Brandler v. Brandler

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of the Estate of:

DAVID WARD DICKERSON, Deceased,
___________________________________

ERIC BRANDLER, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

ALESIA E. BRANDLER, Respondent/Appellee.

Nos. 1 CA-CV 25-0563 PB
1 CA-CV 25-0920 PB
(Consolidated)
FILED 10-09-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. PB2007-002477
The Honorable Elizabeth T. Bingert, Judge

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED
AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Eric Brandler, Rowlett, TX
Petitioner/Appellant

BRANDLER v. BRANDLER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

G A O N A, Judge:

¶1 In these consolidated probate appeals, Eric Brandler, the
estate’s former personal representative, appeals two orders: (1) an order
affirming the dismissal of his counterclaims and denying his motion to void
the amended final judgment, and (2) an attorneys’ fees judgment against
him in favor of the current personal representative, Alesia Brandler.

¶2 As we elaborate below, we (1) dismiss one of the appeals (1
CA-CV 25-0563 PB); (2) affirm the order dismissing Eric’s counterclaims; (3)
hold that the denial of Eric’s motion to void the amended final judgment is
moot; (4) affirm the attorneys’ fees award; (5) reverse the cost award; and
(6) remand for entry of an amended judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 Eric Brandler and Alesia Brandler1 are siblings of the
decedent, David Ward Dickerson. The superior court appointed Eric
personal representative of David’s estate in 2008. David, Eric, and Alesia’s
parents were David’s surviving heirs. Alesia’s parents both passed away
during this litigation.

¶4 In March 2022, Alesia filed an amended petition for
surcharge, for financial exploitation, to remove Eric as personal
representative, and to appoint herself as personal representative. In
response, Eric asserted counterclaims for breach of contract, tortious
interference with contract, and reimbursement of unpaid expenses. The
court granted partial summary judgment in Alesia’s favor, removing Eric
as personal representative and appointing Alesia as his successor.

¶5 On September 21, 2022, ten days after his removal as personal
representative, Eric filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in Texas (where

1 Because the parties share a common surname, we respectfully refer to

them by first names.

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he lives). The superior court stayed all proceedings until the bankruptcy
stay was lifted.

¶6 In the bankruptcy proceedings, Eric’s debts were discharged
in March 2023. Alesia filed an objection as personal representative of both
David’s estate and their mother, the heir to David’s estate. In October 2023,
Alesia notified the superior court that the bankruptcy stay was dissolved,
and that she was “permitted to resume her prosecution of her claims against
[Eric]. The Bankruptcy Court retains jurisdiction to determine whether any
debt owed by [Eric] as determined by [the superior court] is dischargeable
under bankruptcy law.” Eric didn’t dispute this.

¶7 With the bankruptcy stay lifted, Alesia moved for summary
judgment on her claims for surcharge and financial exploitation. The
superior court granted summary judgment and entered a final judgment
against Eric for over $650,000. Eric appealed (“first appeal”). This court
dismissed the first appeal as premature because the final judgment didn’t
expressly resolve Eric’s counterclaims, so the judgment’s finality language
under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(c) was improper. The
superior court then entered an amended final judgment with Rule 54(b)
language (“the amended final judgment”).

¶8 Between the time the superior court entered the final
judgment and the amended final judgment, the bankruptcy court denied
Alesia’s objection, finding her state court claims against Eric weren’t
exempt from the bankruptcy discharge. As a result, Eric moved to void the
amended final judgment, arguing it violated the bankruptcy discharge.

¶9 The superior court held a scheduling conference on June 19,
2025, to address Eric’s counterclaims. Alesia’s attorney argued that the
counterclaims had been previously raised and rejected in a March 2021
order. The superior court agreed and affirmed the March 2021 order
adjudicating the counterclaims, in effect, dismissing them.

¶10 At the same scheduling conference, Alesia conceded that the
bankruptcy discharge applied to her claims. Alesia’s position was that the
superior court only had to decide (1) whether Eric’s counterclaims were
previously adjudicated and (2) her request for attorneys’ fees for the post-
discharge litigation.

