weinzweig joined.
F A B I A N, Judge:
¶1 Maria G. Rosas Rivera (“Mother”) argues the superior court
erred in denying her request to amend the final decree of dissolution (“the
Decree”) entered between her and Abiud Rosas Carreon (“Father”). The
Decree was based on a Rule 69 agreement, Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 69, which
purported to resolve many issues, including how Mother would acquire the
marital residence. Mother claims the Rule 69 agreement is unenforceable
because it lacked mutual assent. This Court agrees. The transcript
memorializing the Rule 69 agreement shows the parties each had their own
version of how Mother would acquire the marital residence. Because the
Rule 69 agreement lacked mutual assent, it was unenforceable. The superior
court’s decision is vacated to the extent it relies on that agreement.
DISCUSSION
¶2 Mother and Father were married in June 2011 and had four
children together. The parties petitioned for dissolution in 2023.
¶3 Leading up to the evidentiary hearing, Mother consistently
sought, in settlement negotiations, filings, and her pretrial statement,
spousal maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319, retroactive child and spousal
support, child support, and equitable division of community and joint
property (including two of Father’s businesses) and debts. Mother’s pretrial
statement identified Exhibit B61, entitled “Offsets Related to Marital
Home,” which included all of the items Mother was willing to give up to
offset Father’s equity in the family home. Father, in his pretrial statement,
did not request that Mother buy out his interest in the marital home.
Instead, Father requested the marital home be sold, with each party
receiving half of the proceeds after reimbursement for Father’s Bobrow and
Ouster claims.
¶4 As part of settlement negotiations, Father offered to give
Mother the marital residence in exchange for her waiver of both spousal
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CARREON v. RIVERA
Decision of the Court
and child support. Although Mother was willing to waive spousal support
and back child support, she would not waive future child support. Thus,
the parties did not reach settlement.
¶5 On December 12, 2024, the court held an evidentiary hearing.
Both parties were represented by counsel. Immediately before the hearing,
counsel met in the hallway, where they believed they reached a Rule 69
agreement on some issues, which they memorialized on the record:
FATHER’S COUNSEL: We did meet and confer
this morning, and we’ve reached the following
agreements under Rule 69: Number one, the
division of the bank accounts will be according
to the mother’s pre-trial statement, subject to
any offset regarding the marital residence;
number two, the Robinhood account and the TD
Ameritrade account have a zero balance as of
date of service; number three, the life insurance
shall be allocated to each individual as their sole
and separate property without offset; number
four, the two automobiles shall be allocated to
each party as sole and separate property
without offset, with full indemnification
mutually between the parties for any debts; and
number five, division of the income tax refund,
which is anticipated for 2022, or any shortfall or
any investigation shall be a community
property, debt, or asset and shared equally,
whether it’s a refund or an amount owed.
Did I miss anything, Kip?
MOTHER’S COUNSEL: The only thing, Your
Honor, is there may be some things that happen
in the future, particularly as to tax returns,
where my client is going to be seeking tax
advice. So she may be looking to insulate herself
from some of the problems that we’ve been
made aware of. But yeah, that’s the statement.
And so what’s most important to my client is
that she is getting the marital residence in
exchange for the setoffs that are in one of our
exhibits.
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FATHER’S COUNSEL: Yeah. The sixth item,
Your Honor, I neglected to mention. The former
marital residence, that will be awarded to
[Mother] as her sole and separate property,
subject to a 50 percent equity buyout of [Father]
within 120 days of signature of the decree. The
mortgage shall continue to be paid 100 percent
by [Mother].
THE COURT: Counsel, you’re going to need to
pull that microphone closer to you. Thank you.
FATHER’S COUNSEL: I’m sorry.
THE COURT: Thanks.
MOTHER’S COUNSEL: If I may, Your Honor,
part of the consideration for the marital
residence is that my client is waiving the setoffs,
and we can get into that exhibit during the
testimony. But she’s waiving spousal
maintenance, she’s waiving past child support,
she’s waiving her interest in the two business
interests that we claim interest in, and then
there’s a few other items. But the nut of it is that
[Mother] is getting the marital residence. The
two businesses are being insulated. She doesn’t
have an interest. She’s waiving. No more
spousal maintenance. And we’re done with all
of that. And that’s, like, half the case.
