Gerardi v. Siddens

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

CHRISTINE LYNN GERARDI, Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

KIRK DAVID SIDDENS, Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0523 FC
FILED 08-07-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2022-051338
The Honorable Paula A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

APPEARANCES

Cantor Law Group PLLC, Phoenix
By Travis J. Owen
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Genesis Legal Group, Gilbert
By Kevin Jensen
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

GERARDI v. SIDDENS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Veronika Fabian and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Christine Gerardi (“Wife”) appeals the superior court’s
dissolution decree ending her marriage with Kirk Siddens (“Husband”),
who cross-appeals. Both parties challenge various aspects of the court’s
division of property. We affirm part of the decree, but we vacate other
portions and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties married in 2012. Husband acquired a business
(“Business”) before the marriage and continued to operate it during the
marriage until he sold it in 2021. Wife works for the military as a civilian.
After Wife petitioned for dissolution in 2022, the parties proceeded to trial
where the disputed issues were allocation of their dogs, cars, bank accounts,
Husband’s two retirement accounts, and a brokerage account, as well as the
classification of the Business profits as separate or community property.1

¶3 At trial, the superior court heard testimony from the parties
and their expert witnesses. In dissolving the marriage, the court awarded
two cars (a BMW and the Ford Shelby) to Wife and one car (a second BMW)
to Husband along with an equalization payment. Addressing retirement
funds, the court referenced Wife’s federal pension and her Thrift Savings
Account, as well as Husband’s retirement funds and brokerage account
totaling $997,527, and awarded each party “his or her interest in any
retirement benefits, pension plans, or deferred compensation.” The court
further ordered the parties to arrange for preparation of necessary qualified
domestic relations orders (“QDRO”) by an expert, including determination

1 In his pretrial statement, Husband referred to the two retirement
accounts and the brokerage account as his “retirement account.” As
explained in ¶¶ 14–16, infra, inclusion of the brokerage account led to
confusion in the decree.

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of the community portion of Husband’s retirement accounts. The court also
concluded that contributions to Husband’s retirement accounts relating to
the Business were community property and thus subject to division
through a QDRO. The court awarded both dogs to Husband and declined
to award attorneys’ fees and costs to either party.

¶4 Each party moved to amend the decree under Arizona Rule
of Family Law Procedure (“ARFLP”) 83. Wife asserted that Husband
waived his claim for the parties’ dogs by asking the court in his pretrial
statement to award them to her. Wife also argued the court (1) should have
clarified that Husband had three separate accounts instead of finding “there
was one IRA account valued at $997,527,” and (2) needed to further analyze
the community interest in those accounts. The court denied both
arguments.

¶5 Husband argued the court erred by awarding the Ford Shelby
to Wife, given both parties’ request that it be awarded to Husband, and by
refusing to admit Wife’s discovery responses, which included pertinent
information about the cars. He also asserted the court erred in finding that
contributions to his retirement accounts compensated the marital
community. The court vacated the award of the Ford Shelby to Wife and
awarded it to Husband but denied his request to change the findings on his
retirement accounts. A timely appeal and cross-appeal followed, and we
have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Under A.R.S. § 25-318(A), the superior court “shall assign
each spouse’s sole and separate property to such spouse” and shall divide
the community property “equitably.” The court has broad discretion to
apportion community property “to achieve an equitable division, and we
will not disturb its allocation absent an abuse of discretion.” Boncoskey v.
Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). Generally, “an equal
distribution of joint property will be the most equitable.” Toth v. Toth, 190
Ariz. 218, 221 (1997) (noting that determining whether a property division
is equitable is “dependent upon the facts of particular cases”). “[W]e
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the superior
court’s ruling and will sustain the ruling if it is reasonably supported by the
evidence.” Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. at 451, ¶ 13.

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A. Ownership of the Dogs

¶7 Noting that the pretrial statement “controls the subsequent
course of the litigation,” Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 378, ¶ 19 (App.
2007) (quotation omitted), Wife argues that because Husband asked the
court to award the dogs to Wife, the court erred in awarding both dogs to
Husband. Wife cites Robertson v. Petz, 260 Ariz. 327 (App. 2025), to support
her argument about pretrial statements, but that case supports the court’s
action here. Both Husband and Wife placed the issue of ownership of the
dogs before the court in their pretrial statements. See id. at 334, ¶ 19 (noting
the pretrial statement placed an issue before the court). Wife cites no
authority suggesting a court is precluded from dividing property in the
manner that best achieves an equitable division.

¶8 Wife consistently stated, both in her pretrial statement and
her trial testimony, that she could only keep one dog. Husband testified
the two dogs were from the same litter, they should not be separated, and
he would keep both dogs if it was the only way to keep them together.
Under these circumstances, Wife has not shown the court abused its
discretion. See Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. at 451, ¶ 13; see also In re Marriage of
Flower, 223 Ariz. 531, 535, ¶ 14 (App. 2010) (recognizing the trial court has
broad discretion to allocate property and “may consider other factors that
bear on the equities of a particular case”).

