Sinacori v. Sinacori

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

CHRISTOPHER SINACORI, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

COREN SINACORI, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0529 FC
FILED 06-12-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2022-091597
The Honorable William R. Wingard, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

The Cavanagh Law Firm, P.A., Phoenix
By Helen R. Davis, Nicholas J. Brown
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Padish Law Group, PLLC, Scottsdale
By James E. Padish
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

SINACORI v. SINACORI
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Coren Sinacori (Wife) appeals from a decree dissolving her
marriage to Christopher Sinacori (Husband). For the reasons that follow,
the decree is vacated and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Husband and Wife married in 1996 and have two children in
common, one of whom is still a minor. In 2022, Husband filed a petition for
dissolution. Both parties were represented by counsel.

¶3 At a mediation in August 2023, the parties reached a
comprehensive settlement, the terms of which were stated in an audio
recording before the mediator. See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. (ARFLP) 69(a)(3)
(2026).1 As applicable here, Husband agreed to pay: (1) $1,000 in monthly
child support; (2) $14,500 in non-modifiable monthly spousal maintenance
to Wife until the parties sold their business and received the proceeds; and
(3) Wife’s attorneys’ fees. Both parties agreed to be bound by the agreement
and that it was fair and equitable.

¶4 In October 2023, Husband submitted to the superior court a
proposed consent decree, stating it reflected the settlement agreement. Wife
filed a response seeking more time to respond to the proposed decree, citing
concerns about personal guarantee provisions and noting scheduling issues
for counsel. Rather than granting Wife the additional time requested, the
court rejected the decree, stating Wife’s filing “shows that the parties are
not in complete agreement.”

¶5 After numerous continuances, in February 2025, the court
held a trial on the petition and, at the end of trial, directed the parties to
brief “the issues related to” the settlement agreement. After those briefs
were filed, the resulting April 2025 decree affirmed the settlement

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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agreement but also purported to modify it. The decree modified Husband’s
payment obligations when compared to the settlement agreement by
ordering that he pay: (1) $1,383 per month in child support (an increased
amount); (2) $6,000 in monthly spousal maintenance (a decreased amount);
and (3) nothing to Wife for her attorneys’ fees (a decreased amount).

¶6 This court has jurisdiction over Wife’s timely appeal under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 By statute, parties may reach an agreement resolving a
divorce proceeding. See A.R.S. § 25-317(A). On appeal, Wife argues the
court erred by partially adopting the parties’ settlement agreement with
modifications, asserting the court was required to either adopt or reject the
settlement agreement in its entirety. Husband’s primary response is that
Wife has invited the error she now alleges the superior court made, and that
the decree should be affirmed. The parties’ changing views about the
apparent settlement agreement cast a long, dark shadow over the legal
analysis applicable to resolving this appeal.

¶8 Nearly two years before trial, Husband lodged the proposed
consent decree, Wife asked for more time to respond, and the court found
Wife’s request “shows that the parties are not in complete agreement.” At
no time has the court approved that proposed consent decree, or any other
settlement agreement. See ARFLP 69(b) (stating any settlement agreement
“is not binding on the court until it is submitted to and approved by the
court as provided by law.”); see also A.R.S. § 25-317(B). Before and after trial,
and now on appeal, the parties have taken conflicting and evolving
positions on whether they settled the matter.

¶9 In the agreed-upon uncontested issues of fact listed in the
joint pre-trial statement, the parties stated they “reached a binding
settlement” but added that they “have been unable to resolve the final
issues regarding spousal maintenance and business distribution.” In that
same filing, Husband stated he should pay Wife $7,400 in monthly
modifiable spousal maintenance for four years, or until their son graduated
high school. Wife countered that the settlement agreement required
Husband to pay $14,500 in monthly non-modifiable spousal maintenance,
but added that requirement “needs to be revised” given changes in how the
business was structured, and then claimed she should receive $14,500 in
monthly spousal maintenance for 30 months. For the business distribution,

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Husband argued the parties should equally divide the shares of the
business, while Wife expressed concern about the change in the business
structure, concluding she “does not know whether her consent should be
provided with respect to the merger” that was proposed for the business.

