Clout Construction v. Lb contracting/bryant

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

CLOUT CONSTRUCTION, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

LB CONTRACTING, LLC, Defendant/Appellee.

v.

ORVILLE LARRY BRYANT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0534
FILED 02-18-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-019145
The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Orville Larry Bryant, Prescott
Appellant

CLOUT CONSTRUCTION v. LB CONTRACTING/BRYANT
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Orville Larry Bryant appeals from an order denying his
motion to intervene. Because he has shown no error, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2022, general contractor Clout Construction, LLC, entered
into a subcontract with L.B. Contracting, LLC, for construction work. A
dispute later arose and, in December 2023, Clout filed this case against L.B.
alleging, as applicable here, breach of contract. Bryant is the sole member
of L.B. but was not a party to the subcontract and not joined as a defendant.

¶3 Bryant moved to treat L.B. as a “disregarded entity,” citing
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 19 (“Required Joinder of Parties”), which
the court denied. In May 2025, Bryant filed an “amendment” to that motion,
seeking to intervene. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24 (2026).1 By that time, default had
been entered against L.B. and Clout had moved for entry of default
judgment. Later in May 2025, the court entered a default judgment,
requiring L.B. to pay Clout about $125,000. A few days after that, treating
Bryant’s May 2025 “amendment” as a motion to intervene, the court denied
it. The court noted the motion was untimely (having been filed after default
was entered against L.B.) and that Bryant had not shown a right to intervene
or that permissive intervention was appropriate.

¶4 This court has jurisdiction over Bryant’s timely appeal from
that ruling under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(3).

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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CLOUT CONSTRUCTION v. LB CONTRACTING/BRYANT
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶5 Bryant’s brief on appeal does not comply with applicable
rules, failing to include “citations of legal authorities” or citations to the
“applicable standard of appellate review.” ARCAP 13(a)(7). Accordingly,
Bryant has waived his arguments on appeal. See, e.g., In re Aubuchon, 233
Ariz. 62, 64-65 ¶ 6 (2013).

¶6 Waiver notwithstanding, Bryant’s arguments are
unavailaing. He argues that he should have been joined as a party under
Rules 19 and 20 and should have been allowed to intervene under Rule 24.
Bryant has not shown how Rule 19, addressing required joinder, compels
the conclusion that he had to be joined as a party. And Bryant did not cite
Rule 20, addressing permissive joinder, in superior court, resulting in
waiver on appeal. See Cont’l Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading
& Utils., LLC, 227 Ariz. 382, 386 ¶ 12 (App. 2011) (arguments raised for the
first time on appeal are waived) (citing cases).

¶7 Turning to Rule 24, a ruling on the timeliness of a motion to
intervene is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Heritage Vill. II
Homeowners Ass’n v. Norman, 246 Ariz. 567, 570 ¶ 9 (App. 2019) (citing
cases); see also State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
196 Ariz. 382, 384 ¶ 5 (2000) (citing cases). A ruling on a timely motion for
intervention of right is reviewed de novo, while a permissive intervention
ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Dowling v. Stapley, 221 Ariz.
251, 269-70 ¶ 57 (App. 2009) (citing cases).

¶8 Bryant argues his motion to intervene was timely because it
was filed before entry of default judgment. Bryant’s May 2025 motion,
however, was filed 17 months after Clout filed the suit in December 2023.
Bryant knew of the suit the entire time, having received service on behalf of
L.B., and offered no explanation for his delay. On this record, Bryant has
not shown that the superior court abused its discretion in finding his
motion to intervene – coming after entry of default against L.B. – was
untimely. See Norman, 246 Ariz. at 571 ¶ 13 (citing cases) (timeliness under
Rule 24 focuses on where the action has progressed before intervention is
sought and whether intervention could have been sought earlier).

¶9 Timeliness notwithstanding, Bryant has not shown that he
had a right to intervene. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Although claiming such a
right under A.R.S. § 32-1127(B), that statute deals with responsibility for
licensing violations, and does not give Bryant a right to intervene. See Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). Nor has Bryant shown that protecting his interests (as

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CLOUT CONSTRUCTION v. LB CONTRACTING/BRYANT
Decision of the Court

opposed to L.B.’s) would impermissibly be impaired or impeded unless he
was allowed to intervene. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

¶10 For permissive intervention, Bryant cites to no statute
providing him “a conditional right to intervene.” Ariz. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(1)(A). Clout’s claim was against L.B. (not Bryant) and the resulting
default judgment required L.B. (not Bryant) to pay money damages. The
superior court properly could conclude that Bryant did not have “a claim
or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). Moreover, consistent with the conclusion
that the motion to intervene was untimely, the court properly could
conclude that intervention would “unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).

¶11 For these reasons, Bryant has shown no error in the superior
court denying his motion to intervene. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24. As a result,
Bryant was never a party to this case. Therefore, this court does not address
his merits arguments, including that default judgment against L.B. (which
is not a party to this appeal) was improper.

CONCLUSION

¶12 The order denying Bryant’s motion to intervene is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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