B. Car Valuations

¶9 In the decree, the superior court found the only credible
evidence about car values were Wife’s Carfax reports. The court also found
there was “no credible evidence” on whether the cars “had positive equity
at the time of service.” Based on the Carfax valuations, the court (1)
awarded Wife one of the BMWs and the Ford Shelby, and (2) awarded
Husband the other BMW plus an equalization payment of $17,025. Later,
the court granted Husband’s ARFLP 83 motion, vacating the award of the
Shelby to Wife and awarding it to Husband. Yet the court did not address
the equalization payment originally awarded to Husband. Wife argues that
awarding the Shelby to Husband without making additional findings or
corrections to the equalization payment was error. We agree; the court
must reconsider this issue on remand.

¶10 In his cross-appeal, Husband contests the Carfax valuations
the court relied on at trial. Husband sought to introduce Wife’s sworn
discovery responses as substantive evidence of the car valuations and the
lien on his BMW. Wife objected, asserting her responses were

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“voluminous” and Husband had not laid proper foundation. The court
sustained the objection, explaining that Husband could testify to his
recollection of Wife’s responses, but because “there’s a ton of other stuff in
there,” the court refused to admit the responses into evidence.

¶11 “We review evidentiary rulings . . . for an abuse of discretion
and generally affirm absent a clear abuse or legal error and resulting
prejudice.” Davis v. Davis, 246 Ariz. 63, 65, ¶ 6 (App. 2018) (citation
modified). But “we review the application and interpretation of court rules
de novo.” Id.

¶12 In civil proceedings, a party’s own statements are admissible
when offered by an opposing party under Arizona Rule of Evidence
(“Rule”) 801(d)(2). See Barrett v. Melton, 112 Ariz. 605, 607 (1976) (“When
offered by the opposing party, interrogatories fall within the admissions of
a party exception to the hearsay rule and are admissible.”). But under
ARFLP 2, the hearsay and authentication rules do not apply in family law
proceedings unless a party expressly requests strict compliance with the
Rules. Neither party did so here.

¶13 Husband’s ARFLP 83 motion explained that he planned to
use Wife’s sworn interrogatory responses to establish the lien on his BMW,
as well as the car values. He admits he “did not have alternative evidence”;
however, we recognize his reliance on the presumed admissibility of Wife’s
interrogatory responses. Because the court explained it received “no
credible evidence” of liens on the cars, the court’s final equalization of the
car values does not reflect the circumstances of the parties’ property. Thus,
the court erred by failing to consider Wife’s interrogatory responses, which
were admissible as relevant evidence under ARFLP 2(b)(2) and Rule 402.
On remand, the court must reconsider the value of each car and the related
liens, as well as any necessary equalization payment.

C. QDROs

¶14 The superior court found that Husband’s retirement accounts
totaled $997,527 and that the community portion of that amount should be
determined through preparation of a QDRO. Wife argues the court’s
failure to distinguish between the accounts, or adequately describe them,
presents a “fundamentally flawed” order that would prevent a QDRO-
preparer from completing their task of identifying the community’s
deposits. Without explanation, the court denied Wife’s ARFLP 83 motion
to clarify the portion of the decree addressing QDROs.

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¶15 Under ARFLP 72.1, “[i]f a court order requires retirement
benefits . . . to be divided, the court may appoint [a professional] . . . to
recommend a division or to implement the division that the court has
ordered.” ARFLP 72.1(a). “The court’s order of appointment must identify
the specific assets to be divided.” ARFLP 72.1(b); see also A.R.S. § 25-318(F)
(“The decree or judgment shall specifically describe . . . any real property
. . . [and] any other property affected.”); Matter of Howie v. Howie, 1 CA-CV
23-0587 FC, 2025 WL 1711285, at *11, ¶ 54 (Ariz. App. June 19, 2025) (mem.
decision) (“An order allocating marital property must identify the property
with sufficient specificity to determine if the order has been complied with
and, if not, to permit its enforcement.”).

¶16 The portion of the decree addressing QDROs is defective for
two reasons. First, a brokerage account must be divided by decree, not by
a QDRO. See Chang v. Sui, 234 Ariz. 442, 448, ¶ 23 (App. 2014) (affirming
the superior court’s adoption of an arbitrator’s conclusion that assets in a
series of brokerage accounts were community property and divisible by the
dissolution decree). Second, although the court’s order states that the
parties shall arrange for preparing “any necessary” QDROs, given the
authorities noted above, supra ¶ 15, we agree with Wife that greater
specificity is necessary. With the decree’s consolidation of Husband’s
retirement accounts, the potential for confusion by the appointed QDRO
professional is probable. The court must provide the required specificity
on remand.

D. Husband’s Retirement Accounts

¶17 Husband argues the superior court erred by reclassifying
profits from the Business as community property based solely on the fact
the funds were paid into his retirement accounts. He contends the court’s
classification of his retirement contributions ($203,825) as community
property, on top of its awards to Wife for under-compensation and the
appreciation of the Business, is unjustified “stacking.”