THE COURT: Yes, or more.
FATHER’S COUNSEL: Yeah. And Your Honor,
for the record, the buyout will be dictated by the
appraisal that is approved by the lender for the
refinance. Should we review -- well, let’s get the
Rule 69 behind us, and then we’ll talk about
what’s coming next.
THE COURT: Sounds good, Counsel. Anything
else to add to it?
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MOTHER’S COUNSEL: I can’t think of
anything, Your Honor.
Without repeating the specific terms of the Rule 69 Agreement, the court
asked Mother and Father to confirm they heard and agreed to the
agreements as described by counsel. The parties affirmed they did and that
the agreements were full and accurate, fair to both parties, and made
without threat. When the court asked the parties whether they would like
to draw up a formal agreement, their counsel declined, agreeing the minute
entry would be sufficient. The court accepted counsel’s declarations and the
parties’ affirmations as the basis of a Rule 69 agreement.
¶6 Less than two hours after the end of the evidentiary hearing,
Mother’s and Father’s counsel exchanged emails regarding the apparent
misunderstanding and notified the court that the parties were ordering
transcripts.
¶7 Five days later, on December 17, 2024, the court adopted the
Rule 69 agreement. The court then entered the Decree on December 18,
2024, which incorporated the Rule 69 agreement:
The parties’ Rule 69 agreement includes the
following agreements: Mother agrees to waive
her interest in Father’s businesses. The parties
agree to divide the financial accounts, based on
Mother’s pretrial statement. . . . The parties
agree that the Robin Hood and Ameritrade
accounts have balances of $0. The parties agree
that each party shall keep their own life
insurance policy, with no offset to the other
party. The parties agree to each keep their own
cars, with no offset. The parties agree that the
2022 tax refund or tax debt shall be divided
equally.
¶8 The Decree awarded Mother $524.00 per month in child
support and denied requests for spousal maintenance and child support
arrears based on the Rule 69 agreement. The court awarded the marital
property to Mother as sole and separate property, stating:
Per the parties’ Rule 69 agreement, the house is
awarded to Mother. She shall refinance the
home in her name and shall provide a 50%
buyout to Father within 120 days of this Court
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Decision of the Court
order. The buyout amount shall be dictated by
the appraisal. Mother will continue to make all
mortgage payments.
¶9 On January 13, 2025, Mother moved to alter, amend, and
grant relief from the Decree under Rules 83(a)(1) and 85(b), contesting that
the Rule 69 agreement reflected the terms as intended and requesting the
court amend the agreement for no buyout term or grant a new trial on
Mother’s claims.
¶10 The court denied Mother’s motion, explaining it “made its
findings, consistent with the evidence and testimony presented at trial, as
is within its broad discretion to do.” Mother appealed from the Decree and
order denying her motion to amend the Decree on May 7, 2025. This Court
has jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal pursuant to Article VI, Section
9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶11 The superior court adopted a Rule 69 agreement, under which
Mother would buy out Father’s interest in the marital residence, and waive
claims for child support arrears, spousal support, and Mother’s interest in
Father’s businesses. Mother argues the court erred because the Rule 69
agreement was unfair and there was no mutual assent as to material terms
or consideration. This Court agrees the record does not show the mutual
assent necessary to form a binding Rule 69 agreement.
¶12 A Rule 69 agreement is valid and binding if, as relevant here,
“the agreement’s terms are stated on the record before a judge” and
“submitted to and approved by the court as provided by law.” Ariz. R. Fam.
P. 69. Courts presume Rule 69 agreements are valid and the party
challenging the validity has the burden to prove an agreement has a defect.
Ariz. R. Fam. L. P. 69(c).
¶13 The validity and enforceability of a separation agreement is a
mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo. Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246
Ariz. 126, 129 ¶ 10 (App. 2019). This Court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to upholding the superior court’s ruling. In re Marriage of
Rojas, 255 Ariz. 277, 280 ¶ 2 (App. 2023).
