Jadormio v. Jadormio

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

AILEEN NERONA JADORMIO, Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

RANIE ASIROT JADORMIO, Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0416 FC
FILED 08-14-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
No. S1400DO202200939
The Honorable Claudia Maria Gonzalez Jimenez, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED; AFFIRMED IN PART

COUNSEL

S. Alan Cook, PC, Phoenix
By S. Alan Cook
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

Mary Katherine Boyte, P.C., Attorneys At Law, Yuma, AZ
By Mary Katherine Boyte Henderson
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

JADORMIO v. JADORMIO
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David B. Gass1 delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Father appeals the superior court’s dissolution decree, and
mother cross appeals. Father raises 2 arguments: (1) the superior court
abused its discretion when it granted mother’s request to relocate the
parties’ child from Arizona to California, and (2) the superior court abused
its discretion when it allocated community property between the parties
and calculated the community lien on the marital residence. Mother
challenges the superior court’s award of the marital residence to father as
his sole and separate property based on a disclaimer deed she signed.

¶2 Because the superior court erred in allocating the parties’ joint
checking account, the court vacates the superior court’s equalization
calculation. The court remands for the superior court to amend the decree
consistent with the directions in paragraph 38. The court otherwise affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 The court views the facts in the light most favorable to
upholding the superior court’s ruling. Ferrill v. Ferrill, 253 Ariz. 393, 396 ¶ 8
(App. 2022).

¶4 Mother and father married in 2014 and have 1 child together.
In 2018, the couple used community funds to buy a home, the marital
residence, for $273,500.00. As part of the purchase process, mother signed a

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this court when the matter

was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective June 30, 2026. In
accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of the
Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the
Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro
tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for
the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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disclaimer deed stating she “has no present right, title, interest, claim or lien
of any kind whatsoever in, to or against said property.”

¶5 Mother filed for dissolution in 2022. Father moved for
temporary orders giving him exclusive use and possession of the marital
residence, allowing mother parenting time, and having the child reside
primarily with father in Yuma. Mother amended her petition and moved
for temporary orders to allow her to relocate the child to California with
her. Mother then left Arizona for California without telling father. Father
learned of the move when he took the child to a medical appointment and
discovered mother’s insurance would not cover the appointment because
mother had resigned from her Arizona job.

¶6 The superior court held a temporary orders hearing in July
2023. The superior court denied mother’s temporary relocation request,
finding she did not meet her burden to show relocation was in the child’s
best interests. Under the temporary orders, the child was to live primarily
with father, and mother received parenting time based on her proposed
schedule for father. About 2 years later, the superior court held a trial and
entered a dissolution decree.

I. In the final decree, the superior court granted mother’s request to
relocate the child to California.

¶7 In ruling on mother’s request to have the child relocate to
California with her and to grant her legal decision-making, the superior
court considered all the factors in A.R.S. §§ 25-403.A and -408.I when
deciding what was in the child’s best interests. Based on the child’s best
interests, the superior court granted mother’s request to relocate the child
and awarded both parents joint legal decision-making authority, but gave
mother global final decision-making authority if the parents could not
agree.

II. In the final decree, the superior court addressed the parents’
property.

A. The superior court found the marital residence was father’s
sole and separate property but subject to a community lien.

¶8 Mother argued the superior court should treat the marital
residence as community property because there was “fraud in her signing
of the disclaimer deed” that justified setting it aside. The superior court
found mother did not establish “by clear and convincing evidence that
fraud was used in her signing the disclaimer deed.” The superior court thus

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awarded the marital residence to father as his sole and separate property
and the mortgage on it to him as his sole and separate debt.

¶9 The superior court then imposed a community lien on the
marital residence because father used community funds to buy and pay for
the marital residence during the marriage.2 Father bought the marital
residence for $273,500.00. The superior court used the formula from Drahos
v. Rens, 149 Ariz. 248 (App. 1985) to determine the community lien. The
following chart demonstrates the superior court’s calculations:

Basis for Findings Superior Court’s Final Calculation
Findings

Amount due at closing $279,004.98 $279,004.98

Community funds used $19,417.98 $259,587.00
for deposit, fees, and
closing costs.

