Crown Asset v. Ciulla

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

CROWN ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

JULIA CIULLA, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0455

FILED 02-17-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2021-010077
The Honorable John R. Hannah Jr., Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Faber and Brand L.L.C., Columbia, MO
By James Joseph Eufinger
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Law Office of Richard Groves, Phoenix, AZ
By Richard N. Groves
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
 CROWN ASSET v. CIULLA
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Julia Ciulla opened a revolving credit account with Citibank,
N.A. (“Citibank”), used her Citibank credit card, and then failed to pay the
debt she incurred.1 Crown Asset Management, LLC (“Crown Asset”),
which acquired Citibank’s rights to the debt, sued Ciulla. After a bench trial,
the superior court awarded damages to Crown Asset. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Crown Asset, a passive debt buyer, sued Ciulla for breach of
contract and “account stated” relating to the revolving credit account she
opened with Citibank. Crown Asset alleged that Ciulla incurred a debt of
over $55,000 to Citibank and that Crown Asset acquired Citibank’s rights
to the debt through a sale and assignment.

¶3 At a bench trial, Crown Asset offered testimony from
custodians of records for both Citibank and Crown Asset to authenticate
documentary evidence establishing its claim, including Citibank’s
cardholder agreement, monthly billing statements addressed to Ciulla, and
documents showing Crown Asset’s acquisition from Citibank of its right to
collect the debt from Ciulla. Ciulla objected to the witnesses’ testimony on
grounds of lack of foundation and hearsay. The superior court overruled
Ciulla’s objections, finding the witnesses had personal knowledge
sufficient for them to authenticate the exhibits under Arizona Rule of
Evidence (“Rule”) 901(a). The court also found the witnesses were qualified
to testify as to the prerequisites for admission of the records under Rule
803(6). The court admitted the exhibits in evidence and found that Crown
Asset proved by a preponderance of the evidence each of the elements of

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the judgment.

Ariz. Biltmore Hotel Villas Condos. Ass’n v. Conlon Grp. Ariz., LLC, 249 Ariz.
326, 329, ¶ 3 (App. 2020).

2
 CROWN ASSET v. CIULLA
Decision of the Court

its breach of contract and “account stated” causes of action. The court
entered final judgment and denied Ciulla’s motion for new trial.

¶4 We have jurisdiction over Ciulla’s timely appeal under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1) and (A)(5)(a).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Ciulla argues that the superior court erred in admitting the
documents offered by Crown Asset to prove its claim. Ciulla asserts the trial
witnesses were not competent to authenticate the exhibits because they did
not have personal knowledge of the “mode of [their] creation.” She also
asserts that the documents were inadmissible hearsay. We review the
superior court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Gemstar Ltd. v.
Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 493, 506 (1996).

¶6 Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 602 requires witnesses to
have personal knowledge of the matters about which they testify. Ariz. R.
Evid. 602. Under Rule 901, the party offering an item of evidence must
“produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is[,]” which may be accomplished through the
testimony of a witness with “knowledge” that the “item is what it is claimed
to be.” Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a)-(b)(1). Alternatively, an item may be
authenticated by its “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or
other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the
circumstances.” Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a)-(b)(1). The admissibility of evidence
under Rule 901 does not depend on a determination that the evidence is in
fact authentic, “but only whether evidence exists from which the
[factfinder] could reasonably conclude that it is authentic.” State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 386 (1991). The burden of establishing authenticity under
Rule 901, in other words, is “not high.” D.G. by and through Goan v. Alpine
Union Sch. Dist., Case No. 24-cv-0220-BAS-MSB, 2025 WL 2308872 at *2 (S.D.
Cal. July 25, 2025) (citation omitted).2 And contrary to Ciulla’s suggestion,
neither Rule 602 nor Rule 901 require the witness authenticating an exhibit
to have personal knowledge of the “mode” of its “creation.” See, e.g., HDT
Bio Corp. v. Emcure Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., Case No. C22-0334JLR, 2022 WL
3018239 at *5 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2022) (holding that “personal
knowledge[,]” for purposes of the federal counterpart to Rule 602, “can

2 When interpreting an evidentiary rule that “largely mirrors” its
counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence, Arizona courts “look to the
federal rule and its interpretation by federal courts for guidance.” Phillips v.
O’Neil, 243 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 13 (2017).

3
 CROWN ASSET v. CIULLA
Decision of the Court

come from review of the contents of file and records[,]” and so “a witness
who has reviewed records may testify to acts that she or he did not
personally observe but which are described in the record.” (citation
modified)); Chao v. Westside Drywall, Inc., 709 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1052 (holding
that the federal counterpart to Rule 901 “does not require personal
knowledge of a document’s creation, but rather only personal knowledge
that a document was part of an official file”).

