Juergensmeyer v. Hickman's

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

CINNAMON JUERGENSMEYER, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

HICKMAN’S EGG RANCH, INC., Defendant/Appellant.
__________________________________

VICTOR H. SANCHEZ, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

HICKMAN’S EGG RANCH, INC., Defendant/Appellant.

Nos. 1 CA-CV 25-0462, 1 CA-CV 25-0586
(Consolidated)
FILED 08-18-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Nos. CV2024-031325, CV2024-035037
The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge
The Honorable John R. Hannah Jr., Judge Retired

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Robbins Curtin Millea & Showalter, LLC, Phoenix
By Joel B. Robbins, Lauren Channell
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Phoenix
By Adam S. Polson, Bruce C. Smith
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

JUERGENSMEYER v. HICKMAN’S
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Veronika Fabian
joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Procedural unconscionability protects a party to a contract
against deception and compulsion—the hidden clause, the rushed
signature, the concealed waiver. It does not protect a party from an
agreement the party chose not to read. Two inmates were injured working
at an egg farm and sued rather than pursue arbitration under their work
agreements. The superior court refused to compel arbitration, concluding
the arbitration clauses were procedurally unconscionable in part because
the egg farm paid far more than other prison jobs, leaving inmates “highly
incentivized” to sign whatever they were offered.

¶2 Hickman’s Egg Ranch, Inc. (“Hickman”) appeals the superior
court’s denial of its motions to compel arbitration in this consolidated
appeal. We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 Hickman operates egg farms in Arizona and two other states
and sells eggs in the southwestern United States. Cinnamon Juergensmeyer
and Victor H. Sanchez were both inmates at the Arizona Department of
Corrections, Rehabilitation & Reentry who were injured while working at
Hickman as part of a prisoner labor program.

Juergensmeyer

¶4 On her first day of work, Juergensmeyer attended an
orientation where a Hickman representative reviewed information and
showed videos about safety and other topics relevant to working at the
facility. The orientation lasted two and a half hours. Hickman’s
representative presented a packet of forms for Juergensmeyer to sign or
initial in more than a dozen places.

¶5 Among the forms was a single-page Volunteer Agreement
and Waiver (“Agreement”). The first paragraph of the Agreement

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described the job as “strictly voluntary” in underlined text. The fifth
paragraph included an arbitration clause in bold and underlined text:

You further agree to submit all disputes related to the
interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement or your
participation in the Program to final and binding arbitration
in Maricopa County, Arizona.

Hickman’s representative never explained how arbitration worked or what
it meant.

¶6 Directly above the signature line, the Agreement warned with
emphasis (all capital letters, bold and underlined text) that Juergensmeyer’s
signature meant she read and understood all terms of the Agreement and
waived her right to sue Hickman:

BY SIGNING BELOW, YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT
YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD ALL OF THE TERMS
OF THIS AGREEMENT AND ARE VOLUNTARILY
CHOOSING TO GIVE UP LEGAL RIGHTS, UP TO AND
INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO SUE HICKMAN’S FAMILY
FARMS AND ITS ENTITIES FOR THEIR ACTIONS.

¶7 Juergensmeyer was given time to read the documents and
told she could ask questions. She asked no questions and signed the
Agreement. Had she refused to sign, Juergensmeyer would have been
returned to the prison, and not allowed to participate in Hickman’s work
program.

¶8 Juergensmeyer slipped and fell while cleaning cages on her
second day of work, and she sued Hickman for negligence in superior
court. Based on the Agreement, Hickman moved to dismiss the lawsuit and
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).
Juergensmeyer argued the Agreement was unenforceable because (1) the
arbitration clause did not apply to her negligence claim, (2) her signature
was procured through circumstances that rendered the Agreement both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable and (3) the Agreement was
contrary to her reasonable expectations.

¶9 After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied
Hickman’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. It rejected
Juergensmeyer’s other defenses, but ruled the arbitration provision was
procedurally unconscionable because of a significant imbalance of power
between Juergensmeyer and Hickman, and because the Agreement was

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presented as a “routine part of several must-sign documents with no
explanation.” It emphasized that Hickman offered far more money and
superior vocational training benefits to inmates than was available with
other inmate jobs, so Juergensmeyer was “highly incentivized” to sign
whatever she was given without asking questions. Hickman timely
appealed.