¶18 “We review the court’s property characterization as separate
or community de novo.” Larrea v. Chand, 261 Ariz. 93, 98, ¶ 18 (App. 2025).
Arizona courts recognize a “strong presumption” that all earnings received
during a marriage are community funds. See Barr v. Petzhold, 77 Ariz. 399,
409 (1954). The party seeking to rebut the community-property
presumption has the burden to identify and trace the separate funds with
clear and satisfactory evidence. Larrea, 261 Ariz. at 99, ¶ 21.

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¶19 When addressing “separate property profits and increase in
value, Arizona courts have looked to the nature, or source, of the profit
from or increase of the separate property business.” Rueschenberg v.
Rueschenberg, 219 Ariz. 249, 252, ¶ 12 (App. 2008). “[I]f the profits and/or
increase result from the ‘inherent qualities of the business,’ the profits and
increase are separate property; if the profits and/or increase result from the
‘individual toil and application of the spouse,’ they are community
property.” Id. (citation omitted). The profits, or increase, are apportioned
to the community according to the amount attributable to compensating the
community for the “labor, skill and industry of one or both spouses.”
Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 54 (1979) (citation modified). Once the court
has determined the amount of reasonable compensation due to the
community, the superior court must apportion any remaining profits
“between the community and [the owner spouse’s] separate-property
estate.” Kim v. Pak, 258 Ariz. 594, 599, ¶ 18 (App. 2024).

¶20 Consistent with this authority, the superior court explained
that “contributions to retirement plans are typically employer contributions
that are part of an employee’s compensation package or contributions from
the employee from his wages.” The court then concluded that Husband did
not present “clear, credible evidence of his compensation package,” and
thus had “not met his burden of proof that the retirement contributions
were sole and separate property.”

¶21 Husband notes that the court contemplated Husband’s labor,
determined the community was under-compensated for that labor and thus
awarded $23,107 to the community. And because the court also awarded
Wife $30,822.50 as her portion of the community’s share of the Business
appreciation when it was sold, Husband asserts the court fully accounted
for her share that resulted from his efforts under Rueschenberg. He therefore
contends that under Kim, the court erred by apportioning the contributions
to his retirement account as compensation rather than excess profits from
the Business. See Kim, 258 Ariz. at 599, ¶¶ 18–19.

¶22 We are not persuaded by Husband’s reliance on Kim, which
establishes that the superior court is “required to determine the separate
and community portions” of a separate business’ profits “and allocate them
to the respective estates accordingly.” Id. at ¶ 18. Here, the superior court
did exactly that: it determined a portion of the retirement contributions was
compensation from the Business and apportioned that share to the
community.

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¶23 We recognize that the court accounted for the marital
community’s interest when it awarded Wife funds to account for under-
compensation and appreciation of the Business, but that does not mean the
court improperly treated Husband’s contributions to his retirement
accounts as part of his compensation. The court found that Husband failed
to provide credible evidence of his compensation package, and Wife’s
expert’s report included Husband’s contributions to one of the retirement
accounts as community property.

¶24 Moreover, Husband’s expert noted that his analysis “reduced
the actual compensation paid to [Husband] for retirement contributions to”
one of Husband’s retirement accounts. That statement implies that the
Business made contributions to Husband’s retirement accounts as part of
his compensation and is consistent with the presumption applied by the
superior court that employer contributions to retirement accounts form a
portion of an employee’s compensation, supra ¶ 21. Because Husband
failed to present any evidence showing his contributions to his retirement
accounts resulted from the inherent qualities of the Business, the court did
not err in classifying $203,825 of the retirement contributions as community
property. See Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. at 451, ¶ 13 (explaining that appellate
courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
superior court’s ruling); see also Kerr v. Killian, 207 Ariz. 181, 182, ¶ 4 (2004)
(explaining that the employer’s contribution to an employee’s retirement
account “is plainly a benefit conferred by the employer as a result of the
employee’s labor”).

E. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

¶25 Wife requests an award of attorneys’ fees under ARCAP 21.
We deny her request because merely citing the rule does not provide a
substantive basis for awarding fees. See ARCAP 21(a)(2) (“A claim for fees
under [ARCAP 21] must specifically state the statute, rule, decisional law,
contract, or other authority for an award of attorneys’ fees.”); see also
Zambrano v. M & RC II LLC, 254 Ariz. 53, 66, ¶ 49 (2022) (denying request
for attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal because the party seeking fees “failed
to state the basis for the request as required by our rules of procedure”).
Because each party has achieved partial success on appeal, we decline to
award taxable costs.

CONCLUSION

¶26 We vacate the superior court’s award of an equalization
payment of $17,025 to Husband as part of its allocation of the cars and

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remand to allow the court to reconsider its findings after considering all
admissible evidence. We remand the portion of the dissolution decree
directing preparation of QDROs so the court may specifically describe each
relevant account as well as their respective community and separate
portions. We affirm the remainder of the court’s decree.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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