¶11 In an order entered the next day (“June 2025 order”), the
superior court (1) found Eric’s counterclaims were previously denied in a
March 16, 2021, order, (2) denied Eric’s motion to void the amended final
judgment, and (3) awarded attorneys’ fees to Alesia in an amount to be

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determined. Eric appealed from the June 2025 order. The superior court
later awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to Alesia in yet another judgment
(“second amended final judgment”). Eric also appealed from the second
amended final judgment. We consolidated the two appeals.

JURISDICTION

¶12 We have an independent duty to determine whether we have
jurisdiction over these consolidated appeals. In re Guardianship of Sommer,
241 Ariz. 308, 310 ¶ 5 (App. 2016). The appeal in 1 CA-CV 25-0563 PB,
relates to the June 2025 order awarding attorneys’ fees in an amount to be
determined.

¶13 Because the June 2025 order didn’t resolve the attorneys’ fees
issue, the inclusion of Rule 54(c) language was improper and the notice of
appeal was premature. See Madrid v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Chandler, L.L.C., 236
Ariz. 221, 224 ¶ 6 (App. 2014) (including Rule 54(c) language when claims
remain pending is improper). The June 2025 order isn’t final, and the notice
of appeal is a nullity. Hernandez v. Athey, 256 Ariz. 530, 532–33 ¶ 6 (App.
2023); Club W. Conservancy v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 261 Ariz. 141, 141 ¶ 48
(App. 2025). We thus dismiss the appeal in 1 CA-CV 25-0563 PB.

¶14 That said, Eric also filed a timely notice of appeal from the
second amended final judgment awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to
Alesia. We have jurisdiction in that appeal under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(9).
The second amended final judgment sufficiently incorporates the June 2025
order and A.R.S. § 12-2102(A) allows us to “review any intermediate orders
involving the merits of the action and necessarily affecting the judgment.”
We thus have jurisdiction to consider the June 2025 order based on the
notice of appeal in 1 CA-CV 25-0920 PB.

DISCUSSION

I. June 2025 Order.

¶15 Eric challenges the June 2025 order finding that the superior
court previously adjudicated his counterclaims and denying his motion to
void the amended final judgment. We first note that Alesia didn’t file an
answering brief in either appeal. If an appeal raises debatable issues and
there appears to be no good cause for the appellee’s failure to appear, we
“will assume that the failure to file an answering brief is a confession of
reversible error on the part of the appellee.” See Tiller v. Tiller, 98 Ariz. 156,
157 (1965). But if it’s clear that the superior court didn’t err, we may affirm

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the judgment regardless of the confession of error. See Honsey v. Honsey, 126
Ariz. 336, 337 (App. 1980).

A. Eric Previously Raised Only the Contract Counterclaims.

¶16 Eric contends that the affirmative defenses he asserted in a
March 2020 pleading differ from the counterclaims he raised in his April
2022 answer to Alesia’s first amended petition. The superior court
disagreed, finding that its March 19, 2021, ruling adjudicated the same
claims.

¶17 Eric’s March 2020 “answer, affirmative defenses, and
response” to Alesia’s petition to compel an inventory and accounting
included the affirmative defense of “breach of oral contract by heirs to
maintain estate records.” His 2022 answer made the same legal arguments:
that the heirs (and now Alesia as their representative) breached an
agreement to maintain David’s estate records. But in the 2022 pleading, he
designated this a “counterclaim” rather than an affirmative defense.

¶18 The superior court decided this issue against Eric in the
March 2021 order (and again in an August 3, 2022, order). It thus didn’t err
by finding as much and dismissing the “counterclaims.” And because Eric’s
opening brief assigns no error to the March 2021 order’s rejection of his
affirmative defense, he waived those arguments. ARCAP 13(a); Dawson v.
Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84, 100 ¶ 40 n.11 (App. 2007) (“By not raising the issue
in their opening briefs, Appellants have waived [the issue] on appeal.”).

B. Eric Failed to Properly Plead the Compulsory Counterclaim
for Unpaid Expenses.

¶19 Eric also asserted a counterclaim for reimbursement of
unpaid expenses. Unlike the contract counterclaims, Eric didn’t raise this as
an affirmative defense in his 2020 answer to Alesia’s petition to compel an
accounting of estate assets. The court thus erred in finding that the March
2021 order resolved this counterclaim.

