Arizona School v. Honeywell

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

ARIZONA SCHOOL RISK RETENTION TRUST, INC.,
as Subrogee for Chino Valley USD,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant/Appellant.
___________________________

LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Arizona School
Risk Retention Trust, Inc. and Chino Valley Unified School District,
Intervening Plaintiff/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0574
FILED 07-02-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CV202300817
The Honorable John David Napper, Judge
The Honorable Kristyne Schaaf-Olson, Judge Pro Tempore (Ret.)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Lang Thal King & Hanson PC, Scottsdale
By Jason A. Clark, Erika L. Johnsen
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

Quintaros Prieto Wood & Boyer PA, Scottsdale
By Anthony J. Fernandez, Shelby L. Hall
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

Kean Miller LLP, Baton Rouge, Louisana
By Jason R. Cashio (pro hac vice), Randal R. Cangelosi (pro hac vice)
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

Welker & Pauloe PLC, Phoenix
By Richard R. Carpenter, Christopher S. Welker, Scott G. Andersen
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc.

Denenberg Tuffley PLLC, Southfield, Michigan
By Alyssa J. Endelman, Brandon T. Brown (pro hac vice)
Counsel for Intervening Plaintiff/Appellee Lexington Insurance Company

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision in which Presiding
Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined. Judge Cynthia J. Bailey dissented.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Honeywell International, Inc. (“Honeywell”) appeals from
the superior court’s order denying its motion to compel arbitration. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2010, Honeywell contracted with the Chino Valley Unified
School District (“the District”) to provide carbon dioxide sensors to several
schools within the District. The sensors were installed in 2011. The contract
between Honeywell and the District contained an arbitration clause which
provided, in relevant part, that “any controversy or claim between
[Honeywell] and [the District] arising out of or relating to this Agreement,
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration[.]”

¶3 Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc. (“Arizona School”)
provides property insurance coverage to the District. Arizona School, in
turn, holds a policy of reinsurance with Lexington Insurance Company
(“Lexington”). In October 2021 and June 2022, fires occurred in a high
school where Honeywell had provided carbon dioxide sensors pursuant to

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its contract with the District. As subrogees of the District, Arizona School
and Lexington (collectively “the Subrogees”) alleged the sensors
manufactured and sold by Honeywell were a cause of both fires. Arizona
School sued Honeywell for negligence and product liability in September
2023, and Lexington intervened as a plaintiff in December 2023.

¶4 Honeywell provided its initial disclosure statement in
January 2024 and answered both of the Subrogees’ complaints by February
2024. In March 2024, the parties submitted a joint report and scheduling
order to the superior court in which Honeywell “reserve[d] its right to
future Arbitration if it is deemed to be applicable in this case.” That same
month, Honeywell notified Arizona School it intended to identify another
company, Senseair, as a non-party at fault, and that if Arizona School
“want[ed] to add a deadline for [Arizona School] to amend the Complaint
to name Senseair, [Honeywell would] not object.” Honeywell filed a notice
of non-party at fault identifying Senseair, and the parties stipulated to stay
the deadlines outlined in the scheduling order for the Subrogees to amend
their complaints to name Senseair.

¶5 The Subrogees amended their complaints to add Senseair as
a defendant in May 2024. Senseair, a Swedish company, moved to dismiss
the amended complaints for lack of personal jurisdiction. The superior
court held oral argument on Senseair’s motion, which Honeywell attended.
The court denied Senseair’s motion in January 2025.

¶6 Two weeks later, Honeywell moved the superior court to
compel arbitration and dismiss the case, arguing the arbitration clause in
the contract between Honeywell and the District bound the Subrogees to
arbitrate. The court denied Honeywell’s motion on grounds that the
arbitration clause did not apply and that Honeywell had waived its right to
compel arbitration “by engaging in substantial conduct inconsistent with
that purported right and inexcusably waiting over 14 months after filing its
answer to file [its] motion [to compel arbitration].”

¶7 Honeywell timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§ 12-2101.01(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Honeywell argues the superior court erred by denying its
motion to compel arbitration. We review the court’s ruling de novo. Gray v.
GC Servs., LP, 256 Ariz. 480, 484, ¶ 9 (App. 2023).

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¶9 Honeywell challenges the superior court’s determination that
it waived its right to compel arbitration. “[W]hether conduct amounts to
waiver of the right to arbitrate is a question of law we review de novo.” Sec.
Alarm Fin. Enters., L.P. v. Fuller, 242 Ariz. 512, 515, ¶ 9 (App. 2017).