Sanchez

¶10 On his second or third day of work, Sanchez attended an
orientation in a conference room, where he received 20 pages of documents,
including the one-page Agreement. Sanchez was the only person who
attended the orientation. He was in the room with the documents for an
hour. Hickman had a representative who staffed the orientation. That
representative did not read the documents to Sanchez, explain their
meaning, or discuss the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration.
Sanchez did not seek more time to read the documents and asked no
questions. He “glanced through” the documents before he signed the
Agreement and printed his full name.

¶11 Sanchez was injured on the job when a machine crushed his
right thumb, and he sued Hickman for negligence. Based on the
Agreement, Hickman moved to dismiss the lawsuit and compel arbitration.
Sanchez argued the Agreement was unenforceable for the same reasons
offered by Juergensmeyer.

¶12 The superior court held an evidentiary hearing. Sanchez
testified that he wanted the Hickman job because it paid far more than yard
work and he had to wait nine months to get the position. He also testified
he did not know what arbitration meant and did not remember signing any
agreement to arbitrate.

¶13 After the hearing, the superior court refused to compel
arbitration, ruling the Agreement was procedurally unconscionable
“because of the unfairness of the bargaining process.” The court found a
“radical power imbalance” between Sanchez and Hickman because
Hickman paid $4.85 per hour versus roughly $.10 per hour for other prison
jobs. This disparity, according to the court, gave inmates a powerful
incentive to sign the Agreement and Hickman could “essentially write
anything that they want into” the contract.

¶14 The court also found that Hickman “buried” the Agreement
in a stack of unrelated documents, without reading or explaining the
arbitration clause. It determined that Sanchez was not a sophisticated or

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educated person, and that he signed the Agreement without reading it
because he needed to get back to work. The court also found that Sanchez
reasonably believed that, if he refused to sign the Agreement, he would be
unable to participate in the work program, and instead be limited to low-
paying jobs for some time. Hickman timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

¶15 We first address this court’s jurisdiction. Sorensen v. Farmers
Ins. of Ariz., 191 Ariz. 464, 465 (App. 1997) (“[T]his court has an independent
duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction to consider an appeal.”).

¶16 Sanchez, but not Juergensmeyer, argues we lack jurisdiction
under A.R.S. § 12-2101.01(A)(1) because the superior court never entered
“[a]n order denying an application to compel arbitration made under § 12-
1502 or 12-3007.” Even if true, however, we may accept special action
jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(4). Phillips v. Garcia, 237 Ariz. 407,
410, ¶ 6 (App. 2015). Special action jurisdiction is proper when a party has
no “equally plain, speedy, and adequate” remedy by appeal, and when the
petition raises a matter of first impression or statewide importance. Ariz.
R.P. Spec. Act. 2(b)(2), 12(b).

¶17 We accept special action jurisdiction here because Hickman
lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Security Alarm Financial Enterprises,
L.P. v. Fuller supports this result. 242 Ariz. 512, 515, ¶¶ 7–8 (App. 2017)
(accepting special action jurisdiction over an order denying a motion to
compel arbitration governed by the FAA). And given the number of similar
lawsuits, the question is of statewide importance. Id. at ¶ 7.

DISCUSSION

¶18 Hickman challenges the superior court’s rulings that the
arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable. We review de novo
the court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration, id. at ¶ 9, but defer to
its factual findings absent clear error, Est. of DeCamacho ex rel. Guthrie v. La
Solana Care & Rehab, Inc., 234 Ariz. 18, 20, ¶ 8 (App. 2014).

A. The Law.

¶19 The Agreement is governed by the FAA, which directs that
written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Arizona law governs whether an arbitration
clause is valid and enforceable under the FAA. Harrington v. Pulte Home

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Corp., 211 Ariz. 241, 245–46, ¶¶ 9–10 (App. 2005). The party seeking to void
a contract based on unconscionability must prove it. Gullett ex rel. Est. of
Gullett v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. W., L.L.C., 241 Ariz. 532, 541, ¶ 31 (App.
2017).

¶20 Procedural unconscionability examines the bargaining
process for fairness: “‘unfair surprise,’ fine print clauses, mistakes or
ignorance of important facts or other things that mean bargaining did not
proceed as it should.” Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 88–89
(1995) (citation omitted).

