Banks v. Bailey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

JERA BANKS, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

ADAM CHADFIELD BAILEY, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0451 FC
FILED 01-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2024-004269
The Honorable Richard J. Hinz, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL

S. Gregory Jones Law, PLLC, Phoenix
By S. Gregory Jones
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Christian Dichter & Sluga, PC, Phoenix
By Stephen M. Dichter, Nathan Andrews
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Adam Chadfield Bailey appeals the superior court’s order
affirming an order of protection and issuing a Notice of Brady Indicator
(“Brady notice”) restricting Bailey’s firearm rights. For the following
reasons, we affirm the order of protection but vacate the Brady notice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Bailey and his ex-fiancée, Jera Banks, ran a real estate business
together during their relationship. As part of their marketing efforts, they
jointly purchased a one-half ownership interest in a community Facebook
group called “Living Chandler.” The owner of the other one-half interest
in the group was not involved in its administration or management.

¶3 Living Chandler provided a platform for members to
communicate about community events, issues, concerns, etc. Banks and
Bailey were joint administrators of the group and enforced community
guidelines by removing content or members who violated the guidelines.

¶4 After their romantic relationship ended in 2022, Banks and
Bailey retained their joint ownership interest in Living Chandler and
remained as joint administrators. They later became embroiled in an
ongoing dispute over its administration. At some point, Banks removed
Bailey as joint administrator, and Bailey sued to be reinstated. The superior
court ordered Banks to reinstate Bailey and appointed a special master to
resolve disputes going forward.

¶5 In September 2024, Banks petitioned for an order of
protection, alleging that Bailey used the Living Chandler administration log
to harass, threaten, and intimidate her. The superior court entered an ex
parte order of protection that prohibited Bailey from contacting Banks. It
also found Bailey “pose[d] a credible threat to [Banks’s] physical safety”
and issued a Brady notice under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), prohibiting him from
possessing a firearm. Bailey requested a hearing, which the court held in
May 2025.

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¶6 At the hearing, Banks introduced an exhibit containing
screenshots of Bailey’s messages to her on the administration log. The
exhibit showed numerous angry messages, including “You got it coming,
b,” “[k]armas [sic] a bitch,” “[a]ct like a bih get treated like one,” “I warned
you- [sic] you want hell… [sic] I’ll bring it!” Banks testified that “b” and
“bih” meant “bitch.” Bailey also threatened to take her dog on several
occasions in his log messages. Banks testified that Bailey’s comments made
her feel “intimidated,” “bullied,” and “harassed.” She further testified that
he used the administration log to harass her because she had blocked him
from contacting her by phone, text, or social media.

¶7 Bailey testified that all of their communication was business-
related, and his comments were appropriate in response to her actions. He
claimed he had no intent to intimidate or harass her but also testified that
he threatened to take the dog because she was “derailing [his] business.”
He further testified that Banks knew he owned no guns, so firearm
restrictions were not justified.

¶8 The superior court found that his statements did not
constitute “threats” under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 13-
1202 but constituted harassment under Section 13-2921. It found there were
comments “intended to disturb and harass [Banks]” which were “clearly
designed to be personal,” and did in fact disturb and alarm Banks. It
therefore affirmed the order of protection.

¶9 The court then found some of Bailey’s comments “impl[ied]
possible physical threats” or were “ambiguous enough to cause [Banks] to
be concerned,” so Bailey presented “a credible threat to the physical safety
of [Banks].” The court thus affirmed the Brady notice.

¶10 Bailey timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Section
12-2101(A)(1), (5)(b), and Arizona Rule of Protective Order Procedure
42(a)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Bailey argues the superior court erred in upholding the order
of protection because no credible evidence supported the superior court’s
findings that Bailey committed harassment and posed a credible threat to
Banks.