Mortgage payments $9,278.11 $250,308.89
made before refinance

2020 refinance amount (+$9,691.11) $260,000.00

Community funds used $12,468.00 $247,532.00
to reduce amount owed
from refinance date to
2022 service date

Total community funds $41,164.093

Drahos formula applied [$41,164.09 + (0.15 x $66,289.09
$167,500.00)] =

2 The court’s calculations are based on the superior court’s findings. Father

proposed slightly different amounts, but the superior found father was not
credible and rejected those amounts.

3 That amount should have been $41,164.62, but the superior court did not

include $.53 in the mortgage reduction from the refinance. Neither father
nor mother challenges that minor math error.

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B. The superior court made specific findings when it divided
the parties’ community property.

¶10 The superior court also calculated mother’s interest in 2 of
father’s retirement accounts. Based on the evidence presented, the superior
court found:

1. Father made 4 withdrawals from his retirement accounts totaling
$31,059.49, all without mother’s knowledge or consent.

2. Father proved he used the money from 2 of those withdrawals
($10,011.81) for community obligations.

3. Father did not meet his burden of proving he used the funds from
the remaining 2 withdrawals ($21,047.68) to benefit the community.

¶11 The superior court then allocated the community property
accordingly, assigning mother and father certain debt balances as their sole
and separate responsibility. The superior court credited father with
$1,262.00 for payments he made toward mother’s personal loan from Wells
Fargo. Father requested reimbursement for other payments he made
toward the debt and “submitted a demonstrative summary of payments.”
But the superior court found father did not present supporting evidence
and did not meet his burden by clear and convincing evidence. The superior
court ultimately awarded father $20,436.74 in an equalization judgment
against mother’s $7,148.00.

¶12 The court has jurisdiction over father’s timely appeal and
mother’s timely cross-appeal under Article VI, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.1.

DISCUSSION

¶13 The court defers to the superior court’s factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471 ¶ 4
(App. 2018). On appeal, the court will not reweigh conflicting evidence.
Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009). Instead, the court gives
“due regard to the [superior] court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. Even though conflicting evidence may exist, [the court]
affirms the superior court’s ruling if substantial evidence supports it.” Id.

¶14 The court reviews matters of law de novo. Woyton v. Ward, 247
Ariz. 529, 531 ¶ 5 (App. 2019). The court also reviews de novo the superior
court’s characterization of property as community or sole and separate, but

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reviews for abuse of discretion the superior court’s division of property. In
re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 581 ¶ 15 (App. 2000). The court also
reviews for abuse of discretion the superior court’s orders for parenting
time, relocation, and legal decision-making authority. See Hurd, at 52 ¶ 19
(addressing relocation); Woyton, 247 Ariz. at 531 ¶ 5 (addressing parenting
time and legal decision-making authority). An abuse of discretion occurs
when “the record is devoid of competent evidence to support the [superior]
court’s decision” or when the superior court commits legal error. Woyton,
247 Ariz. at 531 ¶ 5.

I. The superior court did not err in finding it was in the child’s best
interests to relocate to California with mother after it considered
mother’s financial advantage, proximity to family, and work
schedule.

¶15 Father argues the superior court erred in considering the
benefits mother would gain in relocation rather than whether relocation
was in the child’s best interests.

¶16 The superior court must determine whether to allow a parent
to relocate with a child “in accordance with the child’s best interests” by
considering the factors in A.R.S. §§ 25-408.I and -403.A. See A.R.S. § 25-
408.G; Woyton, 247 Ariz. at 531–33 ¶¶ 6–12. The superior court must
consider “the reasons for the relocation, the potential advantages of the
relocation to both the parent and the child, and whether the relocation will
allow a realistic opportunity for parenting time with each parent.” Id. ¶ 9
(cleaned up) (citing A.R.S. § 25-408.I). The parent who seeks to relocate with
a child bears “[t]he burden of proving what is in the child’s best interest.”
A.R.S. § 25-408.G.

¶17 Father does not challenge the superior court’s application of
the factors, but asks the court to reweigh the evidence and conclude mother
did not meet her burden. He argues the superior court’s “findings do not
favor one party over the other and reveal that Mother did not meet her
burden to prove relocation benefited [the child]. As such, relocation should
have been denied.” Father relies on Wright v. Farris, 259 Ariz. 149, 151 ¶ 7
(App. 2025), in which the superior court allowed relocation because the
superior court found both parents “equal under the best interests factors.”
The court reversed on appeal because the superior court did not explain
what findings supported the superior court’s relocation and parenting time
decisions. Id. at 152 ¶¶ 12–17.