¶21 To assess whether an arbitration agreement is procedurally
unconscionable, Arizona courts consider “whether the contract was
separate from other paperwork, whether the contract used conspicuous
typeface, and whether the contract was signed hurriedly and without
explanation in emergency circumstances.” Dueñas v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am.,
Inc., 236 Ariz. 130, 135, ¶ 8 (App. 2014) (citation omitted).

¶22 According to the Arizona Supreme Court, procedural
unconscionability “bears a strong resemblance to its ‘common-law cousins’
of fraud and duress.” Maxwell, 184 Ariz. at 89. We therefore consider
whether a party lacked meaningful choice on whether to enter the
transaction:

[G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms
unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm
indications that the transaction involved elements of
deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party
had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in
fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. d (1981).

¶23 To gauge whether an agreement reflects “the real and
voluntary meeting of the minds,” Arizona courts consider the “age,
education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, [and] relative
bargaining power” of the party, along with “who drafted the contract,
whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether alterations
in the printed terms were possible, [and] whether there were alternative
sources of supply for the goods in question.” Maxwell, 184 Ariz. at 89 (citing
Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976)).

¶24 And yet, “[a] bargain is not unconscionable merely because
the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even because the

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inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party.”
Restatement § 208 cmt. d.

B. Juergensmeyer.

¶25 The superior court held the Agreement was procedurally
unconscionable because the arbitration clause waived substantial rights,
and Hickman presented the clause as a non-negotiable, unexplained
formality in a packet of must-sign documents that inmates were motivated
to sign without question because Hickman paid far more than any other
prison jobs. Accepting the superior court’s factual findings, we hold that
the Agreement was not procedurally unconscionable because the record
shows no unfair surprise or surreptitious conduct, and Juergensmeyer was
not deprived of a meaningful choice. See Dueñas, 236 Ariz. at 135, ¶¶ 8, 9.

¶26 First, the Agreement’s terms were not buried in fine print or
obscured by deceptive practices. Procedural unconscionability is about
hiding the ball—burying a clause in fine print, rushing a signature in a
crisis, concealing what rights are being waived. Here, the arbitration clause
was displayed in plain sight on a separate one-page document in bold,
underlined text. See id. at ¶ 8 (finding relevant factors include whether the
contract was separate from other papers or used conspicuous typeface).
The Agreement also warned: “BY SIGNING BELOW, YOU
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD ALL OF
THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT.” Juergensmeyer chose not to read
the Agreement, asked no questions and signed it.

¶27 Second, the Agreement was not presented under “high
pressure” tactics that “’work[] on mental, moral, or emotional weakness’—
aimed at extracting arbitration agreements.” Martinez-Gonzalez v. Elkhorn
Packing Co. LLC, 25 F.4th 613, 627 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Keithley v. Civ.
Serv. Bd., 11 Cal.App.3d 443, 451 (1970)). Hickman presented the
Agreement during a lengthy orientation. Juergensmeyer had a chance to
review the Agreement and was encouraged to ask questions. See Dueñas,
236 Ariz. at 135–36, ¶¶ 10–11 (holding no procedural unconscionability
where plaintiff had an opportunity to review the agreement and exercise
independent judgment).

¶28 Third, Juergensmeyer was educated and had life experience.
She was an adult in her mid-30s when she signed the Agreement. She was
fluent in English, had completed high school and attended community
college. She was certified as a medical assistant and had registered a trade
name with the Arizona Secretary of State.

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¶29 Fourth, Juergensmeyer had a meaningful choice—she could
have refused to sign the Agreement and worked elsewhere, even if for less
money. Yes, she was “highly incentivized” to sign whatever she was given,
but Hickman did not create that incentive through wrongful conduct or
place her in a distressed position. Juergensmeyer was in prison and that
imprisonment limited her work options.

¶30 To penalize Hickman because it paid inmates the highest
wage turns procedural unconscionability on its head. Procedural
unconscionability seeks to protect the weaker party to a bargain. Accepting
Juergensmeyer’s argument would create a perverse incentive: the more an
employer pays relative to the alternatives, the more vulnerable its arbitration
clauses to a claim of procedural unconscionability. A rule like that gives
employers every reason to pay inmates less, harming the very people the
doctrine seeks to protect.