¶12 We note at the outset that Banks did not file an answering
brief. When an appeal raises debatable issues unrelated to a child’s best
interests, we “will assume that the failure to file an answering brief is a

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confession of reversible error on the part of the appellee.” Tiller v. Tiller, 98
Ariz. 156, 157 (1965); see also In re Mayberry v. Stambaugh, 1 CA-CV 23-0289
FC, 2024 WL 1282653, at *1-5, ¶¶ 5-20 (Ariz. App. Mar. 26, 2024) (Morse, J.,
concurring) (mem. decision).

¶13 Although our courts have yet to establish a test to determine
what constitutes a “debatable issue,” they have found debatable issues exist
when: (1) the opening brief claimed error with supporting authority, and it
would “require much industry and independent research to refute” the
appellant’s position, Merrill v. Wheeler, 17 Ariz. 348, 350 (1915); (2) there is
“at least grave doubt” about the superior court’s order, Adkins v. Adkins, 39
Ariz. 530, 532 (1932); or (3) when an appeal raises novel legal questions,
Luna v. Peinado, 1 CA-CV 23-0634 FC, 2024 WL 2207309, at *3, ¶ 17 (Ariz.
App. May 16, 2024) (mem. decision) (collecting cases). Conversely, no
debatable issue exists “when the record ‘clearly’ resolves the question.”
Luna, 2024 WL 2207309, at *3, ¶ 17.

I. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the
order of protection.

¶14 Bailey argues the superior court’s finding that he committed
harassment is not supported by sufficient evidence. He claims the superior
court based its finding on three statements, one of which was protected
speech, and none of which could be viewed as harassing by a reasonable
person.

¶15 We review an order of protection for an abuse of discretion.
Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259, ¶ 10 (App. 2014). We defer to the
superior court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless
clearly erroneous. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998);
First Fin. Bank, N.A. v. Claassen, 238 Ariz. 160, 162, ¶ 8 (App. 2015).

¶16 Harassment under Section 13-2921 constitutes domestic
violence when the victim and the defendant have “resided in the same
household” or were “previously [in] a romantic or sexual relationship.”
A.R.S. § 13-3601(A)(1), (6); see also A.R.S. § 13-3602(A) (“A person may file
a verified petition . . . for an order of protection for the purpose of
restraining a person from committing an act included in domestic
violence.”). As relevant here, a person commits harassment if he or she
knowingly “[c]ontacts or causes a communication with another person by
verbal, electronic, mechanical, telegraphic, telephonic or written means” in
a manner that harasses. A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(1). In this context, “harass”
means “conduct that is directed at a specific person and that would cause a

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reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed, humiliated or
mentally distressed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys,
humiliates or mentally distresses the person.” A.R.S. § 13-2921(E); see Ariz.
R. Protective Order P. 3(e).

¶17 Bailey’s assertion that the superior court’s finding of
harassment is based solely on three statements is incorrect. The superior
court merely listed these three statements to provide examples of comments
that were “clearly designed to be personal.” Even excluding the one
statement the court found to be protected speech, the record shows
numerous other harassing comments. As the court noted, Banks’s exhibits
show “multiple pages” of similar comments, spanning several months.

¶18 Regardless, even a single occurrence of any act enumerated in
Section 13-2921(A)(1)-(5) may constitute harassment if “commit[ted] . . . in
a manner that harasses.” A.R.S. § 13-2921(A); see, e.g., In re Caudill v. Nelson,
1 CA-CV 24-0258 FC, 2025 WL 602938, at *2, ¶¶ 11-14 (Ariz. App. Feb. 25,
2025) (mem. decision) (affirming order of protection based on “single act of
harassment”); Herman v. Herman, 2 CA-CV 2025-0090, 2025 WL 2751688, at
*2, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. Sept. 26, 2025) (mem. decision) (same); Nicaise v.
Sundaram, 1 CA-CV 17-0518, 2018 WL 4688923, at *3, ¶ 13 (Ariz. App. Sept.
27, 2018) (mem. decision) (same).

¶19 The superior court found a reasonable person would be
harassed by Bailey’s comments. Sufficient evidence clearly supports this
factual finding, so Bailey has not raised a debatable issue. See Luna, 2024
WL 2207309, at *3, ¶ 17 (“[A]n issue is not debatable when the record
‘clearly’ resolves the question raised.”). The superior court did not abuse
its discretion, so we affirm the order of protection.