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CARREON v. RIVERA
Decision of the Court
I. The Record Shows the Rule 69 Agreement is Unenforceable
Because of a Mutual Mistake.
¶14 Mother argues there was a mutual mistake because “the
parties and their counsel had different understandings of the material terms
as to the marital residence.” Specifically, she claims she understood she was
waiving “claims to offset [Father]’s interest in the home” while Father
“understood [Mother] would buy him out” of the marital home.
¶15 A separation agreement incorporated into a decree is
governed by general contract principles and requires mutual assent to be
enforceable. See Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. at 129 ¶¶ 10-11. For a court to adopt an
agreement as binding, the parties must mutually assent to all material terms
“without doubt or difference” as to the common intent of the parties. Id. at
129 ¶ 11. Parties to a separation agreement must share a “common
understanding” of material terms for there to be mutual assent. Id. at 130
¶ 13. “Mutual assent is based on objective evidence, not on the hidden
intent of the parties, and objective evidence includes both written and
spoken words, as well as acts.” Id. at 129 ¶ 11. Reasonable
misunderstandings can be grounds for finding no mutual assent. Id. “Relief
is proper if the writing evidencing the purported agreement is uncertain or
ambiguous.” Hill-Shafer P’ship v. Chilson Fam. Tr., 165 Ariz. 469, 474 (1990).
Finally, “to effectuate a waiver of child support arrearages, the facts must
demonstrate by ‘clear and compelling evidence’ the voluntary and intentional
abandonment of a known right.” Ray v. Mangum, 163 Ariz. 329, 332 (1989)
(quoting Cordova v. Lucero, 129 Ariz. 184, 187 (App. 1981)); see also Coburn v.
Rhodig, 243 Ariz. 24, 26 ¶¶ 10-11 (App. 2017) (applying the clear and
compelling evidence standard from Ray, 163 Ariz. at 332, to enforceability
of Rule 69 agreement for spousal support arrearages).
¶16 The transcript from the December 2024 hearing shows there
was no agreement. It shows no meeting of the minds on a material term—
how Mother would acquire Father’s interest in the marital home. Mother’s
counsel described a “setoff” in which Mother acquired the home in
exchange for waiving spousal maintenance, past child support, and her
interest in two community-owned businesses. Father’s counsel described a
“buyout” in which Mother acquired the home in exchange for one-half its
appraised equity. The transcript does not reflect mutual assent; it shows
two attorneys talking past one another.
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CARREON v. RIVERA
Decision of the Court
¶17 There is no dispute that the interest in the marital residence
was material to the agreement. Because there was no mutual assent as to
this material term, this Court vacates the superior court’s order to the extent
that it relies on the unenforceable Rule 69 agreement. The parties’
remaining arguments and other pending claims should be determined by
the superior court on remand as if no Rule 69 agreement was reached. See
Jacobs v. Jacobs, 259 Ariz. 467, ¶ 14 (App. 2025).
II. Father’s Legal Citations Contain Substantial Defects.
¶18 Mother points out “[m]any of [Father’s] citations are
incomplete, a sign of the use of [Artificial Intelligence].” This Court’s review
reveals that three of the five cases Father cited in his opening brief contain
substantial defects, including unsupported premises and fabricated
quotations. Thus, this Court finds Father’s opening brief violates Arizona
Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 13(a)(7), which requires that arguments
contain citations to legal authority.
¶19 Compliance with this Court’s rules is not optional. The
integrity of the appellate process depends on accurate and honest advocacy.
In the future, failure to provide accurate legal authority may result in
sanctions. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7).
III. Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal.
¶20 Both parties request attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to
A.R.S. § 25-324(A). Because Mother is the successful party on appeal, this
Court awards Mother her taxable costs, A.R.S. § 12-341, contingent upon
her compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21, but
denies Mother’s and Father’s requests for attorney’s fees.
CONCLUSION
¶21 Because the Rule 69 agreement lacked mutual assent, it is
unenforceable. The Decree is vacated to the extent it relies on the Rule 69
agreement and the case is remanded to the superior court for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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