¶10 Though the contract between Honeywell and the District
contains an Arizona choice-of-law provision, the parties agree that the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and corresponding federal law apply to
the issue of waiver. See Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1269–70
(9th Cir. 2002) (concluding “that waiver of the right to compel arbitration is
a rule for arbitration, such that the FAA controls[,]” even when a contract
contains a state choice-of-law provision); see also Sec. Alarm, 242 Ariz. at
516–17, ¶¶ 10–14 (applying federal law to the issue of waiver under the
FAA).

¶11 In Security Alarm, we adopted the Ninth Circuit’s rule
governing waiver under the FAA.1 242 Ariz. at 517, ¶¶ 14–16. At that time,
the rule was that “waiver of a right to arbitration under [the FAA] requires
a showing of: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; (2)
acts inconsistent with that existing right; and (3) prejudice to the party
opposing arbitration resulting from such inconsistent acts.” Id. at ¶ 14
(citation modified). We also noted that federal law generally favors
arbitration. Id. at ¶ 16 (“In applying this standard, we keep in mind that
‘any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense
to arbitrability.’” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983))).

¶12 In 2022, the United States Supreme Court held in Morgan v.
Sundance, Inc. that circuit courts may not “create arbitration-specific
variants of federal procedural rules, like those concerning waiver, based on
the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration.” 596 U.S. 411, 416–17 (2022) (citation
modified). Applying this principle, the Supreme Court eliminated the
prejudice requirement from the waiver test. Id. at 416–17, 419. The Supreme
Court also explained that the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration “is merely

1 As we noted in that case, “[i]n interpreting a federal statute, in the absence

of guidance by the United States Supreme Court, Arizona courts will first
look to a ‘clear rule’ issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals if that
rule appears just,” and will typically follow Ninth Circuit precedent
“[w]hen other courts are divided on an issue of federal substantive law[.]”
Sec. Alarm, 242 Ariz. at 517, ¶ 15.

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an acknowledgement of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s
longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts” and serves to make
arbitration agreements “as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”
Id. at 418 (citation modified).

¶13 Since Security Alarm, following Morgan, the Ninth Circuit has
updated its waiver rule. Under the current rule, “a party waives its right to
compel arbitration when (1) it has knowledge of the right, and (2) it acts
inconsistently with that right.” Hill v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 59 F.4th 457,
460 (9th Cir. 2023). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that Morgan did
away with the “strong federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements”; instead, “[t]he federal policy is to treat arbitration agreements
like other contracts.” Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 59 F.4th 1011, 1014
(9th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). “The party opposing arbitration bears
the burden of showing waiver,” but “the burden is no longer heavy.” Id. at
1014 (citation modified). “Because there is no concrete test for assessing
whether a party took acts inconsistent with its right to arbitration, we
consider the totality of the parties’ actions.” Id. at 1015 (citation modified).
In this analysis, “we are tasked with evaluating a party’s actions and asking
whether those actions, even if seemingly commonplace and not an express
disavowal of arbitral forums, evinced the party’s partiality for a judicial
resolution of the claims.” Hill, 59 F.4th at 472.

¶14 Applying the current waiver rule here, Honeywell argues that
because it did not litigate the merits of the Subrogees’ claims during the
nearly fifteen months it took to move to compel arbitration, the superior
court erred in determining that it acted inconsistently with its right to
arbitrate. It is true that “a party generally acts inconsistently with exercising
the right to arbitrate when it (1) makes an intentional decision not to move
to compel arbitration and (2) actively litigates the merits of a case for a
prolonged period of time in order to take advantage of being in court.”
Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1015 (citation modified). But merits-based litigation
is not the dispositive factor in the second prong of the waiver analysis that
Honeywell makes it out to be—there are other ways for a party to act
inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has
routinely considered factors other than merits-based litigation, such as
whether a party consistently asserted its right to arbitration despite any
delay in filing a motion to compel, id. at 1015–16, and the length of time a
party took to file its motion to compel, Van Ness Townhouses v. Mar Indus.
Corp, 862 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1988). Importantly, “a party’s extended
silence and delay in moving for arbitration may indicate a conscious
decision to continue to seek judicial judgment on the merits of the arbitrable

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claims, which would be inconsistent with a right to arbitrate.” Martin v.
Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation modified).