II. The superior court erred in issuing the Brady notice.

¶20 Bailey next argues the Brady notice is not supported by
sufficient evidence because the court’s finding that Bailey posed a “credible
threat” to Banks’s safety was made without conducting any analysis and
conflicted with its finding that Bailey’s statements were not threatening.

¶21 We review de novo the application of Arizona and federal law
to the facts to determine whether firearm restrictions are appropriate. See
Mahar v. Acuna, 230 Ariz. 530, 534, ¶¶ 13-14 (App. 2012); Savord, 235 Ariz.
at 260, ¶ 20.

¶22 An order of protection may include a Brady notice, which
indicates that federal law prohibits the person subject to the protective

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order from purchasing or possessing a firearm because the protective order:
(1) “includes a finding that [the] person represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of [an] intimate partner or child,” or (2) “explicitly prohibits
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such
intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily
injury.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), (ii).

¶23 Arizona law permits the court to prohibit the possession of
firearms “[i]f the court finds that the defendant is a credible threat to the
physical safety of the plaintiff or other specifically designated persons.”
A.R.S. § 13-3602(G)(4). Rule 23(i)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Protective
Order Procedure requires the superior court to “ask the plaintiff about the
defendant’s use of or access to firearms to determine whether the defendant
poses a credible threat to the physical safety of the plaintiff or other
protected persons.”

¶24 State rules of procedure apply in state courts even when
federal substantive claims are implicated unless the state rules affect
substantive federal rights. Shotwell v. Donahoe, 207 Ariz. 287, 290, ¶ 6 (2004).
But we have not consistently held the superior court’s failure to comply
with Rule 23(i)(1) was reversible error. Compare Savord, 235 Ariz. at 260, ¶¶
22-23 (vacating Brady notice when superior court failed to make credible
threat finding according to Rule 23(i)(1)), with In re Marriage of Pineda v.
Campos, 1 CA-CV 24-0912 FC, 2025 WL 2254070, at *3, ¶ 18 (Ariz. App. Aug.
7, 2025) (mem. decision) (holding that superior court’s failure to inquire
about firearms was error, but not reversible error, because it still made a
credible threat finding, which was supported by wife’s allegation that
husband owned firearms and evidence of his threatening behavior).

¶25 Similarly, we have been inconsistent in requiring strict
compliance with the Rule 23(i)(1) procedure when the order otherwise
meets substantive federal requirements for a firearms restriction. See Flynn
v. Flynn, 257 Ariz. 1, 7, ¶ 19 (App. 2024) (affirming Brady notice when order
of protection qualified for firearm restriction under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8)(C)(ii), so credible threat finding was unnecessary); but see Nicaise,
2018 WL 4688923, at *5, ¶¶ 21-22 (vacating Brady notice based on lack of
credible threat finding although Brady notice was warranted under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii)).

¶26 Here, Banks merely alleged in her petition that Bailey owned
or carried firearms or other weapons; she did not testify to that effect at
trial. The superior court failed to ask Banks about Bailey’s “use of or access
to firearms to determine whether [he] pose[d] a credible threat to [her]

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physical safety,” as required by Rule 23(i)(1), and there was no testimony
on that point. Bailey testified that he has never owned a gun and that Banks
knew he did not own a gun. Given our conflicting case law regarding
whether failure to comply with Rule 23(i)(1) is reversible error, we find it a
debatable issue and deem Banks’s failure to file an answering brief a
confession of reversible error. See Robledo v. Robledo, 1 CA-CV 24-0717 FC,
2025 WL 1235252, at *3, ¶20 (Ariz. App. Apr. 29, 2025) (mem. decision)
(finding superior court’s failure to conduct Rule 23(i)(1) inquiry was a
debatable issue). We therefore vacate the Brady notice.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We affirm the order of protection but vacate the Brady notice.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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