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¶18 Unlike Wright, the superior court did not find the parents’
evidence equal. The superior court here applied all the factors in
subsections 25-408.I and -403.A and made specific findings highlighting the
factors favoring relocation. The superior court found father did not engage
mother before making important legal decision-making choices under the
temporary orders, such as by enrolling the child in school and
extracurricular activities. Instead, father informed mother after the fact.
Mother also alleged father had controlling tendencies over her. Though the
superior court did not find for mother on that point, it said father did not
rebut mother’s allegations based on the evidence and father’s credibility.
The superior court also found mother was more likely to allow “frequent,
meaningful, and continuing contact with” father, saying “testimony and
evidence also reflect that Father is generally resistant to allow Mother
additional parenting time that is not explicitly court ordered.” To that point,
the superior court noted father’s explanations for allowing mother
parenting time in Yuma “were not reasonable.” The court will not reweigh
the evidence. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

II. Except for the division of the parties’ joint checking account, the
superior court equitably divided the parties’ property.

¶19 Both parties challenge aspects of the superior court’s property
division orders. In her cross-appeal, mother argues the superior court erred
in finding the marital residence was father’s sole and separate property.
Father argues the superior court correctly found the marital residence was
his sole and separate property, but abused its discretion when it calculated
the community’s equitable lien on it. Father further argues the superior
court abused its discretion when it valued his community retirement
account, did not give him credit for payments he made toward a loan debt,
did not account for the division of the balance in a joint checking account to
mother in the decree, and valued a brown side table for less than a value on
which the parties agreed.

¶20 “[C]ommunity property is to be divided ‘equitably’ absent a
sound reason otherwise appearing in the record.” Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246
Ariz. 277, 283 ¶ 15 (App. 2019) (citing Toth v. Toth, 190 Ariz. 218, 221 (App.
1997)). The superior court “has broad discretion to allocate community
property” and the court “will not disturb its allocation absent an abuse of
discretion.” Id. ¶ 14. The court will affirm “if the evidence reasonably
supports it.” Id.

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A. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that the disclaimer deed was valid.

¶21 The court addresses mother’s cross-appeal as a threshold
issue because if mother prevails, a significant portion of father’s appeal
becomes moot. Mother cross appeals the superior court’s decision finding
the marital residence was father’s separate property, arguing the disclaimer
deed she signed was procured by fraud. The court reviews the classification
of property as community or separate de novo. See In re Marriage of Pownall,
197 Ariz. at 581 ¶ 15. “Property acquired during marriage is presumed to
be community property.” Femiano v. Maust, 248 Ariz. 613, 615 ¶ 10 (App.
2020). Father must prove by clear and convincing evidence the property is
separate. Id. “A signed disclaimer deed . . . provides such proof and, absent
fraud or mistake, rebuts the community presumption.” Id. (citing Bell-
Kilbourn v. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. 521, 524 ¶ 11 (App. 2007)). “The party
attempting to nullify the effect of a disclaimer deed had the burden to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the deed was the result of fraud.” Id.

¶22 Though the father acquired the marital residence during the
marriage, father rebutted the community property presumption by
producing a disclaimer deed signed by mother. Mother thus had to show
by clear and convincing evidence the disclaimer deed was procured by
fraud. See id. Mother’s evidence was father told her the house would be for
them both, they used community funds to make the purchase and mortgage
payments, and she did not know what the disclaimer deed meant.

¶23 Though the superior court found father’s explanation about
the execution of the disclaimer deed “less than credible,” it found mother’s
evidence was insufficient to find fraud. See Femiano, 248 Ariz. at 616 ¶ 14
(“Wife had the burden to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence.”).
The superior court thus found the marital residence was father’s sole and
separate property. The court will not reweigh the evidence on appeal to
reach a different result. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

¶24 Mother also argues the court could have found she did not
waive her interest by signing the deed. Father argues mother waived the
argument by not raising it to the superior court. When a party fails to raise
an issue before the superior court, the issue is waived on appeal. Nold v.
Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273 ¶ 10 (App. 2013). Though this argument appears to
be an extension of mother’s fraud argument, to the extent it goes beyond
fraud, the court agrees with father and will not consider it further. The
superior court thus did not err in finding the marital residence was father’s
sole and separate property subject to the community’s equitable lien.