¶15 Here, Honeywell waited approximately fifteen months after
Arizona School’s original complaint was filed to move to compel
arbitration. In that time, Honeywell answered complaints and filed a joint
report and scheduling order, which included deadlines for discovery and
plans to conduct mediation with the Subrogees. Honeywell also filed a
notice of a non-party at fault identifying Senseair, offered a stipulation to
the Subrogees to amend their complaints to add Senseair, and participated
in oral argument for Senseair’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

¶16 These actions may not be overtly merits-based, but they still
constituted time spent litigating in the judicial forum and “evinced . . .
partiality for a judicial resolution” of the case. Hill, 59 F.4th at 472.
Moreover, it was Honeywell that spurred the Subrogees to add Senseair as
a defendant. It then waited until the superior court denied Senseair’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction to move to compel
arbitration, despite admittedly knowing it had the right to compel
arbitration. In this way, Honeywell waited for judicial determination of a
key issue before moving to compel arbitration.

¶17 While cases involving clearly merits-based motions may have
that factor favoring waiver, that factor is not dispositive, and its absence
here does not mean Honeywell did not waive its right to arbitration.
Honeywell’s actions were inconsistent with its asserted right to arbitration
when viewed in their totality. See Martin, 829 F.3d 1118, at 1125–26 (finding
waiver when defendants “spent seventeen months litigating the case”
including preparing for discovery and preparing a “joint stipulation
structuring the litigation”); Kelly v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2, 552 Fed. Appx. 663,
664 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[Defendants] waited eleven months after the lawsuit
was filed to demand arbitration, actively litigating the case in district court.
The parties conducted discovery and litigated motions, including a
preliminary injunction and a motion to dismiss. Such activity is inconsistent
with preserving the right to compel arbitration.”).

¶18 Honeywell likens this case to Armstrong. In that case, the
Ninth Circuit determined a defendant had not waived its right to compel
arbitration when the defendant had engaged in only minimal discovery
with the plaintiff (five interrogatories, twenty-eight pages of document
production, and one stipulated protective order) and moved to compel
arbitration within one year (approximately ten months) after the plaintiff

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filed suit. Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1013–14. The defendant in that case was
also “consistently vocal about its intent to move to compel arbitration,”
disclosing a concrete plan to move to compel in a joint case management
statement early in the case. Id. at 1013, 1015.

¶19 Honeywell’s actions here differ from the defendant’s actions
in Armstrong. Though Honeywell contends it too “expressly reserved the
right to arbitrate,” thereby preserving its right to compel arbitration,
Honeywell made no mention of arbitration, as an affirmative defense or
otherwise, in its answers to the Subrogees’ complaints. 2 The first time
Honeywell mentioned its right to compel arbitration was in its initial
disclosure statement to the Subrogees in January 2024, in which it merely
stated that it “may have the right to arbitration” pursuant to its contract
with the District. The first time Honeywell raised its right to compel
arbitration to the superior court was in the joint report in March 2024, in
which Honeywell stated it “reserve[d] its right to future arbitration if it is
deemed to be applicable in this case.” Honeywell made no other mention
of arbitration to the superior court until it filed its motion to compel
arbitration in January 2025. Honeywell was never “consistently vocal”
about its “intent to move to compel arbitration” as the defendant was in
Armstrong. Id. at 1015. Moreover, Honeywell waited five months longer
than the Armstrong defendant to move to compel arbitration. Id. at 1013–14.

¶20 Finally, Honeywell argues it did not waive its right to compel
arbitration because the case deadlines were stayed while Senseair’s motion
to dismiss was pending. But, as Arizona School points out, the case itself
was not stayed, only the deadlines for discovery and other motions listed
in the scheduling order. Nothing prohibited Honeywell from moving to
compel arbitration in the fourteen months after it answered the Subrogees’
complaints. Honeywell’s argument on this point is unavailing.

¶21 Because we conclude Honeywell waived its right to compel
arbitration, we do not address its other arguments that an arbitrator should
have determined arbitrability or that the arbitration clause in the contract
mandates arbitration. And because Honeywell is not the prevailing party

2 Honeywell points out that it included its right to arbitration as an
affirmative defense in its answers to the Subrogees’ second amended
complaints, which included amendments pertaining to adding Senseair as
a defendant. While true, this point does not help Honeywell because
Honeywell filed these answers alongside its motion to compel arbitration,
not before.

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on appeal, we deny its requests for attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S.
§§ 12-341 and 12-341.01.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm.

B A I L E Y, J., dissenting:

¶23 I respectfully dissent. Because the Subrogees did not meet
their burden to show that Honeywell acted inconsistently with its right to
compel arbitration, I would decline to find waiver. See Armstrong v.
Michaels Stores, Inc., 59 F.4th 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he party
opposing arbitration still bears the burden of showing waiver . . . .”).