¶10 At trial, Wife sought to enforce the settlement agreement.
Husband countered by pointing to the pre-trial statement. In response, the
superior court stated it “will have to look into” the settlement agreement
issue and directed post-trial briefing on the topic.

¶11 In that post-trial briefing, the positions changed again.
Husband argued the settlement agreement provision regarding spousal
maintenance was “subject to rescission due to” a mutual mistake of fact
about the change in the business structure. Noting the settlement
agreement had not been approved by the court, Husband stated “[t]he
parties concur that the [settlement a]greement should be approved by the
Court with the exception of the spousal maintenance term.” Wife countered
that the settlement agreement “needs to be set aside and . . . the court needs
to reexamine the issues therein anew.” Wife, added, however: “If the Court
does not agree that the Agreement needs to be set aside, then Father should
be following the entire Agreement, which has not been occurring.”

¶12 On appeal, Wife argues that the court erred by partially
adopting the settlement agreement, rather than entirely approving it or
entirely rejecting it. Husband counters that Wife invited any error in the
court partially adopting the settlement agreement, meaning she cannot now
argue that the superior court erred by partially adopting the settlement
agreement.2

¶13 On the record presented, it is not clear how the superior court
properly issued a decree purporting to accept the settlement agreement in
part. There are no findings in the record approving the settlement
agreement. See ARFLP 69(b); A.R.S. § 25-317(B). To the contrary, the sole
ruling on point came in October 2023, when the court rejected it. And even
if this court were to read into the decree the superior court approving the
settlement agreement, that would not explain how the decree included
some, but not all, of its material terms. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 259 Ariz. 467, ___

2 Given these shifting sands, Husband has not shown that Wife led the

superior court into taking the actions it took that she claims on appeal were
error. Among other things, the statement that the parties “have been unable
to resolve the final issues” regarding spousal maintenance and business
distribution did not ask the court to issue the decree that it did.

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¶ 12, 567 P.3d 1287, 1290 (App. 2025) (holding “the superior court may not
adopt only parts of a separation agreement and reject others”).
Accordingly, the decree cannot stand.

¶14 On remand, if the parties submit the settlement agreement to
the superior court for approval (recognizing they might reach a different
settlement agreement and submit that for approval), the court will need to
address whether the agreement is unfair before approving or rejecting it.
See ARFLP 69(b); A.R.S. § 25-317(B); Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 126, 131
¶ 18 (App. 2019). Only after making that evidence-based determination
would the court be in a position to approve or reject the settlement
agreement. See A.R.S. § 25-317(B) & (C).

¶15 If a settlement agreement is presented to the court on remand
and approved by the court, the court must enter a decree reflecting it. See
A.R.S. § 25-317(B); Jacobs, 259 Ariz. at ___ ¶ 14, 567 P.3d at 1290. The relevant
inquiry in that determination is consideration of the “circumstances that
existed around the time of the separation agreement’s formation.” Meek v.
Meek, 256 Ariz. 405, 413 ¶ 41 (App. 2023). If the court is not presented with
a settlement agreement on remand, or it rejects such an agreement, the case
would have to be retried.

¶16 Resolution of those issues must await remand. Accordingly,
although noting those issues, this court does not resolve them. And because
this court remands for further proceedings, it need not (and expressly does
not) address Wife’s due process or evidentiary arguments.

CONCLUSION

¶17 The decree is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this decision. Wife requests attorneys’ fees and
costs on appeal under A.R.S. §§ 25-324(A) and 12-341.01. Husband requests
attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324(A). After
considering the parties’ financial resources and the reasonableness of their
positions, and in exercise of this court’s discretion, Wife is awarded a
portion of her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on appeal
contingent upon her compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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