¶20 Yet, as Alesia argued below, the counterclaim for unpaid
expenses wasn’t sufficiently pled under Rule 8 and was a mandatory
counterclaim to the petition to compel an accounting under Rule 13(a). Rule
8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” “Arizona follows a
notice pleading standard, the purpose of which is to ‘give the opponent fair
notice of the nature and basis of the claim and indicate generally the type

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of litigation involved.’” Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins., 218 Ariz. 417, 419 ¶ 6
(2008) (citation omitted).

¶21 In its entirety, the counterclaim sought “reimbursement of
funds [Eric] has advanced to the estate, or paid on the estate’s behalf from
personal funds.” This statement is conclusory with no supporting factual
allegations in the answer. In fact, the answer stated to the contrary: that Eric
reimbursed himself from estate funds for estate expenses. Absent
supporting factual allegations, the counterclaim is not sufficiently pled
under Rule 8.

¶22 Furthermore, under Rule 13(a)(1), “[a] pleading must state as
a counterclaim any claim that—at the time of its service—the pleader has
against an opposing party if the claim . . . arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim[.]”
(Emphasis added). A claim arises from the same transaction or occurrence
“when a logical relationship exists between the current cause of action and
the previous one.” Mirchandani v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 235 Ariz. 68, 70–
71 ¶ 8 (App. 2014). There was a “logical relationship” between Alesia’s
petition to compel an accounting and Eric’s counterclaim for expenses he
paid on behalf of the estate.

¶23 Alesia alleged that Eric failed to properly distribute assets,
questioned what happened to $40,000 from the sale of David’s house, and
requested an accounting. The accounting Eric later provided didn’t include
a claim for his unpaid expenses. In fact, it showed that he paid himself
$80,000, which included “reimbursements.” Eric’s 2020 answer to the
petition to compel an accounting admitted that he deposited some of the
estate funds into his own accounts but never claimed any expenses
remained unpaid. Yet Eric’s counterclaim sought payment for unspecified
unpaid expenses. This counterclaim related to the estate accounting and
was thus a compulsory counterclaim.

¶24 Alesia raised valid reasons to dismiss the counterclaim for
unpaid expenses. Although this isn’t the reason given by the superior court,
“[w]e may affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is correct for any reason
apparent in the record.” Forszt v. Rodriguez, 212 Ariz. 263, 265 ¶ 9 (App.
2006). The court thus properly dismissed all Eric’s counterclaims.

¶25 We also reject Eric’s claims that he was denied due process.
“At a minimum, due process requires that litigants be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346 ¶ 29 (App. 2020) (citation omitted). Eric had notice and

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an opportunity to present his counterclaims during the hearings on the
motion to compel accounting. Eric also had an opportunity to address this
issue at the June 19, 2025, proceeding. We find no due process violation.

C. The Bankruptcy Discharge Moots the Challenge to the
Amended Final Judgment.

¶26 Eric moved to void the amended final judgment. According
to Eric, the bankruptcy discharge on March 22, 2023, precluded any further
action by Alesia to assert her claims in superior court, including the
amended final judgment entered in April 2025. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (a
discharge “voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such
judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with
respect to any debt discharged . . . [and] operates as an injunction against
the commencement or continuation of an action, . . . or an act, to collect or
recover from, or offset against, property of the debtor . . . .”). As a result,
Eric argues that the court lacked authority to enter the amended final
judgment. The superior court denied the motion to void the amended final
judgment.

¶27 Alesia conceded that the bankruptcy court denied her request
to exempt these claims from discharge. She also conceded that Eric’s
counterclaims were the only issues that survived after the bankruptcy
proceedings. These concessions mean we need not address the effect of the
bankruptcy on the amended final judgment. The challenge to the amended
final judgment is moot.

II. The Second Amended Judgment.

A. The Superior Court Didn’t Err in Granting Attorneys’ Fees.

¶28 Eric argues that the fee award in the second amended final
judgment was untimely because the amended final judgment didn’t award
attorneys’ fees to Alesia. He contends that because Alesia didn’t timely
move to reopen or amend the amended final judgment, there was no basis
to award fees in the second amended final judgment.