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B. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it
included $19,417.98 in community funds spent on the
marital residence from 2018 to 2020 in its calculation of the
community’s equitable lien.

¶25 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion in
calculating the community’s equitable lien on the residence for two reasons.
Father argues (1) the superior court abused its discretion when it
determined the community’s equitable lien, and (2) the superior court
double counted some expenses. Mother argues the superior court did not
abuse its discretion. Mother is correct.

¶26 When the marital community contributes funds toward 1
spouse’s separate property, the community is entitled to reimbursement by
an equitable lien. See Saba v. Khoury, 253 Ariz. 587, 592 ¶ 15 (2022); see also
Drahos v. Rens, 149 Ariz. 248, 249 (App. 1985) (“The community, which
contributed capital to the separate property, is nevertheless entitled to some
form of compensation.”). “The existence and the value of an equitable lien
present mixed questions of fact and law.” Valento v. Valento, 225 Ariz. 477,
481 ¶ 11 (App. 2010). The court defers to the superior court’s factual
findings unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by any credible evidence,
but draws its own legal conclusions from those facts. Id.

¶27 In assessing the community’s equitable lien, courts have
applied the Drahos formula. Saba, 253 Ariz. at 591 ¶ 13. The superior court
is not bound to use the Drahos formula, but it provides a starting point. Id.
at 592 ¶ 16. Under Drahos, courts calculate the equitable lien as follows:

• Dividing the community contributions used to reduce the principal
balance by the property’s purchase price;

• Multiplying that figure by the appreciation in the property’s value
during the marriage; and

• Adding that figure to the community’s contributions to the principal
paid.
C + [C/B x A]
o A = Appreciation;
o B = Purchase price; and
o C = Community contributions to principal.

Id. at 591 ¶ 12.

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¶28 And as the Arizona Supreme Court said, the superior court
should “adjust the calculation to account for the community’s overall
contribution of labor and funds to the separate property along with the
market appreciation of the property.” Id. at 589 ¶ 2. But this requirement
does not limit superior court’s “discretion to consider the value the
community’s contributions actually added to the value of the separate
property to fairly determine the amount to which the community is
entitled.” Id.

¶29 First, father argues the superior court abused its discretion
because it increased the community’s equitable lien by $19,417.98 to
account for deposits, fees, and closing costs on the marital residence.4 Father
argues the $19,417.98 neither enhanced the value of his separate property
nor reduced the principal mortgage on that property. Because father used
community funds to purchase the marital residence in the first place, the
superior court had “discretion to consider the value the community’s
contributions actually added to the value of the separate property to fairly
determine the amount to which the community is entitled.” Id. Here, father
would not have the sole and separate property but for the infusion of those
community funds. The superior court thus did not abuse its discretion
when it included them in the community’s equitable lien.

¶30 The superior court also did not abuse its discretion when it
included $9,691.11 to account for the increased principal ($250,308.89 to
$260,000.00) resulting from the refinance. That refinance had a long-term
benefit for father that will continue after the dissolution because it lowered
father’s monthly mortgage payments for the balance of the mortgage
period. On these facts, the court cannot say the superior court abused its
discretion, apportioning “a fair and equitable reimbursement to the
community.” Id. at 592 ¶ 15 (citing Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. at 524 ¶ 12).

¶31 Second, father argues the superior court erred by including
$19,417.98 twice when it calculated the community lien. True, at first blush,
it may appear the superior court counted $19,417.98 twice because it used
separate entries in the decree, but as the chart in paragraph 8 shows, the

4 On appeal, father uses $19,413.00, reflecting $13,662.00 for the down
payment and $5,751.00 for the closing costs. The superior court used
$19,417.98. Because father does not explain the minor discrepancy or why
the superior court’s numbers were incorrect, and because the court can
track the superior court’s findings, the court will defer to the superior
court’s factual findings for those calculations. See Valento, 225 Ariz. at 481
¶ 11.

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superior court counted the $19,417.98 just once. If the court were to adopt
father’s calculations, it would exclude the $19,417.98 the community paid
toward the marital residence, meaning the community would not receive a
“fair return on its investment reflecting its contribution to the increase in
the property’s value.” Id. (citing Honnas v. Honnas, 133 Ariz. 39, 44 (1982)).
The superior court did not err.

III. The superior court did not err when it accounted for the same
$9,281.00 twice from 2 retirement accounts because the superior
court found father did not prove he transferred the money from 1
account to the other.