¶7 Rule 803(6) provides that a record of an event is generally
admissible if the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness
establishes that (1) the record was made nearly contemporaneously with
the underlying event by or from information transmitted by someone with
knowledge, (2) the record was kept in the course of regularly conducted
business activity, and (3) “making the record was a regular practice of that
activity[.]” Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6)(A)-(D). A document that satisfies those
requirements may nonetheless be inadmissible if the opposing party
“show[s] that the source of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6)(E).

¶8 “Neither the person who witnessed the matters recorded nor
the person who created the record are necessary foundational witnesses”
for admission of documents under Rule 803(6). Premier Consulting & Mgmt.
Sols., LLC v. Peace Releaf Ctr. I, 257 Ariz. 80, 90, ¶ 42 (App. 2024) (quoting 1
Arizona Practice, Law of Evidence § 803:7 (4th ed.)); see also Wells Fargo Bank
NA v. Terrenate Enterprises Inc, 1 CA-CV 19-0081, 2020 WL 2730781 at *12, ¶
61 (Ariz. App. May 26, 2020) (mem. decision) (“To lay adequate foundation
under [Rule 803(6)], the testifying witness need not have personal
knowledge of the creation of the document.”). On the contrary, “courts
regularly admit business records even when the testifying witness did not
assemble the complete record.” State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 401, ¶ 33 (2013)
(citing with approval United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1326-27 (11th
Cir. 2011), which found that the proponent of bank records properly laid
foundation for admission through its proffered custodial witness despite
the witness “not hav[ing] personal knowledge of each of the records[.]”).

¶9 Here, the superior court found the witnesses

had personal knowledge sufficient to enable them to
recognize the credit card agreement, the billing statements
and the bill of sale as authentic records of Citibank and Crown
Asset Management. The witnesses’ categorical familiarity
with the documents was clear from the details of their
testimony.

4
 CROWN ASSET v. CIULLA
Decision of the Court

¶10 The court further found that Crown Asset “laid sufficient
foundation for admission of the records over a hearsay objection” because
the custodians “were personally familiar with, and able to explain in detail,
the record-keeping systems of their respective organizations and how those
systems were used to create the records that the plaintiff introduced in
evidence.” The court found them qualified to testify to the prerequisites for
admission of records under Rule 803(6) because “their testimony
demonstrated the reliance of their organizations on the accuracy and
trustworthiness of the record-keeping systems they described.”

¶11 The record supports the court’s findings. The custodian of
records for Citibank reviewed Ciulla’s monthly credit card statements. She
explained how these documents are created from transaction information
electronically transmitted to Citibank by merchants at the point of sale and
then compiled into a statement at the end of each billing cycle, which is sent
via United States mail to the customer at the address the customer
provided. She explained that this procedure is “as a regular practice” of
Citibank’s, that the information is retained “in the regular course of
[Citibank’s] business[,]” and that she has “personal knowledge of how the
transactions appear and get to the statements.” The custodian identified an
exemplar of Citibank’s cardholder agreement and reviewed the notification
letter Citibank sent to Ciulla stating her account had been sold and was no
longer owned by Citibank. She also reviewed the bill of sale and assignment
between Citibank and Crown Asset reflecting that Ciulla’s debt was sold
by the former to the latter. The custodian testified that these documents,
too, were created at or near the time of the underlying events as part of a
regular practice and kept in the regular course of Citibank’s business. The
custodian thus testified in the affirmative as to each of the Rule 803(6)
elements for all of the Citibank documents.

¶12 The custodian of records for Crown Asset testified that the bill
of sale and assignment of Ciulla’s account was signed by Crown Asset’s
chief executive officer and included data about Ciulla’s account that was
provided by Citibank. She testified in the affirmative as to each of the Rule
803(6) elements for the bill of sale and assignment. She further testified that
Crown Asset received the statements and other data from Citibank
electronically, that it “does not have the ability to manipulate any of [the]
data” that Citibank transmitted electronically, and that it relied on the data
obtained from Citibank in its “work in trying to collect the accounts[.]”

¶13 Ciulla did not show, or even allege, that the source of the
information contained in the documents, or the method of the documents’
preparation, was untrustworthy. Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6)(E).

5
 CROWN ASSET v. CIULLA
Decision of the Court

¶14 Based on this record, the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the witnesses had sufficient personal knowledge
under Rule 602 to enable them to authenticate Citibank’s agreement,
Ciulla’s billing statements, and the bill of sale of Ciulla’s debt from Citibank
to Crown Asset. The same testimony supports the court’s finding under
Rule 901(a) that the records are what Crown Asset claimed they were and
that Crown Asset satisfied admissibility requirements for the exhibits. Ariz.
R. Evid. 901(b)(1). Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the records under the business records exception to the hearsay
rule. See Cont’l Tel. Co. of the West v. Blazzard, 149 Ariz. 1, 5 (App. 1986)
(holding that testimony about how the documents were prepared and
maintained by company’s predecessor established sufficient foundation for
admission of business records).

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s
judgment. Because she is not the successful party, we deny Ciulla’s request
for attorney fees. We award costs to Crown Asset upon compliance with
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

6