¶24 I agree with the majority that the Armstrong factors guide our
determination whether Honeywell waived its right to compel arbitration:
“a party generally acts inconsistently with exercising the right to arbitrate
when it (1) makes an intentional decision not to move to compel arbitration
and (2) actively litigates the merits of a case for a prolonged period of time
in order to take advantage of being in court.” Supra ¶ 14 (quoting
Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1015 (citation modified)). But I disagree with the
majority’s assessment of the factors. Even assuming Honeywell satisfied
the first prong by making an “intentional decision” not to move to compel
arbitration, in assessing the totality of the circumstances, I disagree that the
Subrogees met their burden of proof to show that the elements of the second
prong were met: that Honeywell (1) actively litigated (2) the merits of the
case (3) for a prolonged period of time (4) in order to take advantage of
being in court. Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1015.

¶25 First, the record is clear that except for its appearance at the
November 2024 oral argument on Senseair’s motion to dismiss, Honeywell
engaged in no litigation activity after the superior court granted the parties’
joint motion to stay the scheduling order deadlines in May 2024.
Honeywell’s appearance to observe the oral argument alone cannot support
a finding that it “actively” litigated the case.

¶26 But even assuming Honeywell’s oral argument appearance
could be considered “litigation,” it did not go to the “merits of the case.”
Honeywell’s notice of other potential parties is not equivalent to asking the

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court to decide issues underlying the merits of this case: duty, breach,
causation, damages, or defenses.

¶27 The majority casts Honeywell’s efforts to bring Senseair into
the litigation as a “merits” issue that tips the scales for its conclusion that
Honeywell “used” the court to decide the claims against it. Supra ¶¶ 15-16.
At worst, the superior court’s determination of which entities had a seat at
the litigation table was necessary to all parties. This is especially true given
Honeywell’s non-party at fault allegation that Senseair produced the very
component the Subrogees alleged caused its’ damages. And the majority’s
framing ignores that Honeywell had to file any non-party at fault notice
within the 150-day deadline required by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 26(b)(5). I therefore disagree with the majority’s conclusion on this
element because I see no record evidence that Honeywell’s conduct
“evinced [its] partiality for a judicial resolution of the claims.” Hill v. Xerox
Bus. Servs., LLC, 59 F.4th 457, 472 (9th Cir. 2023).

¶28 Next, I credit Honeywell’s contention that this case is more
analogous to Armstrong than to the cases cited by the majority where waiver
was affirmed. Supra ¶¶ 13-14. In surveying the relevant cases, the majority
correctly observes that engaging in merits-based litigation becomes a less
important factor when the party seeking to compel arbitration “consistently
asserted its right to arbitration despite any delay in filing a motion to
compel.” Supra ¶ 14 (quoting Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1015-16). But while
Honeywell did not notice arbitration as an affirmative defense as the
defendant did in Armstrong, the Armstrong parties actively litigated the
merits of the case by engaging in discovery. Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1016.
Here, by contrast, the scheduling order was stayed before any merits-based
litigation occurred, and Honeywell could take no merits-related action until
the stay was lifted in January 2025.

¶29 As to the “prolonged period of time” element, the majority
heavily weighs the “nearly 15 months” that elapsed between the original
complaint filing in September 2023 and Honeywell’s motion to compel
arbitration in January 2025. Supra ¶¶ 14, 15, 19. Because we must examine
the totality of the circumstances, I consider not only the length of time, but
what action the parties took during that time, which party controlled the
delay, and whether Honeywell acted to further the delay to its advantage.

¶30 Here, the parties spent a considerable portion of the 14
months arranging the seats at the litigation table. After Honeywell
answered the original complaint in November 2023, Lexington moved to
intervene and filed its own complaint. Honeywell answered Lexington’s

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complaint in February 2024. Those three months were not Honeywell’s
delay. The parties then filed a joint report and scheduling order in March
2024. In the joint report, Honeywell raised the arbitration clause and
reserved the right to invoke it “if applicable.”

¶31 In early April 2024, Honeywell noticed Senseair as a non-
party at fault. The majority characterizes Honeywell’s notice as a tactic to
“spur[] the Subrogees to add Senseair as a defendant,” and implies that
Honeywell gained an advantage by inducing the Subrogees to involve the
court but fails to explain how Honeywell’s compliance with Rule 26(b)(5)
could influence the Subrogees’ litigation strategy. Supra ¶ 16. By the end
of April, the Subrogees moved to amend their complaints to add Senseair.
Soon after, the parties stipulated to stay the scheduling order deadlines they
had agreed to just one month before. Further disclosure, discovery,
dispositive motions, mediation, and other case-related dates were put on
hold while the Subrogees served Senseair and the parties awaited Senseair’s
answer.