¶32 Father concedes the funds in his retirement accounts are
community property, but argues the superior court erred because it
assessed him $9,281.00 twice based on a single transfer from one account to
another. Father thus argues the superior court erred in determining the
equitable division of his retirement accounts.

¶33 As for father’s account #2613, father withdrew $31,059.49
without mother’s knowledge or consent. Father proved he used $10,000.00
of those withdrawn funds to benefit the community. Father says he
withdrew $21,746.29 from account #2613 before the dissolution filing,
withdrew another $9,281.00 right before service, and transferred $9,282.97
from account #2613 into account #1113. But father could not show where
those funds went or how they went toward community obligations, so the
superior court found father “presented inconsistent, conflicting, or no
supporting evidence” for the remaining withdrawals and attributed the
amount to father for reimbursement to the community.

¶34 Considering father presented “inconsistent, conflicting or no
supporting evidence” to show where the $21,047.68 withdrawal went, the
court cannot say the superior court abused its discretion when it calculated
the equitable division of account #1113 and #2613. At bottom, father is
asking the court to reweigh the evidence on appeal, which the court will
not do. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

IV. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it did not
reimburse father for payments made toward the couple’s joint
federal tax debt.

¶35 Father argues the superior court erred by not crediting him
for post-service payments he made toward a loan mother took out to pay
their past joint federal tax debt. A spouse’s payments toward community
debt with separate property “must be accounted for in an equitable

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property distribution.” Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 596 ¶ 19 (App.
2017). Mother did not respond to this argument in her answering brief.
Though the court may consider mother’s failure to respond to the argument
as a confession of error, the court declines to do so here, preferring “to
decide cases on their merits when the interests of justice dictate.” Flynn v.
Flynn, 257 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 6 (App. 2024) (reaching the merits of the case rather
than treating the failure to file an answering brief as a confession of error).

¶36 Father claims the parties agreed that mother would secure a
loan to pay their tax debt and father would make payments to mother to
pay down the loan. Father further claims he paid mother every other month
until late 2024.

¶37 In considering father’s reimbursement claim, the superior
court found father did not prove by clear and convincing evidence he made
the post-service payments and denied his request. The only evidence father
submitted was a summary of payments—not evidence of receipts or
confirmations. Because the court will not reweigh the evidence, the superior
court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting father’s request for credit. See
Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

V. The superior court erred when it did not credit mother for her
share of the joint checking account, but did not err when it valued
the brown side table.

¶38 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion when it
did not assess mother for $2,862.00 in the parties’ joint bank account when
it divided the community assets. Father also argues the superior court
should have valued a brown side table as $100.00 instead of $50.00—what
father alleges is the value on which the parties agreed. Because mother did
not address these 2 arguments in her answering brief, father argues mother
waived any argument to the contrary. As above, the court exercises its
discretion and considers both issues on the merits. See Flynn, 257 Ariz. at 3
¶ 6.

¶39 First, the superior court calculated the bank account balances
in 2 columns, 1 for mother and 1 for father. In father’s column, the superior
court attributed $20,346.74 to him, with $2,862.00 coming from the joint
bank account #4853. But the superior court left blank mother’s column for
the same account. The superior court thus calculated an equalization
payment of $48,185.76. But adding the $2,862.00 to mother’s column would
result in the correct equalization payment of $46,754.75. The court thus
remands to the superior court to correct the allocation of the couples joint

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checking account and make any commensurate change to father’s
equalization obligation.

¶40 Second, as to the brown side table, the superior court did not
adopt the parties’ agreed upon $100.00 valuation, but it also did not value
it at $50.00 as father alleges. Instead, the superior court exercised its
discretion and valued it at $150.00. See Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. at 283 ¶ 14.
Though the superior court did not adopt the parties’ $100.00 valuation, the
court finds no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s valuation of this
item. Id.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

¶41 Father and Mother both requested an award for attorney fees
and costs under A.R.S. § 25-324. Under subsection 25-324.A, the court
considers “the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness of
the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” The parties
did not take unreasonable positions on appeal and based on the relevant
financial evidence in the record, the court declines to award father attorney
fees.

¶42 Because both parties prevailed in significant parts, the court
declines to award costs.

CONCLUSION

¶43 The court vacates the superior court’s equalization calculation
and remands for the superior court to amend the decree consistent with the
directions in paragraph 38, but otherwise affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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