¶31 And last, Juergensmeyer was not compelled to accept
unreasonable or draconian terms. She does not challenge the garden-
variety arbitration clause as misleading or contend she relied on false
statements. See id. at 136, ¶ 12 (court considered whether a contract’s
misleading text rendered it procedurally unconscionable).

¶32 We are not persuaded by Juergensmeyer’s arguments to
affirm. She first argues the Agreement was procedurally unconscionable
because she did not know what arbitration meant, Hickman never
explained it and the Agreement was not titled “arbitration.” But Arizona
law does not require a drafting party to explain standardized clauses. Rizzio
v. Surpass Senior Living LLC, 248 Ariz. 266, 271, ¶ 19 (2020), aff’d in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, 251 Ariz. 413 (2021). Just the opposite. A
party is “assumed to have read and understood the terms of a contract he
or she signs.” Coup v. Scottsdale Plaza Resort, LLC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 931, 949
(D. Ariz. 2011); see also Harrington, 211 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 27.

¶33 Juergensmeyer next argues the Agreement was procedurally
unconscionable because it was non-negotiable. But standardized, take-it-
or-leave-it contracts are routinely enforced. See Rizzio, 248 Ariz. at 271, ¶
18. Adhesion contracts are enforceable. Restatement § 208 reporter’s note,
cmt. a (“It is to be emphasized that a contract of adhesion is not
unconscionable per se.”). And mere unequal bargaining power does not
void an arbitration clause. Coup, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 948; see also Restatement
§ 208 cmt. d (“A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties
to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even because the inequality
results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party.”).

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¶34 Juergensmeyer also argues Hickman withheld important
information about Hickman’s history of workplace injuries and unsafe
working conditions. But Arizona law did not require Hickman to provide
all information Juergensmeyer might have found helpful before signing the
Agreement. See Dueñas, 236 Ariz. at 135–36, ¶¶ 10–11. And, again, she
chose to ask no questions.

¶35 We reverse because Hickman did not act unfairly or
surreptitiously to deny Juergensmeyer her day in court. Hickman
presented the Agreement in a standard orientation and gave
Juergensmeyer time to ask questions. And despite the disparity in
bargaining power, Juergensmeyer had a meaningful choice to sign or not.
Having signed the Agreement, she is bound by its terms.

C. Sanchez.

¶36 Turning to Sanchez, the superior court denied Hickman’s
motion to compel arbitration “because of the unfairness of the bargaining
process.” Accepting its factual findings, we disagree that the arbitration
clause was procedurally unconscionable.

¶37 The one-page Agreement was separate from other
paperwork, regardless of its position in the stack. See id. at 135, ¶ 8
(considering whether “the contract was separate from other paperwork”).
Sanchez had a high school diploma and attended some college courses. He
has never claimed he cannot read English. He had one hour to review the
documents, glanced at them and signed the Agreement. See id. at 135–36,
¶¶ 10–11 (rejecting unconscionability where plaintiff had opportunity to
review each agreement and exercise independent judgment). Arizona law
assumes he “read and understood the terms of” the contract he signed.
Coup, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 949.

¶38 Sanchez’s arguments are not persuasive. Hickman was not
required to read the Agreement to Sanchez or explain its provisions. See
Rizzio, 248 Ariz. at 271, ¶ 19. The Agreement was not procedurally
unconscionable just because it was non-negotiable, see id. at ¶¶ 18–19, or
because he felt pressure and was “highly incentivized” to sign, Coup, 823 F.
Supp. 2d at 948 (“Mere inequality in bargaining power is not sufficient to
invalidate an arbitration agreement.”). Hickman did not create that
incentive through wrongful conduct. See Maxwell, 184 Ariz. at 89 (noting
procedural unconscionability “bears a strong resemblance” to fraud and
duress). Sanchez was in prison. That fact (and not Hickman) limited his
work options. Sanchez had a meaningful choice—refuse to sign, not be

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employed by Hickman and work for lower pay. We reverse the superior
court’s order finding the Agreement was procedurally unconscionable.

CONCLUSION

¶39 We reverse the superior court’s orders denying Hickman’s
motions to compel arbitration and remand with instructions to compel
arbitration.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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