¶32 In June 2024, the Subrogees served Senseair. In early
September 2024, Senseair moved for dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) in lieu of filing an answer. The Subrogees
objected, while Honeywell stayed on the sidelines. Four months passed
while the Subrogees and Senseair briefed the dismissal motion and engaged
in oral argument. No party moved to lift the scheduling order stay during
this time. The superior court lifted the stay on the same day it denied
Senseair’s motion to dismiss in January 2025. The three-month wait for
Senseair to file its dismissal motion and the additional four months the
superior court took to resolve the Subrogees’ effort to bring Senseair into
the case cannot be attributed to Honeywell.

¶33 With the litigation table set, Honeywell moved to compel the
Subrogees to arbitration just fifteen days after the court lifted the
scheduling order stay. Of the 14 months that passed between Honeywell
answering the original complaint and moving to compel arbitration, I
would count only five months toward evaluating Honeywell’s arbitration
request delay. Based on that amended timeframe, I cannot find Honeywell
waived their right to seek to enforce the arbitration clause.

¶34 Relatedly, the Subrogees argue Honeywell could have moved
to compel arbitration at any time because only the scheduling order
deadlines and not the case itself was stayed. While true, with the
substantive deadlines stayed, the fact remains that Honeywell did not file a
merits motion, litigate a discovery dispute, disclose an expert witness, or

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cause the Subrogees to do the same during this time. And a closer look at
the cases the majority relies on reveals no case in which the court found
waiver based on the passage of time alone when the moving party had not
also affirmatively sought merits relief.

¶35 Based on Honeywell’s 14-month “delayed” arbitration
motion, the majority likens this case to Van Ness Townhouses v. Mar Indus.
Corp., 862 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1988). Supra ¶ 14. I find that comparison
unconvincing. The party seeking arbitration in Van Ness waited two years
to compel arbitration and, based on that party’s misunderstanding of the
law, sought to avoid the severance of her arbitrable and non-arbitrable
claims by deciding not to move to compel arbitration. Id. at 759. Here, even
without considering the scheduling order pause, Honeywell waited far less
than two years to compel arbitration, and when it moved to compel
arbitration, it did so as to all claims. Referring to Van Ness, Armstrong
emphasized both the length of time and the merits action when it observed
that “we have held that a defendant waived the right to arbitrate after
litigating in federal court for two years and then filing a motion to dismiss
on the merits.” 59 F.4th at 1015-1016 (emphasis added).

¶36 The majority observes that a “party’s extended silence and
delay in moving for arbitration may indicate a conscious decision to
continue to seek judicial judgment on the merits of the arbitrable claims.”
Supra ¶ 14 (quoting Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016)
(citation modified)). But in Martin the defendants participated in the case
for 17 months, during which time they sought a substantive ruling on a key
merits issue, answered discovery, and conducted a deposition. Id. at 1126.
The majority also relies on Kelly v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2, 552 F. App’x 663
(9th Cir. 2014), in which the defendants were found to have waived
arbitration after only 11 months of case participation. Supra ¶ 17. Yet like
the defendants in Martin, the Kelly defendants conducted discovery and
litigated merits motions, including a motion to dismiss and a preliminary
injunction. Id. at 664. Honeywell undertook no similar merits-based action
here.

¶37 As to the last element, the majority cites Honeywell’s non-
party at fault notice as evidence of Honeywell’s effort to “take advantage of
being in court.” Supra ¶¶ 14, 15. In my view, this singular act is insufficient
to show Honeywell involved the court in the merits of the case. To be sure,
Honeywell may benefit from Senseair’s inclusion in the litigation, but the
decision to name and serve Senseair was not Honeywell’s. Nor was
Honeywell involved in litigating whether Senseair was a proper party, but
for its appearance to observe the oral argument. With no record evidence

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of Honeywell seeking a ruling on the underlying claims or acting in
contradiction to an intent to arbitrate, I would not set aside a contracted-for
arbitration clause based solely on Honeywell’s delayed filing.

¶38 For these reasons, I decline to join the majority in its holding
that Honeywell waived its right to compel arbitration. I take no position on
whether the arbitration agreement applies to the Subrogees’ claims, or
whether the question of arbitrability should have been decided by the
superior court in the first place.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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