¶29 Eric misunderstands the basis for the fee award in the second
amended judgment. The superior court awarded attorneys’ fees and
sanctions to Alesia in the June 2025 order that addressed Eric’s
counterclaims and his motion to void the amended final judgment. Alesia
properly filed her fee request in response to that order granting fees, not in
response to the amended final judgment. Moreover, Eric concedes that his
counterclaims, the subject of the June 2025 order, weren’t impacted by the

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bankruptcy discharge. As a result, the court properly awarded attorneys’
fees to Alesia relating to that proceeding.

B. The Award Included Improper Costs.

¶30 Eric argues that the superior court erred in denying his
objections to Alesia’s statement of costs and by failing to hold a hearing.
Specifically, he argues that two filing fees ($180.56 and $10.61) were
incurred in the appeal in 1 CA-CV 24-0895. And indeed, these two filing
fees appear to relate to a prior appeal, not the June 2025 proceedings. See
State ex rel. Corbin v. Tocco, 173 Ariz. 587, 590 n.1 (App. 1992) (“This court
may take judicial notice of records and other appellate proceedings in the
same case.”). The superior court improperly awarded these costs, totaling
$191.17.

¶31 Eric also challenges four entries for unspecified
“computerized research.” Of the four entries, the first two occurred during
the first appeal. The fee application only claimed fees incurred for the
proceedings related to the counterclaim issue. Thus, it was error to award
the costs incurred on January 30, 2025, and February 7, 2025, totaling
$649.69.

¶32 Although “computerized research” isn’t a taxable cost, see
A.R.S. § 12-332(A), “attorneys’ fees awards can include the cost of
computerized legal research.” Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n v.
Bach, 193 Ariz. 401, 403–04 ¶ 10 (1999). In fact, the last two entries for
computerized research correspond to dates in the fee application for
preparation of relevant pleading. Because these two cost entries would
have been properly claimed as attorneys’ fees, id., we find no prejudice.

¶33 Eric made these arguments below, but the court granted all
costs Alesia requested. Because Eric raised debatable issues as to some
costs, we treat Alesia’s failure to file an answering brief as a confession of
reversible error on this point. See Tiller, 98 Ariz. at 157. We vacate the award
of costs and direct the court on remand to enter a judgment for costs in the
amount of $560.41.

¶34 Eric also argues that Alesia’s attorney failed to submit a
verified statement of costs as required by Rule 54(f)(1). Because Eric didn’t
make this argument in his objections below, it is waived, and we don’t
consider it on appeal. Noriega v. Town of Miami, 243 Ariz. 320, 326 ¶ 27 (App.
2017) (appellate courts generally don’t consider arguments raised for the
first time on appeal).

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C. The Fee Award Didn’t Violate Eric’s Right to Due Process
and Wasn’t Unconscionable.

¶35 Eric contends the fee award was unconscionable and violated
his right to due process. We review the evidence in a manner most favorable
to sustaining the award and will affirm unless the court’s award of fees
under A.R.S. § 12-349 is clearly erroneous. Goldman v. Sahl, 248 Ariz. 512,
531 ¶ 65 (App. 2020). We review an award of attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. §
14-1105 for an abuse of discretion. In re Aiylam & Saranya Krishnan Living
Trust, 261 Ariz. 539, 541 ¶ 13 (App. 2026). We review due process claims de
novo. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 28.

¶36 Section 14-1105(A) authorizes an award of fees “[i]f the court
finds that a decedent’s estate or trust has incurred professional fees or
expenses as a result of unreasonable conduct[.]” Similarly, § 12-349 requires
the court to award fees against a party that engages in certain unreasonable
conduct, listed in the statute. We find no abuse of discretion in the fee
award. Eric’s attempt to reassert claims that were previously rejected or
waived was unreasonable.

¶37 The attorneys’ fees issue was “fully briefed[.]” Eric submitted
a response and objection to the fee request. Thus, Eric had an opportunity
to address this issue and wasn’t denied due process. See Backstrand, 250
Ariz. at 346 ¶ 29.

CONCLUSION

¶38 We dismiss the appeal in 1 CA-CV 25-0563 PB. We affirm the
June 2025 order and the dismissal of Eric’s counterclaims. We affirm the
second amended final judgment awarding attorneys’ fees to Alesia, but
vacate the cost award and remand for entry of an amended judgment
awarding $560.41 in costs to Alesia.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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